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Competition in Banking:
Exogenous or Endogenous Sunk Costs?
Astrid A. Dick∗
This version: July 2004
Abstract
Testing the theory of Sutton (1991), this paper presents empirical evidence consis-
tent with the predictions of the endogenous sunk cost model of competition, with an
application to banks. In particular, banking markets remain concentrated regardless of
market size. Given an asymmetric oligopoly where dominant and fringe firms coexist,
the number of dominant banks remains unchanged with market size, with only the
number of fringe banks increasing with market size. Such structure is sustained by
competitive investments in advertising and quality, with the level of these increasing
with market size and dominant banks providing a higher level than fringe banks. Our
findings indicate that the expansion of sunk investments in advertising and quality,
and not exogenous scale economies or horizontal differentiation, explain the persis-
tent concentration observed in the banking industry. The analysis has implications for
antitrust policy.
∗Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., astrid.dick@frb.gov.This paper is based on earlier work titled “Market Structure and Quality: An Application to the BankingIndustry,” from the author’s PhD dissertation. The author is grateful to Susan Athey, Evren Örs and NancyRose for their insightful comments. She would also like to thank Allen Berger, Steve Berry, Paul Ellickson,Timothy Hannan, Michael Salinger, as well as participants at the International Industrial OrganizationConference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Competition and Structure Conference, and FederalReserve Bank of New York for their suggestions. The views herein, as well as any errors, are the author’s.
1 Introduction
The work of Sutton (1991) provides a theoretical framework to explain why some markets
remain concentrated as they grow in size, while others fragment. The theory discriminates
among industries by analyzing the interplay of exogenous and endogenous elements of sunk
costs. When the latter, such as advertising or quality investments that are fixed with respect
to output, are significant relative to the setup costs of the firm, the theory predicts that mar-
ket concentration will not fragment but rather converge to a strictly positive value as market
size grows, with quality investments per firm increasing with market size. By categorizing
industries into either exogenous or endogenous sunk cost competition based solely on a few
observables, the theory provides insight into the process behind a given market structure as
well as the nature of competition among firms.
While Sutton’s work makes robust predictions across a broad class of competition models
about the relationship between market concentration and market size, empirical research
testing these predictions has nevertheless been scant. Sutton (1991) provides a cross-country
analysis of various industries in trying to find empirical counterparts to the theory, thus
confronting many of the measurement problems typical of such cross sections. Ellickson
(2001) applies the Sutton framework to the empirical study of U.S. supermarkets. His work
is the first to test the theory’s predictions on a large data set of markets within a single
industry. Recently, Berry and Waldfogel (2003) examine the relationships between market
size and product quality in the newspaper and restaurant industries, where the quality
production processes are believed to differ.
This paper uses Sutton’s framework to build on the empirical work in the literature, with
an application to the banking industry,1 taking a cross-section of U.S. metropolitan markets.
The theory, providing clear and concise predictions, allows for a formal test of the nature of
competition characterizing banking markets. The banking industry is a good application
because of the large number of geographically distinct markets of varying sizes, and the
available bank level data. Moreover, it is an industry where we expect both exogenous
and endogenous sunk costs to be relevant, with both horizontal and vertical differentiation
1On a different vein, Gual (1999) tests a model related to Sutton to analyze the impact of deregulationin European banking markets.
1
potentially affecting the observed market structure.
The results suggest that the industrial structure of banking markets can be explained by
the endogenous sunk cost model. In particular, there exists a lower bound to concentration
which converges asymptotically to a positive value, with banking markets exhibiting similar
concentration levels across all market sizes. This market structure appears to be sustained
by competitive investments in advertising and quality, including employee compensation,
branch networks, branch staffing and geographic diversification, with the level invested per
firm increasing with market size. Moreover, there is an asymmetric, dual structure in the
market characterized by the coexistence of a few and regional dominant banks — defined
as those banks with the largest shares who jointly control over half of the deposits in a
given metropolitan market — with a number of small and local banks which constitute a
fringe. Given this concentrated structure of asymmetric oligopoly, the equilibrium number
of dominant banks remains unchanged with market size, with only the number of fringe
banks varying across markets. Dominant banks are also found to advertise more intensively
and provide a higher level of quality than fringe banks. Furthermore, banks do not appear
to carve out areas within the relevant geographic banking market, but rather compete with
each other closely. In terms of the product market, however, dominant and fringe banks
appear to focus on a few different sectors.
The analysis has some direct implications for antitrust policy. The introduction of quality
investment in the study of competition alters the interpretation of certain empirical corre-
lations between the number of firms, market concentration and conduct used in antitrust
policy. For instance, the finding that markets with fewer firms tend to have lower deposit
rates and higher loan rates has been historically taken to imply a less competitive conduct
by banks and therefore a bad thing for consumers. However, once quality is controlled for,
there is no unambiguous implication one can make about consumer welfare from the empiri-
cal correlation between prices and the number of banks in a market. In fact, one could easily
envision banks charging higher prices for a higher quality service that consumers are happier
with. Moreover, antitrust authorities focus on market concentration to determine whether
a contemplated merger might cause antitrust concerns. In the context of the present paper,
a relevant question might be whether the new bank would provide a higher level of quality,
2
and whether it would become a dominant firm or join the fringe. For example, will the
merger increase the ATM network available to consumers and the levels of advertising that
consumers might enjoy? Will the formation of the new firm imply the reduction of the
number of dominant firms to one? If the post-merger firm becomes dominant, will it have
competition from other dominant firms?
This paper also sheds light on the empirical finding that larger banks charge significantly
higher fees than smaller banks [such as Hannan 2001, 2002]. The reasons usually speculated
for this occurrence include locational differences between larger and smaller banks, the better
service quality of bigger banks, and the fact that larger organizations tend to depend less on
retail customers for funds. The findings here indicate that dominant firms, which tend to
be large banks, do charge higher fees yet advertise heavily and invest more in quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes the data and provides a discussion of sunk costs in banking. Section 4
takes the predictions of the Sutton theory to the banking data, providing a robustness
analysis as well as exploring alternative explanations to the findings. Section 5 provides an
analysis of competition inside banking markets, while 6 analyzes some of the implications
for antitrust policy. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Theory of market structure and quality
The work of Sutton (1991)2 provides a robust framework that allows us to categorize the
type of competition in an industry based on the observed relationship between market con-
centration and market size. This theory guides the empirical analysis in this paper. Central
to it is the notion that some sunk costs are incurred with a view to enhancing consumers’
willingness-to-pay for the firm’s products, and as a result represent a firm’s choice variable
and are “endogenous.” The key to the theory is that while exogenous sunk costs have a
fixed magnitude irrespective of market size, endogenous sunk costs do vary with market
size —though both are fixed with respect to output. Drawing a distinction between these
sunk costs, the model makes predictions, across a broad class of competition models, about
2Sutton (1991) builds especially on two earlier papers by Shaked and Sutton (1983, 1987).
3
the relationship between market concentration and market size, as well as the equilibrium
investment in endogenous sunk costs.
Exogenous sunk costs, on the one hand, are defined as those setup costs or fixed outlays
associated with acquiring a single plant of minimum efficient scale, which do not vary with
market size. Endogenous sunk costs, or quality investments whose magnitude is chosen by
the firm, on the other hand, are defined as costs that can change a firm’s demand and require
a fixed cost but no or little increase in unit variable costs. Examples of endogenous sunk
costs are advertising, R & D, and any product feature that increases the amount consumers
are willing to pay for the firm’s product relative to rivals’ products. The central focus of the
theory then lies in unraveling the way in which these two elements of sunk costs, exogenous
and endogenous, interact with one another to determine the equilibrium market structure in
an industry.
For the case of exogenous sunk costs, the central prediction of the theory is that an
increase in market size relative to setup costs may lead to indefinitely low levels of market
concentration.3 In the case of endogenous sunk costs, however, this property breaks down.
Here the model predicts that markets remain concentrated regardless of market size, as com-
petition among firms leads to escalating investment in quality. In particular, the conclusions
of the model are:
(1) Market structure does not fragment as market size increases, and therefore there exists
a lower bound to the equilibrium level of concentration in the industry, no matter how large
the market becomes;
(2) firms engage in a competitive escalation of investment in quality as market size increases;
(3) the equilibrium number of firms in the market remains approximately the same regardless
of market size.
Model
While Sutton considers the case of industries with solely exogenous sunk costs, in reality,
endogenous sunk costs are a business decision variable in all industries. One way to capture3In an industry where there are only fixed setup costs and the product is homogeneous, the equilibrium
number of firms should increase with market size, while market concentration should asymptote to zero. Ina horizontally differentiated product setting, however, the existence of only exogenous components to sunkcosts leads to multiple equilibria, ranging from concentrated to fragmented market structures.
4
this is by measuring the significance of endogenous costs relative to the setup costs of the
firm. The model of Schmalensee (1992), which is used here to illustrate Sutton’s theory,
allows for this kind of analysis. The degree of importance of sunk costs is a parameter of
the model, such that competition is determined by the competitive escalation of endogenous
sunk costs as long as market share is sufficiently sensitive to variations in these fixed costs
(so that firms compete mostly on fixed outlays as opposed to per-unit price-cost margins).
