DESIGN FOR SAFETY HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES -HAZOPs

DESIGN FOR SAFETY

HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES -HAZOPs

RISK ANALYSIS METHODS

HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY)PETERS & TIMMERHAUS, P. 29 AND PERRY’S, 26-10 EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITYRESULTS IN A REPORT WITH

LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESSDEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDSCLARIFICATION OF OPERATING PROCEDURES

SAFETY IN PLANTS MORE THAN JUST A PHRASETHE COMBINATION OF CHEMICALS AND PROCESSES CAN RESULT IN HAZARDSTHE SIMPLEST HAZARDS ARE THE SAME AS IN ANY OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR OFFICE SITUATION

– TRIPPING OR FALLING – ELECTRIC SHOCK, – CHOKING – JUST GETTING

TO WORK

CAUSES OF DEATHS

National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

CAUSES OF DEATHS

National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTSAGES 35 – 44, 2004 DATA

http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus.html

LOCATION OF INJURIES

http://www.nsc.org/library/report_injury_usa.htmTHE SAME REPORT INDICATES THE LOCATIONS OF MOST DEATHS AND INJURIES

RELATIVE RATES FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshc_d99.htm#first.link 188.3 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE COUNTRY111.4 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY124 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY85 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE DRUG INDUSTRIES

OBJECTIVE FOR ENGINEERS

ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE HAZARDS ANDDESIGN THEM OUT OF THE SYSTEMDESIGN THE SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE THE FREQUENCY AND THE INTENSITYREDUCE THE RISK AS LOW AS PRACTICAL WHILE STILL KEEPING AN ECONOMICALLY SOLVENT OPERATION

RISK AVERSIONhttp://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds_dying.jpg

IDENTIFY INHERENT PROBLEMS

METHODS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH OBJECTIVES:DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS

HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSISSAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF CONTROL

DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES

CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING, ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSEVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING

LEGAL REQUIREMENTSANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR PROCESSES AS PART OF: SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/sara.htm)OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119 (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARDS

HAZOPS FLOW CHART

ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM

WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

DESIGN ENGINEERSOPERATORSMATERIALS SPECIALISTSEH&S SPECIALISTS

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

COLLECT DATA

PFD’S, P&ID’S, ONE-LINES, LOGIC DIAGRAMS, & OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGSEQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND SPECIFICATIONSMAINTENANCE INFORMATIONMSDS

DEFINE PROCESS NODES

WALK THROUGH THE PROCESS AND BREAK IT INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSISLOCATE THESE ONP&IDs

http://www.tisec.com/images/reliability/refinery.jpg

http://www.mne.psu.edu/me415/spring06/AP1/PID.jpg

ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH NODE

PURPOSE OR INTENTPROCESS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE:

HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION, SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION, INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC.

PROCESS VARIABLES INCLUDE: PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION, CORROSION, EROSION, ETC.

HUMAN INTERACTION: HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.

POSSIBLE PROCESS DEVIATIONS

PREDICT RESULTS IF NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS ARISE, WITHOUT

CONSIDERATION OF SOURCE

NO OR NOTMORELESSAS WELL ASREVERSE

OTHER THANFLUCTUATIONEARLYLATE

DEFINE RISK

SEVERITY AND PROBABILITYDETERMINE CAUSE

– EQUIPMENT FAILURE– OPERATOR ERROR– ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES– EXTERNAL IMPACTS

http://www.qualityamerica.com/QAProducts/images/fishbone.jpg

ESTIMATE SEVERITY

PREDICT EVENT FREQUENCY

COMPLETE REVISION RECOMMENDATIONS

EXAMINE EXISTING SAFEGUARDSDEFINE REVISIONS AND ESTABLISH CHECK LIST TO IMPLEMENT

– ACTIONS THAT CAN REMOVE THE CAUSE –

– INHERENT FAIL-SAFE DESIGN ACTIONS TO MITIGATE OR ELIMINATE CONSEQUENCES