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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 1
Joint Research CentreInstitute for Transuranium Elements (ITU)
Karlsruhe, Germany
http://itu.jrc.cec.eu.int
Case Study Core Capabilities in Nuclear Forensics
Klaus Mayer
Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 2
•Nuclear Forensics aims at providing clues on the history (production process, date of production, place of production, intended use) of nuclear material
Advanced Capabilities
Objectives of Nuclear Forensic Analysis
•Nuclear Forensics shall provide information on nuclear material of immediate relevance to law enforcement
Core Capabilities
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 3
Information required for comprehensive investigation:
• Full set of characteristic parameters• Comparison information
Nuclear Forensics
Information of immediate relevance to law enforcement:
• Main characteristics of material• Radiological hazard• Amount of material
Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 4
Case Study
Contaminated Scrap Metal
Detection and then?
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 5
U contaminated scrap metal in Europe
Fund 23: Karlsruhe, Feb 1997, from ?
Fund 27: Hennigsdorf, Mar 2006,from St. Petersburg
Fund 34: Tornio, Feb 2010,from RotterdamFund 32: Rotterdam, Nov 2008Fund 33: Rotterdam, Jul-Oct 2009Fund 35: Rotterdam, Apr 2010Fund 36: Rotterdam, Apr 2010Fund 37: Rotterdam, Jun 2010Fund 38: Rotterdam, Sep 2010Fund 39: Rotterdam, Oct 2010,all except F 35 from St. Petersburg,F 35 from Karachi
Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 6
Find 27
Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm
• Shipload of scrap metal• Radiation detectors at material entry
Entire containerSingle (or few) items
• Alarm triggered by detector• Alarm verification• Identification of item• Separation of item
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 7
Find 27
Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm
• Notification of competent National AuthorityState ministry for the environment
• Deployment of measurement expert support team (MEST)Contractor
On-site measurementhigh resolution gamma spectrometryAssessment of type of material (categorization)highly enriched uranium (90% 235U)Estimation of amount of material50 gAssessment of radiological hazard incrustation of HEU on inner wallsno action on scrap metal yard
Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 8
Find 27
Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm
• Information to other AuthoritiesLaw enforcementFederal Ministry for the EnvironmentITDB via National Point of Contact
• Joint evaluation of situationno criminal or unlawful act
• Decisions and ActionsSample taken for further analysisAnalysis request to ITUDisposal of itemItem transferred to federal waste storage facility
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 9
22 February 2007, Lauenförde, Germany.14 Uranium pellets found in a garden.
Questions:Intended use of the material ?Origin of the material ?
Example 2: Lauenförde, Germany
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Example 2 - Chronology
• 22. February 2007 Pellets found in gardenDetermination of main parameters (core capability)
• 28. February 2007 Regional Authority asks for support by ITUReach-back support
• 03. March 2007 Samples arrive at ITUAdvanced nuclear forensics
• 05. March 2007 1. Intermediate Report (first clues)• 09. March 2007 2. Intermediate Report (all conclusions)• 10. Mai 2007 Final Report (full details)
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 11
Investigation in the Laboratory
Unpacking
Visual Inspection
Non-destructive measurement
Homogeneity Testing
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Unpacking
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Pellet Homogeneity - Dimensions
Pellet No. Höhe Durchmesser Masse Masse Uran(1)
[mm] [mm] [g] [g]30/1 11,24 9,23 7,704 5 6,790 7
30/2 11,35 9,23 7,748 9 6,829 9
30/3 11,36 9,23 7,693 0 6,780 6
30/4 11,35 9,23 7,785 2 6,861 9
30/5 11,08 9,23 7,567 8 6,670 3
30/6 11,20 9,22 7,666 6 6,757 3
30/7 11,26 9,25 7,628 7 6,723 9
30/8 11,18 9,21 7,581 2 6,682 1
30/9 11,27 9,24 7,580 5 6,681 5
30/10 11,12 9,26 7,663 5 6,754 6
30/11 11,12 9,24 7,542 1 6,647 6
30/12 11,23 9,24 7,724 3 6,808 2
30/13 11,01 9,22 7,547 0 6,651 9
30/14 10,95 9,23 7,448 4 6,565 0
Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 14
Pellet Homogeneity - Enrichment
Pellet-Nr. Datum der Messzeit U-235 Fehler (1s)(ITU Numerierung) Messung (s) (Gew.%) (Gew.%)
Fund-30-1 05-Mar-07 5000 3.432 0.034Fund-30-2 05-Mar-07 5000 3.448 0.034Fund-30-3 05-Mar-07 5000 3.451 0.034Fund-30-4 05-Mar-07 5000 3.469 0.034Fund-30-5 06-Mar-07 5000 3.392 0.033Fund-30-6 06-Mar-07 5000 3.454 0.034Fund-30-7 06-Mar-07 5000 3.444 0.034Fund-30-8 06-Mar-07 5000 3.400 0.034Fund-30-9 06-Mar-07 5000 3.414 0.034Fund-30-10 07-Mar-07 5000 3.451 0.034Fund-30-11 07-Mar-07 5000 3.433 0.034Fund-30-12 07-Mar-07 5000 3.472 0.034Fund-30-13 07-Mar-07 5000 3.470 0.034Fund-30-14 07-Mar-07 5000 3.474 0.034
Mittelwert 3.443Streuung (1s) 0.026
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Example 2 - Data interpretation
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Database Query – Enrichment, Geometry
Measurement Database Record [1] Database Record [2]
Average StDev Average Tolerance Average Tolerance
Pellet Diameter mm 9.26 0.02 9.11 0.02 9.11 0.02
Dishing Diameter
mm 6.71 0.08 6.7* 0.3* 6.73 0.05
DishingDistance (Land)
mm 1.22 0.16 1.2 0.3 1.2* 0.1*
Chamfer Width mm 0.44 0.04 0.4 0.2 0.61 0.05
Siemens (RBU) Fuel Fabrication Plant Hanau
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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 17
Investigation in the Laboratory
U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238
Isotope Abundance (Mass%) 0,029 4 % 3,455 % 0,005 2 % 96,511 %
Uncertainty 0,000 3 % 0,004 % 0,000 1 % 0,003 %
U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238Isotope Abundance (Mass%) 0,029 3 % 3,459 0 % 0,005 0 % 96,506 7 %
Uncertainty 0,000 2 % 0,002 0 % 0,000 1 % 0,003 0 %
Isotopic Compositionmeasured by TIMS
measured by MC-ICP-MS
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Investigation in the Laboratory
Al
Bi
Ce
Fe La Mn
Na
Nd P
Sr
Ti Y
Zn
0,0
50,0
100,0
150,0
200,0
250,0
300,0
Con
cent
ratio
n [p
pm]
Chemical Element
LauenfördeRussiaEurope
Chemical Impurities
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Pellet Geometry
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Investigation in the Laboratory
• Radioactive decay as built-in chronometer
• Last chemical separation Nov./Dec. 1990
• Pellet production campaign Feb./March 1991
• Fall 1991 Upgrade of physical protection at RBU plant
Age Determination
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Pellets are• Homogeneous• Typical Western European PWR pellets• Russian origin can be excluded• Sintered, unground, damaged• Based on geometry RBU (Siemens in Hanau, Germany)
was identified as the only possible manufacturer
Conclusions
Pellet production campaign Feb./March 1991.Fall 1991 upgrade of physical protection at RBU plant.
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Summary
Core capabilities in nuclear forensics• Available to each government
• Rapid and efficient
• Affordable
• Sustainable
• Supported through international cooperation
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