View
220
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
1/23
Britain and Ottoman Domestic Politics: From the Young Turk Revolution to the Counter-Revolution, 1908-9Author(s): Hasan ÜnalSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 1-22Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154 .
Accessed: 17/02/2015 07:18
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle Eastern
Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
2/23
Britainand
Ottoman
DomesticPolitics:
From
the Young
Turk
Revolutionto the
Counter-Revolution, 908-9
HASAN
UNAL
The counter-revolution,r the Incidentof the 31 March1909against he
Committee f Union
and
Progress
hereafter
he
CUP)(the
Young
Turks
s
they
are
known
n
Western
istoriography)
s one
of
the most controversial
points
in
Anglo-Turkishelations
n
the
periodunder
review.It has been
suggested hatthe
counter-revolution
onstituted
watershed
n
Britain's
relationswith Turkeymarking he end of the
honeymoon,
which
the two
countries ad
enjoyed ollowing he YoungTurk evolution
f
July
1908.'It
is maintained
hat his was due
primarily
o
unlimitedBritish
upport
or the
'LiberalUnions'(Ahrar)which hadbecome erstwhileadversaries f the
CUP since the
restorationof the
Constitution.
The
British Embassy
particularly
as
suspected
of
having
been involved
n
fomenting, hrough
variouschannels,even perhaps
of funding
and organizing he counter-
revolution gainst he CUP.2
According o
these accounts,Britain's arlier
commitments
o Russia under the
Anglo-Russian
onventionof
1907
determined
London'spolicies towards he Ottoman
Empire.
And
Britain
sided with
those least
likely
to obtain
the upper hand because of her
sneakingdesire o
give up
Turkey
as
a prospective utureally
by backing
the wronghorse
and hus
antagonizinghe CUPwhichwas
more ikelythan
not to emergevictorious rom
he power
struggle.3
Before
looking into the role that Britain
allegedly
played, it is first
necessary o
take a glance at
her attitude owardsdifferences
of opinion
withinvariousYoungTurk
groupsand between
hem and the
Cabinet, or
example,
he
CUP,
he
LiberalUnions
and
Kamil
Pasha.From
he outset,
Britain's
attitude
owardsdifferences f opinionbetween hem all
can be
interpreteds one of
indifference.
Soon after his arrivaln Constantinople,he BritishAmbassador, ir
Gerald
Lowther,detectedthat there was a
lack
of
experienced eading
figures among
the
Young
Turks,
a
view that
was to be confirmedby
Fitzmaurice,
Chief
Dragoman f the Embassy4
nd later n the
autumnby
Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol.37, No.2,
April 2001, pp.
1-22
PUBLISHED
BY
FRANK
CASS,
LONDON
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
3/23
2
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
Sir Valentine
Chirol,
The Times editor.5Nevertheless, he
Ambassador
admitted
hat
'things
have
gone
as well as
they
could'6
despite
he fact that
the CUP
was just 'a collectionof good-intentioned
hildren'.'Yet,
he was
not over optimistic.
He
feared hat
one sectionwithin he CUP who had
no
confidence
n the Sultan
even with his
wings
so
clipped'might
attempt
o
dethrone
him.
This,
he
thought,
coupledwith the sackingof many
other
officials and
officers
would lead to untoward
ncidents,
makingeven
the
return f the
old regimepossible.He, therefore,
ndeavouredo
'temper
he
zeal
of the reformers'
and
pinned
all
his
hopes
on what he called
'the
moderation
f the
largemajority
f
the Committee'
o
prevent
disaster.8
Lowther'smeeting
with the two prominent
CUP
figures
Mehmed
Talat
(laterTalatPasha)andBahaeddin
akir
aninfluentialmember f the inner
circle of the CUP)
relieved
him
of
the
anxiety
hat
he
Young
Turkswould
mess thingsup by 'going
too
fast' in theirendeavour
o reform
he
country.
Much
to Lowther'ssatisfaction
he two
leaders
utterly repudiated
he
rumour hatthe CUP
was anxious o
depose
the Sultan.
f
anything,
hey
emphasized
he vital
importance
f
keeping
he Sultan
on the throneand
expressed
heirsatisfactionwith
KamilPasha's
abinet.9
However,
his rosy picture
was not to last for long.
His meetingwith
AhmedRiza,a YoungTurk eaderwho hadlong beenin exile in France
before the revolution,cold-watered
his enthusiasm.
The
latter, while
admitting
that he
knew
nothing
about the
details of the financial
arrangements
nd
loans, suggested
hat he
British
Government
ow come
forward ndoffer
Turkey pontaneously
ome millionsrather hancontent
herselfwith
encouraging
inanciers ndbankers
nreturn or a guaranteeo
ratify t by the
Turkish arliament hen t met.
TheAmbassador
eplied hat
Britainhad also a Parliament,
which would be most unlikely o
sanction
such a transaction.AhmedRiza's second remark hat Britain, eeing that
genuinesteps
were
being
taken
n the
direction
of reforms,shouldnow
extendher
protection,
n
accordancewith the Cypirus onvention f 1878,
to the whole
Empire
id seemto the Ambassadoro be a prematureuestion
to raise.
AhmedRiza, 'too loquacious
with mmature iews', what s more,
seeming
o favoura moreradicalprogramme,ltogethermadea
very poor
impression
n Lowther.
n
the
ForeignOffice,Mallet,Headof the
Eastern
Department,
ound t disappointing;
ut still hoped
hat t did not represent
the 'YoungTurkintelligence',while Sir CharlesHardinge,Permanent
Under-Secretary
n the
Foreign
Officedismissed t as 'worthless'.'1
British Foreign Secretary,Sir Edward
Grey and Hardinge,
it so
happened, adan opportunity
f meetingAhmed
Rizatogetherwithanother
leadingCUPfigure,Dr Nazim,
n London t the
heightof the Bosnian
risis
in
mid-November,
908.11
The
two leadersused
this occasionto express
their
ndignation
t the idea
of the recognition f
the annexation
n returnor
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
4/23
BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN
DOMESTIC
POLITICS,
1908-9
3
some
pecuniary ompensation hich
would, hey
argued,
e tantamount
o
selling
their
rights
for
money.
Instead, hey proposed
hat
the
annexed
provinces be transformednto a buffer state underAustro-Hungarian
administration.he
only means hey
suggested
o achieve his end was
that
Britain,
Franceand
hopefully
Russiashouldassociate hemselveswith the
Turkish
rotestagainst he
Austro-Hungarian
ction or at least five or
six
months
by
which ime
Turkey
wouldmost
ikely
havemade
an
entente
with
the Balkan
States.
Sucha
strong
ombination ould
hen
compel
Austria
o
give way. But at the same time,
they laid much stress on the
point
that
Bulgaria hould
only be allowedto remain
n civil
possession
of
Eastern
Rumelia, epriving erof
anyright
o use the
regionmilitarily.'2
s thiswas
bound o
pushBulgaria
nto
the
Austro-Hungarian
rbit,Grey
and
Hardinge
told them that
any combination etween
Turkey,
Serbiaand
Montenegro
wouldbe of little
use against
n
Austro-Bulgarianront.
n
addition, o
such
condition s
they
suggested
ouldeverbe
imposedupon
Bulgaria
withouta
war.Moreover,
simpleprotest, ven
if
madeand nsisted
uponby all the
Powers
n
question
or somefive or six months,would
not advancematters.
Their
offer
of
alliance o Britainwas politely
urned
own.
Greypointed
out to them
hatBritain's
olicy
was
based
on the
principle
f
keeping
our
hands free, thoughwe made ententesand friendship'.For instance, he
ententewith
Japanwas limited o certain
distant
questions
n the Far
East.
