IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone · Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone Lecture 6 Nuclear...

IAFF6101Interna-onalAffairsCornerstone

Lecture6NuclearProlifera0on

October18,2016

Today’sClass

•  Nuclearweaponsandnucleararsenals

•  Technologyofprolifera0on

•  Causesofprolifera0on•  Isprolifera0ondangerous?•  Iran

NuclearFission

FissionWeapons:“Gun”Type•  U-235

FissionWeapons:“Gun”Type

•  LiGleBoy(Hiroshima)–  15kilotons

FissionWeapons:“Implosion”Type•  U-235orPu-239

Nagasaki:August9,1945– FatMan(Nagasaki)•  22kilotons

FusionWeapons

•  “Thermonuclear”or“Hydrogen”bomb

•  Fissionexplosionignitesfusionofhydrogenisotopes

•  Muchmorepowerfulthanfissionalone

•  U.S.firsttestedin1952,Sovietsin1953

TheTriad:Bombers

•  B-29,B-36,B-52,B-2

•  Strengths–  Youcanrecallthem!

•  Weaknesses–  Vulnerabilitytointercep0on

TheTriad:ICBMs •  Land-basedintercon0nentalballis0cmissiles

•  Mul0plewarheadspossible(MRVsorMIRVs)

•  Strengths:reliability,command-andcontrol

•  Weaknesses:vulnerability

TheTriad:SLBMs •  Submarine-launchedballis0cmissiles

–  Enteredservicein1961

•  Strengths:nearlyinvulnerablebecausethey’rehardtofind

•  Weaknesses:command-and-control

TheCurrentU.S.TriadWarheads Delivery

VehiclesType

Bombers 300 60 B-52,B-2ICBMs 450 450 MinutemanIIISLBMs 1,152 288 TridentIID-5Total 1,902 798

HansM.KristensenandRobertS.Norris,“U.S.NuclearForces,2015,”Bulle%noftheAtomicScien%sts71/2(March/April2015):107-19.

CurrentU.S.andRussianArsenalsU.S. Russia

Opera-onalWarheads 1,902* 1,600Reserve 2,680 2,700†Awai0ngDismantlement 2,340 3,500TotalInventory 7,100 7,800

*TheUnitedStatesalsohas180non-strategic(tac0cal)warheadsdeployedinEurope†700ofthewarheadsinRussia’sreservearestrategicwarheads;theremaining2,000arenon-strategic(tac0cal)warheadsUnderthetermsoftheNewSTARTTreaty,deployedwarheadsforbothU.S.andRussiawilldropto1,550

OtherNuclearArsenals

TotalInventory MethodofDeliveryFrance 300 SLBMs,aircraiChina 240 ICBMs,aircraiBritain 225 SLBMsPakistan 120 Aircrai,missilesIndia 110 Aircrai,missilesIsrael 80 Aircrai,missilesNorthKorea <10 NA

HansM.KristensenandRobertS.Norris,“GlobalNuclearInventories,1945-2013,”Bulle%noftheAtomicScien%sts69/5(Sept.-Oct.2013):75-81.

TwoTypesofBombFuelHighlyenricheduranium UraniumorPlutonium

TwoTypesofUranium

Plutonium:HeavyWaterReactor

•  Usenaturaluraniumasfuel

•  Reac0onproducesplutonium

•  Boom!

Plutonium:LightWaterReactor

•  Lightwaterreactor,usesLEUasfuel

•  Plutonium=byproductofnuclearreac0on

•  Mustbereprocessedfromspentnuclearfuelrodsinlargeplants

ElectricityortheBomb?Thesameprocesscanleadtoboth!