This framework is particularly useful here as it embodies the two kinds of industries Sutton
studies but does so in a single model, providing specific predictions for both cases that we
can then take to the data.
Following Schmalensee (1992), assume an industry with free entry andN ex ante identical
firms. Firm i’s profits are given by:
πi ≡ (P − c) ∗ qi(Ei)−Ei − σ
where price, P, is assumed exogenous4 (set in earlier stage)5, c is a constant per unit cost, σ
is a fixed setup cost, and Ei represents the endogenous sunk cost investment which shifts de-
mand, such as advertising. The firm’s unit sales, qi, which are a function of this endogenous
sunk cost investment, are given by:
qi(Ei) = S
"Eτi /
NXj=1
Eτj
#
where S is the size of the market and the firm’s market share is in brackets (which may be
thought of as arising from a random utility model) and depends on Ei. The parameter τ ,
where τ > 0, represents the toughness of endogenous sunk cost competition, and captures
how sensitive market share is to demand shifting expenditures.
4As Schmalensee points out, note that the results are robust to alternative models of price competition,such as assuming that (P − c) is some decreasing function of N (an increasing number of firms puts extrapressure on margins, and therefore N grows more slowly with market size), a reasonable assumption.
5This dynamic structure is chosen by Schmalensee (1992) as he argues that a more short-lived advertisingchoice is reasonable based on advertising budgets usually responding periodically to market conditions, whileprices exhibit some rigidity. The latter appears to be a good assumption for the banking industry, whereprices, especially on the deposit side, tend to exhibit some rigidity, especially downwards [Hannan and Berger(1991); Neumark and Sharp (1992)]. Schmalensee also cites empirical evidence for the fact that the effectsof advertising are not very long-lived.
5
There are well-behaved symmetric Nash equilibria in the Ei with π ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 2.Setting E∗i = E∗ = (P−c)Sτ
N
£1− 1
N
¤, from the zero profit condition we have:
(1/N∗)(1− τ) + (1/N∗)2τ − (σ/S)(1/(P − c)) = 0.
For the range τ ≤ 1, the predominant form of competition is in exogenous sunk costs:
N∗ →∞ as S →∞, so that market concentration converges asymptotically to zero, and, asmarket share is not very sensitive to E, the ratio of endogenous sunk cost expenditure with
respect to output is low.6
For 1 < τ ≤ 2, the predominant form of competition is in endogenous sunk costs:
N∗ → τ/τ − 1 as S → ∞, so that market concentration is bounded away from zero,
converging to a strictly positive value. Moreover, investments in endogenous sunk costs
are high and grow with S. The idea is that the larger is τ , all else equal, the higher are the
endogenous sunk expenses per firm and the lower the profits, so that in equilibrium there is
a lower number of firms.
More generally, the testable implications from the model for banking markets are as
follows. If competition is predominantly through exogenous sunk costs, then we should
observe lower levels of concentration in larger cities. If competition is mainly through
endogenous sunk costs, in the sense that demand is responsive to a firm’s investment in
advertising or some other quality enhancing expenditure, then we should observe high levels
of concentration even in larger cities as well as a higher level of advertising and quality. In
the following sections, these empirical implications are taken directly to the banking data.
3 The banking industry: data and background6Note that when τ = 1, as S → ∞, N also grows but at a slower rate, since N∗ =
p(p− c)S/σ, such
that E∗grows but not as fast.
6
3.1 Data sources
The data are based on a cross-section for 19997 and are taken from several sources. The
variables used here to analyze market structure include: 1) bank characteristics, derived
from balance sheet and income statement information from the Report of Condition and
Income (Call Reports) from the Federal Reserve Board; 2) branch deposits, taken from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Summary of Deposits; and 3) demographic
variables, taken from the U.S. Census, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. The sample includes all metropolitan markets and
all FDIC insured-commercial banks in the U.S. The Appendix shows summary statistics for
the variables used in the analysis, as well as a description of the variables.
Given the format of the data, there are several possible levels of aggregation that could
be used as the unit of analysis. My approach is to define the relevant geographic banking
market at the level of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), a geographic unit defined by
the U.S. Census Bureau that consists of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent
communities, that comprise one or more counties. This market definition is supported by
surveys of consumers and businesses as well as the bulk of the empirical banking literature.8
3.2 Basic characteristics of banking markets
In the U.S. there are about 330 MSA banking markets, which represent 83 percent of total
U.S. dollar deposits. These markets are geographically distinct and largely independent.
While some banks in the U.S. operate in various markets, the bulk of banks have presence in
only one or two markets.9 Even for those banks that operate in more than one market, usu-
ally demand conditions, and to some extent cost factors, are independent across markets.10
The average number of banks in an MSA is 20, with as few as two banks in Lewiston-Auburn,
7The data are for the second quarter, which is chosen here because some the variables of interest arereported only then.
8For a detailed discussion on relevant geographic market definition, see Dick (2002) and the referencestherein.
9Close to 65 percent of banks operate in a single MSA market.10While the evidence suggests that multimarket banks do tend to set uniform prices across large geographic
areas [Radecki (1998), Heitfield (1999), Biehl (2000)], they are assumed to do so by responding to local marketconditions across all markets served, such that the uniform price is a weighted average of these.
7
ME, and with as many as 255 in Chicago, IL. Table 1 shows the distribution of MSA mar-
kets in terms of the number of banks in the market. On average, an MSA has a total of
140 branches. Adjusting by population, there is an average of 28,000 persons per bank in a
given MSA, and 4,600 per branch. As measured by population, the bulk of markets has a
size between 100,000 and 500,000 people.11 Table 2 shows a tabulation of MSAs by various
population size categories.
The average Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)12 across MSA markets is around 1900,
with market concentration going from as low as 584 in Chicago, IL, which has 255 banks, to
almost 7800 in Pittsfield, MA with only three banks.13 The largest deposit share in a given
market (C1) is an average of 0.31 or 31 percent. The last two columns of Table 2 shows the
average HHI and C1 for each market category by population, while Table 3 depicts some
percentiles for the distribution of the HHI (st. dev. of 800) and C1 (st. dev. of 0.1) across
MSA markets.
Definitions: dominant and fringe firms
Banking markets usually hold dozens of firms, with great variation in their market shares,
and with many firms holding only a very small portion of the market. This is likely to give
rise to an asymmetric oligopoly structure, which will be explored later in the paper. For
this purpose, I define two types of banking firms that will be used in the analysis: dominant
and fringe. Dominant firms are the set of leading banks with the largest market shares
which jointly hold over half of the market’s deposits. All other firms are fringe firms. For
robustness purposes, some other definitions of dominant firms will be used as well later in
the analysis.14
11The average MSA size is about 1940 square miles.12The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a concentration measure constructed as the sum of the squares of
the market share of deposits at the local market level. Here, following the practice of the Antitrust Division,I multiply it by a factor of 10,000.13The Antitrust Division defines the threshold of a highly concentrated market at 1800.14In particular, two other definitions of dominant firm will be utilized to test whether the results here are
sensitive to the definition of dominant firm given in the text: (i) following the Department of Justice and theFederal Reserve Board’s definition, a dominant bank is that whose market share is at least twice as large asthe share of the second-largest competitor in the market (from the “Casework Manual” for merger proposalsof the Federal Reserve Board); and (ii) a dominant firm is that with the largest market share in a market(or alternatively, those with the largest two/three market shares).
8
Market equilibrium
Sutton’s theory of market structure applies to markets in equilibrium. In the case of
the banking application here, the underlying assumption is that the industry reached an
equilibrium in 1999, the year of the analysis. While changes in the industry continued
to occur after 1999, the assumption seems reasonable given the tremendous shake-out the
sector experienced throughout the last three decades, and in particular in the last ten years,
with the introduction of nationwide branching throughout 1994-1997.15 Figure 1 shows the
number of bank mergers per year since 1993.16 There is an average of 360 mergers per
annum, and the number of mergers per year decreases steadily since 1994. Moreover, in
1999, there is a decrease of over 60 percent in the number of mergers from the previous year,
and of 70 percent since 1993.
There are a few caveats to note about this assumption. First, mergers take a while to
settle, and mergers do occur in 1999. Second, 1999 is a boom year in the business cycle.
However, the market structure in 1993 (in terms of a dominant firm vs. fringe framework)
is found to be similar to that of 1999, even though 1993 is not a boom year.
In addition, I find that the firms that have negative (accounting) profits in 1999 and that
would likely exit the market, are part of the fringe. As a result, the basic market structure
between dominant and fringe firms, documented later in this paper, should not be affected
by these developments in the industry in any significant manner.
3.3 Exogenous and endogenous sunk costs in banking
The setup costs involved in opening a bank in the US are small relative to other industries.
While there appears to be no legal minimum and there is great variation across states and
local areas, the amount of capital needed to start a bank averages around 7 million dollars,
15Regulatory restrictions affecting the ability of banks to diversify geographically have decreased dramat-ically. Deregulation of unit banking and limited branch banking occurred gradually throughout 1970-1994in most states. Intrastate branching deregulation began in some states even before the 1970’s, while inter-state banking started as early as 1978. The process of deregulation of geographic expansion culminated in1994 with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which permittednationwide branching as of June 1997.16The information on the figure is based on the author’s calculation using Banking Holding Company data
from the Federal Reserve Board.
