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EVALUATING THE MECHANISMS OF JALSWARJYA WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
Jie-Sheng Tan
Subhrendu K. Pattanayak
Nicholas Sch of the Environment, Duke University
Camp Resources
9 August, 2011
OBJECTIVES Demonstrate how mechanisms evaluation can
complement a standard program evaluation Assess the performance of community driven-
development projects
APPLICATION Jalswarjya water and sanitation project
INTRODUCTION
High global burden of water-related diseases such as diarrhea
Clean water and basic sanitation break the pathways to the diseases
Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation project Maharashtra, India Community-Driven Development (CDD) Community participation:
Each village choose and implement their W&S projects Village pay 10% of capital costs and all of future
maintenance
JALSWARJYA – EVALUATION OF IMPACTS
95 treatment, 147 control villages Treatment: Jalswarjya W&S project Control: Selected by propensity score matching
Household-level baseline and endline surveys at 2005 and 2007 respectively
Averting costs and cost of illnesses Improvements in both groups but no statistical
difference between both groups Possible conclusions from these results
Project did not work… but why? Impacts did not show due to closeness between
baseline and endline survey Another mode of investigation: mechanisms
HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS
1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972) Centralization
With ‘policy uniformity’ assumption, central planner choose same level of public good (or any goods), g for all communities
Decentralization Each community can choose their own optimal level of gi
HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS
2nd: Higher capacity for collective action Ostrom (1990) case studies on common pool
resources Institutional designs for cooperative actions
Clear and transparent decision-making Repeated interactions between community members Delegation of power by government
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) Suggested policy prescriptions for increasing collective
action Co-production Empowerment of locals
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Targeting of preferences
Main water source is…
Taste Color Safety Reliability Smell
Private Tap 0.037***(2.83)
0.024(0.87)
0.041*(1.86)
0.056(0.58)
0.006(0.34)
Public Well 0.026(1.20)
0.038**(2.06)
0.040*(1.89)
0.045(0.75)
0.021(1.39)
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Capacity for collective action
Village-cleaning activities your household participate in…
Sweeping streets -0.016(-0.41)
Cleaning drains 0.021(0.32)
Cleaning water sources -0.043(-0.67)
Cleaning school areas 0.041(0.63)
Removing garbage -0.043(-0.67)
Planting trees 0.0046(0.07)
Cleaning community latrines -0.011(-0.27)
Thank you
HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS
1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972)Representative consumer:
- gi is the level of local public good (or any goods provided by the program)
- ϕi is the preference parameter- xi is the private good (or necessities)
iiii xguu ,
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