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ECPRGraduateStudentConference2014(Innsbruck)PublicAdministration(S22)‐TheOrganisationofWickedPolicyProblems(P094)
PanelChair:DovileRimkutePanelDiscussant:AnneK.Krueger
Governingwickedproblems:Theroleofself‐organizinggovernanceinfostering
theproblem‐solvingcapabilitiesofpublicsectororganizations
Inorder to copewithsuchwickedproblemsas climatechangeandpoverty,problem‐
solving capabilities need to be cultivated in policy‐ and decision‐making and service‐
delivery.Therefore,stakeholders,includingpublicofficialsaswellascitizens,shouldbe
involved inorder tomakeadequateuseof theirknowledge, skills and resources.This
paper theoretically conceptualizes how governance mechanisms can be innovatively
usedtothisend. Inagovernanceframework,wecombineexistingconceptsandideas,
notably inNewPublicGovernance andPublicValueManagement,withorganizational
theory and the concept of knowledge governance. It is shown that neither classical
authoritativegovernance(i.e. regulatoryandsupervisorymeasuresas inanauthority‐
based Weberian bureaucracy) nor output‐based governance (i.e. financial and
performancemeasuresas in competition‐orientedNewPublicManagement) isable to
tackle wicked problems alone. Neither motivates public officials and/or citizens to
constructivelyparticipateindecision‐makingortoinvesttheirknowledgeandskillsin
co‐producingpublicservices.Instead,adequateself‐organizinggovernancemechanisms
in policy‐making and service‐deliverymay usefully complement existing authoritative
and output‐based governance mechanisms. We further show how self‐organizing
governance requires a minimum of common understanding between participants as
well as their willingness to co‐operate. These behavioral antecedents can also be
influencedbyadequateconditionsandself‐organizationitself,andthuscircumventthe
detriments of the Weberian bureaucracy and New Public Management in fostering
problem‐solvingcapacities,tacklingwickedproblemsandthuscreatingpublicvalue.
MichèleMornerGermanResearchInstituteforPublicAdministrationSpeyer
GermanUniversityofPublicAdministrationSpeyer
Reinhard‐Mohn‐InstituteofManagementandCorporateGovernance,Universityof
Witten/Herdecke
ManuelMisgeldGermanResearchInstituteforPublicAdministrationSpeyer
GermanUniversityofPublicAdministrationSpeyer
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1. Introduction
"Look,I'venottamedthewholeproblem,justthegrowl;thebeastisstillaswickedasever."
(Amanagementscientistbeinghonest;Churchman1967:B‐142)
Wickedproblemshavebeendebatedforsometimewithinvariousdisciplines,including
business and public administration, policy science, ecology, health, employment and
education,although theiroccurrencecanbedatedbackeven further (Roberts2000:2;
Batie2008:1176).Theterm,coinedbyRittelandWebber(1973),refers to the fieldof
policy‐anddecision‐makingandstrategicplanning.Wickedproblemsarecharacterized
by ambiguous or uncertain settings in which unstructured, multi‐causal
interdependencies dynamically evolve. At the border between social‐economical,
ecologicalandtechnicalsystems,deviationsfroman‘optimalstateofaffairs’canneither
beclearlydefinedintheirexactcauses,effectsorsolutionsnorultimatelybesolved–in
contrast to trivial problems. Put pointedly, “we cannot solve wicked problems […]
becausewecannotknowwhattodo”(Grint2010:170).Thismaybethecaseinclimate
change, energy production, genetic engineering, malnutrition/obesity, immigration,
integration and refugee policies, poverty, unemployment, environmental pollution,
propertyandviolentcrime,orunequalopportunitiesforminoritygroupsandsoforth.
Associated problems can be characterized as intractable or incorrigible, since they
involve causal relations that “are numerous, interrelated, and difficult to identify.”
(Bueren et al. 2003:193). Further, various social actors perceive, interpret and assess
wickedproblemsdifferentlyandveryoftenhavedifferentinterestsincopingwiththem.
Accordingly,copingwithwickedproblemsisnottrivialandrequirescertainstrategies.
Respective authors (Rittel and Webber 1973; Australian Public Service Commission
2007;Batie2008;Buerenetal.2003;Termeeretal.2013:2;Fischer1993;Ludwigetal.