9
a small portion of which are actually sunk costs such as filing fees, branch construction
costs, and legal fees.17 The process takes at least 7 months, and it includes: (i) forming the
organizing group (usually with a minimum of 5 individuals) that are capable of jointly holding
at least a quarter of the bank’s capital; (ii) submitting an application to the corresponding
regulatory authority (based on the type of charter chosen) with a filing fee of around $15,000;
(iii) regulatory review; (iv) raising capital; and (v) regulatory approval.
In terms of endogenous sunk costs, a cost incurred by a bank to enhance its service
qualifies as endogenous if it mostly involves an increase in fixed outlays, possibly accompanied
by a limited increase in unit variable costs. Advertising and branding expenditures are a
good example in the industry, but also the branch and ATM network, among others. The
latter can be interpreted as endogenous sunk costs as long as banks open branches mostly
in response to their own quality and market targets, as opposed to their existing customers’
needs, with branches usually operating below capacity. The anecdotal evidence appears to
support this assumption.
Banks differ greatly in terms of the advertising and the service quality they provide to
their customers. Within a given market, a set of very diverse banks tend to coexist, with
some being small, local banks with a few branches, and others big brand names covering
large geographic areas with extensive ATM and branch networks. Banks also differ in terms
of the expertise and customer care offered at the branch, the size of branch personnel (which
is related to the availability of human interaction and waiting times), financial advise and
overall service quality.
Advertising and Branding
Advertising and developing a brand name is likely to be an important component of a
bank’s endogenous sunk costs. Though one feature that stands out is the degree of hetero-
geneity across banks in terms of their investment in advertising. According to surveys carried
out by the American Bankers Association, roughly one percent of bank operating costs, on
average, was devoted to advertising in 1996, while total bank marketing expenditures were
17Based on anecdotal evidence from Richardson, C. (2003), “5 Phases of De Novo Formation,” Bankmarkand Startabank.com (www.nubank.com). The amount of capital also depends on the type of charter andfinancial institution chosen, as well as the types of services the bank wants to provide.
10
close to 4 billion dollars in 2001. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the nineties “[bank]
marketing has moved from a back room operation ... to a front line strategic function.”18
For instance, according to National Leading Advertising, BankAmerica Corp. was the 125th
leading U.S. advertiser in 1996, with total expenditures of $145 million. Further evidence
suggests that banks invest a growing fraction of their advertising resources by engaging in
branding campaigns and brand building, as well as the development of in-house brand mar-
keting departments and branding strategies.19 The importance of branding in banking is
further signified in the way banks that merge choose their new brand name, where they keep
the name that customers are more familiar with and/or is the strongest brand, according to
bank periodicals.20
Given the scarcity of advertising data, there is no academic work in the area, with the
exception of Örs (2003), who analyzes the role of advertising in commercial banking using
new data on bank advertising for the period 2001-2002. Örs finds that advertising increases
bank profitability, thus concluding that nonprice competition through advertising plays an
important role in the industry.
Moreover, advertising outlays are likely to be correlated with the number of bank branches,
based on the anecdotal evidence on the greater role of the branch in the bank’s advertising
decisions.21 As described by Radecki et al. (1996), a typical branch has expenses of around
$700,000 per year, and while the largest component of this cost is staff compensation, ad-
vertising is usually part of it. Indeed, branches are to banks a form of advertising itself.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence about how banks hope to woo customers using their
branches, usually with stylish merchandising and customer service.22 Banks become more
18“The Banks, They Are A’ Changin’,” D. Asher, Newspaper Association of America, 2003.19For example, a search on bank branding on the American Banker magazine database throws out thou-
sands of related articles for recent times, suggesting the prevalence of branding as a part of bank business.20A good example is that of the large NationsBank and BankAmerica merger in 1998: they chose the
BankAmerica name because of “its longer history” and “its patriotic feel which has more intrinsic appealthan the NationsBank name” [“Brand Name to Be Unveiled in Ads Tonight,” C. Guillam, American Banker,Sept. 30, 1998].21“With micromarketing, the promotional decisions are shifted from the corporate staff to the individual
branches, where more is known about customers and prospects, such as where they live and what they buy...There are less [sic] expensive television commercials and highly effective outdoor displays” (from “It Pays toThink Small in Marketing,” K. Pelz, American Banker, March 4, 2002).22For example, “... a handful of large institutions are planning aggresive campaigns to build market share”
(“Some Giants Planning Ad Assaults; They Hope to Gain Market Share as Others Retrench,” E. Braitman,American Banker, November 15, 1990). As part of this strategy, many banks have even tried installing
11
visible to consumers through their branches, and in fact, many banks put clocks outside
their branches for this reason.
Branch and ATM network
At least some of the branch and ATM installation costs, which affect the bank’s demand
by attracting new customers, are clearly sunk (net of any resale value23). Once built, it
is hard to recoup the incurred costs. As Radecki et al. (1996) point out, the typical
bank branch costs roughly $1 million to build. While a portion of this expense is for
equipment, which may be removed and installed elsewhere, most of it covers construction
costs. There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that branches represent sunk
costs. For instance, it represented one of the main arguments for internet banking (The
European Internet Report, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, June 1999).24
While the cost of opening a single branch might not be exactly fixed with respect to
output, a bank’s overall branch density cost is likely to be largely independent of output
levels. In other words, branch networks are at least somewhat independent of the number of
customers using them in the sense that while a consumer might do most of her banking with
a single bank branch, she should still value the convenience of her bank’s branch density in
the area as well as its ATM network. Moreover, while in theory there exists a maximum
number of customers that a single branch can service (or, for that matter, that a given
employee or computer system memory can serve), it is unlikely to be binding in practice.
This is suggested by the popularity in recent years of the in-store or supermarket branch —a
full service branch located within a large retail outlet— as a way to expand customer bases
relative to a conventional bank branch [Radecki et al., 1996]. Banks find them attractive
not only for cost reduction purposes, but also because they provide access to large flows
of potential and existing customers (even though they have smaller staffs than branches):
the typical supermarket averages 20,000 to 30,000 customers a week, while the typical bank
branch averages just 2,000 to 4,000 weekly customers [Williams, 1997].
coffee shops and “investment bars” within their branches (“Bank branches take a page from retail’s book,”San Francisco Business Times, Sept. 2001).23Some of the cost of branches could later be recouped if the bank is able to sell them in a merger or
acquisition.24See also Sullivan (2001), based on a survey of banks and their web site services.
12
Data
The data available do not allow for a complete and direct measure of endogenous sunk
costs, but some observable bank characteristics provide an approximation. While some of
the measures are far from perfect, many types of investments, other than advertising, are
explored here.
Advertising expenditures data are available starting in 2001 for some banks. In particular,
banks with advertising expenditures-to-operating income over 1% are required to report their
advertising expenditures to the supervisory authorities starting December 2001. While these
data are available for a subset of banks, the correlation between other noninterest expenses
— which includes advertising and is reported by all banks in our sample— and advertising is
close to 1. This can be appreciated in Table 4, where the correlation between advertising
expenditures and other noninterest expenses is provided for the years 2001 and 2002, based
on the sample of all reporting banks.25 Many of the reporting banks — over 35%— report
even though they are not required to.26 As a result, other noninterest expenses is used here
as a proxy for advertising expenditures, and divided by the bank’s deposits to get a proxy
of advertising intensity, the variable used in the regression analysis below. Advertising is
likely our cleanest measure of quality, given that it is unrelated to the number of customers
of a bank: an ad has a given price regardless of how many people it reaches or how many
get to see it.
Moreover, I use several bank attributes as quality correlates, including: (i) a bank’s
branch density in the MSA market, defined as the number of branches per square mile in the
MSA; (ii) the number of employees per branch; (iii) the geographic diversification, measured
as the number of states in which the bank operates; and (iv) salary per employee. The first
four of these quality measures have been used and found to significantly affect the consumer’s
choice of depository institution in Dick (2002), who uses a structural product differentiated
demand model.
From the consumer’s perspective, more of each one of these attributes is likely to be a
25Advertising data are reported by about half of all commercial banks in each year.26Advertising represents, on average, 5% of other noninterest expenses. Other items included in “other
noninterest expenses” are: data processing fees (13 percent); directors’ fees (4 percent); printing, stationaryand supplies (5 percent); postage (3 percent); legal fees and expenses (3 percent); FDIC deposit insuranceassessments (1 percent).
13
good thing. Branch density and geographic diversification embody the size of the overall
bank network, and therefore the convenience to the consumer. The number of employees per
branch captures some of the quality provided at the branch, since the larger the branch staff,
the lower waiting times are and the greater the availability of valued human interaction.
Salary per employee is used here as an alternative measure of quality unrelated to bank
size. In particular, salary paid to the bank’s employees should be correlated to quality, as
more highly qualified employees, who can provide better service and expertise, are more
expensive. This could also be correlated with the degree of sophistication of the products
offered by the bank. Since one would expect larger cities to have higher wages, salary per
employee is also adjusted for local costs, using housing prices.