31StatesWiththeCapacitytoBuildNuclearWeapons,butonly10havedoneso

•  Netherlands •  North Korea •  Norway •  Pakistan •  Romania •  Russia •  Serbia •  Slovakia •  South Africa •  South Korea •  Spain •  Switzerland •  Ukraine •  United Kingdom •  United States

•  Argentina •  Austria •  Belgium •  Brazil •  Canada •  China •  Czech Republic •  Denmark •  Finland •  France •  Germany •  Hungary •  India •  Israel •  Japan •  Latvia

Model KeyVariables ExamplesSecurity Externalthreat

Availabilityofnuclear-armedally

USSR,PRC,IsraelW.Germany,Japan,S.Korea,Saudi

Domes-c NuclearbureaucracyEconomicliberaliza0on

IndiaBrazil,Argen0na

Norms Globalnormsaboutnukes•  Pres0ge•  Pariah

France,IranUkraine

3ModelsinSearchofaBomb

ScoGD.Sagan,“WhyDoStatesBuildNuclearWeapons?ThreeModelsinSearchofaBomb,”Interna%onalSecurity21/3(Winter1996/97):54-87.

NPT•  Enteredintoforcein1970•  Dividestheworldintonuclear“haves”(U.S.,Russia,UK,

France,China)and“havenots”(everyoneelse)•  Grandbargain:

–  “Havenots”promisenottoacquirenuclearweapons(Art.II)–  “Haves”promise

•  Nottotransfernuclearweapons(Art.I)•  Toworktowardnucleardisarmament(Art.VI)•  Tohelpdisseminate“peaceful”nucleartechnology(Art.IV)

–  Everyonepromisesnottoimport/exportnucleartechormaterialsunlesssubjecttosafeguards,andtoacceptIAEAinspec0ons(Art.III)

•  Membershipisnearlyuniversal–190memberstates–  India,Pakistan,Israel,NorthKorea,SouthSudan

IAEA•  Twojobs

–  Promoteciviliannucleartechnology–  Monitornuclearmaterials

•  Likeanygoodins0tu0on,theIAEAprovidesinforma0onandmonitoringtodeterchea0ng

•  Safeguards

•  Addi0onalProtocol–  Collectmoreinforma0on–  Accessmorefacili0es–  Streamlinedaccessforinspectors–  Environmentalsampling

SupplySideProlifera-onArguments

•  Tradi0onalargumentsfocusonthedemandfornuclearweapons

•  Recentscholarshipemphasizesthesupplyside–  Sensi0venuclearassistance–ENRtechnology,fissilematerial,weaponsorweaponscomponents(Kroenig2010)

–  Nuclearcoopera0onagreements–non-militarynuclearassistanceofvarioustypes(Fuhrmann2012)

•  Combiningthedemandandsupplyside–  Countriesthatreceivepeacefulnuclearassistanceandfaceathreateningsecurityenvironment(Fuhrmann2012)

TwoSchoolsofThought

•  Nuclearop0mism– Nuclearweaponsareagreatdeterrent–  Inducecau0on,reduceuncertaintyinwaroutcomes– WarmorecostlyàWarlesslikely–  Basedinrealism,3rdimage

•  Nuclearpessimism–  Statesunlikelytodeployweaponssecurely–  Riskofaccidents,unauthorizeduse– MorenukesàWarmorelikely–  Basedinorganiza0ontheory,1stand2ndimage

3KeyQues-onsaboutProlifera-on

•  Preven0veorpreemp0vewar?

•  Securesecond-strikearsenals?

•  Accidentalorunauthorizeduse?

NuclearOp-mists

•  Preemp0on/Preven0on–  Earlystage(Iran):canbedonesafely,butwillhavetobedonerepeatedly•  IsraelistrikesonOsiraq(1981),al-Kibar(2007)

–  Latestage(NorthKorea):toorisky

•  Survivability–  Stateshavebigincen0vestomakeforcesinvulnerable,andit’seasytodoso

•  Accidental/UnauthorizedUse– Newnuclearstateswillbeverycareful;soldiersmaybemorecau0ousthancivilians

NuclearPessimists:Organiza-ons

•  Preemp0on/Preven0on– Militaryofficersbiasedtowardoffensive,havefavorableviewofpreven0vewar

