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Nuclear Forensics Workshop, Bangkok, 7 – 9 December 2011 1

Joint Research CentreInstitute for Transuranium Elements (ITU)

Karlsruhe, Germany

http://itu.jrc.cec.eu.int

Case Study Core Capabilities in Nuclear Forensics

Klaus Mayer

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•Nuclear Forensics aims at providing clues on the history (production process, date of production, place of production, intended use) of nuclear material

Advanced Capabilities

Objectives of Nuclear Forensic Analysis

•Nuclear Forensics shall provide information on nuclear material of immediate relevance to law enforcement

Core Capabilities

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Information required for comprehensive investigation:

• Full set of characteristic parameters• Comparison information

Nuclear Forensics

Information of immediate relevance to law enforcement:

• Main characteristics of material• Radiological hazard• Amount of material

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Case Study

Contaminated Scrap Metal

Detection and then?

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U contaminated scrap metal in Europe

Fund 23: Karlsruhe, Feb 1997, from ?

Fund 27: Hennigsdorf, Mar 2006,from St. Petersburg

Fund 34: Tornio, Feb 2010,from RotterdamFund 32: Rotterdam, Nov 2008Fund 33: Rotterdam, Jul-Oct 2009Fund 35: Rotterdam, Apr 2010Fund 36: Rotterdam, Apr 2010Fund 37: Rotterdam, Jun 2010Fund 38: Rotterdam, Sep 2010Fund 39: Rotterdam, Oct 2010,all except F 35 from St. Petersburg,F 35 from Karachi

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Find 27

Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm

• Shipload of scrap metal• Radiation detectors at material entry

Entire containerSingle (or few) items

• Alarm triggered by detector• Alarm verification• Identification of item• Separation of item

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Find 27

Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm

• Notification of competent National AuthorityState ministry for the environment

• Deployment of measurement expert support team (MEST)Contractor

On-site measurementhigh resolution gamma spectrometryAssessment of type of material (categorization)highly enriched uranium (90% 235U)Estimation of amount of material50 gAssessment of radiological hazard incrustation of HEU on inner wallsno action on scrap metal yard

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Find 27

Length: 55 cm∅ inside: 12 cm

• Information to other AuthoritiesLaw enforcementFederal Ministry for the EnvironmentITDB via National Point of Contact

• Joint evaluation of situationno criminal or unlawful act

• Decisions and ActionsSample taken for further analysisAnalysis request to ITUDisposal of itemItem transferred to federal waste storage facility

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22 February 2007, Lauenförde, Germany.14 Uranium pellets found in a garden.

Questions:Intended use of the material ?Origin of the material ?

Example 2: Lauenförde, Germany

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Example 2 - Chronology

• 22. February 2007 Pellets found in gardenDetermination of main parameters (core capability)

• 28. February 2007 Regional Authority asks for support by ITUReach-back support

• 03. March 2007 Samples arrive at ITUAdvanced nuclear forensics

• 05. March 2007 1. Intermediate Report (first clues)• 09. March 2007 2. Intermediate Report (all conclusions)• 10. Mai 2007 Final Report (full details)

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Investigation in the Laboratory

Unpacking

Visual Inspection

Non-destructive measurement

Homogeneity Testing

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Unpacking

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Pellet Homogeneity - Dimensions

Pellet No. Höhe Durchmesser Masse Masse Uran(1)

[mm] [mm] [g] [g]30/1 11,24 9,23 7,704 5 6,790 7

30/2 11,35 9,23 7,748 9 6,829 9

30/3 11,36 9,23 7,693 0 6,780 6

30/4 11,35 9,23 7,785 2 6,861 9

30/5 11,08 9,23 7,567 8 6,670 3

30/6 11,20 9,22 7,666 6 6,757 3

30/7 11,26 9,25 7,628 7 6,723 9

30/8 11,18 9,21 7,581 2 6,682 1

30/9 11,27 9,24 7,580 5 6,681 5

30/10 11,12 9,26 7,663 5 6,754 6

30/11 11,12 9,24 7,542 1 6,647 6

30/12 11,23 9,24 7,724 3 6,808 2

30/13 11,01 9,22 7,547 0 6,651 9

30/14 10,95 9,23 7,448 4 6,565 0

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Pellet Homogeneity - Enrichment

Pellet-Nr. Datum der Messzeit U-235 Fehler (1s)(ITU Numerierung) Messung (s) (Gew.%) (Gew.%)

Fund-30-1 05-Mar-07 5000 3.432 0.034Fund-30-2 05-Mar-07 5000 3.448 0.034Fund-30-3 05-Mar-07 5000 3.451 0.034Fund-30-4 05-Mar-07 5000 3.469 0.034Fund-30-5 06-Mar-07 5000 3.392 0.033Fund-30-6 06-Mar-07 5000 3.454 0.034Fund-30-7 06-Mar-07 5000 3.444 0.034Fund-30-8 06-Mar-07 5000 3.400 0.034Fund-30-9 06-Mar-07 5000 3.414 0.034Fund-30-10 07-Mar-07 5000 3.451 0.034Fund-30-11 07-Mar-07 5000 3.433 0.034Fund-30-12 07-Mar-07 5000 3.472 0.034Fund-30-13 07-Mar-07 5000 3.470 0.034Fund-30-14 07-Mar-07 5000 3.474 0.034

Mittelwert 3.443Streuung (1s) 0.026

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Example 2 - Data interpretation

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Database Query – Enrichment, Geometry

Measurement Database Record [1] Database Record [2]

Average StDev Average Tolerance Average Tolerance

Pellet Diameter mm 9.26 0.02 9.11 0.02 9.11 0.02

Dishing Diameter

mm 6.71 0.08 6.7* 0.3* 6.73 0.05

DishingDistance (Land)

mm 1.22 0.16 1.2 0.3 1.2* 0.1*

Chamfer Width mm 0.44 0.04 0.4 0.2 0.61 0.05

Siemens (RBU) Fuel Fabrication Plant Hanau

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Investigation in the Laboratory

U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238

Isotope Abundance (Mass%) 0,029 4 % 3,455 % 0,005 2 % 96,511 %

Uncertainty 0,000 3 % 0,004 % 0,000 1 % 0,003 %

U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238Isotope Abundance (Mass%) 0,029 3 % 3,459 0 % 0,005 0 % 96,506 7 %

Uncertainty 0,000 2 % 0,002 0 % 0,000 1 % 0,003 0 %

Isotopic Compositionmeasured by TIMS

measured by MC-ICP-MS

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Investigation in the Laboratory

Al

Bi

Ce

Fe La Mn

Na

Nd P

Sr

Ti Y

Zn

0,0

50,0

100,0

150,0

200,0

250,0

300,0

Con

cent

ratio

n [p

pm]

Chemical Element

LauenfördeRussiaEurope

Chemical Impurities

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Pellet Geometry

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Investigation in the Laboratory

• Radioactive decay as built-in chronometer

• Last chemical separation Nov./Dec. 1990

• Pellet production campaign Feb./March 1991

• Fall 1991 Upgrade of physical protection at RBU plant

Age Determination

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Pellets are• Homogeneous• Typical Western European PWR pellets• Russian origin can be excluded• Sintered, unground, damaged• Based on geometry RBU (Siemens in Hanau, Germany)

was identified as the only possible manufacturer

Conclusions

Pellet production campaign Feb./March 1991.Fall 1991 upgrade of physical protection at RBU plant.

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Summary

Core capabilities in nuclear forensics• Available to each government

• Rapid and efficient

• Affordable

• Sustainable

• Supported through international cooperation