But,Greymade t
quiteclear hat he
British ympathywas entirelywith he
YoungTurks,
ndthat
he ForeignOfficewas
prepared
o
supply
Turkey,
f
desired,
with
the
necessary
know-how'and
experts
o
organize
Customs,
Police
andso forth.
The impressionhat
he
CUP
eaders eft withGreyand
Hardingewas most disappointing.
hmedRiza in
particulareemed o be
quite
impractical',omething f an
dealist, t leastas far
as dealingwith his
external risiswasconcerned.Greywas sure hat'the TurkishGovernment
will havea
difficult
ob
if
all the YoungTurks re ike
them'
13
Hardinge
ad
nevermet
'visionaries
.. withscantly
political deas'
ike thembefore. 4
In
the
meantime,
Lowther
came to notice the
interwoven
relations
between he
CUP
and
the
army,
and
was inclined o the view
that
possibly
all this
may
end in a
militarydictatorship'.
e
also noticed
hatthe CUP
was
going too fast
in
preaching ecular enets
amongst he masses,
and
feared hat t
would,
f
carried
n
in
the samemanner,
ause
disturbances'. 6
Hisanxietyas to the internal ituation atheredmomentumwhenhe heard
a rumour
hat the CUP
would soon
dethrone he Sultan.
n
fact, this was
probably
he
only pointupon
whichall
the
factions
within he CUPagreed.
Yet,
Lowther
could
not simply see how a
depositionwould address
he
situation, iven
thatthere
was
still 'a
sad lack of men
and moneyto
deal
with
the
complications f an entirelynew system'.'
It
must be
borne
n
mind
that the alarm elt
by
the Embassyand the
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
5/23
4
MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDIES
Foreign
Officeat the
ideawas
in
no
way
becauseof the 'beaux
yeux'
of
the
Sultan.
On
the
contrary,Grey
opposed
a
royal
visit to
Constantinople,
n
the
grounds hat it was to be
to the
presentSultan;
whereashe would
have
supported visit
by
the
King
to 'a
Young
Turk
government'
s it
'would
have a
beneficial
effect
upon
our Mohammedan
ubjectseverywhere'. 8
Initially,
herehadperhaps
een someconfusion
s to the line to be takenas
regards
he deposition.
For
instance,Grey
minuted n Lowther's
dispatch,
reporting is advice o MehmedTalatand
Bahaeddin
akir
not to
attempt
t
dethronement:we need not
lay
too
much
stress
upon
deference o
the
present
Sultan'. 9
One
thing
was, however,
clear:
both the
Foreign
Office
and the
Embassy
were fearfulof the
widespread
disturbances
ny
such
attemptwould ead to.
Lowther's
lready
haken onfidence
n the CUP was to further uffer.
In
mid-December,
wo
bribery
ases
involvingpeople
romthe innercircle
of the
CUP
with
English
businessmenwere
brought
o his notice.20
espite
the factthat he
Englishcompetitors
were
given
the contract s the resultof
the
bribery,
Lowtherwas
disgusted
with
the whole
affair,
but could not
bring
he matterbeforethe GrandVizier.
f
he
did,
he wouldhave to
give
chapter
and
verse, exposing
British
competitors
nd
ruining
heir future
chances.Despiteall this,he was not stillpreparedo putthewhole blame
on
the
CUP,
as it
was,
after
all,
a secret
ociety.
However,
he
pace
of events
was
certainlymaking
him
'sick of the
Committee',
and he
hoped that it
wouldcome into the
open.2'
It
must not be inferred,
however,
as is
often
the case
in
Turkish
historiography,hat he British iked KamilPashaany
better.22 is conduct
of
affairs at the outset of the Bosnian
crisis was seen as
intransigent,
obstructive nd
impracticable.More
particularly,
is
attitude owardsan
alliancewith theBalkanStates,hispersistent efusal o consider n entente
with
Bulgariawas far from satisfactory.He was seen
as negotiatingwith
Serbia,
Montenegro
nd even
Austria-Hungary
ith
no regard o British
advice. So much
so,
when
he asked Lowther
views of the British
government
n
connectionwith a
secret
agreement roposedby Austria-
Hungary, he Foreign Office
officials concerned
gave free rein to their
feelings.
KamilPasha
was
soliciting
reaction
o a proposal hat the Dual
Monarchy ive
an
undertaking
ot to enter nto any
commitment ontrary
to theintegrity f theOttomanEmpire, ndrecognizeSanjak s an integral
part
of
Turkey
n
return
or the
withdrawal f the
Turkishprotest o the
annexation f
Bosnia-Herzegovina
y the Dual
Monarchy. he minuteson
Lowther's
dispatch
read: 'while
Turkey s negotiatingwith a varietyof
governments,
t
is somewhat
difficult or us
to assisther'.
Tilley,a Foreign
Office
official
n
the
Eastern
Departmentemindedhat
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
6/23
BRITAIN
AND
OTTOMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS,
1908-9
5
Kamil
Pasha s a very cunningold gentleman,
whose methodsare
very oriental.Whenhe took refugeat the Consulate
General,
e
was,
I believe, in no sort of dangerand merelywished to manoeuvre
himselfbackto
Constantinople
ndbecomeGrand
Vizier
.,23
Lowtherdescribed is scheme n
connection
withthe transformation
f
the
annexedprovinces nto an
autonomous uffer tate,and
his negotiationsor
a
defensive
and
offensivealliancewithSerbiaand
Montenegro
s 'rather f
a wild order'. The GrandVizier
was,
Lowther
described,
a
'frightfully
difficultman to
get
to talk
and so
frightfully
ndistinct .. that
it
is
very
difficult
o
appreciate
what
really
s
in
his
mind'24
Hardinge
n the
Foreign
Office was no less annoyedwith the Grand Vizier's negotiations n
Constantinople
ith
'thoserotten
ountries',
Serbiaand
Montenegro.25
The
continualpower struggle
between the Young Turksand Kamil
Pasha,
deepeningand getting out of
control,and
later
on, involving
the
Liberal Unions and
'reactionary' orces against the CUP created an
atmosphere
n which
the Britishhadto
adopt
a cautious ine of
policy.
The
differences f opinionbetween he
CUP and
KamilPashacame to
a head in
December.The British
displayeda striking
xample
of
caution.
Some
members f the BalkanCommittee f the Houseof
Commons,
Noel
BuxtonMP and his friends,
who had been visiting
Constantinople
ere
invited
by
a small
section
of
the CUP to an
entertainment
n
the Grand
Vizier's
house without he latter's
expressconsent.KamilPasha, urious
with
whathe called 'the dictation
f the CUP' refused
o
allow
theni nto
the
house,
as
it
was
not,
in his
own words, 'the
Committee estaurant'
26
Mallet
deprecatedhe friction ausedby the Balkan
Committee etween he
CUP
and
Kamil
Pasha,27
hile
Grey nstructed owther o warnBuxton o
abstain rom
mixing up
'in
any
differencesbetween
any
section of the
YoungTurks nd he GrandVizier'
28
Lowther,hough inding t beyondhis
power
o
intervene,
was
particularly
elievedwhen
hey
eft.29 iven
hat
he
Foreign
Office was quite aware of the woeful effect
that the King's
congratulatorymessage
to the Sultanwhich
includeda reference o the
appointment
f Kamil
Pasha
as
GrandVizierhad
produced,30hisprudent
attitude
ould
have been
predicted.
One
gathers
rom
primary
ources
n
British
archives hatKamil
Pasha,
though
never
regarded
s more
han he 'leastworst'alternative,31radually
emerged romthe cloudyinternal ituationas wiser than othercontesters
towards the
end of
the year. Yet, this did not
mean active British
involvement
n
backinghim
against he CUP. On the
contrary,Lowther
assured he CUPon
severaloccasions
hatBritainwas
by
no
meansrelying
upon
Kamil
Pasha.32 n
fact,
the British
postponed, for this
reason,
conferring pon
him
a
GCB.33
With
he internal
ituation
howing
no
signs
of
improvement,
owtherwas now
sure
thata
fight
between
he
CUP and
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
7/23
6
MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
the
government
headed
by
Kamil Pasha
was unavoidable. He
hoped
that
the
Governmentwould win the
day,34
view shared
by
the
Foreign
Office.35
Although Lowther's
hopes
that
Kamil would
get
a
vote of confidence
in
the Parliament and establish himself
firmly
in the
saddle36
ame true
in
January, hey were to be
proven
short-lived.
