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Phillip Clark Clark 1
Professor John Dedie
Comparative Politics & Government
November 19th, 2012
Condoleezza Rice: A Broker and Diplomat With Few Regrets
No Higher Honor is a political memoir written by Condoleezza Rice. Rice was the
National Security Advisor, and subsequently, Secretary of State during President George W.
Bush’s two terms in the Oval Office. Born in segregated Alabama during the mid-1950’s, Rice
would rise to transcend the circumstances of her birth. She would go on to become a respected
academic in foreign policy at Stanford University, and eventually serve a president with
capability and vigor for the respective positions which she held. The years during which
Condoleezza Rice served President Bush were some of the most tumultuous that the nation has
witnessed since its inception. In the court of public opinion, the Bush administration has been
judged harshly, for an ill-calculated and prolonged war on a country that had little to do with the
terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and for a perceived inability to hear the expressed
desires of American citizens – as well as the international community – when it came to
determining the course the nation would take in terms of domestic and foreign policy. With
eloquence and recourse to detail, Condoleezza Rice offers her vantage point as one of the most
crucial insiders of the Bush administration. Compellingly, she makes the case that the court of
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popular opinion will not have the last word on the legacy of George W. Bush’s presidency. In
fact, many courses of action taken by the administration that have been viewed through a
universal lens of denunciation were in actuality, much more nuanced and complex.
Condoleezza Rice was first acquainted with the Bush family when she had been sought
out as a Soviet specialist for President George H. W. Bush’s National Security Council (Rice 1).
Rice was first introduced to George W. Bush when she was invited by the family to visit their
vacation residence on the seacoast of Maine in August of 1998. George W. Bush was currently
the Governor of Texas and was preparing to run re-election. He mentioned that if he was
successful in this bid he would begin to form a campaign to run for the presidency of the United
States. During the course of her visit Condoleezza Rice and the Governor would discuss a
plethora of foreign, as well as, other policy initiatives. Governor Bush would go on to win re-
election later on that year and promptly launched his campaign for the American presidency
(Rice 2).
As the 2000 presidential campaign drew to an end, its conclusion would be defined by the
controversial recount saga that was waged over a discrepancy between the popular vote-count,
which had been garnished by presidential candidate Al Gore, and the tally of the Electoral
College, which was won by Governor George W. Bush. The U.S. Supreme Court would
ultimately have to put an end to the dispute. Following this debacle, President Bush would name
Rice as his National Security Advisor (Rice 11).
In great detail, Rice reflects on the unique duties and obligations of the National Security
Council. Although it is a component of the president’s Cabinet, the NSC is not a designated
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department within the Executive Branch. It does not possess troops, diplomats, or a budget. It is
solely used as an advisory office to the president. The office is involved intensely with policy
matters but never enforces them directly. Operational concerns in terms of policy are left to
Cabinet secretaries who are confirmed by the Senate (Rice 14). The main task of the National
Security Council is to “coordinate” the intricacies of policy among various government agencies
(Rice 18). Rice once remarked to President Bush that working to get the secretaries of other
departments to do what the president wants them to do in terms of policy is like “using a remote
control” (Rice 18).
Early on in the first term, a clear illustration is given of how the conventional portrayal of
George W. Bush as an unintelligent, heartless, conservative may be somewhat unfair. The close
proximity of the state of Texas to Mexico led President Bush to make engaging and building a
relationship with Latin America a key part of his foreign policy agenda. This partnership would
be carried out by “emphasizing strong ties to Mexico, renewed promotion of hemispheric free
trade, and sustained support for freedom and democracy across the Americas” (Rice 25). The
President’s first trip abroad would be to Mexico in 2001. The underlying theme of the journey
was to highlight the importance of Mexico to President Bush. Following his election to the
presidency, Bush, along with Mexican President Vicente Fox, constructed an initiative of
cooperation in which trade was strengthened, the borders between the United States and Mexico
were modernized, comprehensive immigration reform was pursued, and an advocacy of a free-
market approach was taken up throughout the region (Rice 25). George W. Bush’s personal
commitment to immigration reform has been a subject that has been lost to the wider American
public. Because of his close ties to Mexico as Governor of Texas the political, geographic,
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and demographic conditions that characterized the lives of those who lived on both sides of the
border caused President Bush to have a deeper investment in this issue than few other presidents
have. Perhaps the absence of this degree of familiarity that George W. Bush brought to the table
in confronting this issue has been why realizing a solution to this problem has proven so elusive.