2001) show that a post‐modern problem‐solving method is necessary which has to
includethedifferentinvolvedactors.However,concreteevidenceastohowexactlythis
problem‐solvingmethodshouldbeorganizedremainsunclear.Here itmakessense to
connecttotheconceptofknowledgegovernancefromorganizationaltheory.Knowledge
governanceaimsto findorganizationalsolutions for fosteringorganizationalproblem‐
solvingcapacitiesthroughthecreationanduseoforganizationalknowledge(Frostand
Morner2005).Thelatterincludestheideasandskillsoforganizationalparticipantsthat
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have to be combined and leveraged in collective bundles (Grant 1996; Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). This makes cooperation and coordination between participants
necessary,whocontributetheir ideasandexperiences(KogutandZander1992;Grant
1996; Teece at al. 1997). In this context governing knowledge means fostering the
creation, sharing and use of knowledge resources and processes in firms (Frost and
Morner2010;GrandoriandKogut2002;Fossetal.2003;Foss2007;TurnerandMakhja
2006).Therespectiveauthorsshowthatthoseprocessescannotbeenforcedbutrequire
acertainwillingnessandabilitybytheparticipantstocooperate,andthereforehaveto
include aspects of self‐organizing governance.We connect to that streamof literature
and show that problem‐solving capacities for coping with wicked problems can
accordinglybefosteredorhinderedbytheuseofdifferentgovernancemechanisms.
The paper is structured as followed: In Section 2 below, we show which possible
strategies canbe identified in order to copewith or rather ‘tame’ (Rittel andWebber
1973: 160) wicked problems. As complexity and contested conceptions or value
conflicts existing in this context cannot be sufficiently met by single actors or
organizations, we look at building and cultivating collective problem‐resolving
capabilities that involve using, creating and sharing knowledge aswell as consensus‐
finding via public dialogue. Section 3 focuses on the adequate use of the different
governancemechanisms.Itoutlinesthemaintypesofgovernancemechanismsandlinks
them with paradigmatic institutional arrangements in the public sector, taking
motivational and cognitive aspectsofparticipants into consideration:First, the classic
Weberian bureaucracy in which authority‐based governance via rules and personal
supervision is upheld. Second, output‐based governance mechanisms via prices and
performance indicators predominant in New Public Management are identified. And
third, we discuss whether self‐governance via subtle forms of (clan) control in
socialization mechanisms favors the cultivation of wicked problem‐resolving
capabilities. We show that elements of self‐governance help to foster vertical and
horizontal collaboration and coordination in policy‐ and decision‐making and
implementation inNewPublicGovernance aswell as in PublicValueManagement. In
Section4,weshowthatinrelationtoproblem‐resolvingcapabilities,copingwithwicked
problems requires the cognitive aswell asmotivational compatibility of participants:
Publicofficialsandcitizensneedontheonehandtocognitivelyunderstandeachother
andontheotherhandtobemotivatedenoughtoplayapartinconstantly(co‐)creating,
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sharingorusingknowledge.InSection5wedrawashortconclusionofthearguments
developedinthispaper.
2. Approachingwickedproblemsbyacceptingcomplexity
Thefirststepincopingwithwickedproblemsistoaccepttheircomplexity–evenifthey
are defined in different ways. In the following we first outline the most relevant
definitions of wicked problems (see section 2.1) before we outline the different
strategiesthathavebeendevelopedtoapproachthem(seesection2.2).
2.1Definingwickedproblems
Rittel and Weber (1973) enumerate a list of characteristics for describing wicked
problems:Awickedproblemcannotbeformulateddefinitivelyorfullyunderstood.Also,
itcannotbeeasilydiscontinued–solutionattemptshavenostoppingrule.Solvingthe
problem objectively or in a right or wrongway is impossible (no ‘one‐best‐answer’).
Furthermore,evaluatingortestingsolutionattemptscannotbeultimatelyaccomplished.
Experimenting with solution attempts is consequential (trial and error without a
‘restart‐button’) and risky. Additionally, neither an exhaustively describable set of
alternativesolutionsnorpredominant(identical)communalitiesbetweentheproblems
exist (uniqueness).Moreover, the authors suggest that an incremental policy – oneof
smallsteps–cannotguaranteeoverall improvement,because itmissesthebigpicture
andoftenleavesthenatureoftheproblemunchanged(RittelandWebber1973:160et
sqq.;Rittel1972;seealsoConklin2005). Inanutshell,wickedproblemsareproblems
thatare“complex,unpredictable,openended,orintractable”(HeadandAlford2013:2).
Theyarenotethically‐speakingmalignant,evilorvicious,buttheyarewickedbecause
of a high resistance to resolving them (Australian Public Service Commission 2007:3;
Termeeretal.2013:2).
Moreover, wicked problems are partly socially constructed, i.e. various social actors
perceive, interpretandassessinterdependent,complexanddynamicissuesdifferently,
sothatthenatureoftheproblemisnotagreedupon.Theperceptionoftheproblemand
its underlying causes depend on one’s view of how to resolve it, and vice versa. “It
attracts varying interests and perspectives constantly juggling for recognition and
acceptance.” (FitzGibbon and Mensah 2012:2). Or, as Head and Alford put it, many
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problemsare“markedbydeep‐rooteddisagreementsaboutthenatureandsignificance”
(2013:5)ofthesechallengesandtheirpolicysolution.