4 Empirical results: market structure, quality andmar-
ket size
4.1 Market structure across market sizes
In this section the first testable implication from Sutton’s theory is taken to the data, by
analyzing the relationship between market concentration and market size. Figure 2 and 3
show the relationship between concentration and market size, based on two different measures
of market concentration: HHI and C1. Market size is measured in terms of the log of market
population, where the log is taken to facilitate appreciation of the figure. The figures depict
the concentration observed in markets with as few as 57,000 people and as many as 9 million
people. Apparently, there is a lower bound to concentration throughout all market sizes,
with a city with millions of people, such as Los Angeles, as concentrated as a small town
with a few thousand people such as Enid, OK. Indeed, as depicted in the last two columns of
Table 2, the average HHI and C1 show little variation across various market size categories.
In order to formalize the graphical analysis of the scatter plots, a lower bound is esti-
mated. The common method and that applied by Sutton (1991) is to assume that the
measure of concentration is generated by some underlying distribution. A natural choice is
the Weibull distribution, and in particular here as the C1 can be treated as an extreme value.
14
Based on the study of limiting distributions, the distribution of extreme values converges
asymptotically to a Weibull. As maximum likelihood estimation does not work for some
ranges of the parameters of the Weibull (no local maximum), I use a method developed by
Smith (1985, 1990).27
Figure 4 fits both a linear and a quadratic bound to the C1 scatter plot (where C1 is
now its logit transformation in order to remove scale since the assumption is that the distri-
bution is identical at all values of the independent variable). Table 5 shows the estimated
parameters and their standard errors. Indeed, confirming our intuition, the limiting value
of the estimated bound as market size goes to infinity is 16 percent and 99 percent — both
strictly positive values.
FINDING 1: There exists a lower bound to concentration in banking markets, as market
structure does not fragment with market size.
4.2 Sunk costs across market sizes
In this section the second testable implication of Sutton, that of the relationship between
endogenous sunk costs and market size, is taken to the banking data.
Table 6 reports MSA level regressions of advertising intensity and quality correlates
on the log of population, including MSA income per capita (natural logs) to control for
other MSA characteristics. The coefficient on population is significant for advertising proxy,
branch density, number of states of bank presence and salary per employee, suggesting that
advertising intensity and quality increase with market size, as the model predicts under
endogenous sunk costs. The results are similar when salary per employee is adjusted for
local housing prices, to control for the possibility that wages are simply higher in larger
cities (results not shown). In terms of city-specific effects, the results imply roughly that for
a doubling of population size there is a 2 percent increase in advertising intensity, a 3.5 times
increase in the branch density of the average bank in the market, and a $ 2,000 increase in
the average salary per employee.27The method consists of a two step procedure: (i) pick a shape for candidate schedules; (ii) fit a line such
that the sum of the difference between the lower bound and the observed values is minimized subject to thenonnegativity of each of these differences. Then the residuals can be used as the sample derived from theWeibull, and MLE can be carried to obtain estimates of the Weibull distribution.
15
These results suggest that there is a pivotal role for endogenous sunk cost competition
in banking, driven by a high sensitivity of demand to advertising and quality. While there
is a dearth of empirical evidence on the effects of bank advertising, the results are consistent
with the evidence in Örs (2003), where advertising expenditures are found to be related to
bank profitability. In addition, they are consistent with the evidence in Hannan and Prager
(2004) of higher prices (lower deposit rates) in larger markets, since higher advertising outlays
demand higher prices. Moreover, it is coherent with a nonmonotonic concentration schedule
as market size grows: the fact that the lower bound to concentration was found earlier to be
upward sloping can be explained by a large sensitivity of demand to fixed costs outlays like
advertising — or, alternatively, to a diminishing returns to advertising that are low.
FINDING 2: The level of bank investment in endogenous sunk costs increases with market
size.
4.3 Asymmetry and number of firms across market sizes
In this section I explore further the industrial structure of banking markets by analyzing
asymmetry among firms.
Table 7 presents a tabulation of markets according to population and number of dominant
firms.28 This table provides evidence of a striking fact: regardless of market size, the bulk
of markets (87 percent of the MSAs) have either two or three dominant firms.29 Moreover,
the correlation between the population and the number of dominant firms in a market is
almost zero. This is particularly interesting when contrasted with a model without quality
competition but just exogenous fixed costs, where the number of firms should grow with
market size given that the number of consumers served per firm should be the same for all
markets.28Ellickson (2001) finds a similar structure for supermarkets.29The results of this section hold using a few other definitions of dominant firm. In particular, following
the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board’s definition, a dominant bank is defined as thatwhose market share is at least twice as large as the share of the second-largest competitor in the market(only 57 banks fall into this category, however), and as alternative definitions, a dominant firm is definedas that with the largest market share in a market (or alternatively, those with the largest two/three marketshares).
16
Deposit Lorenz curves30 provide another way to appreciate the fact that few firms control
most of the market, regardless of the number of firms serving it. Figure 5 shows a Lorenz
curve for deposits, where firms are ranked on the x-axis according to their share of market
U.S. dollar deposits, while the y-axis shows the cumulative share of deposits. Given the
large number of MSA markets, for ease of analysis the figure depicts only six markets, one
for each market size category31 (as defined in Table 2). The only apparent difference among
the markets is in the length of the tail of the curve, which grows in the number of firms
serving the market. Below the 50 percent cumulative share line, markets differ little.
The above description indicates that as markets grow, the number of dominant banks
remains virtually unchanged. Naturally, as markets grow in population size, they also tend
to expand in the number of banks, yet this growth is only reflected in the length of the
tail of the fringe, and does not affect the dominant-firm fringe structure observed in smaller
markets. Indeed, the number of firms in a market is highly correlated with population size
(0.77), yet the number of dominant firms is almost independent of population and the total
number of firms in the market.
Table 8 shows means for the various components of the measure of quality, for both
dominant and fringe firms. Dominant banks appear to advertise more intensively, as well as
provide more branches, that are also more highly staffed, be more geographically diversified,
and pay higher salaries to their employees.32 To test for the significance of these attribute
differences, Table 9 shows the results from estimating quality correlates of bank j in marketm
as a function of an indicator variable for whether the bank is a dominant firm (in which case
the variable takes on the value of one), including MSA fixed effects. All the specifications
depict a positive and highly precise coefficient estimate for the dominant firm indicator,
30In a market with symmetric firms, the Lorenz curve would actually be a straight line, since all firmswould have the same market share. Thus, the closer the curves get to the y-axis, the more asymmetric, andtherefore, the more concentrated the market becomes.31The markets chosen in each category are those that are most representative of the Lorenz curve structure
within their population size category, both in terms of the number of firms and the market population.However, even if markets were chosen randomly, the figure would be similar. The markets shown in thefigure are, in decreasing order by population size: Philadelphia, PA; Fortlauderdale, FL; Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA; Hunstville, AL; Punta Gorda, FL, and Pocatello, ID.32While Sutton’s model provides some clear predictions about market structure, it tells little about what
determines who becomes a dominant firm. The fact that dominant firms tend to be older might suggestthe existence of a first-mover advantage into local markets, sustained not only through customer switchingcosts but also through informational barriers as in Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999).
17
suggesting that dominant firms provide a significantly higher level of quality.33 In particular,
dominant firms tend to advertise more heavily, have a higher branch density, more employees
per branch, and are more geographically diversified. Moreover, after controlling for MSA
fixed effects, dominant firms appear to pay salaries that are on average almost $ 5,000
higher than those paid by fringe firms. Finally, the results are robust to adjusting salary
per employee by local housing prices (results not shown).
By restricting the sample to only dominant firms, Table 10 shows the results from es-
timating quality correlates of dominant bank j in market m as a function of an indicator
for whether the bank operates in an MSA with population larger than 500,000 (in which
case the variable takes on the value of one). Dominant banks operating in larger markets
indeed appear to provide a higher level of quality than dominant banks in smaller markets.
On average, dominant banks in large MSAs offer a statistically significant higher advertising
intensity, branch density and geographic coverage, and pay more than $ 8,000 to their em-
ployees than dominant banks in smaller markets (the last result being robust to adjusting
salaries for local costs). They also have more employees per branch (significant at the 10 %
l.o.c.).
Among other quality-related characteristics, dominant firms also appear to serve rural
markets much more frequently than fringe firms (80 percent of dominant firms operate in
at least one rural market vs. 39 percent of fringe), which might be considered by some
customers as a useful service, as well as operate in many more MSAs across the country
(89 percent of dominant firms operate in more than one MSA vs. 55 percent of the fringe).
Also, based on a survey of banks carried by the Federal Reserve, larger banks, which tend
to be dominant in local markets (as will be seen in the next section), had much higher web
site adoption rates since the advent of the internet, especially for web sites with not only
informational but transactional capabilities as well.34
This dual structure of two groups of firms might arise when some fraction of consumers
are very sensitive to advertising and the rest are less so or do not care at all. Then the low-
33Results are shown for MSA fixed effects regressions only, given that most banks appear in only onemarket, and moreover, most attributes are measured at the bank level, so that there is no within-bankmarket variation.34See Sullivan (2001). Most banks in the survey indicated that the most important factors for delivering
bank services through the internet were to retain existing customers and to be competitive in the future.
18
advertising sector might follow the exogenous sunk cost model, with fragmentation in this
group is consistent with an overall market structure which is concentrated. In fact, unlike
dominant firms, the results contrasting fixed cost outlays between large and small cities based
on fringe banks show no significant differences in advertising (results not shown). Thus,
banking markets appear to have a small number of leading firms that are heavy advertisers
and have large market shares, coexisting with a large fringe of low-advertisers who focus on
other segments of the market (as finding 4 below indicates).
