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Enlightened Nation Building: The "Science of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau Author(s): Ryan Patrick Hanley Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Apr., 2008), pp. 219-234Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193810Accessed: 30-07-2015 18:11 UTC
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http://www.jstor.orghttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mpsahttp://www.jstor.org/stable/25193810http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspEnlightened Nation Building: The "Science
of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau
Ryan Patrick Hanley Marquette University
Rousseau is famous as an advocate of the politics of "denaturing" But attention to his conception of the "science of
the legislator, "
as developed in the Geneva Manuscript and his writings on Poland and Corsica, reveals a more moderate
approach to statecraft. Here Rousseau claims that legislative science requires tempering commitment to principles of political
right with sensitivity to actual political conditions?a claim that importantly and unexpectedly parallels the better known account of the science of the legislator developed by Adam Smith. In comparing these conceptions, this article draws three
conclusions: first, Smith's and Rousseau s shared moderation reveals their common commitment to accommodating the
passions and prejudices of modernity; second, their fundamental difference concerns not practical legislative methods but
rather differing conceptions of natural justice and political right; and finally, their prudential approach to legislation helps clarify the specific types of "moderation" and "intelligence" required of contemporary nation builders.
Recent American foreign policy has reawakened, with great urgency, interest in the methods and the
legitimacy of nation building, particularly with re
gard to the proper role of the United States in constructing
self-governing democracies with stable national identities
(see, e.g., Dobbins et al. 2003; Feldman 2004; Fukuyama 2006). Yet debates on these subjects have been hampered
by serious disagreement over the questions of the origins of national identity and of how national integration might best be achieved; where some advocate the recovery of na
tive cultural characteristics, others envision a more artifi
cial fabrication of national identities.1 In light of such dis
agreements, contemporary nation builders might wonder
where best to turn for guidance. The present article argues that this debate would do well to reconsider the contri
butions of two leading thinkers of the Enlightenment era, Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular their concept of "the science of the legislator."
Two questions thus animate this article. The first
is more explicitly political: what insights do Smith and
Rousseau provide to contemporary nation builders? The
second is perhaps more scholarly: namely, how do
Rousseau's and Smith's visions of the science of the legis lator compare given their famously incommensurate po sitions on modernization and commercial liberalism? The
article's answer to the first question itself implies a need
to reconsider a certain conception of the Enlightenment. In contrast to a received vision of the political thought of the Enlightenment as mainly concerned with the jus tification of rational, universal norms, the most valuable
legacy of Smith and Rousseau's approach to nation build
ing lies rather in its skeptical counsels of prudence, and
the necessity of both accommodating the moral and cul
tural "passions and prejudices" of a nation and making institutional provisions for a nation's continued moral
and cultural flourishing. With regard to the second question, comparing their
conceptions of the science of the legislator also affords an opportunity to reconsider the standard contrast of
Rousseau as the champion of either primitivism or classi
cal republicanism and Smith as the herald of commer
cial modernization. On this front, my principal claim
below is that Rousseau's vision of the true legislator's sci ence closely parallels Smith's in one respect and sharply
Ryan Patrick Hanley is assistant professor of political science, Marquette University, PO Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
(ryan.hanley@marquette.edu).
Earlier versions of this article were delivered in 2005 at the University of Wisconsin Political Theory Workshop, and also at the 2005 annual
meetings of the New England Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association. I am very grateful to those audiences?and particularly to Richard Boyd, Eric MacGilvary, Alice Behnegar, Louis Hunt, David Lay Williams, and the three anonymous reviewers?for many helpful suggestions. 1
For a helpful review of contemporary primordial, constructivist, and instrumentalist perspectives on nationalism and nation building, see especially Barrington (2006, 13-14).
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2008, Pp. 219-234
?2008, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853
219
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp220 RYAN PATRICK HANLEY
departs from it in a second. The first two sections of the
article demonstrate that Smith and Rousseau each sub
scribe to the classical distinction of the best regime from
the best possible regime and also that each insists that the
fundamental task of a nation builder is to devise mod
erate, prudential mechanisms tailored to the exigencies of particular given circumstances in order to instantiate
universal political norms within existing conditions. The
next section of the article examines how this intention in
forms Rousseau's practical works on Corsica and Poland,
arguing that in these Rousseau practices his commitment
to accommodate exigencies, and particularly to accom
modate the conditions and vices of modernity that he
famously diagnosed in the Discourse on Inequality. The
fourth section of the article turns to the tension between
the moderation characteristic of these practical writings and the immoderation of the legislative science described
in the Social Contract and argues that the divide that sep arates Rousseau from Smith on this front is to be traced
not to their differing attachments to realism or idealism,
but rather to their conceptions of "natural justice" and
"political right," the specific ideals to be instantiated. In
concluding, the article examines two specific implications of these analyses for contemporary nation builders, ar
guing in particular that Smith and Rousseau's greatest
legacy on this front lies in their ability to clarify the spe cific types of "moderation" and "intelligence" required of
nation builders today.
Natural Justice and Particular Circumstance: Smith on the
Legislator's Science
The Enlightenment offers students of the history of po litical philosophy at least two visions of "the science of
the legislator."2 By far the more well known is that set
forth by Smith and David Hume, the philosophers chiefly
responsible for articulating and subsequently defending the project of commercial modernity. As has been shown,
Hume and Smith aspired to teach potential legislators in
their audiences how to devise political and economic insti
tutions capable of accommodating man's selfish passions and in turn meliorating or transforming them into agents of social stability and growth (see esp. Cohen 1989,51,54,
59, 62; Haakonssen 1981; McNamara 1998; Winch 1996,
117). Given this objective, it may at first seem strange, if
2 For other eighteenth-century variants of the legislator's science,
see
esp. Lieberman (1988), Haakonssen (1996), and the studies cited
in n8 below.
not perverse, to regard Rousseau as a contributor to this
project. Rousseau's advice to nation-building legislators, as presented in his writings on Poland and Corsica and
Geneva, seems to counter Smith in advocating resistance
to commerce and liberal individualism and a recovery of
a commitment to the common good based on classical re
publican ideals. Yet it is Rousseau, in his early draft of the
Social Contract (the Geneva Manuscript), who advances
the second vision of "the science of the legislator" (GM
I.iv, 168; Il.i-vi, 179-94), elsewhere called "the true legis lator's science" (L, 66).3 Our first task is to see how these
two visions compare.
Adam Smith is today famous as the champion of the
"system of natural liberty"?that is, as the champion of
a self-regulating economic system which would seem to
have little need, or even room for, the interventions of
political actors. The associated fame of Smith's advocacy of such devices as the "invisible hand" and the theory of
spontaneous or unplanned order further seem to suggest that Smith's political philosophy defends or engenders a
minimization of the importance of political agency and
consequently leads to a "deflection" of politics towards
economics (see Cropsey 2001 ; Minowitz 1993 ). But if true,
why then does Smith insist on articulating a science for the
legislator? Thus Winch's helpful question: if indeed Smith
means to teach that politics does better when directed
by nature rather than the "active statesman as purposive moulder of events and outcomes," then "what positive
part is there for any legislator to play?" (Winch 1996,94).
Smith's answer rests on his distinction between two
different types of statesmen, one of whom he agrees should be excluded from political action, but the other
of whom he deems vital to the proper functioning of the
system.4 He presents this contrast in one of his central
discussions of the legislator. Here Smith distinguishes one
directed by "the science of a legislator, whose deliberations
ought to be governed by general principles which are al
ways the same," from "that insidious and crafty animal,
vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils
are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs"
3 Rousseau's works are abbreviated as CC = Plan for a Constitution
for Corsica; E = Emile; GM = Geneva Manuscript; GP
= Government
of Poland; L = Letter to d'Alembert; OC = Oeuvres compl?tes; PE
=
Political Economy; SC = Social Contract; SD = Second Discourse
{Discourse on Inequality). Standard translations have been used
whenever possible. Smith's works are abbreviated as LJ = Lectures
on Iurisprudence;TMS =
Theory ofMoral Sentiments; WN = Wealth
of Nations.