Some authors differentiate between trivial and wicked problems by using two
dimensions: complexity and uncertainty as one, and value conflicts or controversial
resolvingstrategiesas theother. In thecaseofwickedproblems,bothdimensionsare
highlyrated(DurantandLegge2006:310;Baoetal.2013;Batie2008;HeadandAlford
2013:2 et sqq.): They are highly complex (or their causes uncertain) and at the same
timepoliciesforresolvingthemarehighlycontested.Consequently,solvingthemisby
definitionimpossible;theycanmerelybe‘tamed’orcopedwith.
2.2Strategiesforcopingwithwickedproblems
AccordingtoRittelandWebber(1973)therearetwomainapproachestotamingwicked
problems: a professional bureaucratic and managerialistic approach (a); and a
postmodernapproach(b):
(a)Aprofessional,bureaucratic,managerialisticapproach:Thisapproachisengineering‐
basedandrepresentsacyberneticprocessofgovernance that iscontinuouslyadapted
andcorrectedinordertoalignthesteps inplanning(strategyandimplementation)to
thestriven‐forgoals.Technocraticexpertscountercomplexitywithanevidence‐based
policy and further research andprofessionalization (Head andAlford 2013:3 et sqq.).
RittelandWebberhoweverquestionthiskindof“expert‐drivenrationalcomprehensive
planning” (Head and Alford 2013:3). They doubt that the so‐called modern‐classical
modelofplanningisabletocopewithwickedproblems.Theybelievethat,althoughthis
kindofrational‐orientedparadigmcanfixscientificandengineeringproblems,itcannot
beappliedtodiversesocietalsystemsinwhichproblemsareinterpretedandoutcomes
valueddifferently(RittelandWebber1973:159etsqq.).Incontrasttotrivialproblems,
complex, vast and intractable wicked problems require more than the standardized
resolutiontechniquesofamechanisticsteeringmodel.
(b) A postmodern approach: The so‐called postmodern approach (Rittel and Weber
1973) accepts that wicked problems cannot be solved effectively when approached
individually or by a single organization. Since the issues dealt with are
“multidisciplinary, interorganizationalandmultidimensional” (Durant2011:293), their
‘taming’ requires the consideration of different disciplines and dimensions. However,
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very often the complexity of wicked problems is underestimated: The participants
simply do not know that other disciplines and dimensions exist – each defining the
problem from another perspective. Instead they assume that everyone else has to
interpret the problem identically. Other perspectives which do not fit into their own
definition of the problem are interpreted as ‘garbage’ (Cohen et al. 1972) since the
respectiveothersseemnottobeabletounderstandtheproblem.
Inordertocopewithwickedproblemstheircomplexityhastobeaccepted.Forcoping
withe.g.terrorismandorganizedcrime,whichinvolvevalueconflictsanduncertaintyor
complex interdependencies, a collaborative effort is essential and implies interactions
between various parties. Ideally, all affected stakeholders who perceive the problem
differentlyandarethereforesearchingfordivergentanswers,havetobeinvolvedinthe
problem‐solving process. Only by integrating them and their knowledge, skills,
resources, and perspectives (Batie 2008:1187) canwicked problems be ‘tamed’. This
extends to the civic involvement, political participation and co‐creation (Bueren et al.
2003; Emerson et al. 2012) across horizontal and vertical boundaries of agencies,
jurisdictionsandthepublic,for‐profitandnon‐profitsectorsandcivilsocietyasawhole
(seeAgranoffandMcGuire2003).
Thus, theformermentionedprofessionalbureaucraticandmanagerialistapproachhas
tobeenrichedwithadialogue‐basedapproachthatisabletofosterthecreation,sharing
anduseof the respective stakeholders’ knowledge, skills andperspectives. It requires
responsive, flexible and citizen‐centered government that fosters public deliberations,
participation and discursive engagement (Durant and Legge 2006:310 et sqq.). We
extendthisapproachinthefollowingsectionsandenrichitwithresultsfromknowledge
governanceinorganizationaltheorytohighlighttheimportanceof“self‐governance”.
3. Governingwickedproblems
How can knowledge creation, sharing and use as well as consensus‐finding between
different participants be governed in order to cope with wicked problems? Put
differently,howcanthesecollaborativeactivitiesbeeffectivelycoordinatedinorderto
reach the commongoal?This constitutes a central question in knowledge governance
(Grandori1997)andorganizationalcontrol(Ouchi1980;Eisenhardt1985).Wetransfer
themainresultstothecontextofcultivatingdifferentcapabilitiestocopewithwicked
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problemsthattranscendsocial,technicalandecologicalrealms,anddefineitassteering
the “process that influencesdecisions and actionswithin theprivate, public, and civic
sectors”(O’Learyetal.2006:7).
