EVALUATING THE MECHANISMS OF JALSWARJYA WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT

Jie-Sheng Tan

Subhrendu K. Pattanayak

Nicholas Sch of the Environment, Duke University

Camp Resources

9 August, 2011

OBJECTIVES Demonstrate how mechanisms evaluation can

complement a standard program evaluation Assess the performance of community driven-

development projects

APPLICATION Jalswarjya water and sanitation project

INTRODUCTION

High global burden of water-related diseases such as diarrhea

Clean water and basic sanitation break the pathways to the diseases

Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation project Maharashtra, India Community-Driven Development (CDD) Community participation:

Each village choose and implement their W&S projects Village pay 10% of capital costs and all of future

maintenance

JALSWARJYA – EVALUATION OF IMPACTS

95 treatment, 147 control villages Treatment: Jalswarjya W&S project Control: Selected by propensity score matching

Household-level baseline and endline surveys at 2005 and 2007 respectively

Averting costs and cost of illnesses Improvements in both groups but no statistical

difference between both groups Possible conclusions from these results

Project did not work… but why? Impacts did not show due to closeness between

baseline and endline survey Another mode of investigation: mechanisms

HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS

1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972) Centralization

With ‘policy uniformity’ assumption, central planner choose same level of public good (or any goods), g for all communities

Decentralization Each community can choose their own optimal level of gi

HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS

2nd: Higher capacity for collective action Ostrom (1990) case studies on common pool

resources Institutional designs for cooperative actions

Clear and transparent decision-making Repeated interactions between community members Delegation of power by government

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) Suggested policy prescriptions for increasing collective

action Co-production Empowerment of locals

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Targeting of preferences

Main water source is…

Taste Color Safety Reliability Smell

Private Tap 0.037***(2.83)

0.024(0.87)

0.041*(1.86)

0.056(0.58)

0.006(0.34)

Public Well 0.026(1.20)

0.038**(2.06)

0.040*(1.89)

0.045(0.75)

0.021(1.39)

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Capacity for collective action

Village-cleaning activities your household participate in…

Sweeping streets -0.016(-0.41)

Cleaning drains 0.021(0.32)

Cleaning water sources -0.043(-0.67)

Cleaning school areas 0.041(0.63)

Removing garbage -0.043(-0.67)

Planting trees 0.0046(0.07)

Cleaning community latrines -0.011(-0.27)

Thank you

HYPOTHESIZED CDD MECHANISMS

1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972)Representative consumer:

- gi is the level of local public good (or any goods provided by the program)

- ϕi is the preference parameter- xi is the private good (or necessities)

iiii xguu ,