Unfortunately, the optimistic prospects of the trip were overshadowed by an unexpected
development in Iraq. White House press secretary Ari Fleisher interrupted the meeting to ask,
“Why are we bombing Baghdad?” (Rice 27). It turned out that American planes had “flown too
close” to the air space of Iraqi defenses and had consequently set off air raid sirens throughout
the city and the immediate radius of the area. A press release was issued noting that the United
States was fulfilling its obligations under the armistice terms that had ended the Persian Gulf
War in 1991. Regular air patrols were carried out to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his
aircraft against his own people or his geographical neighbors – thus enforcing a no-fly zone
mandated by the peace agreement (Rice 27). Unfortunately, as it was highly unexpected and
alarming in nature, this incident undermined the potential that could have existed in the
relationship between President Fox and President Bush.
Not all in the administration viewed this occurrence as a setback. Vice President Dick
Cheney let it be known that he thought the development rightly showed that the United States
was being tough on Saddam Hussein. The following morning, the New York Times quoted the
Vice President as saying, “The air strikes had sent a timely signal that the new administration
would not shy away from using force to contain any new Iraqi military threat.” However,
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Condoleezza Rice felt that this action would only be perceived as the United States behaving
arrogantly, particularly towards their Mexican hosts (Rice 28). Even if it was an embarrassing
faux pas on the President’s first foreign trip, Rice still saw this episode as evoking the
implications of a larger trajectory:
The incident in Mexico was a reminder of the festering problem of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq and its threat to our national interests. Almost from the very
beginning Iraq was a preoccupation of the national security team. Our focus was
not, as common wisdom now has it, on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Rather, the early efforts were aimed at trying to strengthen the containment
regime that had been put into place after the Gulf War. That war had ended
inconclusively with Iraqi forces expelled from Kuwait but the regime still in
power. The assessment of the George H. W. Bush administration in 1991 that
Saddam was so weakened that he would either fall from power or stay in his box
turned out to be wrong. (Rice 29)
Thus, even if the notion of Iraqi invasion was not planned at the outset, Rice reveals that some
sort of military confrontation was always viewed as being inevitable when it came to engaging
and negotiating with the regime of Saddam Hussein. She goes on to mention that no-fly zones
were just one method used in a network of tactics that the international community was using to
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negate the probability of the dictator attacking his neighbors and to prevent him from obtaining
weapons of mass destruction (Rice 29.)
In the wake of the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 an aggressive
strategy was sought by the Bush administration to combat the extremist agendas of Islamic
jihadists that had prompted the strike against the security of the United States, and to prevent it
from ever occurring again. Abu Zubaydah, a key al-Qaeda operative who had helped plan and
carry out 9/11, was discovered in Faisalabad, Pakistan on March 28, 2002 hiding in a safe-house
(Rice 116). A gunfight erupted in the process of capturing him and he was shot three times. Rice
notes that his survival was due completely to the efforts of an American physician who had been
flown in directly by the CIA. She further asserts that his death would have had negative
consequences in the efforts to thwart al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations (Rice 117). Zubaydah
managed a plethora of duties during the time that he spent with the extremist organization. He
was the chief recruitment officer who reviewed the stream of incoming militants in terrorist
training camps in Afghanistan. It was he who would impart orders to these men as they would
leave the facilities. Zubaydah had even authored the manual that detailed how to resist
interrogation techniques if the militants were ever caught (Rice 117). This latter reality was a
challenge to gaining as much information as possible on the ideas that al-Qaeda was planning at
the time. The situation lead those within the CIA who had been tasked with interrogating
Zubaydah to seek authorization to use particular procedures that were referred to as “enhanced
interrogation techniques.” When presented with this proposition, Rice recalls President Bush
asking two questions, “Would the interrogation program be legal? Would it be necessary?” (Rice
117).
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In discussions with the then-Director of the CIA, George Tenet, he opined that the
techniques were “safe and effective” because they were the very same techniques “that had been
used in the military training of thousands of U.S. soldiers.” (Rice 117). Still, President Bush
directed Tenet not to approve the interrogations until the Justice Department had confirmed their
legality. The Department did so, and the procedures – most notably waterboarding – would
commence from that point on. Rice attests that as a result of these steps Abu Zubaydah ended up
being an invaluable source of information. This information would lead to the capture of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed. This man was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, the al-Qaeda
operational commander for North America, and knew what was coming next as well as who
would be in charge of planning it within the organization. He would also confess to being the
executioner of Daniel Pearl, the late journalist of the Wall Street Journal who was kidnapped and
heinously slaughtered before the lens of a video camera (Rice 118).
