Britain and Young Turk

8/9/2019 Britain and Young Turk

1/23

Britain and Ottoman Domestic Politics: From the Young Turk Revolution to the Counter-Revolution, 1908-9Author(s): Hasan ÜnalSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 1-22Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154 .

Accessed: 17/02/2015 07:18

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle Eastern

Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 152.118.24.10 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 07:18:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4284154?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis


2/23

Britainand

Ottoman

DomesticPolitics:

From

the Young

Turk

Revolutionto the

Counter-Revolution, 908-9

HASAN

UNAL

The counter-revolution,r the Incidentof the 31 March1909against he

Committee f Union

and

Progress

hereafter

he

CUP)(the

Young

Turks

s

they

are

known

n

Western

istoriography)

s one

of

the most controversial

points

in

Anglo-Turkishelations

n

the

periodunder

review.It has been

suggested hatthe

counter-revolution

onstituted

watershed

n

Britain's

relationswith Turkeymarking he end of the

honeymoon,

which

the two

countries ad

enjoyed ollowing he YoungTurk evolution

f

July

1908.'It

is maintained

hat his was due

primarily

o

unlimitedBritish

upport

or the

'LiberalUnions'(Ahrar)which hadbecome erstwhileadversaries f the

CUP since the

restorationof the

Constitution.

The

British Embassy

particularly

as

suspected

of

having

been involved

n

fomenting, hrough

variouschannels,even perhaps

of funding

and organizing he counter-

revolution gainst he CUP.2

According o

these accounts,Britain's arlier

commitments

o Russia under the

Anglo-Russian

onventionof

1907

determined

London'spolicies towards he Ottoman

Empire.

And

Britain

sided with

those least

likely

to obtain

the upper hand because of her

sneakingdesire o

give up

Turkey

as

a prospective utureally

by backing

the wronghorse

and hus

antagonizinghe CUPwhichwas

more ikelythan

not to emergevictorious rom

he power

struggle.3

Before

looking into the role that Britain

allegedly

played, it is first

necessary o

take a glance at

her attitude owardsdifferences

of opinion

withinvariousYoungTurk

groupsand between

hem and the

Cabinet, or

example,

he

CUP,

he

LiberalUnions

and

Kamil

Pasha.From

he outset,

Britain's

attitude

owardsdifferences f opinionbetween hem all

can be

interpreteds one of

indifference.

Soon after his arrivaln Constantinople,he BritishAmbassador, ir

Gerald

Lowther,detectedthat there was a

lack

of

experienced eading

figures among

the

Young

Turks,

a

view that

was to be confirmedby

Fitzmaurice,

Chief

Dragoman f the Embassy4

nd later n the

autumnby

Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol.37, No.2,

April 2001, pp.

1-22

PUBLISHED

BY

FRANK

CASS,

LONDON


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/23

2

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

Sir Valentine

Chirol,

The Times editor.5Nevertheless, he

Ambassador

admitted

hat

'things

have

gone

as well as

they

could'6

despite

he fact that

the CUP

was just 'a collectionof good-intentioned

hildren'.'Yet,

he was

not over optimistic.

He

feared hat

one sectionwithin he CUP who had

no

confidence

n the Sultan

even with his

wings

so

clipped'might

attempt

o

dethrone

him.

This,

he

thought,

coupledwith the sackingof many

other

officials and

officers

would lead to untoward

ncidents,

makingeven

the

return f the

old regimepossible.He, therefore,

ndeavouredo

'temper

he

zeal

of the reformers'

and

pinned

all

his

hopes

on what he called

'the

moderation

f the

largemajority

f

the Committee'

o

prevent

disaster.8

Lowther'smeeting

with the two prominent

CUP

figures

Mehmed

Talat

(laterTalatPasha)andBahaeddin

akir

aninfluentialmember f the inner

circle of the CUP)

relieved

him

of

the

anxiety

hat

he

Young

Turkswould

mess thingsup by 'going

too

fast' in theirendeavour

o reform

he

country.

Much

to Lowther'ssatisfaction

he two

leaders

utterly repudiated

he

rumour hatthe CUP

was anxious o

depose

the Sultan.

f

anything,

hey

emphasized

he vital

importance

f

keeping

he Sultan

on the throneand

expressed

heirsatisfactionwith

KamilPasha's

abinet.9

However,

his rosy picture

was not to last for long.

His meetingwith

AhmedRiza,a YoungTurk eaderwho hadlong beenin exile in France

before the revolution,cold-watered

his enthusiasm.

The

latter, while

admitting

that he

knew

nothing

about the

details of the financial

arrangements

nd

loans, suggested

hat he

British

Government

ow come

forward ndoffer

Turkey pontaneously

ome millionsrather hancontent

herselfwith

encouraging

inanciers ndbankers

nreturn or a guaranteeo

ratify t by the

Turkish arliament hen t met.

TheAmbassador

eplied hat

Britainhad also a Parliament,

which would be most unlikely o

sanction

such a transaction.AhmedRiza's second remark hat Britain, eeing that

genuinesteps

were

being

taken

n the

direction

of reforms,shouldnow

extendher

protection,

n

accordancewith the Cypirus onvention f 1878,

to the whole

Empire

id seemto the Ambassadoro be a prematureuestion

to raise.