According toOuchi (1979), three typesof steering levers, or governancemechanisms,
can be identified. Ouchi (1979) argued that it is not only authority‐based governance
mechanismsincludingrulesorsupervisioninaWeberianbureaucracy(3.1)andoutput‐
basedgovernancemechanisms including prices and indicators (3.2) that can influence
decisionsandcoordinateactions.Self‐organizinggovernance(3.3)toocanhaveaneffect,
with the latter becoming increasingly important for fostering knowledge creation and
enhancing problem‐solving capacities (Frost and Morner 2010). This again is an
important part of coping with wicked problems, whereas output‐based or authority‐
basedgovernanceareoflimitedusehere.
3.1 Authority‐basedgovernanceinWeberianbureaucracy
PublicadministrationistraditionallydominatedbyWeberianprinciplesofauthorityand
rule‐based governancemechanisms. It is suited for standardized and repetitivework
tasks and traditionally characterized by predictable careers for public employees and
equitable treatment by rule‐of‐law. The bureaucrat is expected to implement policies
neutrally consistent with legal requirements and to follow budgetary or procedural
standards(Andersenetal.2012).Thisisenforcedbyrules,directivesandlawsthatset
goals and limits for certain behaviour and conduct that need to be monitored or
regulatedbyacentralized(andlegitimate)authority(MarchandSimon1958;Lawrence
andLorsch1969).Theauthority‐basedgovernancemechanismscanbesubdividedinto
direct (personal, hierarchical) supervision or into general (impersonal) rules and
adherentenforcements(Weber1922).
Since authority‐based governance in aWeberian bureaucracy concentrates on setting
rules and procedures and monitoring compliance, it significantly limits “the
opportunitiestothinkexpansivelyaboutpolicyissuesofthetypethatmightbethrown
up to wicked problems” (Head and Alford 2013:9). Strictly interpreted tasks and
authoritynotonly leadtoa functionalfragmentationofpublicsectororganization,but
also toa lackofresponsiveness towards thecomplexneedsofcitizens.Astheprivate,
public, and civic sectors need to dealwith “multiple, overlapping, interconnected […]
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problems” (Weber andKhademian2008:336) that exceedpolicy areas, the spheresof
organizational activities and jurisdictions, and confined hierarchical and authoritative
structuresareoverwhelmedbysuchcomplexityincopingwiththeseproblems.
Furthermore, authority‐based governance implies a high level of understanding and
judgeability by those who supervise or establish and enforce the rules, i.e. by the
monitoring agents (Ouchi 1980).Otherwise itwould be impossible to supervise or to
regulatecorrectly,or toestablishadequate regulationandensurecompliance.Thus, if
publicofficialshaverecognizedtheexperienceandexpertiseoftherespectiveprocesses
andinteractions,theyshouldbeabletoadequatelyjudgepolicyanddecision‐makingas
wellasknowledge‐intensivecollaboration(FrostandMorner2010).
However,thereisadangerofarational‐technocraticplanningmodel,astheknowledge
seems“objective”. In thiscase,participatorypolicy‐anddecision‐makingarerendered
disposable (Nabatchi 2010:380 et sqq.), with less room left for creativity, discursive
participationandpublic learning.Veryoften in the caseofknowledgecreation,public
officials aren’t included in the process and are unable to judge it. In these cases,
authority‐basedgovernance fails to copewithuncertaintyandvalueconflicts. Instead,
other forms of governance need to be established that are better able to encourage
government and citizens to collaboratively create knowledge and foster a consensus,
withoutengaginginpatronizingormeddlingbehaviour.
3.2 Output‐basedgovernanceinNewPublicManagement
Asa response to the challengesofpurely authority‐basedgovernmental interventions
and the bureaucratic organizational design of the state, a more market‐oriented
approachhasbeen introducedaround theworld. It aimsat reducing the inefficiencies
that monopolistic forms of service provision implicate and which are dominated by
producer interests or the citizen as a recipient of orders. In general, the reform
paradigm commonly known as New Public Management “seeks to dismantle the
bureaucraticpillaroftheWeberianmodeloftraditionalpublicadministration”(Stoker
2006:45).Itstressestheimportanceofoutput‐basedgovernancemechanisms.Theyare
primarily based on output‐measures i.e. prices or numericmeasurementswhich give
incentives for individual behaviour leading supply and demand to an equilibrium.
Citizens are understood as clients whose needs are the focus of public management.
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Breaking up state service‐provision monopolies and implementing private‐sector
management techniquesbothaimatsavingmoney, improvingperformance,becoming
responsivetoclients’needsandthusbeingmoreeffectiveinprovidingpublicservices.
Furthermore, New Public Management is characterized by autonomous organizations
(public or private). Their clients decide upon economic transactions bilaterally, but
organize the input, transformation processes and related behaviour and actions
unilaterally.Itismainlytheoutputandthepriceofgoodsandservicesthatisrelevant
(Ouchi1979;Merchant1985;Merchant1989;Stoker2006).