Despite the provocative nature of these techniques, and the scathing criticism they would
receive in following years, Rice stands by and defends the utilization of such methods during the
Bush administration (Rice 120). She boldly states, “…In the aftermath of the attack on the Twin
Towers and the Pentagon, I do not regret the decisions we made. I would never have engaged in
– or encouraged the President to undertake activities – that I thought to be illegal. That was why
the Justice Department was front and center in the assessment of the policies…” The
sanctimonious claim of having steadfast recourse to legal parameters in crafting policy initiatives
has been made numerous times by occupants of the Oval Office. Yet, is this really the case?
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Does the White House thoroughly examine the necessary legal authorizations to conduct its
policy endeavors, or does the president merely dictate the outcome behind the scenes? Even as
many hailed the decision, one merely has to look at President Barack Obama’s recent shift in
policy regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. His administration assumed office defending the
federal law – enacted by Congress in 1996 – which barred any recognition of same-sex
marriages by the U.S. government. As more federal courts interpreted DOMA as being
unconstitutional and an increasing number of states would legalize the aspiration of same-sex
couples to marry, the President has directed the Justice Department to cease defending the statute
in court. So, does legal precedent truly serve as the foundation for policy decisions, or, does
politics determine the end result – using the “law” as a means to achieve this end?
Nonetheless, Rice rationalizes all concerns by honestly stating, “I could not have forgiven
myself had there been another attack. And had that happened, there would have rightly been a
different kind of second-guessing as Americans asked, ‘Why did you not do everything in your
power to keep it from happening again?” (Rice 120-121)
In 2004, Rice would testify before the 9/11 Commission in Congress to answer for the
decisions she had made as national security advisor when the attacks had taken place (Rice 260).
She felt that her testimony was crucial because other Cabinet secretaries had testified only from
the context of their own departments. Her thoughts and recollections as national security advisor
would gave a fuller picture of the steps that had been taken across the Bush administration in
response to 9/11 (Rice 260). During the course of her testimony, she noted that the failure to
prevent 9/11 was not the fault of any particular administration. It was rather a “structural”
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mishap. The main problem was that intelligence resources were not being shared
comprehensively among various government agencies. There was also a gap in knowledge
between what was known about foreign and domestic terrorist threats (Rice 263). Rice affirms
that, “Better integrating intelligence would be critical to preventing the next attack” (Rice 263).
The issue of intelligence and how it is gathered is still a hot topic in today’s political climate.
The ongoing saga of U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice (who has no relation to Condoleezza Rice)
and her response to this year’s terrorist attacks on America’s embassy in Benghazi, Libya
continues to underscore this point. The question in this instance being: did Ambassador Rice
simply act on the intelligence she had been given or did she respond in spite of this information,
misleading the American public?
Despite being a driving catalyst of these controversial positions, President George W.
Bush would name Condoleezza Rice as his Secretary of State following his re-election in 2004.
Human freedom and a respect for the inherent dignity of all individuals would form the
foundation of Bush’s foreign policy initiatives during his second term in office (Rice 325).
Secretary Rice makes the case that only stability and democracy will help preserve the interests
of the United States abroad (Rice 326). She compares this approach of confronting the world
after September 11th to that which was taken in the aftermath of the Second World War. The
Secretary mentions that President Roosevelt had not entered World War Two with the intention
of democratizing Germany and Japan. In fact, his closest ally, Winston Churchill of Great
Britain, was content with allowing the nation of Germany to return to its weak, pre-1871
condition after Hitler’s defeat. However, President Truman, General Marshall, and other key
political and military players at the time contended that if a change in the fundamental structures
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of the regimes that had been defeated were made towards democracy the balance of power in the
world would be improved in relation to America’s interests. She also highlights how the United
States had a center role in drafting Japan’s constitution. Secretary Rice goes on to describe and
summarize the vision that undergirded all of these actions:
This was an early political manifestation of a belief that would later emerge in an
academic theory called the “democratic peace.” Historically, it can be
demonstrated that democracies have not fought one another. Therefore
democracy and stability – both within states and between them – can be mutually
reinforcing. (Rice 326)
The State Department would implement the “Freedom Agenda” to pursue these same goals in
today’s world (Rice 328). New international programs were formed, such as the “Broader
Middle East and North Africa Initiative” and the “Forum for the Future” in 2004. The latter
group gathered representatives of civil society and governments throughout the Middle East to
reflect upon and discuss topics such as individual rights, women’s empowerment, and economic
development. American and European officials would join their counterparts from Arab
monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Even participants from dictatorships like Syria
would take part in these sessions centered on human rights and democracy. The main objective
of these meetings was to focus on the many aspects of Middle Eastern society while
simultaneously pressuring governments to change (Rice 328).