AhmedRiza, 'too loquacious

with mmature iews', what s more,

seeming

o favoura moreradicalprogramme,ltogethermadea

very poor

impression

n Lowther.

n

the

ForeignOffice,Mallet,Headof the

Eastern

Department,

ound t disappointing;

ut still hoped

hat t did not represent

the 'YoungTurkintelligence',while Sir CharlesHardinge,Permanent

Under-Secretary

n the

Foreign

Officedismissed t as 'worthless'.'1

British Foreign Secretary,Sir Edward

Grey and Hardinge,

it so

happened, adan opportunity

f meetingAhmed

Rizatogetherwithanother

leadingCUPfigure,Dr Nazim,

n London t the

heightof the Bosnian

risis

in

mid-November,

908.11

The

two leadersused

this occasionto express

their

ndignation

t the idea

of the recognition f

the annexation

n returnor




4/23

BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN

DOMESTIC

POLITICS,

1908-9

3

some

pecuniary ompensation hich

would, hey

argued,

e tantamount

o

selling

their

rights

for

money.

Instead, hey proposed

hat

the

annexed

provinces be transformednto a buffer state underAustro-Hungarian

administration.he

only means hey

suggested

o achieve his end was

that

Britain,

Franceand

hopefully

Russiashouldassociate hemselveswith the

Turkish

rotestagainst he

Austro-Hungarian

ction or at least five or

six

months

by

which ime

Turkey

wouldmost

ikely

havemade

an

entente

with

the Balkan

States.

Sucha

strong

ombination ould

hen

compel

Austria

o

give way. But at the same time,

they laid much stress on the

point

that

Bulgaria hould

only be allowedto remain

n civil

possession

of

Eastern

Rumelia, epriving erof

anyright

o use the

regionmilitarily.'2

s thiswas

bound o

pushBulgaria

nto

the

Austro-Hungarian

rbit,Grey

and

Hardinge

told them that

any combination etween

Turkey,

Serbiaand

Montenegro

wouldbe of little

use against

n

Austro-Bulgarianront.

n

addition, o

such

condition s

they

suggested

ouldeverbe

imposedupon

Bulgaria

withouta

war.Moreover,

simpleprotest, ven

if

madeand nsisted

uponby all the

Powers

n

question

or somefive or six months,would

not advancematters.

Their

offer

of

alliance o Britainwas politely

urned

own.

Greypointed

out to them

hatBritain's

olicy

was

based

on the

principle

f

keeping

our

hands free, thoughwe made ententesand friendship'.For instance, he

ententewith

Japanwas limited o certain

distant

questions

n the Far

East.

But,Greymade t

quiteclear hat he

British ympathywas entirelywith he

YoungTurks,

ndthat

he ForeignOfficewas

prepared

o

supply

Turkey,

f

desired,

with

the

necessary

know-how'and

experts

o

organize

Customs,

Police

andso forth.

The impressionhat

he

CUP

eaders eft withGreyand

Hardingewas most disappointing.

hmedRiza in

particulareemed o be

quite

impractical',omething f an

dealist, t leastas far

as dealingwith his

external risiswasconcerned.Greywas sure hat'the TurkishGovernment

will havea

difficult

ob

if

all the YoungTurks re ike

them'

13

Hardinge

ad

nevermet

'visionaries

.. withscantly

political deas'

ike thembefore. 4

In

the

meantime,

Lowther

came to notice the

interwoven

relations

between he

CUP

and

the

army,

and

was inclined o the view

that

possibly

all this

may

end in a

militarydictatorship'.

e

also noticed

hatthe CUP

was

going too fast

in

preaching ecular enets

amongst he masses,

and

feared hat t

would,

f

carried

n

in

the samemanner,

ause

disturbances'. 6

Hisanxietyas to the internal ituation atheredmomentumwhenhe heard

a rumour

hat the CUP

would soon

dethrone he Sultan.

n

fact, this was

probably

he

only pointupon

whichall

the

factions

within he CUPagreed.

Yet,

Lowther

could

not simply see how a

depositionwould address

he

situation, iven

thatthere

was

still 'a

sad lack of men

and moneyto

deal

with

the

complications f an entirelynew system'.'

It

must be

borne

n

mind

that the alarm elt

by

the Embassyand the




5/23

4

MIDDLE

EASTERN STUDIES

Foreign

Officeat the

ideawas

in

no

way

becauseof the 'beaux

yeux'

of

the

Sultan.

On

the

contrary,Grey

opposed

a

royal

visit to

Constantinople,

n

the

grounds hat it was to be

to the

presentSultan;

whereashe would

have

supported visit

by

the

King

to 'a

Young

Turk

government'

s it

'would

have a

beneficial

effect

upon

our Mohammedan

ubjectseverywhere'. 8

Initially,

herehadperhaps

een someconfusion

s to the line to be takenas

regards

he deposition.

