Improving Plant Safety and Lowering Operational · PDF fileImproving Plant Safety and Lowering...

Process, Power & Marine

Improving Plant Safety and LoweringOperational Risks

Intergraph Australia 200815-19 September 2008

Process, Power & MarineSafety is at the Forefront

Process, Power & MarineWas this your plant…………….

Process, Power & MarineSafety is mission critical

PersonnelInjury, death

Attracting the best staff

CostPlant damage, loss of production

Compensation, insurance

ImageCommunity

Brand

Shareholder valueBoard responsibility

LawRegulatory pressure

License to operate

Process, Power & MarineThe Basics

Risk Reduction

Instruments are a well accepted risk reduction system

Safety for personnel, facility and environment

Contributors to an accident

Course

Process deviation

What is released to the atmosphere

Process, Power & MarineRisk Reduction

Increasing

Risk

Process RiskTolerable RiskResidual Risk

Necessary Risk Reduction

Actual Risk Reduction (ALARP)

ProcessDesignBPCSAlarmsReliefSIS

Process, Power & MarineA few definitions on risk

Risk – Combination of the frequency of occurrence of harm and severity of that harm

Tolerable risk – Risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society

RRF – Risk Reduction Factor – The magnitude of risk that has to be reduced by one or more

Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)

Process, Power & MarineWhat is Tolerable risk ?

Process, Power & MarineProcess Industry Systems Integration

- relies onknowledge

of personnel

Control

Maintenance

Asset managementIntergraph

DesignIntergraph

FinanceSAP

Process safety Hazid

Process, Power & MarineThe Standards

ISA S84.01 and IEC 61508

Framework for the design

Key steps are:

Process design

HAZOP and Risk analysis

Determine protection layers

Define Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

Define SIS

Specification of SIS

Design

Operating procedures

Commissioning

Modification coupled back to the process design

Process, Power & MarineRisk Assessment

More for individuals ratherthen a group approachwhich means less inputfrom experience

Very timeconsuming

Very timeconsuming

Need experiencedpersonnel

No new analysiscomponents

Not very thoroughMinus

Very thorough, withdiagrams

Very thoroughVery thoroughGood and fastmethod

Standardizedapproach

Fast and simplePlus

For any type or size systemFor any type orsize system

For larger andmore complexsystems

For proven designsFor repeatablesystems

Smaller systemMethod

FTAFMECAHAZOPWhat if/Checklist

ChecklistWhat if

Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – What, Why and How?

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION

HAZOP = Hazard and Operability Studies

Study of the possibility of deviation from the design intent

HAZOP Fundamentals:

Deviation

Course

Key words are:

Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Level, Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge), Composition, React Mix, Reduce (grind, crush,etc.), Absorb, Corrode Erode

Operational words

Isolate, Drain, Vent, Purge, Inspect, Maintain, Start-up, Shutdown

Secondary Key Words

No, Less, More, Reverse, Also, Other, Fluctuation, Early, Late

Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – What, Why and How?

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDSACTIONNo, Flow Strainer

BlockagePump cavitationsWrong mixing

Pressure measurementAt pumpInspection of filter

Add instr.

Verifying each system

Process, Power & MarineHazops (Hazard and Operability Study)

Application by ICI of work-breakdown methods to process safety in 1960s

The most rigorous method of qualitative hazard identification

Stand-alone data-entry software from 1980s

Cause Consequence

Deviation from design intent

More flow

Less flow

No flow

Reverse flow

More pressure …

Process, Power & MarineHazard identification challenges

Action management process‘Have all the actions been closed off properly? What was the outcome?’

Management of changeOutside of electronic project workflow

‘How does safety know P&IDs have changed?’

traceability

‘Difficult to re-use past Hazops so start again’

Local area study only?

Timing: when P&IDs complete: change costly, limited

Hazardreport

Process, Power & Marine

Hazop study

Industry Challenges – lack of integration

Maintenance Engineering Operation

Plant information requirements

What are thesafeguards?

Dis

connect

What’scausing the

alarms?

What’s the impacton safety?

Process, Power & Marine

Process Design

Instrument design

Piping layout

Material ordering

HAZOP

Found error

Design change ($$)

Change order for material/equipment ($$$$$)

HAZOP’s late in the schedule

Process, Power & Marine

DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION

No, Flow Strainer

BlockagePump cavitations

Wrong mixing

Pressure

measurement

At pump

Inspection of filter

Add instr.

Impact / Follow on Effect:

- DCS Configuration

- DCS HMI (Graphics)

- Alarm Management

- Asset Management

- Instrumentation Design

- Procurement Changes

- Vendor Communications

- Piping Changes

- Material Changes

- Construction Planning

- Commissioning

- Spare Parts Loading

- Documentation

- Etc...

Multiple by thousands of potential “Safe-guards”

HAZOP’s late in the schedule

Process, Power & MarineHAZOP’s – Earlier in the schedule

Process Design

Make HAZOP part of design process early on

Instrument design

Piping layout

Material ordering

HAZOP (final)

No errors

No Design change

No Change order for material/equipment

Reduced design and CAPEX risks

Process, Power & Marine

SmartPlant Process Safety enables to design safety into your plant and

reduces the operational risks.

Design = EPC

Operational = OO

The Solution

Process, Power & Marine

Process, Power & Marine

Intergraph Australia 200815-19 September 2008

Improving Plant Safety and LoweringOperational Risks