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In 2005, the prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, along with twenty-two other
individuals, was killed by a car bomb (Rice 337). In response to this development, the U.S.
ambassador to Syria was recalled. Syria’s military occupied portions of Lebanon at the time and
had a long history of interjecting itself into Lebanese politics. Many within the State Department
suspected that Syria was involved with the assassination (Rice 338). On March 5th, Syria
removed all of its troops from Lebanese territory. Secretary Rice credits this occurrence to
allowing a pro-Western movement to emerge in Lebanon, in the wake of Prime Minister Hariri’s
murder (or martyrdom, as it would be seen by his supporters) that would be led by his son, Saad
(Rice 340).
In the same year, Secretary Rice would visit Sudan. A “Comprehensive Peace
Agreement” had just been reached and signed on Janurary 9th, which had put an end to a civil
war that had ravaged the nation for two decades. However, a new crisis was brewing in a region
called Darfur (Rice 386). Two contingents of rebel forces, the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality movement (JEM) carried out attacks
against government military posts. This was in protest to what was seen as the Muslim-
controlled central government neglecting and ostracizing the region’s black African ethnic
groups. To quash these outbursts, the Sudanese government assembled makeshift militias
(known as Janjaweed) to combat these revolts. These forces would end up slaughtering, and
practically exterminating, a massive number of civilians. Whole villages were destroyed with
grotesque brutality. When these acts were understood as an expression of genocide on the part of
the Sudanese government, U.S. policy changed from merely implementing the terms of the
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Comprehensive Peace Agreement to an initiative to save the people of Darfur (Rice 387). This
was what would necessitate the Secretary’s visit.
After confronting and being in the presence of many refugees who had been displaced by
this violence, particularly female victims of rape, the Secretary was moved to take action. She
would develop the Women Leaders’ Working Group to bring about awareness of this atrocity
and to promote a greater access to education, political and economic participation, and justice for
all women (Rice 391). This venture would reach its peak as numerous female foreign ministers
of various states would confront the United Nations on the subject of rape being used as a
weapon of war. On June 19, 2008, Secretary Rice chaired the American presidency of the
rotating Security Council and Resolution 1820 was passed. This measure would forever
designate rape as a weapon of war as well as criminalizing all acts of sexual violence, allowing
them to be punishable under war crimes statutes (Rice 392).
Another key component to Rice’s tenure as Secretary of State would be her policy of
“Transformational Diplomacy.” This stance emphasized sending American diplomats to spots
around the globe where they were most needed, such as: China, India, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, or
South Africa. The State Department would make it conditional for all diplomats to serve stints in
hardship locations (such as in volatile destinations throughout Africa or the Middle East) and
accrue knowledge in two specific global areas. Speaking at least two languages would also
become a requirement (Rice 653). Secretary Rice would further work to focus efforts of the
Department on finding regional solutions to terrorism, in addition to other issues like drug
trafficking and diseases (Rice 655). A personal priority for the Secretary would be engaging
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other countries on a bilateral basis to help strengthen their infrastructures and decrease their
dependency on American foreign assistance. She would create the position of “Director of
Foreign Assistance” to review and streamline the dissemination of foreign aid in the future (Rice
656).
All in all, Condoleezza Rice’s book was a riveting read. Taking the time to see from her
own perspective what her experiences in Washington were like only confirms the respect I have
always held for her. Coming from a center-left political context, I do vehemently disagree with
many of the policy positions that she, and the Bush administration collectively, took during their
eight years in office – particularly their stances on torture, and the notion of what warrants a
military invasion into another sovereign country. Yet, the honesty and clarity with which Rice
wrote created within me a new respect for the great lengths the administration did go to in order
to keep the United States safe following the 9/11 attacks on the country. Even if it did not make
me agree with all of these steps, I can now better understand in what light, and from what train of
thought they were taken. I have also gained a more objective and full perspective on George W.
Bush as a man. I see him less as an unenlightened, brutish Texan, than as a leader who possessed
a sincere sense of compassion, yet struggled to balance these feelings with his core political
convictions.
As only the second woman to occupy the post of America’s highest diplomat, Secretary
Rice did much during her tenure to carry out her deepest held beliefs while also promoting and
advancing the interests of the United States on the global stage. Her resolute example of
leadership should be an inspiration to whoever may be called upon to fill the office when
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Secretary Clinton’s duration as top diplomat has ended. The phrase No Higher Honor describes
perfectly what the opportunity to serve the president of the United States while simultaneously
promoting America’s foreign policy abroad must be like.
Work Cited
Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York: Crown
Publishers, 2011. Print.
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