For

instance,Grey

minuted n Lowther's

dispatch,

reporting is advice o MehmedTalatand

Bahaeddin

akir

not to

attempt

t

dethronement:we need not

lay

too

much

stress

upon

deference o

the

present

Sultan'. 9

One

thing

was, however,

clear:

both the

Foreign

Office

and the

Embassy

were fearfulof the

widespread

disturbances

ny

such

attemptwould ead to.

Lowther's

lready

haken onfidence

n the CUP was to further uffer.

In

mid-December,

wo

bribery

ases

involvingpeople

romthe innercircle

of the

CUP

with

English

businessmenwere

brought

o his notice.20

espite

the factthat he

Englishcompetitors

were

given

the contract s the resultof

the

bribery,

Lowtherwas

disgusted

with

the whole

affair,

but could not

bring

he matterbeforethe GrandVizier.

f

he

did,

he wouldhave to

give

chapter

and

verse, exposing

British

competitors

nd

ruining

heir future

chances.Despiteall this,he was not stillpreparedo putthewhole blame

on

the

CUP,

as it

was,

after

all,

a secret

ociety.

However,

he

pace

of events

was

certainlymaking

him

'sick of the

Committee',

and he

hoped that it

wouldcome into the

open.2'

It

must not be inferred,

however,

as is

often

the case

in

Turkish

historiography,hat he British iked KamilPashaany

better.22 is conduct

of

affairs at the outset of the Bosnian

crisis was seen as

intransigent,

obstructive nd

impracticable.More

particularly,

is

attitude owardsan

alliancewith theBalkanStates,hispersistent efusal o consider n entente

with

Bulgariawas far from satisfactory.He was seen

as negotiatingwith

Serbia,

Montenegro

nd even

Austria-Hungary

ith

no regard o British

advice. So much

so,

when

he asked Lowther

views of the British

government

n

connectionwith a

secret

agreement roposedby Austria-

Hungary, he Foreign Office

officials concerned

gave free rein to their

feelings.

KamilPasha

was

soliciting

reaction

o a proposal hat the Dual

Monarchy ive

an

undertaking

ot to enter nto any

commitment ontrary

to theintegrity f theOttomanEmpire, ndrecognizeSanjak s an integral

part

of

Turkey

n

return

or the

withdrawal f the

Turkishprotest o the

annexation f

Bosnia-Herzegovina

y the Dual

Monarchy. he minuteson

Lowther's

dispatch

read: 'while

Turkey s negotiatingwith a varietyof

governments,

t

is somewhat

difficult or us

to assisther'.

Tilley,a Foreign

Office

official

n

the

Eastern

Departmentemindedhat




6/23

BRITAIN

AND

OTTOMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS,

1908-9

5

Kamil

Pasha s a very cunningold gentleman,

whose methodsare

very oriental.Whenhe took refugeat the Consulate

General,

e

was,

I believe, in no sort of dangerand merelywished to manoeuvre

himselfbackto

Constantinople

ndbecomeGrand

Vizier

.,23

Lowtherdescribed is scheme n

connection

withthe transformation

f

the

annexedprovinces nto an

autonomous uffer tate,and

his negotiationsor

a

defensive

and

offensivealliancewithSerbiaand

Montenegro

s 'rather f

a wild order'. The GrandVizier

was,

Lowther

described,

a

'frightfully

difficultman to

get

to talk

and so

frightfully

ndistinct .. that

it

is

very

difficult

o

appreciate

what

really

s

in

his

mind'24

Hardinge

n the

Foreign

Office was no less annoyedwith the Grand Vizier's negotiations n

Constantinople

ith

'thoserotten

ountries',

Serbiaand

Montenegro.25

The

continualpower struggle

between the Young Turksand Kamil

Pasha,

deepeningand getting out of

control,and

later

on, involving

the

Liberal Unions and

'reactionary' orces against the CUP created an

atmosphere

n which

the Britishhadto

adopt

a cautious ine of

policy.

The

differences f opinionbetween he

CUP and

KamilPashacame to

a head in

December.The British

displayeda striking

xample

of

caution.

Some

members f the BalkanCommittee f the Houseof

Commons,

Noel

BuxtonMP and his friends,

who had been visiting

Constantinople

ere

invited

by

a small

section

of

the CUP to an

entertainment

n

the Grand

Vizier's

house without he latter's

expressconsent.KamilPasha, urious

with

whathe called 'the dictation

f the CUP' refused

o

allow

theni nto

the

house,

as

it

was

not,

in his

own words, 'the

Committee estaurant'

26

Mallet

deprecatedhe friction ausedby the Balkan

Committee etween he

CUP

and

Kamil

Pasha,27

hile

Grey nstructed owther o warnBuxton o

abstain rom

mixing up

'in

any

differencesbetween

any

section of the

YoungTurks nd he GrandVizier'

28

Lowther,hough inding t beyondhis

power

o

intervene,

was

particularly

elievedwhen

hey

eft.29 iven

hat

he

Foreign

Office was quite aware of the woeful effect

that the King's

congratulatorymessage

to the Sultanwhich

includeda reference o the

appointment

f Kamil

Pasha

as

GrandVizierhad

produced,30hisprudent

attitude

ould

have been

predicted.