The
manner
n which
the Grand
Vizier attempted to get rid
of
the Ministers of War and
Marine,37
whom he
accused of
being
hand
in
glove
with the
CUP, brought
about
his
downfall
just a month later.38
Despite
the assurances
from
the new Grand
Vizier,
Huseyin
Hilmi
Pasha,
former
Inspector
General
of
Macedonia under Sultan
Abduilhamid hat
he
would adhere to Kamil Pasha's
foreign
policy,
Lowther
was
sure that the new
government
was bound to 'do the
bidding
of the
Committee'
This
would, according
to the
Ambassador,
make the
Cretan
question
more and
more
acute
as
the CUP
represented
'purely
Turkish
versus Ottoman interests'.
All
in
all,
the
daily worsening
internal situation
coupled
with
gloomy
international
political
atmosphere
was
filling
Lowther
with
despair.' Hardinge
predicted rightly that
'it all
seems to
be
gradually
tending
to a
military
despotism
of a
nationalist
and chauvinistic
character
..,41
whereas
Grey pinned
all his
hopes
on the
ability
and
statesmanship
of
Rifat
Pasha,
the
newly
appointed Foreign Minister,who had been Ottoman
Ambassador n London.42
However, this was
not
enough to lessen the fears of
the Ambassadorwho
saw little
prospect
of
improvement
n
internal
politics.
Added
to
continued
rumoursof a plot to
get rid of the Sultan,43
he CUP's interference with
governmental
affairs rendered the
whole cabinet
powerless.
He
then
decided to
display
a 'cold' attitude to the
CUP
in
the
hope
that it
might
influence it.4 Yet, he still
endeavoured to be on good terms with
what he
called
some 'good men
amongst them'.46
Until the counter-revolution,on 13 April 1909, Lowther's pessimistic
reports continued to
pile up in the
Foreign Office.47 But it must be
remembered that this
criticism of the
CUP was kept to private
correspondencebecause the
Embassy took great care not to get
dragged nto
the row between
the CUP and the
combined
opposition, which
was growing
by
leaps
and bounds.
Given that
the internal situation on the
eve of the
counter-revolution
was tense and
hopeless, Lowther's despair
does not
seem to be ill
founded.
All
evidence
confirms
that the Embassy had no
foreknowledge of the
coming
revolution.
Apart
from some guesses made by
Lowther and the
Embassy
staff
consequent
on
widespread insubordination
and growing
discontent
among troops
due
to the
preaching
of
anti
religious, secular
tenets,48
t
is safe
to
say
that
the
Embassy
was
caught napping.
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
8/23
BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC
POLITICS,
1908-9
7
In his firsttelegram n 13
April,
Lowther nformed
he
Foreign
Office
of
the
'mutiny',
upported y
a
large
number
f
'softas',
andnot directed
t
theConstitution ut 'rather t theCUP', houghheapplicationf theSharia
Lawwas
demanded.49
n the next
dispatch,Lowther eported
he
resignation
of the
whole cabinet
and
the appointment
f Kamiland Nazim Pashasas
GrandVizierandthe Minister f War
espectively ogether
with SaidPasha
as the Minister
or ForeignAffairs.Hardinge,
heered
up
with
the news
a
little,thought hat
if
Kamilreturnso power,all may
yet
be
well',
whereas
Mallet reminded
him
that, according o the 'Times', the Sultanhad
not
calledfor
Kamil,
but
selected
Tevfik.i0
The following
day,
Lowther
alledTevfikPasha's
Cabinet colourless',
andasked or somemen-of-warobeheld nreadinessoproceedoBeirut,
Smyrnaand Salonica
n
order
to
protect
British
nterests,as,
unless the
mutinywere o be
promptly uppressed,t might ead
o
further isturbances
in
the provinces.51 he
Foreign Office,
still at
a
loss to
grasp
the real
significanceof what was taking place, indulged
in
guesswork.
Mallet
thought
hatthe Sultan
had presumably enefited by the
quarrel
etween
the UnionLiberalsandthe Committee f Unionand
Progress
o
appoint
a
cypher
and
govern
himself',
whereas nother fficial
expressed
eservations
about he Sultan's llegedregainof control. twas obvious hat heForeign
Office found
itself
very
much
in
the
dark;as
Hardinge emarked,
much
more hanLowther
hadreportedwas already n TheTimes.52
AlthoughLowther
noticed hat
this was a 'distinctdefeat
of
the
CUP,53
and heir
ultra-liberal
deas,
or which he
country
s
notripe',5
he
appeared
quite
confusedand
apprehensive;
One
must
regard
he
situation s surrounded
ith
the greatest ossible
danger.. TheHodjasandSoftaclass unitedwiththe menof different
regiments
re
not likely to show muchreason .. it is all
very
bad
and
one must
ook
in
the future or a
violently
chauvinistic ttitude..55
The
MilitaryAttachewas no less apprehensive. e
found t 'deplorable
n
everyrespect hat t
shouldbe possible or a few mutinous attalionsn the
Capital
o
upset
the whole
government
f
the
countryat
a
moment
when
Turkey as everyreason or desiring o present n
appearancef stability s
well as continuity of
policy'.56
On 15 April,withthe appointmentf NazimPasha o the command f
the
Constantinople
arrison
he
situationwould,Lowtherhoped, mprove.
Rifat Pasha,who
retainedhis office,57 xpresseda
wish to Lowther hat
Britainwouldnot
hesitate o give diplomaticupporto
the new government,
which
was totally resolved
to stick to the Constitutionogetherwith the
Sultan.58 he
Foreign
Office's
reply strikingly
underlines he policy that
Britain ad
been
pursuing
ince
heYoungTurk evolution. hat
aid,Britain
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
9/23
8 MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
waspreparedo support nygovernmentn
Turkey
s
long
as
it
endeavoured
to
safeguard ublic
nterests
nd
secure
a
development
n administration.
ut
no specificpromise f supportor thenewgovernment asmade.59
What was Lowther
doing
at
Constantinople
t this
stage?
He
first
ascertained
f the Consul Generalat
Salonica, Harry
Lamb,
as
to
the
likelihood of the
IlIrd
Army, stationed
in
Salonica,
marching
on
Constantinople.0 amb
nformed
he
Ambassadorhat the officersof the
IlIrd
Army were determined
o reverse
the
verdict
of the
coup
in
Constantinople,
nd that
they
had been assuredof the
support
f
the
IVth
Armyat Adrianople.6
In his
report o the
Foreign
Office
on
16
April,
Lowther
layed
down
he
threats
rom
the
IlIrd
Army headquarters
s their
original
plan
to
join
Mahmud
Muhtar
Pasha,
former Commanderof the
Constantinople
Garrison,
had fallen
through
as
a
result
of the latter's
escape
from
the
Capital.62
his
dispatch
caused
some
alarm at
the
Foreign
Office
that
Bulgaria
would move
in
Macedonia
n
the event
of a
clash between
rival
army
units.As it was
admittedly eyond
he
power
of the
Foreign
Officeto
stop Bulgaria,Grey merely hoped
that the
position
of the
government,
strengthened y
the
appointment
f Nazim
Pasha,
would
perhapsprevent
sucha clash.63
At this
juncture,
Lowther was, evidently, being misinformed rom
Adrianople
nd
UskuibSkopje).