These results also shed light on the finding that larger banks charge higher prices. Based
on a survey of retail fees and services commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board on an
annual basis, Hannan (2001, 2002) finds that large banks charge higher fees, on average,
than small banks, based on the data for 1994-2001. If dominant firms, which tend to be
larger banks, provide higher quality, consumers are not necessarily hurt by the higher prices
they have to pay for the services.
FINDING 3: Given a concentrated structure of asymmetric oligopoly where dominant and
fringe firms coexist, the equilibrium number of dominant banks remains virtually unchanged
with market size, with only the number of fringe banks increasing with market size. Thus, this
dual structure between leading and fringe firms does not vary across market sizes. Moreover,
dominant banks appear to provide a higher level of quality than fringe banks, and dominant
banks in larger markets provide higher quality than dominant banks in smaller markets.
4.4 Robustness and alternative explanations
All of the above findings provide evidence that the predominant form of competition among
banks is through endogenous sunk costs. Sutton’s theory applies in extremely broad con-
texts, and its generality exhibits the trade-off between the preciseness of the theory’s pre-
dictions and the breath of the class of models over which they hold. In particular, the
predictions are robust across homogeneous products, various degrees of toughness of price
competition (Cournot, Bertrand, Oligopoly), product differentiation (such as horizontal dif-
ferentiation), single and multiple products, consumer taste heterogeneity, economies of scope,
equilibrium concept, and strategic asymmetry of various types. Nevertheless, in our case of
19
study here, it is important to consider whether there are other explanations which might also
be consistent with the findings, or the conditions under which we should expect to observe
something different than that predicted by the endogenous sunk cost model.
Suppose, for a moment, that the banking industry is one characterized by exogenous
sunk cost competition. Can this assumption hold good in light of the findings of this
paper? Let us confine attention to certain specific characteristics of the industry that could
influence equilibrium outcomes and that would be consistent with the largest possible number
of findings of this paper. In particular, assume that banks are horizontally differentiated
(as opposed to homogeneous, or vertically differentiated as has been concluded based on
the empirical results). Clearly, this can coexist with some smaller amount of vertical
differentiation. This combination of horizontal and vertical attributes is plausible as at
least some banking products are likely to exhibit both features. For instance, the location
of branches is important to those consumers who face significant transportation costs. Under
horizontal differentiation, Sutton’s theory makes no predictions for equilibria above the lower
bound to concentration, and as a result, concentrated equilibria are possible even under the
exogenous sunk cost model.
Continuing with the above scenario, if banks are thought to produce only one product,
then the limit theorem regarding the convergence to zero concentration with growth in market
size still holds, and therefore the exogenous sunk cost model (and within it, that of horizontal
differentiation) is inconsistent with our finding that concentration remains bounded away
from zero. In models of horizontal differentiation, like that of Hotelling, it is always possible
for yet another product to enter a market segment and locate itself between preexisting
products, resulting in market fragmentation as market shares become arbitrarily small.35
In contrast, under vertical differentiation, the introduction of new products displaces other
preexisting products, since consumers rank products by quality, such that the introduction of
a higher quality product can remove a lower quality product. Thus, no market fragmentation
occurs under vertical differentiation.
Now, if we let banks produce more than one product (if we assume loans are a separate
35Alternatively, setup fixed costs grow small relative to the size of the market, allowing more firms to existin equilibrium. In our model, this is evidenced by N∗ = S(P−C)
σ in the case of τ = 1, for example. SeeShaked and Sutton (1987) for details.
20
product from deposits, or checking accounts from savings accounts, say), Sutton points out
that multiple equilibria arise, some of which are concentrated equilibria. This then would be
consistent with our finding number 1. What about our second finding regarding endogenous
quality? Investing in advertising or other endogenous fixed cost is costly. Firms will engage
in such activity only if demand is sensitive enough to these outlays such that the firm can
attract consumers that are willing to pay for the product an amount above the firm’s unit
variable costs. If horizontal differentiation is what predominantly characterizes the banking
industry, then we should not observe firms escalate in advertising and other quality outlays
as market size grows, since multi-product horizontal differentiation is enough to hold the
concentrated structure we observe. For instance, tougher price competition, where firms
decrease their margins more steeply as market size grows, would make entry less attractive
for rivals, thus giving rise to concentrated structures even at large market sizes.36 If an
escalation in quality investments had not been found in our results, in fact, the conclusion
would be that the results are explained by horizontal differentiation among multiproduct
banks.
Alternatively, suppose economies of scale are the sole explanation for why large markets
have such a small number of dominant firms. Under this scenario, not only should smaller
markets tend toward monopoly (in the sense of having only one dominant firm), but we
should not find a relevant role for the escalation in advertising or any of the other quality
attributes, as economies of scale alone would give rise to the observed concentrated equilibria.
Economies of scale alone could not explain the finding that firms invest in advertising and
other quality attributes, and that they increase the intensity of these investments in larger
markets. Why would firms incur these costly investments when they can achieve market
leadership solely based on technological advantages? Moreover, smaller markets actually
appear to have the same number of dominant firms as larger markets; in fact, there is no
single MSA market with a single dominant firm.37
36The evidence, by the way, suggests the opposite. In the regression analysis of Hannan and Prager(2004), for instance, greater market sizes are correlated with lower deposit rates, or higher prices.37Antitrust regulation, however, could have influenced this outcome, by not allowing mergers that would
result with a sole firm holding over half of the market’s deposits. Given this paper’s definition of “dominant,”a lower bound on the Herfindahl index in such a market would be 2500, above the Antritrust Division highconcentration threshold of 1800.In terms of the evidence on economies of scale in banking, extensive empirical work in the field suggests
21
Also, note that for economies of scale to matter, competition should occur in homoge-
neous product (otherwise we are back in a product differentiated setting where concentrated
equilibria arise). The assumption of homogeneity is clearly inappropriate in banking, as evi-
denced by the anecdotal evidence presented earlier on bank advertising, for instance, and on
empirical findings (see, for example, Dick (2002), who finds that various non-price attributes
enter the consumers’ indirect utility for bank deposit services).
Strategic asymmetries such as a first-mover advantage (not unlikely to exist in banking,
by the way, where older entrants tend to have the largest market shares), which might allow
first movers to preempt the market or by implicitly creating a barrier to entry in light of
consumer switching costs, would also give rise to concentrated equilibria under horizontal
differentiation. If banks are vertically differentiated, a concentrated market structure would
also arise and be accompanied by endogenous sunk cost escalation, as our findings indicate.
In summary, there are many models of exogenous sunk costs —including homogenous
goods and (horizontal) differentiation, single and multiproduct firms, firm asymmetries and
economies of scope and scale — that might give rise to the concentrated equilibria we observe
in banking and explain our first finding. A model of Bertrand competition where marginal
costs are constant and asymmetric across firms —as yet another example— could easily explain
the fact that there is the same number of firms across various market sizes (though clearly
the implicit assumption of homogeneous goods here is not a good one for banks as both the
observed variety of bank attributes and empirical findings suggest). However, not one of
these models (in their various combinations) could explain the escalation in advertising and
quality investments we document here.
While a historical analysis of the banking industry is outside the scope of this paper, it
is useful to point out certain features of this development in order to explore whether the
pattern of evolution of the structure in the industry exhibits the qualitative features implied
that they exist for small-sized banks, while scale diseconomies are experienced by banks of larger size [seeBerger and Mester, 1997, for a survey of this literature]. In addition, while some bank products might showincreasing returns to scale in production (e.g. electronic payments processes), there appear to be decreasingreturns to scale in management as banks grow into larger organizations. However, a paper by Hughes, Lang,Mester and Moon (2000) argues that standard techniques to estimate scale economies do not appropriatelyaccount for the interplay between bank capital, risk and managerial preferences in the production functionof the bank, and as a result find very limited scale economies which are much larger once the adjustment ismade.
22
by Sutton’s theory. The dual market structure of leading firms that advertise heavily along
with a local fringe of non-advertisers (or advertisers in a much smaller scale) has existed for
a long time, but the profile of the firms in each group has changed over time, in particular
in the group of advertisers. In the latter, big market banks have historically advertised
and enjoyed a brand image, but in the last decade have usually increased their geographic
diversification dramatically, sometimes going from regional or even local banks that just
happened to enter first, to national brand names like BankAmerica (that either entered the
market early, or recently through a merger by buying one of the largest market banks). It is
well-known that these big national or regional banks are heavy advertisers — that is why they
are big brand names that are known to most people! In the profound dynamism that the
industry experienced throughout the eighties, and especially the nineties with the passage
of the Riegle Neal Act in 1994 which allowed nationwide branching, it is interesting and
consistent with the framework provided in this paper that these big brand names became
the leaders across local banking markets, as opposed to other local banks.