•  Survivability– Makingweaponssurvivablenotahighlypriori0zedmilitarymission,conflictswithotherorganiza0onalgoals

•  Accidental/UnauthorizedUse–  Complex,0ghtlycoupledsystemsalmostinevitablyhaveaccidents

–  Poorweaponsdesign,secrecy,proximity,predelega0on,unrest

NuclearPessimism:Leaders •  Someleaderstooirresponsibletobetrustedwithhighlydestruc0veweaponry–  Hardtodeter,couldusethemagainstus–  Couldgivethemtoterrorists,whoareimpossibletodeter–  Possessionofnuclearweaponscouldenableregionalaggression

DoNuclearWeaponsMakeStatesMoreAggressive?

•  Commonargumentisthatacquiringnuclearweaponsprovidesstateswithashieldbehindwhichtheycanengageinregionalaggression–  Iraq,Iran

•  Notalotofsystema0cevidencehere–  Oneproblemisthatconflictinvolvementisapredictorofprolifera0on,whichis

thenarguedtobegetfurtherconflict

•  Lateststudyfindsthatnewnuclearstatesaremorelikelytoini0atemilitarizeddisputesvs.non-nucleartargets,butnotagainstnucleartargets

•  Newnuclearstatesprimarilytargetstateswithwhichtheyhavenoconflicthistory–pickingnewtargetsratherthangoingaieroldfoes–  Suggestsan“expansionofinterests”storyratherthana“nuclearshield”story

MarkS.BellandNicholasL.Miller,“Ques0oningtheEffectofNuclearWeaponsonConflict,”JournalofConflictResolu%on59/1(2015):74-92.

DoNuclearWeaponsHelpStatesPrevail?

•  Scholars(mostly)agreethatnuclearweaponsareusefulfordeterrence

•  Scholarsdisagreeaboutwhethernuclearweaponsareusefulforcompellenceorprevailingincrises

•  Yes:Havingmorenuclearweaponsthanyouradversaryenablesyoutoprevailinthecompe00oninrisk-taking–  Stateswithnuclearweaponsmorelikelytoprevailincrisesovernon-nuclearadversaries,but

notagainstnuclear-armedstates(BeardsleyandAsal2009)–  Incrisesbetweennuclear-armedadversaries,stateswithnuclearsuperioritymorelikelyto

prevail(Kroenig2013)

•  No:Threatstousenuclearweaponsforoffensivepurposesoienlackcredibility–  Stateswithnuclearweaponsnotmorelikelytomakesuccessfulcompellentthreats,even

againsttargetsthatlacknuclearweapons(FuhrmannandSechser2013)•  Notusefulfortakingterritory•  Nuclearthreatsaredispropor0onate

UraniumEnrichment:NatanzandFordow

InNovember2013,Iranhad:•  c.19,500centrifugesinstalled(almostallIR-1)

•  Nearly8tonsofLEU(informofUF6gas)

•  432poundsenrichedto20%

LightWaterReactor:Bushehr

•  StartedbytheGermansin1970s

•  CompletedbyRussiain2010;Russianssupplyingfuel

•  WentonlineinSept.2011

HeavyWaterReactor:Arak

•  Heavywaterproduc0onplantrunning

•  Heavywaterreactorunderconstruc0on(AR-40)

•  Heavywaterplantsusenaturaluranium,producemoreplutonium

JointComprehensivePlanofAc-on•  Reduc0onofinstalledcentrifuges

–  5,060atNatanz–  1,044atFordowforproduc0onofmedicalisotopes—nouraniumenrichment–  AllIR-1

•  ReducestockpileofLEUfrom10,000kgto300kg–  Maintainthatlevelfor15years

•  Noenrichmentabove3.67%

•  RedesignofArakheavywaterreactortoproducelessplutonium–  Spentfuelshippedoutofthecountry–  Noaddi0onalheavywaterorH.W.reactorsfor15years

•  Noreprocessingfor15years

•  Intrusiveinspec0ons,includingimplemen0ngNPTAddi0onalProtocol