The
reason
why
Lowther
layed
downthe
threats rom he
IlIrd
Army
was his disbelief n the IVth
Army
stationed t
Adrianopleoining the former.This was
due to the telegramshe
received
from
he Consular
Officerat Adrianople
asting
doubts
on such ikelihood.4
Informationrom Consul Satow at
Uskuibwas
of
a
similarnature.The
commander
f the Vth
divisionat Uskiib
was, according
o
the
Consul,very
reluctanto complywitha request rom heIlIrdArmy osend roops ojoin
them n
order o march n the
Capital. n
addition, enior
officers,as distinct
from the
younger
ones,
were
opposed
to marchingon Constantinople.
Moreover,
he
Albanianswere
sending
a
deputationo the Capital o see the
real
nature of
occurrences as the CUP blocked
the passage of
Constantinopleapers.65
Partly
due to this
'misinformation',66
oupled with
the signs of
improvementn the situation rom 17
Aprilonwards67
ogetherwith Rifat
Pasha's reassuringmessages, Lowtherseems to have misread nternal
occurrences,
nd
took
some unusual
teps
in
endeavouringo disseminate
'the
actual
facts as
widely
as
possible ...to calm
the popular xcitement'
through
BritishConsuls.68 is
apprehensions to the
Bulgarian ttitude lso
made
some
effect on his action.69
Lowther irst
sent a
telegraphic
messageto all consulatesgiving them
his
observations.He
argued hat the
previousgovernment ad not been
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
10/23
BRITAIN
AND
OTTOMAN
DOMESTIC
POLITICS, 1908-9
9
overthrown,
ut
simplyresigned
in
writing
and with
insistence',
and
the
movement at the Capital was
directed against
'ultra-liberal
nd anti-
Mohammedanendencies'
f
Hiiseyin
HilmiPasha's abinet.
Therefore,
he
Consuls should, 'judiciously
and
discreetly
exercise'
their influence
in
letting he truth e known.70
hefollowing
day,he wentone stepfurther
nd
suggested,
n
an
urgent elegram
o
the
Consuls
n
Macedonia,
hat
they
'shoulddiscreetly
andunofficially uggest
o malcontents
o
agree
o
send
a small deputation
to Constantinople o ensure themselves
that the
constitution
s not
in
danger'.
This
step
was
taken in view of the
impossibilityfor the populationand officials
in
Macedonia
o obtain
impartial
ews as the CUP was holding
backgovernmentelegrams.7
However,Lowther'snterventionailedto producehedesired ffect,as
the Embassy was
inundatedwith
telegrams
from Consuls throughout
Macedonia, xceptingUskuib,
ll
emphasizing
he steadfastness
f the
IlIrd
and
IVth
Army
Corps, ogether
with volunteers ecruited
y
the
CUP to
march n the capital.72
owther hen mmediately
withdrew is instructions
andasked he Consuls o abstain
rom
commenting
n the situation
withthe
authorities
r
others
and et eventstaketheir
own
course.73
Lowther's
equest
hatsome
warships
be
despatched
o Turkishwaters
to show somekind of interestn thefutureof theOttomanEmpire,andto
send them where
there
was
likely
to be
disturbances roduced lashing
views
in the
Foreign
Office.While
Sir
Eyre
Crowe,SeniorClerkand
ater
Head of the Eastern
Department,was prepared
o informthe Admiralty
accordingly,
Mallet
hought
hat t
'might
ook like intervention'.
iven
hat
the Turkish
Charge
'Affaires ad
expressed
o
him a wish that here
would
be
no
outside
interference,Mallet declined to support he proposal.
He
would
only
be
prepared
o
comply
with it
if
it would deterBulgaria
rom
moving,which,he thought,had nowbecomea remotecontingency.Grey
intervened
n
Mallet's ide because he presence
of the British leet would
be
'variouslynterpreted
s a
demonstration
gainst
he
CUP or
against
he
Sultan
...',
and
so on. He would
only
run
these
risks if there were real danger
to
Britons'
ives.74
wo
days ater,however,Grey
decided o run
hese
risks
by sending
some ships to Lemnos
o
await
eventsthere n order o protect
Britishsubjectsas the likelihoodof a clash
between wo opposing
orces
outside he
Capital athered
momentum.75
On 17 April,Lowtherdecided to complywith Rifat Pasha'srequest
apparently
at the unanimousdesire
of
the Cabinet' that Fitzmaurice
accompany
he Turkish elegation o reassure he Salonican roops
hat he
Constitutionwas
in
no danger.The Ambassador
was
quite
alive
to the
dangers
hat his action
entailed,
but the
newly
formedOttoman abinet
stated hat 'the
present
ituation s so critical,not only froma
Turkish ut
also from a
European oint
of
view,
that this effort to save it should
be
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
11/23
10 MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
made'.76However,
when the Cabinet aterdecided
o send the
delegation
withoutFitzmaurice,
owther
was
relieved.77
From
19 Aprilonwards
o the
occupation
f
Constantinople
n
24
April
by
Salonican roops,
he
Army
of
OperationHareket
Ordusu),
he
Embassy
merely
monitored he situation
nd
kept
the
Foreign
Office
informed.
The
attitudeof the Embassyand
the
ForeignOffice
during
he course
of
the
counter-revolution
as
basically
one
of
indifference.
However,
his
s not
to
say
that
the
Embassy was
not critical of the CUP.
On
the
contrary,
Lowther's islike or
theCUP
especially
rom he
opening
of theParliament
onward rew n
intensity,
nd he
parliamentarypposition
ame o seemto
him to be a 'better'
alternative.Yet,
criticism of
the
CUP was never
translatednto active nvolvementn domesticpolitics,notleastbecauseof
the
awareness f unwanted
onsequences
o
which it
would have
led;
but
also due
to
the fact thatLowtherwas
always
consciousof
the existence
of
whathe called betterelementswithin he CUP whose
friendship e could
not
afford o lose.
During he course
of
the counter-revolution,owther irst
becameconcerned bout he
Bulgarian
ttitude,
ndremained
pprehensive
about t untilafter he
agreement
adbeen
signed
on the
19th.
Rifat
Pasha's
attitudedoes seem to
have
influencedhis actions
between15thand 18th.78
Onthe otherhand, t is safe to say thathis disbeliefthatthe CUP would
unitesuch forcesas it
did against he
capital, oupled
with
the
information
from
he Consuls eeming o confirmhis
convictionhadgreat
effect
on his
decision o instruct he
ConsularOfficers.
But,
as soon as he
realized hat
the
CUP
was rallyingaround tself the
Army
as well as a
largemajority
f
people,
he did withdraw
he instructions.
ven
though
his
instructions an
be
interpreted s
interference,
ne
is
inclinedto the view that it was not
tinged
with
any
hostile intention
because
he
quickly
became,
as
will
be
seen,an admirer f the organizationndabilityof theCUP ogetherwith he
Armyof Operation.
Before
moving
on to
Britain's
policy after the suppression
of the
counter-revolution,
t
is now necessary o
discussallegations
argelybased
on
circumstantial evidence about
British
involvement. Private
correspondenceetween
he Embassyand the
Foreign
Office seem to cast
gravedoubtson the
allegation,madeby
Ahmad, hat he
LevantHerald,a
local
paperpublished
n
English,and
heavily
involved n
the vilification
campaign f the CUPprior o thecounter-revolutionadstrong inks with
the
Embassy.79f
anything,
he
line taken
by the paperpreviousto the
counter-revolutionaused the
Embassy great
dissatisfactionand even
embarrassments,
s it
did not reflect
he official
policy.
What
happenedwas thatDr
Mizzi, the
Editor, pplied o Lowther or a
subsidy
of
?600 a
year
to run the
paper,
which
was then
going down hill.