One

gathers

rom

primary

ources

n

British

archives hatKamil

Pasha,

though

never

regarded

s more

han he 'leastworst'alternative,31radually

emerged romthe cloudyinternal ituationas wiser than othercontesters

towards the

end of

the year. Yet, this did not

mean active British

involvement

n

backinghim

against he CUP. On the

contrary,Lowther

assured he CUPon

severaloccasions

hatBritainwas

by

no

meansrelying

upon

Kamil

Pasha.32 n

fact,

the British

postponed, for this

reason,

conferring pon

him

a

GCB.33

With

he internal

ituation

howing

no

signs

of

improvement,

owtherwas now

sure

thata

fight

between

he

CUP and




7/23

6

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

the

government

headed

by

Kamil Pasha

was unavoidable. He

hoped

that

the

Governmentwould win the

day,34

view shared

by

the

Foreign

Office.35

Although Lowther's

hopes

that

Kamil would

get

a

vote of confidence

in

the Parliament and establish himself

firmly

in the

saddle36

ame true

in

January, hey were to be

proven

short-lived.

The

manner

n which

the Grand

Vizier attempted to get rid

of

the Ministers of War and

Marine,37

whom he

accused of

being

hand

in

glove

with the

CUP, brought

about

his

downfall

just a month later.38

Despite

the assurances

from

the new Grand

Vizier,

Huseyin

Hilmi

Pasha,

former

Inspector

General

of

Macedonia under Sultan

Abduilhamid hat

he

would adhere to Kamil Pasha's

foreign

policy,

Lowther

was

sure that the new

government

was bound to 'do the

bidding

of the

Committee'

This

would, according

to the

Ambassador,

make the

Cretan

question

more and

more

acute

as

the CUP

represented

'purely

Turkish

versus Ottoman interests'.

All

in

all,

the

daily worsening

internal situation

coupled

with

gloomy

international

political

atmosphere

was

filling

Lowther

with

despair.' Hardinge

predicted rightly that

'it all

seems to

be

gradually

tending

to a

military

despotism

of a

nationalist

and chauvinistic

character

..,41

whereas

Grey pinned

all his

hopes

on the

ability

and

statesmanship

of

Rifat

Pasha,

the

newly

appointed Foreign Minister,who had been Ottoman

Ambassador n London.42

However, this was

not

enough to lessen the fears of

the Ambassadorwho

saw little

prospect

of

improvement

n

internal

politics.

Added

to

continued

rumoursof a plot to

get rid of the Sultan,43

he CUP's interference with

governmental

affairs rendered the

whole cabinet

powerless.

He

then

decided to

display

a 'cold' attitude to the

CUP

in

the

hope

that it

might

influence it.4 Yet, he still

endeavoured to be on good terms with

what he

called

some 'good men

amongst them'.46

Until the counter-revolution,on 13 April 1909, Lowther's pessimistic

reports continued to

pile up in the

Foreign Office.47 But it must be

remembered that this

criticism of the

CUP was kept to private

correspondencebecause the

Embassy took great care not to get

dragged nto

the row between

the CUP and the

combined

opposition, which

was growing

by

leaps

and bounds.

Given that

the internal situation on the

eve of the

counter-revolution

was tense and

hopeless, Lowther's despair

does not

seem to be ill

founded.

All

evidence

confirms

that the Embassy had no

foreknowledge of the

coming

revolution.

Apart

from some guesses made by

Lowther and the

Embassy

staff

consequent

on

widespread insubordination

and growing

discontent

among troops

due

to the

preaching

of

anti

religious, secular

tenets,48

t

is safe

to

say

that

the

Embassy

was

caught napping.




8/23

BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC

POLITICS,

1908-9

7

In his firsttelegram n 13

April,

Lowther nformed

he

Foreign

Office

of

the

'mutiny',

upported y

a

large

number

f

'softas',

andnot directed

t

theConstitution ut 'rather t theCUP', houghheapplicationf theSharia

Lawwas

demanded.49

n the next

dispatch,Lowther eported

he

resignation

of the

whole cabinet

and

the appointment

f Kamiland Nazim Pashasas

GrandVizierandthe Minister f War

espectively ogether

with SaidPasha

as the Minister

or ForeignAffairs.Hardinge,

heered

up

with

the news

a

little,thought hat

if

Kamilreturnso power,all may

yet

be

well',

whereas

Mallet reminded

him

that, according o the 'Times', the Sultanhad

not

calledfor

Kamil,

but

selected

Tevfik.i0

The following

day,

Lowther

alledTevfikPasha's

Cabinet colourless',

andasked or somemen-of-warobeheld nreadinessoproceedoBeirut,

Smyrnaand Salonica

n

order

to

protect

British

nterests,as,

unless the

mutinywere o be

promptly uppressed,t might ead

o

further isturbances

in

the provinces.51 he

Foreign Office,

still at

a

loss to

grasp

the real

significanceof what was taking place, indulged

in

guesswork.