Finally, some of the measures of endogenous sunk costs developed in this paper might be
somewhat controversial. Are all of them really capturing a vertical dimension of banking
services, as opposed to a horizontal attribute? This issue, indeed, arises in most analyses
of product differentiation. In particular, branch and geographic diversification are used as
quality correlates for banking services. Some consumers might choose to use a branch solely
based on its location, and do business with that branch only. While both a horizontal and a
vertical attribute are likely to be important, the evidence suggests that the vertical dimension
is more dominant. First, consumer surveys and empirical work provide evidence that the
relevant geographic market definition is at the level of the MSA, and not smaller geographic
areas. Under the assumption that the MSA definition is the correct one, a bank opening a
branch in such market should in theory have access to the choice sets of the consumers of
the entire MSA. Second, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the vertical dimension
of network size (e.g. branch density and geographic diversification) plays a big role in the
consumer’s decision [see Dick, 2002].
Even taken descriptively, the findings of this paper are rather striking and novel, suggest-
ing strategic interaction in the banking industry. The straightforward fact alone that markets
23
remain similarly concentrated across all market sizes provides some interesting insight into
the ways banking firms compete with each other.
5 Competition analysis: Carving out of “neighborhoods”
and product markets
The previous sections established that banking markets remain concentrated regardless of
market size, and that roughly the same number of dominant banks serve each market, as
predicted by the endogenous sunk cost model. This structure, however, is consistent with
various models of “localized” competition. One might ask, for instance, whether firms are
able to carve out geographic areas (“neighborhoods”) or product markets within the relevant
geographic market. Using much of the insight provided by Ellickson (2001) in his study of
market segmentation for supermarkets, in this section I examine the following:
• whether dominant firms control geographic areas or instead compete head on with eachother within a given MSA;
• whether dominant and fringe firms serve different geographic areas within the MSA;
• whether dominant firms carve out a different product market from fringe firms;
• whether there are differences between dominant and fringe firms in terms of prices,costs and performance.
Do dominant firms control geographic areas or compete head-to-head within a
given MSA?
While the bulk of the evidence suggests that the relevant geographic market is at the
MSA level, one might ask whether dominant firms either segment the market or compete
head to head with each other within a given MSA (in the least, this is useful as a sensitivity
analysis of the results on market structure to the particular relevant market definition).
For instance, suppose that in a given market, dominant bank A has ten branches. Then
another dominant bank B in that market, with ten branches as well, could have each one of
24
them located nearby to bank A’s branches, or alternatively, located in very different areas
or “neighborhoods” of the MSA.
In order to explore this, each MSA is broken down into cities (or towns) and counties.
There are 8803 cities and 883 counties for the 331 MSAs present in the sample. Cities are
rather small sections within the MSA, with an average of 27 cities per MSA.38 Counties
are much larger areas, comprising several cities and towns. An average MSA has between
two to three counties. It is worth noting that in the analysis that follows, any reference
to dominant or fringe firm refers to the definition provided earlier, done at the level of the
MSA.
Table 11 shows cities and counties grouped by the number of firms serving them, and
provides the average number of dominant firms in each category. The first column shows
the number of cities/counties that fall in each category based on the number of firms that
serve the area (for instance, there are 3842 cities and 12 counties that are served by a single
bank, where the bank is either dominant or fringe). The second column shows the number
of dominant banks, on average, in a given area (for example, in cities with two to five banks,
there is one dominant bank on average, or 1.2, as indicated on the table). The third column
also provides the number of dominant firms but conditional on there being at least one
dominant firm in the area.
The results from this table suggest that dominant banks do not carve out geographic
market niches within the MSA. First, counties served by only one firm are few, and, moreover,
they are mostly controlled by fringe firms. In particular, only 12 out of a total of 883 counties
actually have a single firm, and out of these 12 counties, only two are controlled by a dominant
firm. Cities with a single firm represent 44 percent of all cities, and only one third of these
cities have a dominant firm as the monopolist. Note, however, that over 96 percent of these
monopoly cities have only one single branch in them. This suggests that the area of these
cities is indeed very small – an area with a single branch can hardly be a carved-out market
“niche.”39
38In the Boston MSA, for instance, some cities and towns include: Boston, East Boston, Braintree,Brookline, Cambridge, Belmont, Chelsea, and Newton.39Also, when we add up the number of cities controlled by a single bank within an MSA, we get a median
of only 1 city.
25
Second, outside of these monopoly areas, the number of dominant firms is above one in
most cities and counties, as evidenced in the second and third columns of the table. The
average number of dominant firms is 1.5 in cities and 2.1 in counties. Conditional on there
being two or more firms in the area, only 16 percent of cities and less than 5 percent of
counties have a single dominant firm. Conditional on there being at least one dominant
firm in the area, there is an average of 2.3 dominant firms in counties, and 1.8 in cities.
That is, if there is one dominant firm in a given area, it is likely there is another dominant
firm. This fact is relevant if one believes that competition from another dominant firm is
important in curtailing the market power of an incumbent dominant firm. These findings
suggest that at various levels of disaggregation within the MSA, dominant banks do not
appear to hold distinct geographic areas, and instead seem to compete head on with each
other.
Do dominant and fringe firms serve different geographic areas within a given
MSA?
An alternative possibility to market segmentation is that dominant and fringe firms might
serve distinct geographic areas within the MSA. This possibility is easily ruled out by the
data.
First, most areas have dominant firms overlapping with fringe firms. Monopoly areas, as
mentioned earlier, are rare. Areas with multiple firms but with only one firm type represent
a small portion (14 percent of cities, and 8 percent of counties), and are mostly served by
fringe firms. Moreover, these areas tend to be geographically small, with two to three banks
serving them, and one or two branches per bank.
Second, dominant and fringe firms tend to locate their branches near each other. Figure
4 shows the location of each branch throughout the Boston MSA market, which is fairly
representative of other MSA markets in this respect. The circles in the figure represent
branches belonging to Boston’s dominant banks, while the triangles depict branches of the
fringe. The amount of overlapping that these two types of banks have all over the MSA
is striking: right next to most circles of the figure there is a triangle. This suggests that
dominant firms tend to compete with fringe firms very closely, by locating their branches
26
near each other.
The evidence indicates that even at the level of analysis of such a small unit as the
city, dominant firms do not appear to be segmenting the market from those of fringe firms,
but rather tend to serve the same geographic areas. Indeed, the basic dominant-fringe firm
structure documented at the level of the MSA appears to be relevant even within the smaller
geographic area of the county.
Do dominant firms carve out a different product market from fringe firms?
This section explores whether dominant firms serve different customers from those of
fringe firms. Table 12 shows several balance sheet items for both types of institutions that
provide insight into their asset portfolio and product mix.
Loans, commitment lines and time deposits may all be thought of as bank products.
In terms of this output set, one significant difference between dominant and fringe firms
is in the proportion of assets allocated to commitment or credit lines (an off-balance sheet
item): while dominant firms allocate over 60 percent of their assets to commitment lines,
fringe firms dedicate about half of this. Given the nature of a commitment, this might be
suggestive of a difference in service quality between the two firm types (emphasizing earlier
findings in this paper), as opposed to a distinct product market niche. The central feature
of a commitment is that a borrower has the option to take the loan down on demand over
some specified period of time.40 Commitment lines of credit are of great value to a bank’s
client as it allows her to obtain loans as her funding needs arise, which is a feature especially
useful for customers that confront numerous contingencies in their activities.
Another marked difference between dominant and fringe firms is in the proportion of
small loans (defined to be less than $100,000 according to the FFIEC form reported by
banks to the regulatory agencies). While 13% of business loans and 24% of agricultural
loans are small in the case of fringe firms, the proportion of these kinds of loans that are
small is negligible in the case of dominant firms. While this could simply be driven by the
40Commitments are defined as the sum of unused commitment lines and letters of credit over total loans.Loan commitments are one of the products that make commercial banks different from other competinginstitutions/lenders such as insurance and finance companies.
27
regulatory restrictions on the loan size that smaller firms can offer, there is, in fact, an
extensive literature that documents the focus of smaller banks on lending to small firms,
known as “relationship” lending [Berger et al., 2002; Cole et al., 2002].
Based on the table, dominant and fringe banks show some other differences as well, but
these are not as striking, and are hardly large enough as to suggest distinct niches in terms of
the product market (even though they are statistically significant, given values of T-statistics
shown on the table). In particular, dominant firms allocate a larger portion to commercial
and industrial loans, and have lower liquidity as measured by the federal funds and securities
holdings. In summary, given the above analysis, dominant banks, who assign a large portion
of their resources to credit lines, might appeal more to consumers that need financing on
demand, which will tend to be business consumers. Fringe firms might focus more on serving
smaller businesses and households, as evidenced by the smaller loan size.
Other differences between dominant and fringe firms
To complement the analysis, I examine differences between dominant and fringe firms in
terms of prices, costs and performance. Table 13 shows the various interest rates paid and
received by both dominant and fringe banks.41 Excluding commercial and industrial loans, in
which dominant banks might specialize (as mentioned above), dominant banks charge higher
interest rates on real estate and loans to individuals (mostly credit card loans), higher fees
on checking accounts, and pay lower interest rates on deposits.42 This could be related to
quality differences between the two types of firms, documented earlier in the paper.