The
Portehad in a
way assisted he paper
under he old
regime o the tune
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
12/23
BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC
POLITICS,
1908-9 11
of ?600 a
year
as an indemnification for the
censorship
to
which
it
was
subjected togetherwith otherpapers.But the
Young
Turk
revolution,
which
lifted the censorship, deprived the paper of this subsidy-like revenue.
Though
he
said that he
had
been offered
'a
considerable
sum
by
the Russian
Embassy to act as their Embassy
organ',80
he
was not certain
whether or not
to
approach
them.
Passing on
Dr
Mizzi's
request
to
the
Foreign Office,
Lowther at first seemed to be
backing it, for otherwise the only English
newspaperwould have to fold up.8
But Hardingewas not enthusiastic about
the scheme, as he put it:
We are
opposed
in
principle
to the idea of
subventions
to
newspapers,
and the only case that I know of where this has been done was thatof
an
Egyptian newspaper,and it was decided two
years ago
to
drop
that
subvention.82
By the time he received
Hardinge's reply, Lowther
had become better
informed as to Mizzi. He now described Mizzi as 'so unbalanced that
he
would
be a hopeless fellow to
support'.
The Ambassadorwas
now in
entire
agreement
with
Hardinge.83
He
continued
to
complain severely
of
Mizzi
to
G.
William
Tyrrell,
Senior Clerk and Private
Secretary
to
Grey.84
n
another
private letter to Tyrrell, Lowther poured out his anger with 'busy-body'
Mizzi,
who was
dragging
his
name
'into
a
squabble,
he
is
having
with the
Committee
paper, Tanin'.85
In
the
meantime, Hardinge,
now
glad
that
Lowther had
come to
the
same conclusion about Mizzi, wrote
back
to
the
Ambassadorthat Mizzi
was 'a
most unreliable man, and not at all straight.
I know
for an absolutefact thathe has
been,
and
still is drawing ?800 a year
from
the Austrian Embassy,
which is cashed quarterly through an
Englishman
in
Constantinople, who goes to the Embassy to get the
money
'*86
In the light of all this, it seems difficult to maintain that the
Levant Herald
was financed, used or manipulated n any form by the British
Embassy
to
discredit the CUP.87
According to Halide Edip
Adivar,
Dervis
Vahdeti, Editor of the Volkan,
pivot
of
reactionaryanti-CUP
propaganda hat played an importantrole
in
fomenting
the
counter-revolution 'was
thought
to be the
paid emissary
of
the British
Embassy,
a tool
of
Fitzmaurice',
whose
name,
she
maintains,
was also
implicated
in the
Incident
of
the 31
March.88
n
similar fashion,
Aubrey Herbertasserted that it was Fitzmaurice who dictated the anti-CUP
oriented
policy
of the
Embassy rather than Grey or Lowther.89Chirol
maintains that
Lowther
'was
disposed
to back
the wrong horse
at
the time
of the
counter-revolution'.Though Chirol was
not
sure
to
what
extent the
CUP's
animosity
after
the
counter-revolution
against Lowther
was
justified,
the
latter
being
'stolid and
reserved' was
unlikely to get on well with the
'more
gushing
members' of at the
CUP.80Sir Andrew
Ryan,
the
Second
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
13/23
12
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Dragomano the Embassy, ears
out this
description
f
Lowther,
ut does
not
support
he
chargebrought gainst
he
Ambassadorhat 'he had
fallen
shortof the greatopportunityffordedby his firstarrival n the glow of
enthusiasm'.
According
o
Ryan,
the
Young
Turkswerechauvinistic nd
no
Britishdiplomatwas likely
to
make
much
headwayagainst
hem'
91
The fact that hese allegations o not seem to coincide
with
the
general
picturedrawnfrom archivalmaterial
raises the
question
as to
why
the
British might, supposing that they
were indeed behind the counter-
revolution,have been supportingt: presumably
o
bring
Kamil back to
power92
ith the LiberalUnions who
were far more
pro-British
han the
CUP.93 ut bearing
n mindthe
fact thatBritainhad,
since the
Young
Turk
revolution,wanteda strongTurkey
with no formalattachmento herselfas
a barrier
ogether
with
the BalkanStates
against
Austro-German
xpansion
in
the Balkans as a result of
Austria-Hungary's
nnexationof Bosnia-
Herzegovina,t
is
worthaskingwhat
Britain
ouldhave
gained
romKamil
andthe LiberalUnions
being
in
power.
t
is
clearthatBritainwas not
in
a
position o go to the lengthof a formalalliance.
Hadshe wantedan alliance
or some kind of
military
onvention o draw
Turkey
loser to
herself,
he
CUPhad
already
fferedher all that.
The manner n which the counter-revolutionas suppressed reatly
impressed he Foreign
Office:
Grey
was
quickto congratulate
he Turkish
Charged'Affaires,
Cevat
Bey.94
He
similarly xpressed
himself o
Lowther,
stating hathe
was much
mpressed y the
'decision,purpose, iscipline
nd
strength' isplayedby the leadersof the
Army
of
Operation,
nd
admitting
that
he
CUP'sreal
strength
adbeen underrated.
lthough
e
continued o
disapprove
f
the existenceof an
'anonymous
nd
irresponsible irecting
body',
recentevents
hadconvinced
him
that 'thebest elements'mustbe on
thesideof theCUP, orotherwiseheywouldnot havebeen successful.He
concluded that Britain must back up
these 'best
elements',
be more
sympathetic nd ess critical f them.95
ardingeooka similar ine, warning
Lowther hat
Fitzmaurice, n
'impressionablerishman',mustbe madeto
adopt
a
friendly
attitude
owards he CUP.
Specifically,
Fitzmaurice
should be neither
critical nor even
impartial
towards them
[my
italics].
He should
try to show them
that we are friendly and
sympathetic,
ndwish to
help
them.
That s
our feelinghere,andthe
only practical
ine
of
policy
to follow.
Our only hope for reformed
Turkeyrests now with the YoungTurks. f they do not meet with
sympathy
ndcannot
ean on us, they will soon learn o leanon some
other
Power,
and
he
splendid osition
we
hadat
Constantinoplefew
months
ago
will be
lost
..96
Lowther's
nitial
responsewas to recommend aution.He remindedGrey
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
14/23
BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN
DOMESTIC POLITICS,
1908-9
13
that he two leading
Unionists,
Talat
andBahaeddin
akir,
hadassured im
that hey would
go 'slowly'
in the
direction
f reformand avoidoffending
the religioussentiments f themasses;but the subsequentvents had not
borneout thisassurance.He also
complainedhat
since
the
suppression
f
the counter-revolution,
he
CUPhadadopted policyexterminating
ll that
savoured
of opposition.
He warned
hat
the country
was
'in a disturbed
conditionunderneath',
nd added that there seemed
little chance
of a
militarydictatorship,
hough n his opinion
such was
probably
he best
solution.He also noted that
the CUP leaders
were
apt
to overlook
'the
existenceof Asia Minorandbase
their deas
on Turkey, onsistingonly
of
the Macedonian rovinces'.
Yethe was prepared
o be more
sympathetic
o
the CUP, and expressed he hope that it would now come to the fore,
obviating
he need
to contact t behindthe back
of a
legal government,
usually opposing
t.
He
also welcomed
the likely appointment
f Ferid
Pashaas Grand
Vizier,despite
his pro-German
eputation,eeing
in him a
'strong
man' able to grapple
with the situation.97
Lowther's eply o Hardinge
id emphasize he
difficultyhe hadhitherto
faced n his
dealings
with the CUP:
witheveryminister ince the Constitution,have beenon the best of
terms,
but
unfortunately
hose ministershave,
after a few
days
or
weeks,rarely
been able
to
retain he
favourof the violentmembers
f
the Committee.My aimthroughout as been
that he Embassy
hould
be
in
completeharmony
with
the government
n
powerand
with the
moderates,
nd
I
believe,
best members
f the Committee.98
Lowther grew less cautious
once he realized
that the deposition
of
Abduilhamid as
not
likely
to cause fresh disturbanceshroughout
he
Empire.He argued hat t was high time for theCUP to assumepositions
and
responsibility,
nd
regretted
Mahmud
evket
Pasha's dvice
o
the
CUP
not to
take office.'