Mallet

thought

hatthe Sultan

had presumably enefited by the

quarrel

etween

the UnionLiberalsandthe Committee f Unionand

Progress

o

appoint

a

cypher

and

govern

himself',

whereas nother fficial

expressed

eservations

about he Sultan's llegedregainof control. twas obvious hat heForeign

Office found

itself

very

much

in

the

dark;as

Hardinge emarked,

much

more hanLowther

hadreportedwas already n TheTimes.52

AlthoughLowther

noticed hat

this was a 'distinctdefeat

of

the

CUP,53

and heir

ultra-liberal

deas,

or which he

country

s

notripe',5

he

appeared

quite

confusedand

apprehensive;

One

must

regard

he

situation s surrounded

ith

the greatest ossible

danger.. TheHodjasandSoftaclass unitedwiththe menof different

regiments

re

not likely to show muchreason .. it is all

very

bad

and

one must

ook

in

the future or a

violently

chauvinistic ttitude..55

The

MilitaryAttachewas no less apprehensive. e

found t 'deplorable

n

everyrespect hat t

shouldbe possible or a few mutinous attalionsn the

Capital

o

upset

the whole

government

f

the

countryat

a

moment

when

Turkey as everyreason or desiring o present n

appearancef stability s

well as continuity of

policy'.56

On 15 April,withthe appointmentf NazimPasha o the command f

the

Constantinople

arrison

he

situationwould,Lowtherhoped, mprove.

Rifat Pasha,who

retainedhis office,57 xpresseda

wish to Lowther hat

Britainwouldnot

hesitate o give diplomaticupporto

the new government,

which

was totally resolved

to stick to the Constitutionogetherwith the

Sultan.58 he

Foreign

Office's

reply strikingly

underlines he policy that

Britain ad

been

pursuing

ince

heYoungTurk evolution. hat

aid,Britain




9/23

8 MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

waspreparedo support nygovernmentn

Turkey

s

long

as

it

endeavoured

to

safeguard ublic

nterests

nd

secure

a

development

n administration.

ut

no specificpromise f supportor thenewgovernment asmade.59

What was Lowther

doing

at

Constantinople

t this

stage?

He

first

ascertained

f the Consul Generalat

Salonica, Harry

Lamb,

as

to

the

likelihood of the

IlIrd

Army, stationed

in

Salonica,

marching

on

Constantinople.0 amb

nformed

he

Ambassadorhat the officersof the

IlIrd

Army were determined

o reverse

the

verdict

of the

coup

in

Constantinople,

nd that

they

had been assuredof the

support

f

the

IVth

Armyat Adrianople.6

In his

report o the

Foreign

Office

on

16

April,

Lowther

layed

down

he

threats

rom

the

IlIrd

Army headquarters

s their

original

plan

to

join

Mahmud

Muhtar

Pasha,

former Commanderof the

Constantinople

Garrison,

had fallen

through

as

a

result

of the latter's

escape

from

the

Capital.62

his

dispatch

caused

some

alarm at

the

Foreign

Office

that

Bulgaria

would move

in

Macedonia

n

the event

of a

clash between

rival

army

units.As it was

admittedly eyond

he

power

of the

Foreign

Officeto

stop Bulgaria,Grey merely hoped

that the

position

of the

government,

strengthened y

the

appointment

f Nazim

Pasha,

would

perhapsprevent

sucha clash.63

At this

juncture,

Lowther was, evidently, being misinformed rom

Adrianople

nd

UskuibSkopje).

The

reason

why

Lowther

layed

downthe

threats rom he

IlIrd

Army

was his disbelief n the IVth

Army

stationed t

Adrianopleoining the former.This was

due to the telegramshe

received

from

he Consular

Officerat Adrianople

asting

doubts

on such ikelihood.4

Informationrom Consul Satow at

Uskuibwas

of

a

similarnature.The

commander

f the Vth

divisionat Uskiib

was, according

o

the

Consul,very

reluctanto complywitha request rom heIlIrdArmy osend roops ojoin

them n

order o march n the

Capital. n

addition, enior

officers,as distinct

from the

younger

ones,

were

opposed

to marchingon Constantinople.

Moreover,

he

Albanianswere

sending

a

deputationo the Capital o see the

real

nature of

occurrences as the CUP blocked

the passage of

Constantinopleapers.65

Partly

due to this

'misinformation',66

oupled with

the signs of

improvementn the situation rom 17

Aprilonwards67

ogetherwith Rifat

Pasha's reassuringmessages, Lowtherseems to have misread nternal

occurrences,

nd

took

some unusual

teps

in

endeavouringo disseminate

'the

actual

facts as

widely

as

possible ...to calm

the popular xcitement'

through

BritishConsuls.68 is

apprehensions to the

Bulgarian ttitude lso

made

some

effect on his action.69

Lowther irst

sent a

telegraphic

messageto all consulatesgiving them

his

observations.He

argued hat the

previousgovernment ad not been




10/23

BRITAIN

AND

OTTOMAN

DOMESTIC

POLITICS, 1908-9

9

overthrown,

ut

simplyresigned

in

writing

and with

insistence',

and

the

movement at the Capital was

directed against

'ultra-liberal

nd anti-

Mohammedanendencies'

f

Hiiseyin

HilmiPasha's abinet.