4The following account of Smith's understanding of the science of
the legislator largely follows the central claims made in Haakonssen
(1981, esp. 83-98), M?ller (1993, 84-92, 139), and Winch (1996,
90-123); more specific debts and deviations are also acknowledged below.
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspTHE "SCIENCE OF THE LEGISLATOR" IN SMITH AND ROUSSEAU 221
(WN IV.ii.39). The distinguishing feature of legislative
science, on this account, is its commitment to those
"general principles" which prevent a politics so guided from degenerating into vulgar Machiavellianism. Else
where Smith repeats the claim. Even in noting the po
tential for general principles to be abused, he hints that
"some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfec tion of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for
directing the views of the statesman" (TMS VI.ii.2.18).
But what precisely did Smith have in mind in sug
gesting that political deliberation ought to be governed by attention to "general principles"? Charles Griswold notes
that Smith's insistence that the "general principles" which
ought to guide the science of the legislator "unquestion
ably echo" his discussion of those "general principles of
law and government" described in the closing pages of
TMS, in which he anticipates a book-to-come on natural
jurisprudence (Griswold 1999, 36n59). There he distin
guishes systems of positive law designed for particular states in particular historical periods from "the natural
rules of justice independent of all positive institution."
The latter were the intended focus of his project on "what
might properly be called natural jurisprudence, or a the
ory of the general principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations"?a field
of study he rigorously distinguishes from the study of
"the particular institutions of any one nation" (cf. LJA Li;
LJB 1-3). This in turn led Smith to promise "an account
of the general principles of law and government, and of
the different revolutions they have undergone in the dif
ferent ages and periods of society" (TMS VII.iv.36-37).5 And while this project was not in fact executed, Smith's
essential claim is clear: that appreciation of the principles of natural justice is the "backbone" of the science of a
legislator ( Haakonssen 1981, 151).
By grounding the science of the legislator in the uni
versal norms of justice, Smith intended to provide a mech
anism capable of elevating statesmanship above the pol itics of interest characteristic of his insidious and crafty
"politician." Yet Smith was also acutely aware that a states
manship grounded in the abstract principles of natural
justice is itself susceptible to abuses of another kind. His
own failure to execute a treatise on the idea of natural jus tice itself suggests the difficulty of establishing its princi
ples. But lacking a clear definition of such principles, am
bitious politicians might well substitute their own more
convenient abstractions. This is precisely the problem that
Smith diagnoses in his famous portrait of the "man of sys
5Griswold rightly notes that Smith, in his own words, only "partly executed" this project (TMS, 3). On whether Smith was capable of
executing the project, see Griswold (1999, 31-37); cf. Fleischacker
(2004, esp. 145-48); Ross (2004, 45-46).
tern." The man of system is first and foremost a man driven
by his ideals: "apt to be very wise in his own conceit" he
is "often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his
own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the
smallest deviation from any part of it" (TMS VI.ii.2.17).
Indeed his fascination with his Utopian vision inspires his
political zealotry, for when this "spirit of system" mixes
with a certain kind of "public spirit," this "often inflames
it even to the madness of fanaticism," which in turn "in
toxicates" all who fall under the sway of "the imaginary
beauty of this ideal system" (TMS VI.ii.2.15). Caught up in this dazzling beauty, such visionaries seek in practice "to establish it completely and in all its parts, without
any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong
prejudices which may oppose it." This leads to Smith's
well-known condemnation of the systemic political re
former who "seems to imagine that he can arrange the
different members of a great society with as much ease
as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess
board," indifferent to or unaware of the fact that "in the
great chess-board of human society, every single piece has
a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from
that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it"
(TMS VI.ii.2.17). But good government requires that the
statesman's hand not deviate from the path traced by the
invisible hand. Smith repeatedly insists on this lesson in
arguing for his system of natural liberty, claiming that
people should always be given free rein to pursue their in
terests, as they always know these interests better than any
superior might (e.g., WN IV.v.b.16; IV.v.b.43; IV.ix.51).
Legislative science is thus intended as an antidote
to the enthusiasm of systematic reformers. Yet this itself
prompts an obvious question: insofar as the "system of
natural liberty" is itself a "system" in its own right, how
can Smith guarantee that the legislator claiming to act in
the name of this "system" will not himself be overcome
by the "spirit of system"? The problem is made even more
acute by his recognition that the legislator's tremendous
abilities render him capable of effecting "the greatest rev
olutions ... in the situations and opinions of mankind"
(TMS VI.iii.28). Smith describes his remedy for this po tential fanaticism in describing the importance of appre
ciating political circumstances. He nods at this even in
venting his frustration with the man of system: not only does he exhibit "the highest degree of arrogance" and a
predilection to "fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the commonwealth," but he moreover thinks "his
fellow-citizens should accommodate themselves to him
and not he to them" (TMS VI.ii.2.18). Yet it is precisely an accommodation of interests and prejudices that Smith
calls for in building actual nations if they are to be free of
the fanaticism to which political idealism is prone.
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Smith's claim then is that the legislator must tem
per his commitment to idealism with an appreciation of
the specific contexts in which he serves. Only by so do
ing will he accommodate his project to the people, rather
than force the people to accommodate his project. But this
claim sets the bar high for the legislator, as it compels him
to cultivate a political wisdom or understanding differ
ent from that wisdom or understanding which might en
able him to comprehend the principles of natural justice. Haakonssen nicely captures the distinction between these
two forms of comprehension in distinguishing "system
knowledge" from "contextual knowledge," the knowledge of the connecting principles of a system from the knowl
edge that enables one to understand actual given political conditions (Haakonssen 1981, 79-82, 89; see also McNa
mara 1998, 87-91; Winch 1983, 510-11). This suggests that the science of the legislator requires a "superior pru dence," an appreciation of both the potential and limits of
actual peoples for whom one hopes to make a normative
legislative intervention (TMS VI.i.15).6 Such prudence is
principally valuable as it enables legislators to shape their
ideals to circumstances and thereby better guarantee that
a political community will in fact receive the intended
benefits of the legislation. Smith goes on to explain that an appreciation of such
circumstances will lead not only to a tempering of ideal
ism, but also to an appreciation of the limits of politics, and hence legislation, owing to the imperfectability of po litical phenomena (Griswold 1999, 301-10; Winch 1996,
123). Smith's favorite historical example of a legislator, Solon, is consistently praised for his capacity to legislate
within the horizons of imperfection and his ability to craft a second-best approach for such situations; hence his en
dorsement of a modern policy with the observation that
"with all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of the laws of Solon, that, though not the
best in itself, it is the best which the interests, prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of ( WN IV.v.b.53).7 The Solonic example is itself the example Smith recom
mends to remedy the idealism of men of system (Winch
1996, 96-97, 104-5). Thus the best legislator
6Helpful here is Haakonssen's observation that "the intention be
hind Smith's criticism of excessive rationalism, or utopianism, in
politics is by no means the abdication of reason," but "rather a very rational appreciation of its limits" (1981, 92).