That said, a meeting with
Mahmud
$evket
Pasha,
Commander f the
Army
of Operation,made an excellent mpression
n
him:
He
has
no
doubta
great
workbeforehim, but he seemeddetermined
to
carry
t
through,
nd
f
his actions n
any
way correspond
ith
his
declarations,
hichseemed o me to be sincere. cannotbutthink hat
the choice
that
has been made of Mahmud
$evket
Pasha
is an
excellent one ...
100
But late
May
1909, there were rumoursof serious
differences
between
Mahmud
$evket
Pasha and the CUP, and at a meeting with
Lowther,
Mahmud
$evket
Pasha
openly
deprecated
he activities of 'a body of
irresponsible
and inexperienced young men
styling themselves
the
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
15/23
14
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
Committee
of Union and
Progress,
who thwarted as much as
they
assisted
the
government'.'01
At
the
Foreign
Office,
Mallet
did
not
find
this
development
'reassuring
or stable
government';'02
but he
still asserted
that,
but for
the CUP's
success,
reactionaries
would
have
massacredChristians
everywhere, as
they
had
done
in
Adana
during
the
counter-revolution'03
or
his
part,
Hardinge
reiterated
his belief
that a
militarydespotism,
presumably
under
Mahmud
$evket
Pasha,
would
be
the best
safeguard
of
the
constitutional
regime. '0
In
the
meantime,
in
order to
establish
direct contacts with the
CUP,
T.B.
Hohler, the First
Secretaryto the
Embassy, was instructed
o see Cavid
Bey,
an
influential
figure
of
the inner
circle
of
the
CUP,
who
was
very likely
to
come
to
the
fore as
a
financial expert. Hohler
pointed
out
to him
that
Britain's
policy
was to
help
set
up
a stable
government
and a reformed
administration
n
Turkey,
and that this
policy was
being pursuedregardless
of who
was
in
power.
In
answer to
Cavid
Bey's complaint
that the
British
Embassy hadrefrained
rom
makingdirect
contact with the CUP as
opposed
to
other
embassies, Hohler
emphasized the fact that
It
had been
impossible to know
who did
represent
the
real governing
force of the country, for from ministersand valis down, all authority
was
subjected
to
the
irresponsible
interference
of
the
Committee,
whose chief was
not even known to
the members
themselves,
and who
apparently
varied from
time to
time.
In
view
of the
fact that there
was so
much dissent
rather than
unity within
the
CUP,
it
was,
Hohler
pointed out,
impossible
for
the
Embassy
to know
who
was the
right person
or
group
to
approach.
He
then
urged
upon
Cavid
Bey
the
advisability
of
the CUP taking
responsibleoffice and
coming to
the
fore. The latter suggested in return that the CUP members be employed
under
ministers
as
Miistesar like
parliamentary
under-secretaries
n
Britain
through
whom
official
contactmight
be made.'05
While
tightening
up his
links with the
CUP,
Lowther gave a
cold
shoulder
to Kamil
and
Nazlm
Pashas,who
came to the
Embassy to pour
out
their
grievances
as
regards
internal
politics. But,
Lowther
did not attach
much
importance
to the
gloomy picture
they had
drawn.
For one thing,
Kamil's
foreboding
might
be
accountedfor by
his
natural
disappointmentat
the victory of his political rival, FeridPasha, as an outwardally of the CUP.
For
another,
they had been
hardly in
touch with
anybody
other than their
own
supporters.'
Lowther's
'ill-treatment'
caused Kamil to
write
directly
to
Grey asking
for
protection.
He
suggested
thatLowther be
instructed, if
possible together with
his
French and
Russian
colleagues, to
do
what he
could to
neutralize the
German
influence at
Constantinople.Though
the
Foreign
Office
acknowledged
his letter
promising him
protection of the
sort
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
16/23
BRITAIN
AND
OTTOMAN DOMESTIC
POLITICS,
1908-9
15
thathe had been
given
in the
past,
his
suggestion
as
to Lowther's
dealings
was
politely gnored,
while his conductof
affairs
during
he Bosnian
Crisis
was flattered. 07
Ismail
Kemal,an
ally
of KamilPasha
during
he
counter-revolution,
as
to
receive
his
shareof this 'cold' attitude
ater
n the autumn f
1909,
when
he went to see Grey in
the Foreign
Office
in
London,
but was received
insteadby Tyrrell,
Grey's
Private
Secretary.
he
latter imply
old
him
that
his
criticism f the CUPfor
having
replaced
Abdiilhamid'secretcamarilla
did not seem to
hold
water
any longer
as therewas a certain nclination
n
the
partof the CUPto take
office
and
responsibility.
n
addition,
t
was
high
time, Tyrellpointed
out to him
that
they
all
dropped
ncrimination
gainst
eachotherandputtheirheads ogetheror theregenerationf thecountry.'08
As couldbe
expected,under hese
circumstances, avid'sappointment
as Finance
Minister
elighted
he
Foreign
Office.
Lowther, escribed
im
as
'intelligent,an exceptionallygood
orator, and debater,
genial, liberal
minded'.109
With
the Turkish
decisionto invite German
General
von der
Goltz
to
reorganize
he
TurkishArmy, Britain's
sincerity
in
desiring a strong
Ottoman
Empire
was
put
to the test. It first
aroused ears
in
the Foreign
Office.WhileAlwynParker ound he wholedispatchunpleasant',Mallet
expressed
his
concernthat the Turkish
Army
would 'become
more
and
more
imbued with
German deas
and, having forged the weapon,
the
Germansare
likely to use it
in
a general
conflagration'.
t
then
fell to
Hardinge
o make
Britain's
ine
clear: We
may
not
like the
Germanizingf
the Turkish
Army,
but it
is
to our
advantage
hat
Turkey hould
be
strong,
and we
can
hardlyblamethe Turks or
turning o a German
General
who
has
already done wonders to
their
army.' Grey was more explicit in
determininghe line of the policy andits limits: 'It remains o be seen
whether he
new regime will
be strongenoughto use
Germanhelp, and
retain ts own
policy,
which shouldbe a good
understanding ith Russia
and
Bulgaria
s the
counterpoise
o
German ressure.''110
A
month ater,
when
the cloudsof
war
gathered ver the
Balkansbetween
Turkey
and
Greece this time
over Crete, with Bulgaria
waiting to take
advantage,Parkernow seemed
glad that the Turkish
army, under the
training
f
von
der
Goltz,
would
steadilybecomemoreandmore
powerful,
deterring ulgariarommoving o realizeheraspirationsn Macedonia. '
There s no
doubt hat
withthe advent f
the YoungTurks evolutionAnglo-
Turkish
elations ook
a sharp urnfor the better.The
revolution n itself
constituted
radical
hange
n
the
political tatusquo of the
Balkans ndof
the Near
East,
ntroducing new dimension o the
considerationsn terms
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
17/23
16
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
of balance of power
within
the
concept
of
Europeansystems
of alliances.