Therefore,

he

Consuls should, 'judiciously

and

discreetly

exercise'

their influence

in

letting he truth e known.70

hefollowing

day,he wentone stepfurther

nd

suggested,

n

an

urgent elegram

o

the

Consuls

n

Macedonia,

hat

they

'shoulddiscreetly

andunofficially uggest

o malcontents

o

agree

o

send

a small deputation

to Constantinople o ensure themselves

that the

constitution

s not

in

danger'.

This

step

was

taken in view of the

impossibilityfor the populationand officials

in

Macedonia

o obtain

impartial

ews as the CUP was holding

backgovernmentelegrams.7

However,Lowther'snterventionailedto producehedesired ffect,as

the Embassy was

inundatedwith

telegrams

from Consuls throughout

Macedonia, xceptingUskuib,

ll

emphasizing

he steadfastness

f the

IlIrd

and

IVth

Army

Corps, ogether

with volunteers ecruited

y

the

CUP to

march n the capital.72

owther hen mmediately

withdrew is instructions

andasked he Consuls o abstain

rom

commenting

n the situation

withthe

authorities

r

others

and et eventstaketheir

own

course.73

Lowther's

equest

hatsome

warships

be

despatched

o Turkishwaters

to show somekind of interestn thefutureof theOttomanEmpire,andto

send them where

there

was

likely

to be

disturbances roduced lashing

views

in the

Foreign

Office.While

Sir

Eyre

Crowe,SeniorClerkand

ater

Head of the Eastern

Department,was prepared

o informthe Admiralty

accordingly,

Mallet

hought

hat t

'might

ook like intervention'.

iven

hat

the Turkish

Charge

'Affaires ad

expressed

o

him a wish that here

would

be

no

outside

interference,Mallet declined to support he proposal.

He

would

only

be

prepared

o

comply

with it

if

it would deterBulgaria

rom

moving,which,he thought,had nowbecomea remotecontingency.Grey

intervened

n

Mallet's ide because he presence

of the British leet would

be

'variouslynterpreted

s a

demonstration

gainst

he

CUP or

against

he

Sultan

...',

and

so on. He would

only

run

these

risks if there were real danger

to

Britons'

ives.74

wo

days ater,however,Grey

decided o run

hese

risks

by sending

some ships to Lemnos

o

await

eventsthere n order o protect

Britishsubjectsas the likelihoodof a clash

between wo opposing

orces

outside he

Capital athered

momentum.75

On 17 April,Lowtherdecided to complywith Rifat Pasha'srequest

apparently

at the unanimousdesire

of

the Cabinet' that Fitzmaurice

accompany

he Turkish elegation o reassure he Salonican roops

hat he

Constitutionwas

in

no danger.The Ambassador

was

quite

alive

to the

dangers

hat his action

entailed,

but the

newly

formedOttoman abinet

stated hat 'the

present

ituation s so critical,not only froma

Turkish ut

also from a

European oint

of

view,

that this effort to save it should

be




11/23

10 MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

made'.76However,

when the Cabinet aterdecided

o send the

delegation

withoutFitzmaurice,

owther

was

relieved.77

From

19 Aprilonwards

o the

occupation

f

Constantinople

n

24

April

by

Salonican roops,

he

Army

of

OperationHareket

Ordusu),

he

Embassy

merely

monitored he situation

nd

kept

the

Foreign

Office

informed.

The

attitudeof the Embassyand

the

ForeignOffice

during

he course

of

the

counter-revolution

as

basically

one

of

indifference.

However,

his

s not

to

say

that

the

Embassy was

not critical of the CUP.

On

the

contrary,

Lowther's islike or

theCUP

especially

rom he

opening

of theParliament

onward rew n

intensity,

nd he

parliamentarypposition

ame o seemto

him to be a 'better'

alternative.Yet,

criticism of

the

CUP was never

translatednto active nvolvementn domesticpolitics,notleastbecauseof

the

awareness f unwanted

onsequences

o

which it

would have

led;

but

also due

to

the fact thatLowtherwas

always

consciousof

the existence

of

whathe called betterelementswithin he CUP whose

friendship e could

not

afford o lose.

During he course

of

the counter-revolution,owther irst

becameconcerned bout he

Bulgarian

ttitude,

ndremained

pprehensive

about t untilafter he

agreement

adbeen

signed

on the

19th.

Rifat

Pasha's

attitudedoes seem to

have

influencedhis actions

between15thand 18th.78

Onthe otherhand, t is safe to say thathis disbeliefthatthe CUP would

unitesuch forcesas it

did against he

capital, oupled

with

the

information

from

he Consuls eeming o confirmhis

convictionhadgreat

effect

on his

decision o instruct he

ConsularOfficers.

But,

as soon as he

realized hat

the

CUP

was rallyingaround tself the

Army

as well as a

largemajority

f

people,

he did withdraw

he instructions.

ven

though

his

instructions an

be

interpreted s

interference,

ne

is

inclinedto the view that it was not

tinged

with

any

hostile intention

because

he

quickly

became,

as

will

be

seen,an admirer f the organizationndabilityof theCUP ogetherwith he

Armyof Operation.