7 In this context see the excellent discussion of Smith's Solonic mod
eration in Brubaker (2006, 201-205) but cf. 191-92, 200, 212
13, where Smith's legislator is explicitly distanced from the seem
ingly immoderate "moralism" of Rousseau's. For Solon's intentions, see Anhalt (1993, 11-14, 135-39). Anhalt's study of Solon's self
conscious presentation of himself as poet-lawgiver is a useful point of reference for the claim that legislators should seek to "persuade without convincing" (SC II.vii.10); see esp. Kelly (1987, 326-31).
will respect the established powers and privileges even of individuals, and still more those of the
great orders and societies, into which the state
is divided. Though he should consider some of
them as in some measure abusive, he will content
himself with moderating, what he often cannot
annihilate without great violence. When he can
not conquer the rooted prejudices of the people
by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to
subdue them by force; but will religiously observe
what, by Cicero, is justly called the divine maxim
of Plato, never to use violence to his country no
more than to his parents. He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the
confirmed habits and prejudices of the people; and will remedy as well as he can, the inconve
niencies which may flow from the want of those
regulations which the people are averse to submit
to. When he cannot establish the right, he will not
disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the
people can bear. (TMS VI.ii.2.16)
Here Smith teaches that political humility is a prerequi site for the science of a legislator. In contrast to the arro
gance and superiority of the man of system, Smith here
praises the humility of statesmen who work with rather
than against the prejudices and preconditions of a nation.
Such statesmen, Smith further insists, know the limits of
their wisdom; fully conscious that they lack the omni
science of the divine, they instead represent the more lim
ited "perfection of human political wisdom" (Griswold
1999, 308). Unlike Caesar and Alexander, such legislators never fall under the spell of the delusive and "excessive
self-admiration" that might suggest the direct inspiration of divinity (TMS VI.iii.28). A properly scientific legisla tor thus strikes a balance between the ideals of natural
justice and the reality of actual conditions and thereby achieves a salutary moderation in steering
a course be
tween the hubris of scientific management and the fa
naticism of the idealists.8 Smith's emphasis on respecting settled habits and prejudices indeed represents a recov
ery of the ancient conception of the distinction between
the best and the most fitting or best possible regime (see Aristotle 1984, 1269a30, 1337al0; Griswold 1999, 305).
Before turning to Rousseau, a final aspect of Smith's
approach to the science of the legislator demands notice.
8 Such proposals particularly echo the legislative methods of Hume
and Montesquieu; see Hume (1985, 260-63, 280, 512-13) and
Winch (1996, 75; 1983, 506); Montesquieu (1989, XIX.5, 6, 14;
XXVI.23) and Pangle (1973, 273-77).
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspTHE "SCIENCE OF THE LEGISLATOR" IN SMITH AND ROUSSEAU 223
Smith's reputation for a commitment to limited political interventions in the civil or economic spheres would seem
to commit him to a restricted view of the proper sphere of the legislator within a well-ordered state; there indeed
would seem to be little room for a legislator if in fact "little
else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of
opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes,
and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being
brought about by the natural course of things" (Smith in
Stewart 1982, 322). But elsewhere?and particularly in a
little-noted passage in The Theory of Moral Sentiments?
Smith takes a much stronger stance on the necessity of
moral legislation:
The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of preserving the public peace by re
straining injustice, but of promoting the prosper
ity of the commonwealth, by establishing good
discipline, and by discouraging every sort of
vice and impropriety; he may prescribe rules,
therefore, which not only prohibit mutual in
juries among fellow-citizens, but command mu
tual good offices to a certain degree ... Of all the
duties of a law-giver, however, this, perhaps, is
that which it requires the greatest delicacy and re
serve to execute with propriety and judgment. To
neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth
to many gross disorders and shocking enormities, and to push it too far is destructive of all liberty,
security, and justice. (TMS II.ii.1.8)
Smith does not provide precise rules for the conduct of
such judgment, but from his comments above it is evident
that he believes good legislation requires a middle ground be established between libertarianism and totalitarianism.
But even as Smith was silent on this front, the attempt to
define this middle ground was to become the particular intention of Rousseau.
Realism and Idealism and Rousseau's "Science of the Legislator"
The study of Smith was once dominated by the famed
Adam Smith Problem: the question of how to reconcile
Smith's analysis of sympathy in moral life with his analy sis of self-interest in economic life.9 But Rousseau seems
91 do not aspire to treat this problem here. For excellent recent
treatments of the relative significance of this problem, see Otteson
(2002) and Montes (2004).
to suffer from his own Problem.10 Aside from the Prob
lem initially posed by Cassirer?the question of whether
Rousseau is better seen as a classical eudaemonist or
Kantian deontologist?a more political Problem concerns
whether he is better understood as a friend of constitu
tional democracy or as a friend of totalitarianism.11 Res
olution of this question is unlikely to be reached soon
and is not attempted here, but attention to his conception of the science of the legislator and how it compares to
Smith's helps illuminate certain moderate aspects of his
thought, and especially his willingness to accommodate
the characteristic prejudices of modernity. To begin by suggesting that there might be anything
moderate or accommodating in Rousseau's science may
at first seem odd. The most famous account of the legis lator in Rousseau's corpus?the account offered in Book
II, chapter vii of the Social Contract?certainly seems to
read as a direct challenge to, if not rejection of, several fun
damental tenets of the Smithean science. First Rousseau
openly questions whether the divine and the political should be separated, arguing that legislation benefits con
siderably from the popular impression of the legislator's intimate association with the divine. Further, where Smith
cautions against the attempt to "impress" on men prin
ciples foreign to their nature, Rousseau seems to endorse
precisely this in claiming that the nation-building legisla tor's first and most important task is to "transform" the
people:
Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel
capable of, so to speak, changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself
is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were
receive his life and his being; of weakening man's
constitution in order to strengthen it; of substitut
ing a partial and moral existence for the indepen dent and physical existence we have all received
from nature. In a word, he must take from man
his own forces in order to give him forces which are foreign to him and of which he cannot make
use without the help of others. The more these
natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater and more lasting are the acquired ones, and the
more solid and lasting also is the institution. (SC
II.vii.3; GM Il.ii, 179-80; cf. PE, 12-13)
'I owe this suggestion to Eric MacGilvary. 1 * Cassirer (1954). The classic sources on Rousseau's totalitarianism
remain Berlin (2002) and Talmon (1960). For a recent attempt to
find liberalism in Rousseau, see Williams (2005a).
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It is difficult to imagine a position more repugnant to
Smith's. Not only does Rousseau's legislator annihilate
the prejudices that Smith's is concerned to respect, but he
also seeks the alteration of human nature itself. Rousseau
elaborates on his intentions in this regard in Emile. Such
denaturing is necessary, he explains, because of the vi
olence already done to human nature by the civilizing institutions that Smith defends. It is the corruptions of
civilized man, or the bourgeois, which make it necessary "to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him
in order to give him a relative one and transport the I
into the common unity" (E, 40). Yet modern legislators are not alone in seeking to "transform" human nature; the
greatest ancient legislators, Rousseau suggests, had similar
ambitions. Thus we are told that when Lycurgus legislated for Spartans he "transformed them into beings more than
merely human," that Moses "made bold to transform this
herd of servile emigrants into a political society, a free
people," and that Numa gave Rome strength by "trans
forming the robbers into citizens.. .by mildly restrictive
institutions that bound each of them to the rest and all of
them to the soil" (GP, 6-7). Such legislators cannot help but seem immoderate when compared to Smith's.