It
was regarded
as
a severe
blow
to
German
prestige,
and
very
much like a
seesaw, British influence gained ascendancy.The Britishrespondedswiftly
to this welcomed development,
first
clearing up
all
the
obstacles
that
they
themselves
had
put
in
front of
the
previous regime,
for
example,
the
suspension of the Anglo-Russian
scheme for a
mobile
force,
and the
agreementas to the future
withdrawalof
Macedonian
gendarmerie
officers
and
so
forth,
thus
giving
the
newly
born
regime
a
politically
vital
breathing
space. '
Some of the myths that
have
gathered
around
the
Anglo-Russian
understanding
of
1907, leading
to
explanations
to what is sometimes
seen
as British reluctance to
prop up
the
Anglophile Young
Turk
regime
are not
always fully supportedby primary
sources. This is
not to
say,
however,
that
Russia was disregarded
as a
power
factor. What seems to
have
been
the
case,
as far as the British were
concerned,
was
that
they recognized,
from
the outset, the slightly different effect that Russia as
an
ally and Turkey
as
a
friend
would have
upon
Britain's
policy.
In
other
words,
Russia and the
Ottoman
Empire had,
as it
were,
different functions
in British
policy-
making.
From
the British
standpoint, Turkey
was
not
a
European
Great
Power, though the Foreign Office seemed to have believed in the possibility
of what it called a
strong
and
regeneratedTurkey.113
The Empire, however, did occupy an important place
in
British
strategicalplanning
in
connection
with
the balance of power
in the
Balkans.
When the Young Turksemerged with Anglophile leanings, it did not lead
the
British
to
give up Russia;
nor
did
it mean
giving a cold-shoulder
to
the
new
regime.
In
essence, there was no need to do so, as the relations with the
two
countries
did
not
present any inconsistency.
In
broader
erms,
Britainneeded
the two at different levels and in different forms and for differentpurposes.
What was, of course, anathema o the Foreign Office, as was recognized at
the early stages
of
the revolution,was the option of supportingTurkeyas a
barrier
against Russia. Given that Russia had long ceased to
be an
expansionist power
in
the Balkans, particularlysince the Russian defeat of
1904-5
at
the hands of the Japanese, but that Austria appeared o be
at the
zenith of her
strengthfollowing
her
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,the
British
did
not
seem
to
have
miscalculated
the
internationalpolitical arena.
4
The British attitude towards Turkish domestic politics was, to a great
extent,
influenced
by
their
strategical considerations. Bearing
in
mind
the
fact that a
strong Turkey
could
only
be
created by a stable government,
the
British
did not attachmuch importance o the question of who was in power.
It is
obvious that the CUP's co-operative attitudewas much appreciated.In
the
ensuing power struggle after the Young Turk revolution, the Embassy
steered clear of
any action likely to be interpretedas interference.Once
the
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
18/23
BRITAIN AND
OTTOMAN
DOMESTIC
POLITICS,
1908-9
17
CUP was seen to
be acting as a destabilizing actor,
then came
British
criticismmostly
kept
to
private orrespondence.
et this is not to
say that
the Embassydid
not cold-shoulder he
CUP.
At this
stage,
the
CUP's
nationalisticand
chauvinistic endencieswere regarded
by
the
Foreign
Office as the beginningof the dismembermentf the
Empire, omething
that the Britishdid not wish to see happening.The
Embassy hought
hat
any alternativeo
the CUP mightbe better.But as
soon as they realized,
afterthe suppression f the counter-revolution,hat
the CUP was hand
n
glove with the army,andhadpopular upport,hey
turned ackto it.
It could be
maintained hat British policy was
more influencedby
Turkishattitude owardsBritain han other factors,
as it was to become
obvious n 1910-11. Itwas, afterall, the CUP,and he Army n generalwho
underestimated ritish
friendshipand assistance,'5digging their own
gravesand
preparingheirown political solation,whichwouldbe severely
felt
by Turkey
during
he
Tripoli
and
Balkan
Wars.
NOTES
1. F.
Ahmad, 'Great
Britain's
Relations with the
Young
Turks, 1908-1914', Middle
Eastern
Studies (1966), pp.310-16; F. Ahmad, 'The Late OttomanEmpire', in M. Kent, TheGreat
Powers
and theEnd of the
Ottoman
Empire(London,
1984),
pp.13-17. See, B.
Samardziev,
'British
Policy towards the
Young Turk
Revolution,
1908-1914
(Some
Problems)',
Bulgarian
Historical
Review,3 (1983),
pp.22-43. See also S.
Ak,in,
31 Mart Olayi
(Istanbul,
1972), pp.290-1.
2. Ibid.
3.
Ak$in, 31 Mart
Olayi, p.356.
4.
Fitzmaurice
o Tyrrell,25
Aug. 1908,
Pte. GreyPapers
(FO800/79).
5. Chirolto H.W.
Steed,
6
Dec.
1908,
Pte.
Chirol
Papers The
Times
Archives,
London);
Chirol
to
Tyrrell, 19 Nov.
1909, Grey Papers
(FO800/16).
6. Lowther to Grey, 4 Aug. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
7.
Lowther o Grey,
11
Aug.
1908
and
25 Aug.
1908, Pte.
LowtherPapers
FO800/193B); Grey
Papers
(FO800/79).
8.
Lowther to Grey,
11 Aug.
1908, 25
Aug. 1908 and 31
Aug.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B);
Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
9.
Lowtherto
Grey,
2
Sept.1908,F0371/6559, 31787.
10. Lowther
to
Grey, 12 Oct.
1908,
F0371/559, 31787.
11.
See, for the
arrangement f
the meeting,
F0371/545,
28993; F0371/548,
32132.
12. For
OttomanPolicy during
the
Bosnian
InternationalCrisis, see
H. Unal,
'OttomanPolicy
during
the
Bosnian
Annexation
Crisis,
1908-1909'
(unpublished
Ph.D.
thesis, University
of
Manchester, 1992). See, also 'OttomanPolicy during the BulgarianIndependenceCrisis:
Ottoman-BulgarianRelations at
the Outset of the
Young
Turk
Revolution', Middle
Eastern
Studies,
Vol.34,
No.4
(Oct.
1998), pp.135-76.
13.
Grey
to
Lowther, 13
Nov. 1908,
Pte.
Grey Papers
(FO800/79); Lowther Papers
(FO800/193A).
14. Hardinge
o
Lowther, 17 Nov. 1908,
Pte.
LowtherPapers
FO800/193A); Hardinge o Block,
17
Nov.
1908, Pte. Hardinge
Papers 13.
15. Lowther to
Grey,
14
Sept.1908, Pte.
Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B); Grey
Papers
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
19/23
18
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
(FO800/79).
16.
Lowther to
Grey,
27
Oct.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B);
Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
17. Lowther to Grey, 27 Oct. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers
(FO800/79);
See
for
rumoursabout
dethronement,
Grey
to
Lowther,
30 Oct.
1908,
Private
telegram,
Grey Papers
(FO800/79);
Lowther to
Grey,
3
Nov.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
18.
Grey to
Asquith,
11
Sept.1908,
Pte.
GreyPapers
(FO800/79).
19.
Grey's
minute,
F0371/559,
31787.
20. Lowther to
Grey,
31 Aug.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B);
Grey Papers
(FO800/79);
Lowtherto
Hardinge,
20 Dec.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
21. Lowtherto
Hardinge,
20 Dec.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
22.
Ak,in, 31 Mart
Olayi, p.31.
23.
Lowtherto
Grey,
31
Oct. 1908,
F0371/553, 36562,
and
minutes;
F0371/554,
37658.
24. Lowther to Grey, 27 Oct. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
25.
Hardinge
o
Lowther,
17 Nov.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193A).
26.
Lowtherto
Grey, 20 Dec.
1908,
FO800/546,
45084.
27. Ibid. Mallet's
minute.
28.
Grey
to
Lowther,
15 Dec.
1908,
FO371/558, 43816.
29. Lowtherto
Hardinge,8 Dec. 1908 and 22
Dec. 1908, Pte.
Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
30.
Lowther
o
Montgomery,
2
Sept.1908,Private
Telegram;Grey
to
Lowther,
9
Sept. 1908,
Pte.
Grey Papers
(FO800/79). See for further
details S.