Before

moving

on to

Britain's

policy after the suppression

of the

counter-revolution,

t

is now necessary o

discussallegations

argelybased

on

circumstantial evidence about

British

involvement. Private

correspondenceetween

he Embassyand the

Foreign

Office seem to cast

gravedoubtson the

allegation,madeby

Ahmad, hat he

LevantHerald,a

local

paperpublished

n

English,and

heavily

involved n

the vilification

campaign f the CUPprior o thecounter-revolutionadstrong inks with

the

Embassy.79f

anything,

he

line taken

by the paperpreviousto the

counter-revolutionaused the

Embassy great

dissatisfactionand even

embarrassments,

s it

did not reflect

he official

policy.

What

happenedwas thatDr

Mizzi, the

Editor, pplied o Lowther or a

subsidy

of

?600 a

year

to run the

paper,

which

was then

going down hill.

The

Portehad in a

way assisted he paper

under he old

regime o the tune




12/23

BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC

POLITICS,

1908-9 11

of ?600 a

year

as an indemnification for the

censorship

to

which

it

was

subjected togetherwith otherpapers.But the

Young

Turk

revolution,

which

lifted the censorship, deprived the paper of this subsidy-like revenue.

Though

he

said that he

had

been offered

'a

considerable

sum

by

the Russian

Embassy to act as their Embassy

organ',80

he

was not certain

whether or not

to

approach

them.

Passing on

Dr

Mizzi's

request

to

the

Foreign Office,

Lowther at first seemed to be

backing it, for otherwise the only English

newspaperwould have to fold up.8

But Hardingewas not enthusiastic about

the scheme, as he put it:

We are

opposed

in

principle

to the idea of

subventions

to

newspapers,

and the only case that I know of where this has been done was thatof

an

Egyptian newspaper,and it was decided two

years ago

to

drop

that

subvention.82

By the time he received

Hardinge's reply, Lowther

had become better

informed as to Mizzi. He now described Mizzi as 'so unbalanced that

he

would

be a hopeless fellow to

support'.

The Ambassadorwas

now in

entire

agreement

with

Hardinge.83

He

continued

to

complain severely

of

Mizzi

to

G.

William

Tyrrell,

Senior Clerk and Private

Secretary

to

Grey.84

n

another

private letter to Tyrrell, Lowther poured out his anger with 'busy-body'

Mizzi,

who was

dragging

his

name

'into

a

squabble,

he

is

having

with the

Committee

paper, Tanin'.85

In

the

meantime, Hardinge,

now

glad

that

Lowther had

come to

the

same conclusion about Mizzi, wrote

back

to

the

Ambassadorthat Mizzi

was 'a

most unreliable man, and not at all straight.

I know

for an absolutefact thathe has

been,

and

still is drawing ?800 a year

from

the Austrian Embassy,

which is cashed quarterly through an

Englishman

in

Constantinople, who goes to the Embassy to get the

money

'*86

In the light of all this, it seems difficult to maintain that the

Levant Herald

was financed, used or manipulated n any form by the British

Embassy

to

discredit the CUP.87

According to Halide Edip

Adivar,

Dervis

Vahdeti, Editor of the Volkan,

pivot

of

reactionaryanti-CUP

propaganda hat played an importantrole

in

fomenting

the

counter-revolution 'was

thought

to be the

paid emissary

of

the British

Embassy,

a tool

of

Fitzmaurice',

whose

name,

she

maintains,

was also

implicated

in the

Incident

of

the 31

March.88

n

similar fashion,

Aubrey Herbertasserted that it was Fitzmaurice who dictated the anti-CUP

oriented

policy

of the

Embassy rather than Grey or Lowther.89Chirol

maintains that

Lowther

'was

disposed

to back

the wrong horse

at

the time

of the

counter-revolution'.Though Chirol was

not

sure

to

what

extent the

CUP's

animosity

after

the

counter-revolution

against Lowther

was

justified,

the

latter

being

'stolid and

reserved' was

unlikely to get on well with the

'more

gushing

members' of at the

CUP.80Sir Andrew

Ryan,

the

Second




13/23

12

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Dragomano the Embassy, ears

out this

description

f

Lowther,

ut does

not

support

he

chargebrought gainst

he

Ambassadorhat 'he had

fallen

shortof the greatopportunityffordedby his firstarrival n the glow of

enthusiasm'.

According

o

Ryan,

the

Young

Turkswerechauvinistic nd

no

Britishdiplomatwas likely

to

make

much

headwayagainst

hem'

91

The fact that hese allegations o not seem to coincide

with

the

general

picturedrawnfrom archivalmaterial

raises the

question

as to

why

the

British might, supposing that they

were indeed behind the counter-

revolution,have been supportingt: presumably

o

bring

Kamil back to

power92

ith the LiberalUnions who

were far more

pro-British

han the

CUP.93 ut bearing

n mindthe

fact thatBritainhad,

since the

Young

Turk

revolution,wanteda strongTurkey

with no formalattachmento herselfas

a barrier

ogether

with

the BalkanStates

against

Austro-German

xpansion

in

the Balkans as a result of

Austria-Hungary's

nnexationof Bosnia-

Herzegovina,t

is

worthaskingwhat

Britain

ouldhave

gained

romKamil

andthe LiberalUnions

being

in

power.

t

is

clearthatBritainwas not

in

a

position o go to the lengthof a formalalliance.