But Rousseau's call for "transformation" hardly ex
hausts his conception of the legislator, for alongside this
grandiose vision lies another more moderate vision. In
the published version of Social Contract, this moderate
vision takes the form of an attempt to mitigate what the
work's subtitle calls the "principles of political right" with
the "maxims of politics" (SC III.xviii.3). As Arthur Melzer
and Roger Masters have demonstrated, the Social Contract
at its heart seeks to establish a balance between these two
principles?a balance between, on the one hand, a com
mitment to the abstract principles of "universal justice"
(SC II.vi.2), and on the other, the practical maxims of
politics necessary to bring a project to fruition (see es
pecially Kelly 1987, 322; Masters 1968, 290-93, 301-13;
Masters 1972, 412-18; Melzer 1990, 114-19). Rousseau's
study of the aims of legislation in the chapter prior to his
description of the legislator in SC Il.vii makes clear that
such a balance is necessary, as a commitment to univer
sal justice in the absence of positive law cannot guarantee the establishment of actual justice; hence Rousseau's re
minder that while "all justice comes from God, he alone
is its source," it remains true that to be realized, justice
requires a set of positive institutions; hence "conventions
and laws are therefore necessary to combine rights with
duties and to bring justice back to its object" (SC II.vi.2).
Such a conception will remind us of Smith's commitment
to balancing natural justice and positive law at the end of
TMS. But more crucially, the commitment to establish
ing a balance between the best and the best possible also
serves to mitigate the seeming extremism of Rousseau's
most rhetorically charged comments on the legislator and
his transformative duties. In this way Rousseau's concep tion of the legislator leads back to Smith's, for the at
tempt to establish a balance between "universal justice" and the "maxims of politics" parallels Smith's commit
ment to describing a balance between the universal prin
ciples of "natural justice" and "contextual knowledge." This parallel is extended when we turn to Rousseau's
explicit comments on the science of the legislator. Rousseau's first and most complete account comes in
the first draft of the Social Contract, or the Geneva
Manuscript. As Masters details, Rousseau comprehen
sively revised this section of the work, with SC II.vii vir
tually all that remains of the sustained investigation of the
science of the legislator that occupied most of Book II of
GM; the "science of the legislator" is never mentioned in
the final published version (Masters 1968, 293 and 1972,
413, 417). Yet Rousseau does explicitly mention the "true
legislator's science" in the Letter to dAlembert. Here he
explains that the mere task of crafting and writing legisla tion is not a difficult one: "On the whole, the institution
of laws is not such a marvelous thing that any man of
sense and equity could not easily find those which, well
observed, would be the most beneficial for society." The
challenge of legislating lies not simply in writing good laws, but in writing laws well suited to a people: "the force
of the laws has its measure, and the force of the vices that
they repress has one too. It is only after one has compared these two quantities and found that the former surpasses the latter that the execution of the laws can be depended
upon. The knowledge of these relations constitutes the
true legislator's science" (L, 66). The central claim here
is that legislation cannot be judged good in the abstract,
but only by the degree of its fittingness for the people and
problems for which it is established.
By insisting that wise legislators should strive to fit
their laws to the nature of the people and the needs of
the state, Rousseau takes an important step back from the
Utopian insistence on "transforming" and "denaturing" that he elsewhere seems to advocate. This continues when
he offers us a historical example of a practitioner of the
"true legislator's science." In the Letter to dAlembert, his
example is Solon. Solon did more than simply author a
legal code, Rousseau explains: "The problem is to adapt this code to the people for which it is made and to the
things about which it decrees to such an extent that its
execution follows from the very conjunction of these re
lations; it is to impose on the people, after the fashion
of Solon, less the best laws in themselves than the best of
which it admits in the given situation" (L, 66). In echo
ing (or anticipating) the endorsement of Solon by Smith,
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Rousseau makes plain that legislative science is a science
of the second-best.12 Indeed throughout the Letter one
finds less idealism than a realist insistence on the need
to accommodate proposals to circumstances: "let us not
seek for the chimaera of perfection but for the best pos sible according to the nature of man and the constitution
of society" (L, 110). In GM Rousseau would further explore this aspect
of the Solonic or second-best approach to legislation. His
constant lesson throughout GM is that "these general ob
jects of all good institutions should be modified in each
country according to the relationships that arise as much
from the local situation as from the character of the in
habitants; and it is on the basis of these relationships that
each people must be assigned a particular system of leg islation that is the best, not perhaps in itself, but for the
State for which it is intended" (GM Il.vi, 193; SC II.xi.4; cf. E, 34-35). In developing this claim, Rousseau makes
clear that legislators must tailor specific policies to the
exigencies of particular customs and circumstances. In
GM this contrast takes the form of a distinction between
"right" on the one hand and "those matters of expedi
ency which are indispensable to every good institution"
on the other (GM Il.iii, 183). The published version drops the explicit distinction between right and expedience, but
repeats the fundamental claim that this distinction in
troduces, namely, that "just as a skillful architect, before
putting up a building, observes and tests the ground to see
whether it can bear the weight, so the wise founder does
not start by drafting laws at random, but first examines
whether the people for whom he intends them is suited
to bear them" (GM Il.iii, 183; cf. SC Il.viii.l). The lesson
in each case is that legislators must begin their efforts to
improve men by taking them as they are (Masters 1972,
429). This leads Rousseau to insist that one should strive
always to work within the context of the material one has
been given: "he should not try to change the institution
of a people that is already subject to laws, let alone try to restore an institution that has been abolished or to re
vive worn out mechanisms" (GM Il.iii, 188). Further, it
is the task of a wise legislator to take not just people but
also conditions as they are, and hence the call for the law
giver to attend to "the location, the climate, the soil, the
morals, the neighbors, and all the particular relations of
the people that it was his task to institute" (PE, 12). Seen
thusly, the science of the legislator tempers the idealism
12Excellent analyses of Rousseau's account of "Solonic" legislation and its influence on his "contextualism" are provided in Forman
Barzilai (2003, 445-50) and now in Williams (2007, 17-18, 25-27,
29-31).
that a sole emphasis on transforming or denaturing might otherwise encourage.13
One final aspect of Rousseau's science of the legisla tor requires review before turning to the practical polit ical writings. It has been argued above that common to
both Rousseau's and Smith's science is an insistence on
the import of tailoring legislation to the ills of the times.
But this suggestion was to have a particularly important effect, and take on a unique cast, in the practical polit ical writings that we are about to examine. To see how,
we turn to Rousseau's final argument for the import of
accommodating context. Such accommodation is neces
sary, he insists, because the particular ills of a given society themselves contain the key to their reconciliation. This is
suggested explicitly in GM:
But although there is no natural and general soci
ety among men, although men become unhappy and wicked in becoming sociable, although the
laws of justice and equality mean nothing to those
who live both in the freedom of the state of na
ture and subject to the needs of the social state,
far from thinking that there is neither virtue nor
happiness for us and that heaven has abandoned
us without resources to the depravation of the
species, let us attempt to draw from the ill itself
the remedy that should cure it. Let us use new as
sociations to correct, if possible, the defect of the
general association. Let our violent speaker him
self judge its success. Let us show him in perfected art the reparation of the ills that the beginnings of art caused to nature. (GM I.ii, 162)
Herein lies what Starobinski has called "the fundamental
insight" of Rousseau's political philosophy: the idea that the most effective political remedies are homeopathic, or
internal to the disease being treated (Starobinski 1993,
118-31, quote at 127; Forman-Barzilai 2003, 462-63). But what precise form should this homeopathic remedy take? And put more directly: what are the "ills that the
beginnings of art caused to nature?" Rousseau's most di rect treatment of this question comes in the Discourse on Inequality. In describing the transition between the
pure state of nature and the corruptions of the civil state, Rousseau identifies a middle position characterized by
precisely the incipient ills that separate art from nature.
This he describes as the "period in the development of
13 Masters notes that such a commitment also distinguishes
Rousseau's prescriptions from those of "value-free" social science; see Masters ( 1972,419). Smith's critique of positivistic social science is a principal theme of Fleischacker (2004).