Output‐basedmechanisms are based on prices and a numericmanagement approach
thatissuitablefortrivialproblems.Forthese,standardizedorcanonicalprocessesand
solutions are available andmeasurable by their usefulness. Examples are “identifying
thecosteffectivenessofdifferentcroppracticestoreducesoilerosion;ordetermining
thecostsandbenefitsofexpandinganirrigationproject”(Batie2008:1177).Pricescan
giveacleardirectiontoindividualsandincentivizethemtoefficientlyallocateresources
and transform them into goods and services that are demanded. Relevant issues are
known and uncontested, so that the production process is clear‐cut and can be
standardized accordingly (see Ouchi 1979; Merchant 1985; Merchant 1989; Stoker
2006;NoordengraafandAbma2003).
Two main arguments, however, can be raised against output‐based mechanisms for
cultivatingproblem‐resolvingcapabilities.First,“onlycollectiveengagementcanhopeto
address the problem” (Grint 2010:171), and this cannot be fostered solely by price
mechanismsandeconomictransactions.Itisinsteadbasedoncooperativebehaviour,its
output is hard to trace, and the individual share in creating it cannot be evaluated or
measured.Incontrast,output‐basedgovernancemechanismstendtoencourageutility‐
maximizing strategies that canbe followedby internalizing benefits and externalizing
costs, leading to uncooperative behaviour that hampers collective engagement.
Individualinterestsandcollectiveinterests(e.g.anequitableandsustainablesupplyof
resources) contradict one another. This is prevalent in situations in which direct or
indirect costs and the benefits of goods and services are not borne or shared
proportionatelybythepartiesinvolved.Marketfailurescanbeidentifiedinparticularin
thecaseofexternalities.Here,thepositiveornegativeeffectsandoutcomesassociated
with producing, supplying and consuming (public) goods and services spill over onto
10
third parties. Consequently, the collectively‐valued outcome of their consumption or
provision isnotcongruentwiththeiroutput– theyareeitherunder‐suppliedorover‐
used.Inthiscontextofmarketfailures,prices‘lie’,i.e.theygivedistortedsignals“about
their real value, confounding the communication between consumers and producers”
(Donahue 1991:18). Furthermore, the individually‐valued divide between output and
outcome is contested, as individual and collective interests depend on the individual
perspectiveor time‐horizon. In order tomake aprofit, exploitingnatural resources is
individually rational for a short period of time, but from a collective perspective
unsustainable in the long run. There is a trade‐off between individual rational utility
maximizing and collectively‐responsible conduct. Such a conflict of values cannot be
solved by output mechanisms alone. An example of this so‐called tragedy of the
commonsisoverfishingthateventuallyleadstoacollapsingecosystem.Also,free‐riding
heavyindustryrefrainsfrominvestmentinairfilters,thusexternalizingthecostsofair
pollution at the expense of public health and climate change – a ‘super wicked
problem’(seeOstrom1990;Stern2006;Hardin1968;Levinetal.2012).
Second, the numeric approach of output-based governance methodologically tends to distort
complexity and ambiguousness because it unidimensionally formulates or specifies the
problem as if it were trivial and well-defined, one that needed to be rationally solved,
perpetuating a fallacy of control. However, inthecaseofcomplexissuesthataredifficult
to answer and which are contested and ambiguous, “the use of facts and figures or
indicators has limited value” (Noordegraaf and Abma 2003:866). Accordingly, New
Public Management fails to tackle ambiguous and contested (solutions to) problems
insofar as it follows a linear approachof scientificmanagement.AsDurant andLegge
suggest, a governance system that “relies primarily on market, technocratic, and
objective scientific rationality as the primary formof persuasion is problematicwhen
wickedproblemsare involved” (2006:328).Theauthorsexemplify that for thecaseof
genetically‐modified food production, which is a complex as well as value‐laden,
controversial issue (Durant and Legge 2006). Consequently, deficiencies in governing
wickedproblemsareperpetuated.
Inastructuralperspective,NewPublicManagementhasbeencriticisedforitsfocuson
disaggregation,competition,andincentivization.Thisisaccompaniedbyhorizontaland
vertical coordination problems, partly because of the rising number of public sector
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organizations.Thus, even fewer capabilities, synergies and cross‐cutting strategies for
copingwithuncertaintyandvalueconflictsseemtobeavailable.Forboundary‐spanning
andcomplexsocialproblems,achievingaconsensusandbuildingtrustandlegitimacyis
necessary but neglected byNewPublicManagement (Dunleavy et al. 2006;Bao et al.
2013:446).
3.3 Self‐governanceinnetworked,whole‐ofandpublic‐valuegovernance
Mechanismsthatrelyoncontrolandmonitoringtendtodiminishcreativity,discursive
participation and public learning in knowledge‐intensive work settings which is
urgentlyneededforcopingwithwickedproblems.Therefore,self‐governancebecomes
crucial forsteering inthesecontexts. Itdiffers fromoutput‐basedandauthority‐based
governancemechanisms insofaras itreliesonsubtle formsofcontrol thatcanalsobe
foundinsocializationprocesses(onasocietalorpoliticallevel)orinprofessions(ona
sectorallevel).