Dominant banks also appear to perform much better than fringe banks in terms of ac-
counting profits. As depicted in Table 14, while fringe banks enjoy a return on equity of 24
percent, with a large standard deviation of 41 percent, dominant banks’ profits are highly
concentrated around 33 percent. In fact, while the number of dominant firms that are losing
money is negligible, many of the fringe firms (over 8 percent) are making negative profits,
41Prices are imputed using the income/expense flows from the income statement, adjusting by the corre-sponding balance sheet stocks, as indicated in the Appendix.42Note that the equality of the rate on leases cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level, as
evidence by the value of the t-statistic shown on the table.
28
which explains the higher turnover in the firms of the fringe. Dominant firms also show lower
average costs, as evidenced by operating expenses as a percentage of assets, which could be
suggestive of the dominant firms’ greater operating efficiency. On the other hand, dominant
firms might be choosing a higher level of risk, as their credit portfolio has a slightly higher
level of charge-off losses in terms of assets.
FINDING 4: Banks do not carve out areas within the relevant geographic banking mar-
ket, but rather compete with each other closely. However, in terms of the product market,
dominant and fringe banks appear to focus on a few different sectors.
6 Implications for antitrust policy
The analysis of this paper has some direct implications for antitrust policy. The introduction
of quality investment in the study of competition alters the interpretation of certain empirical
correlations between the number of firms, market concentration and prices used in antitrust
policy. In particular, the finding that markets with fewer firms tend to have lower deposit
rates and higher loan rates [Rhoades, 1996; Amel, 1997] has been historically taken to imply
a less competitive conduct by banks and therefore a bad thing for consumers. However, once
quality is controlled for, there is no unambiguous implication one can make about consumer
welfare from the empirical correlation between prices and the number of banks in a market.
In fact, one could easily envision banks charging higher prices for a higher quality service
that consumers are happier with. This paper documents not only a role for quality in bank
competition, but also the existence of a dual industry structure where the total number of
firms in each segment might be a more informative statistic than the total number of firms
in the market.
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board43 focus on market con-
centration to determine whether a contemplated merger might cause antitrust concerns [see
Amel, 1997]. In particular, their criteria include whether a proposed merger would result
in a market Herfindahl index greater than 1800, or increase it by more than 200 points
43The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office fo the Comptroller of the Currency also haveregulatory authority but have not been very active in antitrust enforcement in recent years.
29
(“1800/200 rule”), and whether the market share of the post-merger firm would be 35 per-
cent or more of market deposits. In the context of the present paper, a relevant question
might be whether the new bank would provide a higher level of quality, and whether it
would become a dominant firm or join the fringe. For example, will the merger increase
the ATM network available to consumers and the levels of advertising that consumers might
enjoy? Will the formation of the new firm imply the reduction of the number of dominant
firms to one? If the post-merger firm becomes dominant, will it have competition from other
dominant firms? Determining whether the new bank will be one of the big advertisers in
the market can provide insight into the likely behavior of that bank in other areas as well,
such as pricing and market segments. Moreover, using marginal utility estimates on both
price and non-price attributes (such as those provided in Dick (2002)) would allow for an
estimate of the consumer surplus effects associated with the likely changes in quality and
pricing after the merger.
Moreover, whenever a proposed merger violates the above-mentioned screen, regulators
consider what are supposed to be mitigating factors for the potential anticompetitive effects
of the merger. These include the case of an unusually large number of competitors, under
the presumption that the number of firms in a market has a positive effect on competition,
as well as the case of a recent trend toward deconcentration in the market where the merger
is to take place. Yet in light of the analysis of this paper, it should matter whether the new
bank becomes a dominant firm, as the competition effects from other dominant firms should
be quite different from those of fringe firms. In addition, a trend towards deconcentration in
a market could simply be the result of fringe firm entry, which should not affect significantly
the competitive environment of a market.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper presents empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the endogenous
sunk cost model of Sutton (1991), with an application to banking markets. In particular,
banking markets remain concentrated across all market sizes, and they are composed of a
dual structure consisting of branded, leading market firms that advertise very intensively
30
and provide a higher level of quality, along with fringe, low advertising firms. Moreover,
dominant firms engage in a competitive escalation in sunk cost investments as market size
grows. In addition, banks do not appear to carve out areas within the relevant geographic
banking market, though in terms of the product market and consistent with a dual structure,
dominant and fringe banks appear to focus on a few different market segments. Our findings
indicate that the expansion of sunk investments in advertising and quality, and not exogenous
scale economies or horizontal differentiation, explain the persistent concentration observed
in the banking industry.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the relationships between market
concentration, market size, and quality. While the theory of market structure and quality
is well developed and offers robust predictions, the body of empirical work documenting
them is small. Offering evidence supporting the endogenous sunk cost model, this paper
provides a model that can explain the market structure of banking markets. Ellickson
(2001) obtains similar findings for supermarkets, suggesting that retail competition may be
well characterized by this approach. In terms of the empirical banking literature, this work
also represents an attempt to analyze and measure quality in banking services. Furthermore,
the paper sheds light on the empirical finding that larger banks charge significantly higher
fees than smaller banks, as the results here indicate that dominant firms, which tend to be
large banks, do charge higher fees yet invest more in quality.
The analysis of this paper is also useful in the context of the banking literature, which has
relied heavily on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, and which has also affected
the way antitrust analysis is carried out. The introduction of quality in models of banking
competition, which this work suggests is important, changes the interpretation of empirical
correlations between the number of firms, concentration and competition. The analysis
might aid regulators in identifying the relevant variables of analysis as well as asking the
appropriate questions. Moreover, the findings, taken by themselves, constitute a set of novel
and striking stylized facts that can be useful in future theoretical and empirical work in the
banking industry.
31
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34
Table 1: PERCENTILES FOR THE NUMBER OF FIRMS ACROSS MSA MARKETS
5% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95%Number of banks (Mean=20) 6 7 10 14 22 37 54Number of branches (Mean=140) 19 27 39 67 152 343 516
NOTE.– Year: 1999.
Table 2: DISTRIBUTION OF BANKING MARKETS BY POPULATION SIZE
Population Number of MSA markets Percent HHI C1100K or less 22 6.65 2723 0.388100K-200K 103 31.12 1948 0.304200K-500K 106 32.02 1863 0.303500K-1M 39 11.78 1781 0.3021M-2M 37 11.18 1857 0.3092M+ 24 7.25 1696 0.309Total 331 100.00NOTE.– Year: 1999. The last two columns show the averages foreach market category. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is multipliedby 10,000.
35
Table 3: CONCENTRATION PERCENTILES ACROSS MSA MARKETS
5% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95%HHI 934 1124 1432 1793 2240 2817 3417C1 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.43 0.48NOTE.– Year: 1999. Based on deposit shares. HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman index multiplied by 10,000. C1: largest deposit sharein market.
Table 4: CORRELATION BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND OTHER NONINTERESTEXPENSES
Correlation No. ofreporting banks
2001 0.86** 41922002 0.92** 4310NOTE.– Correlation coefficients significant at the 1 per-cent l.o.c.
36
Table 5: LOWER BOUND ESTIMATION PARAMETERS
Linear QuadraticC̃1 = a+ b/(lnS) C̃1 = a+ b/(lnS) + c/(lnS)2
a -1.67 5.10(0.60)** (3.33)
b -2.20 -184.58(7.63) (85.92)*
c — 1222.70(553.08)*
α 2.255 1.535(0.092)** (0.072)**
s 1.144 1.031(0.029)** (0.038)**
C1∞ 0.16 0.99
Standard errors in parenthesis. α and s are Weibull parameters.
C1∞ is the limiting value of the distribution.
Table 6: OLS REGRESSIONS OF QUALITY ATTRIBUTES AND MARKET SIZE
Dependent Variable:Advertising Branch Employees Number Salaryintensity § density per of per
branch states employeeExplanatory Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)Ln(population) 0.0003 0.002 15.524 0.519 2.925
(0.0002)† (0.001)∗ (15.426) (0.131)∗∗ (0.380)∗∗
Ln(income p.c.) 0.0030 0.044 120.348 0.732 13.080(0.0001)∗∗(0.005)∗∗ (82.811) (0.706) (2.040)∗∗
Observations 331 331 331 331 331R-squared 0.06 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.36
NOTE.– Year: 1999. Level of observation: MSA. †significant at 10%; *significant at5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variableis a market share weighted average. Salary per employee is in thousands. Branchdensity is number of branches per MSA square mile. §Advertising intensity is proxiedby Other Noninterest Expenses divided by bank deposits.
37
Table 7: BANKING MARKETS BY POPULATION AND NUMBER OF DOMINANTFIRMS
Number of Dominant Firms TotalPopulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 markets<100K 4 14 4 0 0 0 0 22100K-200K 2 54 35 10 2 0 0 103200K-500K 6 42 37 14 4 3 0 106500K-1M 0 17 18 3 1 0 0 391M-2M 2 18 11 5 1 0 0 37>2M 0 13 9 1 0 0 1 24Total 14 158 114 33 8 3 1 331NOTE.– Year: 1999. Dominant firms are definedas those who jointly control over half of the depositsin the market.
38
Table 8: QUALITY ATTRIBUTES: DOMINANT VS. FRINGE
Dominant Firms Fringe FirmsVariable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. T-Stat
Advertising intensity § 1.03% 0.67% 0.80% 0.70% 4.24Employees per branch 42.33 313.62 25.60 189.89 2.19Branch density 0.0168 0.0228 0.003 0.0115 26.43Number of states 4.61 5.14 1.85 2.66 24.50Salary per employee 46,281 10,962 43,283 15,095 5.67
Observations 869 5856
NOTE.– Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Domi-nant firms are defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits inthe market. Branch density is number of branches per MSA square mile. §Ad-vertising intensity is proxied by Other Noninterest Expenses divided by bankdeposits.