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human faculties, occupying a just mean between the in
dolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour propre"?the state in which the "idea of
consideration" had been awakened in its nascent form,
and "public esteem acquired a price" (SD 11.16-18). In
what follows I argue that it is Rousseau's identification
of the civilizing potential of incipient love of consider
ation properly directed that characterizes his moderate
advice to Corsica and Poland. The remedy for their ills,
Rousseau argues, lies not in the violent uprooting of the
passions and prejudices that constitute the evidence of
their corruption, but rather the redirection of such pas sions and prejudices towards more useful ends. For if in
deed it is true that today "everybody wants to be admired,"
it is then necessary "to excite the desire and to facilitate
the means of attracting by virtue the same admiration
that one today attracts only by wealth" (OC III, 502-3;
cf. GP, 17).
The Legislator's Science in Practice: Corsica and Poland
The previous section of the article sought to demonstrate
that beneath Rousseau's extreme depiction of the legisla tor in his theoretical writings lies a more moderate claim:
that so far from denaturing or transforming citizens, wise
legislators instead meet them where they stand. This same
tension is to be found in Rousseau's practical writings on
Corsica and Poland.14 In each of these works, Rousseau's
extreme republican rhetoric is striking. But when exam
ined closely, so far from revealing Rousseau
as an advo
cate of political denaturing or the recovery of supposed ancient disinterestedness, these writings instead suggest a more prudential approach to legislation. In each es
say, Rousseau crafts solutions to the problems of existing
regimes by appealing to and encouraging passions and
prejudices endemic to these regimes. As such, they stand
as examples of Rousseau's efforts to practice the funda
mental task of legislative science: namely, "to draw from
the ill itself the remedy that should cure it." Yet it is not
only this general formulation that binds Rousseau's ap
proach to Smith's. The principal ill that Rousseau diag noses in each of the nations he examines is precisely a
form of the incipient selfishness characteristic of moder
nity diagnosed in the Second Discourse (see especially SD
11.27, 52, 57). Further, in each of these writings, the rem
14See also Hanley (2006), which argues that Rousseau applied to
Geneva the same strategies described below with regard to the po
litical ordering of Poland and Corsica.
edy proposed is not simply eradication of amour-propre, but its redirection to the promotion of the common good
(Dent 1988, 225; cf. Masters 1968, 380-82). Smith's and
Rousseau's sciences of a legislator thus share a common
aim: namely, demonstrating how vanity can be steered
to become an agent of social stability and the promotion of common well-being. The difference in their sciences
lies in the forms of selfishness to which their respective
legislators train their attention; Smith's legislator seems
to have in mind the prudent regulation of economic self
interest (see, e.g., M?ller 1993; Rosenberg 1960), whereas
Rousseau seems more interested in the proper regulation of the love of honor and glory. But both are keenly sensitive
to the empire of opinion that dominates modernity, and
both recognize that the central task of modern legislators is to cultivate and thereby redirect the vices modernity
encourages. This strategy is suggested in the discussion of
censors in the Social Contract:
It is useless to draw a distinction between a
nation's morals and the objects of its esteem;
for all this follows from the same principle and
necessarily converges. Among all peoples of the
world, not nature but opinion determines the
choice of their pleasures. Reform men's opin ions and their morals will be purified of them
selves. One always loves what is fine or what
one finds to be so, but it is in this judgment that one is mistaken; hence it is this judgment that has to be regulated. Whoever judges morals
judges honor, and whoever judges honor takes
opinion as his law. (SC IV.vii.3; cf. Masters 1968,
385)
Rousseau applies precisely this strategy in his own advice
to actual states. It is perhaps most evident in his advice
to Geneva in the Letter to dAlembert. The seeming story of the Letter is that Geneva, in its uncorrupted purity, should ban the theater and thereby preserve its republican
simplicity. But the true story, always present just beneath
the surface, is that corruption has already made significant
headway in Geneva, and that its efforts might be better
spent attempting to meliorate that which it is already too
late to cure. Thus directly after introducing us to the "true
legislator's science," Rousseau asks,
By what means can the government get a hold on
morals? I answer that it is by public opinion. If
our habits in retirement are born of our own sen
timents, in society they are born of others' opin ions. When we do not live in ourselves but in oth
ers, it is their judgments which guide everything.
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Nothing appears good or desirable to individuals
which the public has not judged to be such, and
the only happiness which most men know is to be
esteemed happy. (L, 67)
So far from a hopeful call of the idealist for transforma
tion, Rousseau's most forthright advice for the ennobling of his fatherland demands a concession to precisely the
worst of all corruptions, the empire of amour-propre. Put
differently: the best state he knows is incapable of receiv
ing the best absolutely, and Rousseau must rest content
with focusing on the transformation of a nation whose
tastes are already corrupted. Such advice is in fact con
sistent across Rousseau's works. He knows that he "may be told that anyone who has to govern men should not
look for a perfection beyond their nature of which they are not capable," yet he remains optimistic that "it is not
impossible to teach them to love one object rather than
another, and to love what is genuinely fine rather than
what is malformed," and "thus to transform into a sub
lime virtue the dangerous disposition that gives rise to all
of our vices" (PE, 36). This advice would form the foun
dation of his practical legislative advice to Corsica and
Poland.15
Rousseau's Plan for a Constitution of Corsica presents itself on its face as a rejection of accommodation and an
endorsement of the politics of transformation. Its intro
duction reads as an explicit rejection of accommodation
to exigencies. Noting that the separation of the govern ment from the people is the source of Corsica's difficulties, Rousseau explains that in such
a case, wise men, "observ
ing relations of suitability, form the government for the
nation. Nevertheless, there is something much better to
do, that is to form the nation for the government" (CC,
123). And he is clear on how Corsica should best pursue this course. Throughout his piece Rousseau is unstinting in his admonitions for the Corsicans not to encourage commerce. So far from advocating
an accommodation
of Corsica within wider European trade networks, he in
stead calls the Corsicans to take all possible means to en
sure their economic self-sufficiency. Not only must they
discourage dependence on money, but they must also dis
courage the growth of large urban centers and encourage
agriculture that will promote the self-sufficiency of both
the nation and its citizens, and in so doing eradicate the
indolence, selfishness, and "stupid pride of bourgeois" (CC, 131).
15On the difficulties associated with regarding Rousseau as a full
fledged legislator rather than one who merely provides legislative advice, see especially Kelly (2003, 78-81).
In recommending this course of moral simplicity and economic self-sufficiency, Rousseau of course seems
far from Smith's own practical recommendations for
Britain.16 Yet as the essay develops, Rousseau moderates
the extremism of his opening republican sallies, qualify
ing his initial statements with the disclaimers that his hope was "not to destroy private property absolutely, because
that is impossible, but to restrict it within the narrowest
limits" (CC, 148), and his hope that even if money can
not practically be done away with altogether, "at least it
can be reduced to so small a thing that it will be difficult
for abuses to arise" (CC, 147). As he continues he also
suggests that he has not forgotten his earlier lessons on
tailoring proposals to specific conditions, reminding us
that there are qualities "in the nature and the soil of each
country" that render a particular type or form of govern ment particularly well suited to it (CC, 127), and that wise
legislators must begin by taking the principle of "national
character" into account (CC, 133). In so doing Rousseau
reminds us that he remains aware that he is not legislat
ing for a new people, but one with cultural traditions and
institutions and habits.