In self‐organizing governance no clearly‐defined authority is to be found – rather,
decentralizedpersuasionandmutualmonitoringdominateself‐governing(Kirsch1996,
Adler 2001). Coordination can be achieved without exogenous interference. Self‐
organization is another fitting term for this mode of governance. Central to it are
mechanismsthatfocusonhowtocreatecommonconsent, forexamplebydeliberative
decision‐making that ideally involves all the persons concerned (Romme1996; Elster
1998;Nabatchi2010).
The concept of Public Value Management also makes use of mechanisms that
characterize self‐governance (Maynhardt 2009:192 et sqq.). “It rests on a fuller and
rounder vision of humanity thandoes either traditional public administration or new
publicmanagement.”(Stoker2006:56).Similarly,networkandcollaborativegovernance
andtheapproachofjoined‐uporwhole‐ofgovernmentaremeanttomeetthechallenges
of New Public Management, i.e. of overcoming governance problems resulting from
atomized organizations (Alford and Hughes 2008; Christensen and Lægreid 2007).
Networkandcollaborativegovernanceisneitherauthority‐basednoroutput‐basedand
thereforemayfosterknowledgetobeused,sharedandcreated(WeberandKhademian
2008:337etsqq.;RethemeyerandHatmaker2007:630etsqq.).Or,asBeningtonputsit
in theperspectiveofpublicvalue: It “recognizes the importanceof the laborofpublic
12
professionalsandmanagersintheco‐creationofpublicservice,throughtheinteraction
betweenproducersandusersandotherstakeholders,forexample,ineducation,health,
and criminal justice” (2009:236). At the same time, Public Value Management as a
reform paradigm is intended to ensure that the inefficiencies and red tape that may
occur inaWeberianbureaucratic top‐downcontrolareaverted(VeenstraandJanssen
2012).
In order to substantiate the concept of self‐governance, we take a look at the policy
issues insocial‐ecologicalsystemsthat“havepowerfulreciprocal feedbacksandactas
complexadaptive systems” (Folkeet al. 2005:443).Here, the tragedyof the commons
showscomplexandcontestedcollective‐actionproblems:Participantsaretemptednot
tocontributetothecooperationeffortthatisneededtoachieveacommongood.Neither
government nor private ownership as governance structures seem to suffice for
planning and building e.g. irrigation systems constituting common‐pool resources
(Ostrom 2011). Instead, adaptive, self‐organizing processes that involve various
stakeholders participating or working together are better suited, especially with
“community‐based systems of resource management tailored to specific places and
situations” (Folke et al. 2005:448). So far many different examples have been
highlighted (Folke et al. 2005): Olsson et al. (2004) examined a Swedish‐Norwegian
policyinitiativetosecurethenoblecrayfishpopulation(APNC),fundedbytheEuropean
Commissions Interreg program. The population was endangered because of a fungal
diseaseaswellasanimbalancedecosystemcausedbyoverexploitationandacidification
stemmingfromairpollutionfromcentralEurope.Thepolicyinitiativetocopewiththis
problem involved polycentric collaboration across organizational levels, including
municipalities, economic, agricultural and fishing associations, national agencies and
environmentaldepartments.Theauthorspointtosimilaritieswithanothercasestudy:A
broadperspectiveon several connected issues in a social‐ecological systemwasused,
multiple actors were involved in the process, and knowledge related to these issues
cultivatedinorganizationsandinstitutionsandsharedinsocialnetworks.Inthecaseof
Sweden,thedecision‐makingauthoritywasdecentralizedtolocalfishingassociationsby
national legislation, whose members monitored the ecosystem. With this self‐
governance approach, capabilities “dispersed across a set of loosely connected actors
[…] at different levels” (Olsson et al. 2004:87)were developed in order to copewith
complexityanduncertainty.
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Asthiscaseshows,output‐basedandauthority‐basedgovernancemechanismsarenot
obsolete in self‐governance. Likewise, the authors conclude that this “self‐organizing
process[…],facilitatedbyrulesandincentivesofhigherlevels,hasthepotentialtomake
the social–ecological systems more robust to change” (Olson et al. 2004:87).
Accordingly,amixofgovernancemechanismshastobeputinplace.Theirinterplayis
complexastheydependonamultitudeoffactors.
4. Behavioralantecedentsin(self‐)governingwickedproblems
Asdiscussedintheprevioussection,eachofthethreegovernancemodeshasadifferent
coordinating effect on how complex, uncertain and controversial issues that deviate
fromanoptimalstateofaffairscanbedealtwith.Wepointedoutthatgovernmentneeds
to cultivate knowledge capabilities and strengthen its responsiveness to the general
public. These capabilities are crucial in order to resolve value conflicts and reduce
complexity anduncertainty.More specifically, it is important to create, share anduse
knowledge collaboratively between public officials and citizens and also to engage in
dialogue‐based or participatory consensus‐finding. In networked and cross‐sectorial
arrangements, the effective use of self‐governance is crucial but very demanding
becausemultiplefactorsdeterminingtheextentoftheinvolvementofpublicofficialsas
wellascitizensneedtobeconsidered(Nabatchi2012:699sqq.).Ifcitizens,groups,and
organizations are incapable or unwilling to be engaged partners in the collaborative
governance process, self‐organization fails to tame wicked problems (Emerson et al.