39
Table 9: OLS REGRESSIONS OF SERVICE QUALITY OF DOMINANT VS. FRINGEFIRMS
Dependent Variable:Advertising Branch Employees Number Salaryintensity § density per of per
branch states employeeExplanatory Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)Dominant firm indicator 0.002 0.013 23.629 2.493 4.914
(0.000)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (11.096)∗ (0.774)∗∗ (0.640)∗∗
MSA fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6690 6390 6725 6725 6716R-squared 0.08 0.55 0.06 0.16 0.28NOTE.– Year: 1999. Adjusted for within-bank dependence standard errors arein parentheses. *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. A single observation is abank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as those who jointly controlover half of the deposits in the market. Salary per employee is in thousands. Branchdensity is number of branches per MSA square mile. §Advertising intensity is proxiedby Other Noninterest Expenses divided by bank deposits.
40
Table 10: OLS REGRESSIONS OF SERVICE QUALITY OF DOMINANT FIRMS INLARGE MSAs VS. SMALL MSAs
Dependent Variable:Advertising Branch Employees Number Salaryintensity § density per of per
branch states employeeExplanatory Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Dominant firm in large MSA 0.002 0.016 57.990 1.629 8.078(0.001)∗ (0.002)∗∗ (35.816) (0.711)∗∗ (1.212)∗∗
Observations 869 805 869 869 869R-squared 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.12NOTE.– Year: 1999. Adjusted for within-bank dependence standard errors arein parentheses. *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. A single observation is abank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as those who jointly controlover half of the deposits in the market. A dominant firm in a large MSA is a dominantbank with presence in an MSA market with population greater than 500,000. Salaryper employee is in thousands. Branch density is number of branches per MSA squaremile. §Advertising intensity is proxied by Other Noninterest Expenses divided bybank deposits.
41
Table 11: CITIES/COUNTIES BY NUMBER OF FIRMS
N Avg. # of dominant banksper city/county
All cities With at leastone dom. firm
CITIES/TOWNS
Served by exactly 1 bank 3842 0.3Served by 2-5 banks 3738 1.2 1.5Served by 6-10 banks 988 2.3 2.3Served by 11-15 banks 164 2.8 2.8Served by more than 15 banks 71 2.7 2.7
Total cities 8803
COUNTIES
Served by exactly 1 bank 12 0.2Served by 2-5 banks 166 1.1 1.6Served by 6-10 banks 355 2.0 2.1Served by 11-15 banks 189 2.6 2.6Served by more than 15 banks 161 2.9 2.9
Total counties 883
Year: 1999.
42
Table 12: PRODUCT MIX: DOMINANT FIRM VS. FRINGE
Dominant firms Fringe firmsMean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. T-Stat
Assets 59B 725M
Liquidity:Cash / Assets 0.0572 0.0399 0.0532 0.0506 2.27Fed. Funds + Securities / Assets 0.2322 0.1141 0.2847 0.1439 10.30
Loans:Real estate loans / Assets 0.3143 0.1214 0.3741 0.1508 11.16Loans to individuals / Assets 0.0968 0.0708 0.0763 0.0741 7.64Commercial and industrial loans / Assets 0.1660 0.0804 0.1317 0.0918 10.44Leases / Assets 0.0266 0.037 0.0081 0.025 18.86Most business loans are small (1=yes) 0.0046 0.0677 0.1342 0.3409 11.17Most agricultural loans are small (1=yes) 0.0702 0.2556 0.2427 0.4287 11.56
Commitment lines / Loans 0.6031 0.8162 0.3187 1.6702 4.93
Time deposits over 100K / Assets 0.0749 0.0437 0.1082 0.0732 13.05
Equity / Assets 0.0836 0.0191 0.1021 0.0699 7.77
Observations 869 5856
Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as thosewho jointly control over half of the deposits in the market.
43
Table 13: PRICES: DOMINANT FIRM VS. FRINGE
Dominant firms Fringe firmsMean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. T-Stat
Real estate loans 7.69% 1.08% 7.44% 2.33% 3.04Loans to individuals 2.28% 2.82% 1.34% 2.90% 8.90Commercial and industrial loans 8.88% 6.30% 15.05% 19.75% 9.13Leases 8.00% 15.15% 8.45% 12.27% 0.80
Service fees 0.72% 0.34% 0.56% 0.72% 6.47Deposits 3.01% 0.51% 3.21% 0.70% 8.15
Observations 869 5856
Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firmsare defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in the market.
44
Table 14: COSTS, RISK AND PROFITS: DOMINANT FIRM VS. FRINGE
Dominant firms Fringe firmsMean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. T-Stat
Operating costs / Assets 0.0668 0.0264 0.0739 0.0664 3.11Charge-off losses / Loans 0.0027 0.0022 0.0018 0.0041 6.28Profits / Equity 0.3292 0.1249 0.2359 .4098 6.67
Observations 869 5856
Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firmsare defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in the market.
45
Bank mergers per annum (1993-1999)
438 453427
368 358 344
134100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Figure 1:
46
Concentration (HHI) and Market Size
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9
1
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ln(MSA population)
Her
finda
hl In
dex
Figure 2:
Concentration (C1) and Market Size
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ln(MSA population)
C1
Figure 3:
47
Lorenz Curve for Deposits- selected MSAs by market size-
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1 10 20 30 40 50 60Number of banks (ranked by deposits)
Cum
ulat
ive
depo
sits
as
shar
e of
tota
l
Philadelphia, PA
Fort Lauderdale, FL
Vallejo-Fairf ield-Napa, CA
Pocatello, ID Punta Gorda, FL Huntsville, AL
Figure 5:
49
APPENDIX: SUMMARY STATISTICS: MSA MARKETS, 1999
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Bank assets 16B 53B 1.4M 323BMSA deposits 370M 1701M 2000 87BCash / Assets 0.05368 0.04935 0.00000 0.96094Federal funds + securities / Assets 0.27794 0.14150 0.00000 0.98427Real estate loans / Assets 0.36634 0.14869 0.00000 0.93675Loans to individuals / Assets 0.07896 0.07397 0.00000 0.95678Commercial & industrial loans / Assets 0.13609 0.09114 0.00000 0.84619Leases / Assets 0.01050 0.02780 0.00000 0.47440Commitment lines / Loans 0.35557 1.58856 0.00000 112.97Most business loans are small (1 = yes) 0.11747 0.32201 0 1Most agricultural loans are small (1 = yes) 0.22037 0.41453 0 1Time deposits over $100,000 / Deposits 0.10392 0.07100 0.00000 0.82665Equity / Assets 0.09968 0.06588 0.01055 0.99675Charge-off losses / Loans 0.00194 0.00395 0.00000 0.13267Other noninterest expense / Deposits 0.0087 0.0125 0.0000 0.4307Employees per branch 28 210 0 12279Branch density 0.00511 0.01419 0.00003 0.38544Bank’s age 63 46 0 215Salary per employee 43,671 14,660 839 275,429Number of states in which bank operates 2 3 1 17Bank operates in at least one rural area 0.4430 0.4968 0 1Banking holding company indicator 0.8369 0.3695 0 1Real estate loan rate 0.0747 0.0221 0.0000 0.3414Loans to individuals rate 0.0149 0.0298 0.0000 0.6345Commercial & industrial loan rate 0.1418 0.1859 0.0000 4.6667Lease rate 0.0832 0.1308 -0.0160 4.0000Service fees 0.0072 0.1155 0.0000 9.4537Deposit rate 0.0317 0.0075 0.0000 0.1562Operating costs / Assets 0.0365 0.0314 0.0000 1.3873Profits / Equity 0.1240 0.1931 -3.4059 7.4284
Number of observations (bank-market) 6725Constructed on the basis of the Federal Reserve Report on Condi-tion and Income; U.S. Census; Bureau of Economic Analysis.
51
APPENDIX(CONT.):DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Variable DescriptionMost business loans are small (1=yes) If all or substantially all of the dollar vol-
ume of loans secured by nonfarm nonresiden-tial properties and commercial and industrialloans have amounts of US$100,000 or less
Most agricultural loans are small (1=yes) If all or substantially all of the dollar vol-ume of loans secured by nonfarm farmlandand loans to finance agricultural productionand other loans to farmers have amoutns ofUS$100,000 or less
Employees per branch Number of bank employees / Number ofbranches
Branch density Number of branches in local market / Squaremiles of local market
Bank’s age Years since beginning of bank’s operationsInterest rate on real estate loans Interest income on real estate loans / LoansInterest rate on loans to individuals Interest income on loans to individuals /
LoansInterest rate on commercial & industrial loans Interest income on commercial & industrial
loans / LoansInterest rate on leases Interest income on leases / LoansService fees Service charge on deposit accounts / De-
positsDeposit interest rate Interest expense on deposits (includes inter-
est on time, savings and NOW accounts) /Deposits
Operating costs Expenses including salaries, expenses onpremises and fixed assets, and other expenses
52
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