Ak~in,
Yiiz
Soruda Ittihat
ve Terakki
e
Jon Tuirkluik
Istanbul,1972) p.46;
P. P.
Graves,
Briton
and Turk
London,
1941),pp.107-8.
31. A minuteby a ForeignOffice official is a verystrikingexampleof this line: 'it is to be hoped
that
Kiamil will
get his vote of
confidence
if
Ahmed Riza is the
alternative'
FO371/546,
43987).
32.
Lowther
to Grey,
29 Dec.
1908, Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B);
Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
33.
Grey
to
Lowther,
27
Nov.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193A);
Grey Papers
(FO800/79).
34.
Lowtherto
Hardinge,
22
Dec.
1908,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
35.
F0371/546, 43987;
Hardinge
o
Lowther,29 Dec.
1908, Pte. Lowther
Papers
FO800/193A).
36.
Lowther
to
Hardinge,
6 Jan.
1909,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
37.
Lowther
does not
seem to have
been
pleased
with
Kamil's
proceeding(Lowther o
Grey,
12
Feb. 1909 and 14 Feb. 1909, F0371/60, 5723, 5828).
38.
Ak~in,
Ittihat
ve
Terakki,
p.33-8.
39.
Lowtherto
Grey, 15 Feb.
1909,
F0371/760; Greyto
Lowther,
17
Feb
1909,
F0371i61.
40.
Lowther
to
Hardinge,
16 Feb.
1909,
Pte.
LowtherPapers
(FO800/193B).
41.
Hardinge
o
Lowther,
22
Feb.
1909,
Pte.
Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193A);
Hardinge's
minute
on
Lowtherto
Grey,
22
Feb.
1909,
F0371/768, 7056.
42.
Grey
to
Lowther, 17
Feb.
1909,
F0371/761,7180,7179; Hardinge o
Lowther,23 Feb.
1909,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193A).
43.
Lowther
o
Grey, 8
Feb, 1909, Pte. Lowther
Papers
FO800/193B);
GreyPapers
FO800/79).
44.
Lowther
to
Hardinge,
16 Feb.
1909;
Lowther to
Gorst, 26
Feb.
1909,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
45.
Lowther
to
Hardinge,
2
March
1909, Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
46.
Lowther
to
Grey, 16 March
1909,
Pte.
Lowther Papers
(FO800/193B);
Grey
Papers
(FO800/79).
47.
Lowther to
Hardinge,
2
March
1909, 10 March
1909,
24
March 1909
and 31 March
1909,
Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B); Grey
Papers
(FO800/192).
48.
Colonel
Surtees stated
that 'the
general
state of
discipline
in
the officer
ranks s
decidedly a
danger
and
unless
authorities
ake
up
the
question
strongly
andabsolutely
forbid
all military
interference n
politics,
it will
not be
surprising
f
we find
ourselves
sliding into a
military
This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk
20/23
BRITAIN
AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC
POLITICS, 1908-9
19
revolution'
(Surtees to Lowther,27 Feb.
1909,
F0195/2323).
See also Lowther to
Grey,
14
April
1909, F0371/770,
14544;
F0421/250;
Cabinet
Papers
(CAB37/99,
no.
62).
49.
Lowtherto Grey,
13 April
1909, F0371/770,
13941;
F0421/250.
50. Lowtherto Grey, 13 April 1909,F0371/770,13942, andminutes;F0421/250.
51.
Lowther
to
Grey, 14 April
1909,
F0371/770, 14033, 14035,
14049.
52.
Ibid. and
minutes.The
correspondent
f
The
limes,
P.P.
Graves,
was
watching
events
closely
in the
streets of
ConstantinopleGraves,
Briton
and
Turk,pp.127-9).
53.
Interestingly, he news about
the overthrowof the
CUP produced
a
shocking
effect
among
Armenian
circles abroad,which
still considered
he
CUP
'friendly'
to their
interests
Friends
of
Armeniato the
ForeignOffice,
14
April 1909,
F0371/770,
14186).
54. Lowtherto Grey, 14
April
1909, CabinetPapers
(CAB/37/99,
no.
62.)
55. Lowtherto
Hardinge,
14
April
1909, Pte. Lowther
Papers
(FO800/193B).
56.
Surtees to
Lowther,
14
April
1909, F0195/2323.
57. See
for
Grey'scongratulations
o
him,
15
April 1909,Private
Telegram,
preparedby Mallet,
GreyPapers(FO800/79).
58.
Lowtherto
Grey,
15 April 1909,
FO371/770,14172,14182.
59.
Grey
to
Lowther, 15
April
1909, F0371/770,14182.
60. Lowtherto
Lamb,
15
April
1909, FO195/2330.
61.
Lamb to
Lowther,
15
April 1909,
F0195/2328.
62. Lowtherto
Grey,
16
April
1909,
F0371/770,14223.
63.
Ibid.,
minutes.
64.
Sampson to
Lowther,
15
April 1909 and
16 April
1909,
F0195/2304.
65. Satow to
Lowther,
16
April
1909, FO195/2328.
66.
Though
the
Consular Officer's first
impression
turned out to be baseless
(Sampson
to
Lowther, 17 April 1909, received on 18 April 1909, F0195/2304), the Albanians'defiant
attitude
remained
unchanged hroughout.
See reportsand
telegrams
from
Satow to
Lowther,
16 April 1909, 19
April 1909, 20
April
1909, 21 April 1909 and
23 April
1909,FO195/2328.
67.
See
for
instance, Surteesto
Lowther, 17
April 1909, F0195/2323.
68.
Lowther
o
Grey,20 April
1909,
F0371/770,15582;
F0421/250;
Cabinet
Papers CAB37/99,
no.
64.) Ismail Kemalalleges that
it
was
him
who
instigated
Lowther o
instruct he
Consuls
(IsmailKemal, Memoirs
of
ismail
KemalBey
(London, 1920),
p.343.Ahmad
and
AkEin
reat
this
together with some other
circumstantial vidence as
proving that the
BritishEmbassy
was behind
the
counter-revolution
Ahmad, 'Great Britain's
Relations',
p.314; Ak,in, 31
Mart,
pp.138-9). This view is
not borne out
by
British documents.
Obviously, Lowther as
Ambassador was
responsible
for providing his
Consuls
with information and
even
occasionally argument. n fact, before Lowtherinstructed hem, some Consuls had already
asked the
Embassy for
informationand
argument(see for
example,
Grey to Lowther, 16
April
1909,
F0195/2328,
'Vali
himself at head
of
Monastir Committee
represents
Constantinople
movement as
reactionary.
s
it
liberal
...?').
On
the
other
hand,
it
seems
arguable
whetherLowther
had much
confidence in
Ismail Kemal. In
writing to Hardingehe
said: 'Ismail
Kemal has bolted
of which
I
am
glad,
as
I
do
not
trust
him'. On 20
April,
Lowther
did not like
the presence of
Kamil Pasha in the
Embassy, and
'got rid of him',
hoping
that
the
ex-GrandVizier would
not return.
See Lowtherto
Hardinge,20 April
1909,
Pte.
LowtherPapers
(FO800/193B).
69.
It
is
interesting
o note that at
this
juncture he
Foreign
Office did not
encourage he
Serbian
attemptto arrive at an understandingwith Bulgariaostensibly againstany Austrianmove
(Grouitch
to
the
Foreign
Office,
15
April
1909 and
Grey
to
Whitehead,15 April
1909,
F0371/770,
14122).
70.
Lowther
to
Consuls,
16
April 1909,
FO195/2330, 2314.
71. Lowtherto
Consuls,
17
April
1909, F0195/2330.
72.
Sampson
(Adrianople)
o
Lowther,
17
April 1909, received on
18 April
1909, F0195/2304;
Lamb
(Salonica)
to
Lowther,
16
April
1909, 17
April 1909, 18 April
1909, 1
Recommended