Furthermore, Rousseau also explicitly recognizes that
Corsica is the product of a series of specific historical cir
cumstances. In the Social Contract, he praised Corsica as
the only country in Europe still capable of receiving leg islation, owing to "the valor and steadfastness with which
this brave people was able to recover and defend its free
dom" (SC II.x.6). Back then Corsica seemed the perfect model of a state "fit for legislation" on account of its self
sufficiency, independence, moderate wealth, and civic af
fection (SC II.x.5). But what does Rousseau find when he
reexamines Corsica from the point of view of a poten tial legislator? Now he explains that the fundamental fact
that shaped the Corsicans was their occupation by the Ge
noese who succeeded in "crushing" Corsica and reducing it to abject poverty and dependence. This leads him to
observe that even though Corsica has retained some of its
original virtues, in its servitude it contracted tremendous
vices that cannot be removed without recourse to extreme
measures (CC, 137). How then does Rousseau respond to such incipient
corruption? His actual remedy is in fact far more accom
modating than his opening rhetoric might have led one to
expect. In particular he strives to accommodate his poli cies to the main passion that has already been encouraged in the Corsicans, presumably the consequence of their
16At the same time, Rousseau's distinction between money and
wealth (CC, 140; cf. GP, 73) and his claim that national wealth
consists in available labor (CC, 125-26) are also central themes of
Smith's antimercantilist argument in WN IV.
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occupation at the hands of the commercial Genoese; in
terestingly, it is precisely the same passion on which his
famous diagnosis of corruption in the SD rests:
Thus in order to awaken a nation's activity it is
necessary to give it great desires, great hopes, great
positive motives for acting. When well examined, the great motive powers that make men act are
reduced to two, sensual pleasure and vanity, still if
you remove from the first everything that belongs to the second, in the final analysis, you will find
that everything is reduced almost to vanity alone.
(CC, 153)
This is a remarkable claim in light of what has come before.
For not only does Rousseau here concede that his legisla tive project for Corsica is conceived within the horizon
of the second best rather than the best absolutely, but he
also suggests that the key to its success lies in the prudent
directing of the chief passion of modernity. He goes on to
explain that the vanity of which he here speaks "is only one of the two branches of amour-propre," the modern
moral failing on which SD focused. But rather than up root amour-propre, he here suggests that the legislator's task lies in redirecting it from vanity, its base form, to
pride, its less base form (CC, 153-54).17 What is striking then is the fact that even though Rousseau is clearly an
advocate of ennobling the moral conditions of the mod
ern Corsicans, the ascent that he envisions is the limited
or moderate ascent from one form of amour-propre to
another.
Rousseau's advice to Poland follows a trajectory simi
lar to his advice to Corsica. By far the most striking feature
of GP is its fervor for a recovery of republican simplicity. Yet read closely it appears that rather than simply ad
vocating the rejection of corruption, Rousseau means to
encourage the Poles to discover a solution to their vices
that emerges from their incipient corruption. Rousseau's
advice in this respect constitutes a practical application of the vanity-directing project described in CC. Yet again this may seem an odd place to start. GP frequently seems
as adamant as CC in calling for an institution of ideals
and rejection of contextual accommodation, particularly
17 Rousseau's methods of educating amour-propre from its base
to its nobler form are nicely treated in Cooper (1999); I compare Smith's methods to Rousseau's on this front in Hanley (2008). Put
terman (2001, 485-89) offers a very helpful account of how both
GP and CC appeal to the desire for opinion prompted by amour
propre (though without connecting these intentions to Rousseau's
science of the legislator). For a quite different account of Rousseau's
intentions in GP see Jeffrey Smith, which claims that far from ac
commodating the conditions of modernity, Rousseau forthrightly
aspires to "the cultivation of ancient virtue" (2003, 412).
with regard to modernity. This stridency is particularly evident in the choice Rousseau compels the Poles to make
between agriculture and commerce. "If what you wish is
merely to make a great splash," he counsels, "cultivate the
sciences, the arts, commerce, industry." "But if perchance
you wish to be a free nation, a peaceful nation, a wise
nation," you must both recover older customs and tastes, and "cause money to become an object of contempt and, if possible, useless besides."18 Yet either way, one must
choose: "Since the two plans of action I speak of are for
the most part mutually exclusive, you must, above all, not
try to combine them" (GP, 67-68). Thus not only does a
moderate accommodation seem unlikely, Rousseau also
here states his preference for ancient virtue over modern
virtue?a predilection in keeping with his call to the Poles
to "seize the opportunity afforded by the events of the
present moment, and raise souls to the pitch of the souls
of the ancients" (GP, 12). And one must not be gentle in so
doing. Sumptuary laws are not enough to ennoble men's
souls and "stamp out luxury": "You must reach deep into
men's hearts and uproot it by implanting there healthier
and nobler tastes" (GP, 18). Here again the plan seems clear: not moderation but
dire measures are necessary if corruption is to be defeated
and expelled. Yet elsewhere Rousseau reminds us that he
has not forgotten the prudence of the legislator's science.
In the opening of the book he reminds us of the im
portance of sensitivity to context. "One must know thor
oughly the nation for which one is building," lest the
final product, "however excellent it may be in itself, will
prove imperfect when it is acted upon" (GP, 1). Rousseau
presents his own proposal as tailored to the Poles, and
thus an exception to the pan-European legislative systems
common in his day; rather than imitate others, he seeks to
craft legislation suited to Poland itself (GP, 11,80,82,86). But what then does he find when he turns to the nation
in question? The truth is that it fits his model of the ideal
state for legislation no better than had Corsica. Poland is
hardly the sort of small nation in which the bonds of civic
affection guarantee national self-identification and unity, but rather a large state, wracked by internal faction and
dissension, and bordered by large, powerful neighbors
(GP, 10, 31; cf. GM ILiii, 183-84; SC II.x.5). In addition,
it seems that Poland may be no more free of the cor
ruptions endemic to modernity than the rest of Europe. Thus just before examining the three great legislators of
antiquity, Rousseau describes the difference between the
ancients and the moderns:
18 It should, however, be noted that Rousseau qualifies these extreme
claims elsewhere in the piece, just as he does in CC (see GP, 73).
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What prevents us from being the kind of men they were? The prejudices, the base philosophy, and
the passions of narrow self-interest which, along with indifference to the welfare of others, have
been inculcated in all our hearts by ill-devised
institutions, in which we find no trace of the hand
of genius. (GP, 5)
This of course admits of several different readings. On
the one hand, it might be seen as a call for modern leg islators to emulate those ancients who sought to trans
form corrupted peoples. On the other hand, Rousseau
explicitly means to remind us of our distance from the
ostensible disinterestedness of ancient republicanism in
insisting that "we" today are shaped by "prejudices" as
well as by the "passions of narrow self-interest"?indeed
it is to this fact that his advocacy of Polish nationalism has
been traced (Hassner 1997, 209). But such a formulation
brings Rousseau much closer to Smith; both emphasize the largely overlooked fact that the proper task of legisla tors is principally to attend to these existing prejudices and
passions (cf. Danford 1980,694-95). Such advice is indeed
fully in keeping with Rousseau's earlier admonition that
"once customs are established and prejudices have taken
root, it is a dangerous and foolhardy undertaking to want
to touch them" (GM Il.iii, 184). As we read on, it at least becomes clear that Rousseau
is concerned to appeal to the modern passions, if not pre
cisely the "passions of narrow self-interest." Interestingly he uses the example of the ancients to introduce this de
cidedly modern approach. Thus he explains the principal aim of Greek legislators seeking to fashion peoples was
to "set them on fire with the spirit of emulation," which
"tied them tightly to the fatherland" (GP, 8). Rousseau's
conception of classical republican virtue, that is, is itself
founded on the proper channeling of amour-propre via
emulation, rather than the recovery of disinterestedness.