2011:2;Morse2012).Referringtoorganizationtheory inthefollowing,wespecifythe
two behavioral factors that enormously impact the functioning of the self‐governance
processes (the following text stemspartly fromMorneret al. 2010;Frost andMorner
2010; Morner and Misgeld 2013): the cognitive compatibility of the involved actors,
representing their cognitive capability for mutual understanding (4.1), and their
willingnesstocooperate(4.2).
4.1 Thecognitivecompatibilityoftheinvolvedactorsasaprerequisiteforself‐governance
Cognitivecompatibilitymeansthedegreetowhichthecognitivepatternsoftheinvolved
participantsarecompatibleandthustheyareabletounderstandeachother,aswellas
respectiveevents, contextsandenvironments (Rumelhart1980; SimsandGioia1986;
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Barr et al. 1992). Whether cognitive patterns are compatible or incompatible
significantly affects how collaborators and participating citizens tend to cooperate in
policy‐anddecision‐making. Ifpatternsdifferbecause, forexample,participantsdon’t
usethesamelanguageorhavedifferentworldviews,interestsandhabits,theyarelikely
to perceive, interpret and evaluate situations in diverging ways. Then, consensus‐
making is impeded,whichcounteractscopingwithwickedproblems(HeadandAlford
2013:7).Fordiscussingcomplexpolicyissuesandvalueconflictsinthecontextofthese
problems,differentpatternscanbeseennotonlyaschallengesbutalsoasopportunities.
Two main effects of dissimilar cognitive patterns can be identified as beneficial for
copingwithcomplexity:Ontheonehand,conflictinginterpretationschemesmayresult
inanenrichedbodyofknowledgeandpubliclearning.Fromthispointofview,cognitive
dissimilaritiestendtobroadenpublicofficials’orparticipants’perspectivesandwaysof
thinking. Individuals are able to consider or to better understand various options in
policy‐ anddecision‐making (Eisenhardt et al. 1997;Head andAlford2013:13 et sq.),
and the set of policy alternatives can be more fully detected. Accordingly, new
knowledge canbe created throughdiscursivedecision‐making that is fruitful if public
officials as well as citizens can contribute equally with deviating ideas, concepts and
understandings.Thus,thescopeanddepthoftheknowledgeobtainedcanbewidened,
deepenedorenriched,andthismayleadtobettercopingstrategies.Withsimilarresults,
innovation research states that diverse knowledge repositories are needed so that
individualsareabletorecognize,assimilateandusenewandrelevantinformationand
also create knowledge. For example, for public private partnerships or in network
governance, a transfer of knowledge, skills and routines and also cross‐boundary
learningareseenasimportantaspectsofself‐organization(KivlenieceandQuelin2012;
WeberandKhademian2008;KoppenjanandKlijn2004:6et sqq.).On theotherhand,
similarcognitivepatternscanleadtoan‘in‐groupbias’.Inthiscase,possibleeffectscan
includesomeinformationordecisionoptionsnotbeingunderstood,notbeingtakeninto
considerationorsimplyoverlooked.Becauseofanin‐groupbias,lessknownindividuals’
contributionsareundervaluedandtheiropinionsnotheard.Also,expertsandpeersina
technocratic planning model may become less capable of using knowledge about
interests and values or of implicit, tacit, practical or contextual character. This
knowledge may stem from outside, local resources, particularly from citizens’ needs,
experiences and perspectives (Batie and Schweickhardt 2009:29; Jentoft and
15
Chuanpagdee 2009:554 et sq.; Head andAlford 2013:3;6 et sqq.). Thus, being able to
cooperaterequiresmaintainingabalancebetweencognitivedissimilarityandsimilarity,
betweenahighernoveltyvalueandlowermutualunderstanding(Wuytsetal.2004:3).
A certain cognitive compatibility or overlapping of cognitive patterns is therefore
needed so that a shared understanding (Nooteboom 1992; Nooteboom 1999) and
reduced uncertainties can be reached. Then, coping with wicked problems via self‐
governancemaybecomepossible.
4.2 Thewillingnesstocooperateoftheinvolvedactorsasaprerequisiteforself‐governance
Asecondprerequisiteforthefunctioningofself‐governanceisthattheinvolvedactors
be willing to cooperate. As mentioned before, coping with wicked problems needs
collectiveengagementthatisbasedoncooperativebehaviorandinteraction(Buerenet
al.2003:195etsqq.).AccordingtoOstrom(2000),most individualsareusuallywilling
to cooperate under certain circumstances. The most important factor influencing
willingness to cooperate is whether others are expected to cooperate or not.
