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DESIGN FOR SAFETY
HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES -HAZOPs
RISK ANALYSIS METHODS
HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY)PETERS & TIMMERHAUS, P. 29 AND PERRY’S, 26-10 EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITYRESULTS IN A REPORT WITH
LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESSDEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDSCLARIFICATION OF OPERATING PROCEDURES
SAFETY IN PLANTS MORE THAN JUST A PHRASETHE COMBINATION OF CHEMICALS AND PROCESSES CAN RESULT IN HAZARDSTHE SIMPLEST HAZARDS ARE THE SAME AS IN ANY OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR OFFICE SITUATION
– TRIPPING OR FALLING – ELECTRIC SHOCK, – CHOKING – JUST GETTING
TO WORK
CAUSES OF DEATHS
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012
CAUSES OF DEATHS
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012
BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTSAGES 35 – 44, 2004 DATA
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus.html
LOCATION OF INJURIES
http://www.nsc.org/library/report_injury_usa.htmTHE SAME REPORT INDICATES THE LOCATIONS OF MOST DEATHS AND INJURIES
RELATIVE RATES FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshc_d99.htm#first.link 188.3 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE COUNTRY111.4 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY124 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY85 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE DRUG INDUSTRIES
OBJECTIVE FOR ENGINEERS
ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE HAZARDS ANDDESIGN THEM OUT OF THE SYSTEMDESIGN THE SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE THE FREQUENCY AND THE INTENSITYREDUCE THE RISK AS LOW AS PRACTICAL WHILE STILL KEEPING AN ECONOMICALLY SOLVENT OPERATION
RISK AVERSIONhttp://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds_dying.jpg
IDENTIFY INHERENT PROBLEMS
METHODS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH OBJECTIVES:DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS
HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSISSAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF CONTROL
DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES
CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING, ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSEVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING
LEGAL REQUIREMENTSANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR PROCESSES AS PART OF: SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/sara.htm)OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119 (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARDS
HAZOPS FLOW CHART
ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM
WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE
DESIGN ENGINEERSOPERATORSMATERIALS SPECIALISTSEH&S SPECIALISTS
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
COLLECT DATA
PFD’S, P&ID’S, ONE-LINES, LOGIC DIAGRAMS, & OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGSEQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND SPECIFICATIONSMAINTENANCE INFORMATIONMSDS
DEFINE PROCESS NODES
WALK THROUGH THE PROCESS AND BREAK IT INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSISLOCATE THESE ONP&IDs
http://www.tisec.com/images/reliability/refinery.jpg
http://www.mne.psu.edu/me415/spring06/AP1/PID.jpg
ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH NODE
PURPOSE OR INTENTPROCESS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE:
HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION, SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION, INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC.
PROCESS VARIABLES INCLUDE: PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION, CORROSION, EROSION, ETC.
HUMAN INTERACTION: HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.
POSSIBLE PROCESS DEVIATIONS
PREDICT RESULTS IF NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS ARISE, WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION OF SOURCE
NO OR NOTMORELESSAS WELL ASREVERSE
OTHER THANFLUCTUATIONEARLYLATE
DEFINE RISK
SEVERITY AND PROBABILITYDETERMINE CAUSE
– EQUIPMENT FAILURE– OPERATOR ERROR– ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES– EXTERNAL IMPACTS
http://www.qualityamerica.com/QAProducts/images/fishbone.jpg
ESTIMATE SEVERITY
PREDICT EVENT FREQUENCY
COMPLETE REVISION RECOMMENDATIONS
EXAMINE EXISTING SAFEGUARDSDEFINE REVISIONS AND ESTABLISH CHECK LIST TO IMPLEMENT
– ACTIONS THAT CAN REMOVE THE CAUSE –
– INHERENT FAIL-SAFE DESIGN ACTIONS TO MITIGATE OR ELIMINATE CONSEQUENCES