But what is striking here is less Rousseau's endorsement of
ancient methods than his sense that such methods might be particularly suited to modern Poland. For in suggest
ing that emulation and "the love of glory" will prove the
best means of shaping the hearts and minds of the Poles, Rousseau advocates a prudent means of appealing to the
concern for the self that is fundamental not merely to
the ancient love of honor but also to the modern love of
recognition (cf. WN V.i.f.4; cf. TMS I.iii.2). In seeking
to encourage emulation, Rousseau's goal
is to direct the native love of honor in the hearts of the
individual Poles to work for the common good. In this
sense, it is lesson analogous to the lesson taught in Corsica.
There Rousseau's goal was not to abolish amour-propre, but to effect an ascent from vanity to pride, or its more
base to its less base form. The same movement is suggested in the examination of selfishness that Rousseau makes in
Poland:
One can make men act only by appealing to their
self-interest. That I know. Of all interests, how
ever, that in pecuniary gain is the most evil, the
most vile, the readiest to be corrupted, though also?in the eyes of one who has knowledge of
the human heart (I reiterate this with confidence
and shall always insist upon it)?the least im
portant and compelling. In the heart of every man there is a natural reservoir of several strong
passions.. .Learn how to foment these passions,
learn how to open up a direct path to their satis
faction that can be travelled without money, and
money will soon lose its price. (GP, 70)
The effect of this passage is twofold. First, Rousseau clearly distances his position from that of the idealism that would
seek to overcome selfishness; his legislative proposals rest
on steering self-interest well rather than attempting to
transcend it. Secondly, Rousseau makes clear how he in
tends to steer selfishness, namely by attempting to direct
it to the love of glory and away from the love of wealth.
Only in this way, Rousseau insists, can the characteristic
vice of modernity, the love of opinion, be employed to
recover what modernity has lost. Thus the remedy most
likely to succeed:
It consists in seeing to it that every citizen shall
feel the eyes of his fellow-countrymen upon him
every moment of the day; that no man shall move
upward and win success except by public appro
bation; that every post and employment shall be
filled in accordance with the nation's wishes; and
that everyone?from the least of the nobles, or
even the least of the peasants, up to the king him
self, if that were possible?shall be so completely
dependent upon public esteem as to be unable
to do anything, acquire anything, or achieve any
thing without it. The resulting emulation among all the citizens would produce a ferment that, in
its turn, would awaken that patriotic fervor which
raises men?as nothing else can raise them?
above themselves. (GP, 87)
The key to elevating the moral character of the Poles is to
meet them where they stand. So far from insisting that the
love of opinion engendered by amour-propre should be
abolished, Rousseau employs it as the source of its tran
scendence. Already corrupted by an extreme solicitude
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for esteem, the Poles' best hope lies in total submission to
opinion. The division of the bourgeois between his pri vate happiness and his solicitude for public esteem which
always transports him outside of himself is to be rectified
by rendering the solicitude for esteem the only source of
his happiness: "let him be conscious always that every de
tail of his conduct is being observed and evaluated by his
fellow-citizens, that no step he takes will go unnoticed, that no action he performs will be disregarded, and that
the good and the evil he does are being posted upon a
scrupulously accurate balance-sheet that will affect every
subsequent moment of his life" (GP, 88). The struggle for
public recognition must thus become the only concern of
the good citizen (GP, 15,22,64,102). Rousseau hopes that
such competition for the honors and esteem of the public will ultimately lead each to "channel all their efforts into
forwarding the glory and prosperity of the state" (GP, 52). In such a manner, his legislative science comes full circle
back to Smith's, for what is true of Smith's market holds
true for Rousseau's Poland: not the disinterested love of
virtue, but the competition of each with all, in which every individual is driven by a desire for the external good of es
teem, becomes a mechanism for promoting the universal
well-being of the whole.
"Rules of Natural Justice" and
"Principles of Political Right"
Above I have argued that both Rousseau's and Smith's vi
sions of the science of the legislator seek to promote mod
eration insofar as each emphasizes the need to mitigate a
commitment to the universal principles of justice with a
sensitivity to the exigencies of a given political context. Yet
this emphasis on expedience, or moderation, itself raises a
heretofore unaddressed question: how is Rousseau's con
cealed moderation to be squared with the explicit political immoderation of SC Il.vii?19 It is this question that the
article's remainder will address. Yet doing so requires ad
dressing a second question. For while it has been argued above that both Smith and Rousseau are dedicated to tem
pering the ideal with the real, it is by no means clear that
they have similar conceptions of what it is that requires
tempering. That is, it is not clear that Smith's vision of
the "general principles" or "rules of natural justice" is
commensurate with Rousseau's vision of the principles of "universal justice" or the "principles of political right." Thus we might ask: given their shared commitment to
19I am grateful to Louis Hunt for compelling me to address this
question.
the moderation necessary for the instantiation of their
respective political ideals, how do Rousseau and Smith
understand those principles themselves?
We begin with Smith. The foundations of Smith's sys tem of natural liberty are to be found in his commitment
to the existence of "rules of natural justice." The question has rightly been raised by several of Smith's commentators
as to whether in fact the sort of skeptical epistemology that
Smith articulates allows him to claim that the principles of
natural justice are in fact humanly knowable; on this view, it is held that the "standpoint external to the human spec tacle" necessary for the investigation of the first principles of natural justice is "unavailable" (Griswold 1999, 256
58 and 2006, 182-86; Fleischacker 2004, 166-69). This
question of whether Smith's skepticism can be reconciled
with his faith in the existence of natural order is impor tant and demands separate treatment. But what is most
important for us here is less the potential epistemological
problems posed by Smith's conception of natural order
than the positive political work that this conception does
in Smith's system of natural liberty. Indeed, in one sense,
the fact that the universal principles of natural justice can
not be comprehensively known is of the greatest political
import for Smith. Smith's primary defense of individual
liberty in the Wealth of Nations is founded not in an ap
peal to natural rights but rather in the evidence that he
adduces for what Griswold calls "the epistemic limits of
statesmanship" (Griswold 1999, 302-4). One of Smith's
principal normative intentions in presenting the science
of the legislator in the manner that he does is clearly to
induce humility?and hence a greater restraint?via the
reminder that the imperfection of our ability to under
stand natural order ought to restrain our interventions.
Yet such an approach to legislation can only work
if indeed the system of natural liberty can be assumed
to operate with minimal external involvement. Much of
Smith's positive political program rests on the claim that
natural order is more efficient than the constructs of men, a view that itself seems to be founded on Smith's faith in
the existence of a providential or ideological natural or
der (see esp. Alvey 2004; Hill 2001; Waterman 2002; cf.
Haakonssen 1981, 77). Put differently, Smith's argument
against the manipulation of human interests by ambi
tious legislators is founded on the claim that human in
terests are naturally self-regulating and can promote the
common interest of the whole, independent of extensive
human intervention. It is, however, precisely this claim
that Rousseau is most concerned to challenge. Despite his several explicit invocations of natural order, Rousseau
consistently denies that it can be known or might serve
as a guide for political order. Given this skepticism, the
fundamental legislative task is not imitation of natural
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order but creation of an artificial order to replace a nat
ural order that is largely unknowable, and to the degree that it is knowable, appears to be inimical to justice.
Rousseau's consistent claim on this front?indeed the
claim that necessitates the extensive political proposals of
the Social Contract?is the claim that unregulated nature
tends towards injustice. Thus Rousseau's striking rejoin der to Smith's natural justice is that nature, left unto it
self, tends to promote injustice: "Far from there being an
alliance between private interest and the general good,
they are mutually exclusive in the natural order of things"
(GM I.ii, 160). Consequently, Rousseau claims, nature
cannot serve as a guide for politics (GM I.ii, 158-60; cf.