Accordingly,thewilltocooperateisreciprocalinnatureandindividualsrateeachother
on how actively they intend to cooperate (or freeride) in the policy‐ and decision‐
makingprocess.Thusthewillingnesstocooperatecanmutuallyintensify(negativelyor
positively) and end up in an upward or downward spiral effect (Osterloh 2007). In a
downwardcooperativemomentum, collective irrational, opportunisticbehavior looms
largeasagentstendtoincorporateconductalignedtovaluesdominatedbyself‐interest
andextrinsicmotivation.Thisleadstoasocialdilemmaandexacerbatesthetragedyof
thecommons:Collaboratorsorparticipantscounteractthegroupoutcomeswhichthey
arestrivingfor.Theresultmaybeadeadendofnon‐cooperation,whichself‐evidentlyis
less preferred collectively and individually than a situation in which conditional co‐
operators show pro‐social collective behavior (Williamson 1985; Dawes 1991; Miller
1992; Frost andMorner 2005). A downward spiral can be triggered by crowding‐out
effects if extrinsic motivators are fostered or patterns of extrinsic motivation
strengthened:Collaboratorsorparticipantsaccordingly tendtoevaluate theirpossible
actionsonhowrewardscanbeachievedandsanctionsavoidedinsteadofsatisfyingthe
need to collaborate or participate for its own sake. Joint‐action in order to follow a
commonintereste.g.forbettercopingwiththetragedyofthecommons,islesslikelyas
collaborators or participants behave competitively in the logic of self‐interest,
16
maximizing instead of cooperating (Christensen 2005; Mooney et al. 2007).
Consequently, cooperative activities that are important for decision‐making, such as
knowledge sharing, are impaired since decision‐makers are afraid of losing their
competitiveadvantage(Osterlohetal.2002).Insettingsthataredominatedbyextrinsic
motivation,socialdilemmasoccurandparticipantsandcollaboratorsarecompelledto
counteract the common interest and public good. Thus, self‐organization may fail to
build capabilities in order to cope with collective problems. In contrast, intrinsically
motivated agents striving to cooperate can positively influence policy‐ and decision‐
making processes. They can build up trust, shared motivation and commitment in a
value‐centered public management. These are important for a positive collaborative
dynamic and even catalyze the collective engagement needed for copingwithwicked
problems(AnsellandGash2008;Emersonetal.2012;Baoetal.2013:453etsqq.).
5. Conclusion
Thispapertheoreticallyconceptualizeshowdifferentgovernancemechanismsareable
to‘tame’wickedproblemsinthepublicsector.Inordertodothis,wefirstidentifythe
characteristicsoftwodimensionsoftheseproblemsinparticular.Wedescribethemas
inherentlycomplexintheirscaleofuncertaintyandvalueconflicts,andshowthatthey
can only be tackled if their complexity is accepted and the involved stakeholders are
includedintheproblem‐solvingprocessthroughparticipatoryprocessesandpractices.
Referringtoorganizationaltheoryandtheconceptofknowledgegovernance,wepoint
out that output‐based governancemechanisms (e.g. prices and indicators) as well as
authority‐basedgovernance(e.g.rulesandsupervision)arerarelysuitedtocopingwith
uncertainty, complexity and value conflicts. They need to be complemented by self‐
governance, so that collective engagement and cooperation in policy‐ and decision‐
making is fostered.This is congruentwith anetwork governance approach or public‐
valuemanagement perspective that stresses the facilitative, enabling and partner‐like
role of public officials. However, involved participants and collaborators need to be
(motivationally) willing and (cognitively) able to interact for consensus‐finding and
sharing, using and creating knowledge. Only then does adequate ‘taming’ of wicked
problems‘seempossible.
17
Our paper contributes to research in the field of public management by specifying
governance‐relatedantecedentsforcopingwithwickedproblems.Wealsocontributeby
transferringresultsfromorganizationalandmotivationaltheoryaswellastheconcept
of knowledge governance into public management. We focus on how governing
collaborative arrangements can be aligned with consensus‐finding and knowledge‐
creation,sharinganduse.Additionally,weshowhowmotivationalandcognitiveaspects
ofparticipantsshouldbeconsideredinthisconnection.
Further research gaps can be identified. The interactions between differentmodes of
governance and how they contribute to building trust, legitimacy and accountability
need to be examined in network governance settings (Christensen et al. 2013). The
mechanisms’mutualinterplayneedstobeanalyzedinrelationtohowtheycomplement,
substituteandhindereachother,andwhether thishelps incopingwithuncertainties,
complexities and value conflicts. Finally, empirical evidence will be very helpful in
advancingourframeworkforgoverningwickedproblems.
18
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