PE, 6; Melzer 1983, 639, 645), insofar as politics must
artificially create the justice that is absent from nature.
Hence Rousseau's departure from Smith: where Smith's
"libertarianism" finds its anchor in his conviction that
the natural order is capable of self-regulating private in
terest for the sake of general interest, Rousseau argues
that it is precisely nature's insufficiency in this regard that
requires replacing natural disorder with artificial order.
And hence Rousseau's version of Hume's sensible knave
problem. Left unto nature, he insists, man necessarily fol
lows his selfish instincts, and it is this that necessitates
creation of a comprehensive conventional order with the
sole purpose of redirecting individuals from the pursuit of their "apparent interest" towards an appreciation of
their interest "properly understood" (GM I.ii, 163)?that
is to say, politics must be dedicated to "substituting justice for instinct" (GM I.ii-iii, 163-65; SC I.viii.l).20 It is then
Rousseau's pessimism over the existence of natural justice that leads him to propose the creation through convention
of "the rules of rational natural right" in order to supplant what goes under the name of "natural right properly so
called," and is "based only on a true but very vague senti
ment that is often stifled by love of ourselves" (GM II.iv,
191 ). In this light, Rousseau's positivism is founded on the
rejection of the principles of natural justice that Smith is
concerned to establish. "Law comes before justice and not
justice before law" precisely because the injustice of nat
ural interest demands it: "The true principles of the just and unjust must, therefore, be sought in the fundamental
and universal law of the greatest good of all, and not in
the private relations between one man and another; and
there is no particular rule of justice that cannot be easily deduced from that first law" (GM Il.iv, 190-91; cf. GM
20This claim, in conjunction with the suggestion that wise legis lators should "attribute their own wisdom to the gods" (GM II.ii,
182; SC II.vii.4, 9; cf. PE, 19), leads one to wonder whether the ac
count of justice at SC II.vi.2 is delivered in the voice of the political
philosopher addressing a potential legislator or that of the legislator
addressing a people.
I.vii, 178; PE 19; Melzer 1983, 640-42). This in turn be
comes the task of the legislator. Realizing the absence of
natural justice, the legislator is charged with the responsi
bility of replacing natural law with positive law (GM I.iii;
SCI.i.2).21
Conclusion: The Enlightenment and Nation Building Today
How then do Smith's and Rousseau's conceptions of the
science of the legislator compare? Their fundamental
agreement, I have argued, lies in their shared insistence
that legislators must temper their efforts at instituting
general principles with a prudential and moderate sensi
tivity to the conditions and contexts in which they work. In
particular they require an appreciation of the "passions" and "prejudices" native to the people for whom they legis
late, as well as an appreciation of the degree to which these
native passions and prejudices have been transformed by
exposure to passions and prejudices of alternative prove nance. Their difference then lies not in their positions on
the need to accommodate the conditions of modernity? on which they agree?but rather their differing concep
tions of the ideals that such accommodations are intended
to instantiate. Rousseau's science of the legislator, dedi
cated to creating the principles of political right, in this
respect sharply clashes with Smith's. Where Smith seeks to
preserve natural justice, Rousseau seeks to create justice to
remedy the challenges that an unregulated nature would
otherwise pose. Where the goal of Smith's moderation is
then to restrain the claims of political life and thereby allow for the persistence of nature in society, Rousseau's
legislative moderation is dedicated to the comparatively immoderate goal of transcending the injustice and chaos
that are, on his view, endemic to nature.
Contemporary nation builders stand to gain from
attention to Smith's and Rousseau's agreements and dis
agreements. It would be dangerous to suggest that any thinker in the history of political philosophy can provide
ready answers to our problems; attempting
to extract con
temporary lessons from historical texts would be particu
larly egregious in the present instance, in which the texts
in question teach the import of appreciating nuances and
particularities in discrete situations and of resisting urges
21 Hence Rousseau's anti-foundationalism: "For the science of gov
ernment is nothing but a science of combinations, applications and exceptions, according to times, places, circumstances" (Let ter to Mirabeau, 26 July 1767, in Gourevitch, Later Political Writ
ings, 269). For important challenges to the "positivistic" reading of
Rousseau, see especially Scott (1994) and Williams (2005b).
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to legislate via imposition of ideal templates. At the same
time, the Enlightenment's conception of the science of
the legislator is worthy of our attention for at least two
reasons. First, for all their internal disagreements, cur
rent debates over nation building concur in recognizing that America is likely to be engaged in nation building for
some time, and that we have thus far failed to establish
an adequate framework for dealing with its challenges
(Dobbins 2003, xiii-xxix; Fukuyama 2006, 8-12). Con
temporary lack of clarity thus provides one argument in
favor of returning to the Enlightenment. Yet more impor
tantly, the Enlightenment's conception of the science of
the legislator also enables us to understand better both the
necessary disposition required of nation builders, as well
as how nation builders might most effectively cultivate
a no less necessary receptivity to the dispositions of the
peoples who comprise the nation to be built.
With regard to the former, Smith and Rousseau de
scribe a disposition likely to be both more sustainable and
more successful than those often seen today. Recent Amer
ican nation-building efforts have prominently featured
two dispositions: the enthusiasm and idealism of initial
reformers and the pessimism and despair of retrospective assessors. It would be easy to counsel "moderation" in the
face of such extremes?yet this would miss the subtlety of the particular sort of moderation Smith and Rousseau
recommend. In the first place, their moderation empha sizes the limits of political intervention and calls for an
embrace of second-best solutions. But to leave matters at
that would be to recommend a deflationary realism rather
than genuine moderation. What distinguishes their vision
of the science of a legislator is that it joins to this tempering of idealism a steady attachment to guiding universal prin
ciples. Smith and Rousseau realize that the hard-nosed
dismissal of universal principles is likely to degenerate into Machiavellianism, just as the too-eager embrace of
such principles is likely to lead to hubristic enthusiasm.
The genius of their moderation lies in its effort to establish
a balance between ideals and context, and thereby enable
a legislator to navigate a course between the Scylla of un
mitigated practicality and the Charybdis of immoderate
idealism.
Smith and Rousseau also provide insight into the
practical methods as well as the spirit of contemporary nation building. While on some level true, it would be
facile to suggest that both emphasize the importance of
gathering the "intelligence" that is so often said to be lack
ing in our recent nation-building projects. Their claim is
more specific. In calling for legislators to come to an ap
preciation of the passions and "prejudices" of the peoples for whom they legislate, their aim is to encourage an ap
preciation of the current state of the psychology of such
peoples and the ways in which this psychology has been
shaped by their political experience. In particular, Smith
and Rousseau counsel that the legislator's first and most
important task is to grasp the nature of the particular loves of a particular people, and craft legislation that ap
peals to such loves, however corrupted by recent experi ences. The lesson is particularly apt for democratic nation
builders seeking to build democratic nations. America's
recent nation-building projects have largely been in na
tions emerging from undemocratic and sometimes total
itarian conditions. Attention to the science of the legisla tor proposed by Smith and Rousseau would suggest that
while freedom and democratic self-rule remain noble and
proper goals for these efforts, a direct appeal to such a peo
ple's love of freedom is unto itself unlikely to succeed; also
needed is engagement with the actual present loves and
needs of such a people, and not merely those loves and
needs one might wish them to have (see also Williams
2007, 30-31). Smith and Rousseau, that is, can remind
"our present-day lawgivers, thinking exclusively in terms
of coercion and punishment," how much they err in for
getting that the essential problem consists in the question of "how to reach men's hearts" (GP, 4).
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