Hadshe wantedan alliance

or some kind of

military

onvention o draw

Turkey

loser to

herself,

he

CUPhad

already

fferedher all that.

The manner n which the counter-revolutionas suppressed reatly

impressed he Foreign

Office:

Grey

was

quickto congratulate

he Turkish

Charged'Affaires,

Cevat

Bey.94

He

similarly xpressed

himself o

Lowther,

stating hathe

was much

mpressed y the

'decision,purpose, iscipline

nd

strength' isplayedby the leadersof the

Army

of

Operation,

nd

admitting

that

he

CUP'sreal

strength

adbeen underrated.

lthough

e

continued o

disapprove

f

the existenceof an

'anonymous

nd

irresponsible irecting

body',

recentevents

hadconvinced

him

that 'thebest elements'mustbe on

thesideof theCUP, orotherwiseheywouldnot havebeen successful.He

concluded that Britain must back up

these 'best

elements',

be more

sympathetic nd ess critical f them.95

ardingeooka similar ine, warning

Lowther hat

Fitzmaurice, n

'impressionablerishman',mustbe madeto

adopt

a

friendly

attitude

owards he CUP.

Specifically,

Fitzmaurice

should be neither

critical nor even

impartial

towards them

[my

italics].

He should

try to show them

that we are friendly and

sympathetic,

ndwish to

help

them.

That s

our feelinghere,andthe

only practical

ine

of

policy

to follow.

Our only hope for reformed

Turkeyrests now with the YoungTurks. f they do not meet with

sympathy

ndcannot

ean on us, they will soon learn o leanon some

other

Power,

and

he

splendid osition

we

hadat

Constantinoplefew

months

ago

will be

lost

..96

Lowther's

nitial

responsewas to recommend aution.He remindedGrey




14/23

BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN

DOMESTIC POLITICS,

1908-9

13

that he two leading

Unionists,

Talat

andBahaeddin

akir,

hadassured im

that hey would

go 'slowly'

in the

direction

f reformand avoidoffending

the religioussentiments f themasses;but the subsequentvents had not

borneout thisassurance.He also

complainedhat

since

the

suppression

f

the counter-revolution,

he

CUPhadadopted policyexterminating

ll that

savoured

of opposition.

He warned

hat

the country

was

'in a disturbed

conditionunderneath',

nd added that there seemed

little chance

of a

militarydictatorship,

hough n his opinion

such was

probably

he best

solution.He also noted that

the CUP leaders

were

apt

to overlook

'the

existenceof Asia Minorandbase

their deas

on Turkey, onsistingonly

of

the Macedonian rovinces'.

Yethe was prepared

o be more

sympathetic

o

the CUP, and expressed he hope that it would now come to the fore,

obviating

he need

to contact t behindthe back

of a

legal government,

usually opposing

t.

He

also welcomed

the likely appointment

f Ferid

Pashaas Grand

Vizier,despite

his pro-German

eputation,eeing

in him a

'strong

man' able to grapple

with the situation.97

Lowther's eply o Hardinge

id emphasize he

difficultyhe hadhitherto

faced n his

dealings

with the CUP:

witheveryminister ince the Constitution,have beenon the best of

terms,

but

unfortunately

hose ministershave,

after a few

days

or

weeks,rarely

been able

to

retain he

favourof the violentmembers

f

the Committee.My aimthroughout as been

that he Embassy

hould

be

in

completeharmony

with

the government

n

powerand

with the

moderates,

nd

I

believe,

best members

f the Committee.98

Lowther grew less cautious

once he realized

that the deposition

of

Abduilhamid as

not

likely

to cause fresh disturbanceshroughout

he

Empire.He argued hat t was high time for theCUP to assumepositions

and

responsibility,

nd

regretted

Mahmud

evket

Pasha's dvice

o

the

CUP

not to

take office.'

That said, a meeting with

Mahmud

$evket

Pasha,

Commander f the

Army

of Operation,made an excellent mpression

n

him:

He

has

no

doubta

great

workbeforehim, but he seemeddetermined

to

carry

t

through,

nd

f

his actions n

any

way correspond

ith

his

declarations,

hichseemed o me to be sincere. cannotbutthink hat

the choice

that

has been made of Mahmud

$evket

Pasha

is an

excellent one ...

100

But late

May

1909, there were rumoursof serious

differences

between

Mahmud

$evket

Pasha and the CUP, and at a meeting with

Lowther,

Mahmud

$evket

Pasha

openly

deprecated

he activities of 'a body of

irresponsible

and inexperienced young men

styling themselves

the




15/23

14

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

Committee

of Union and

Progress,

who thwarted as much as

they

assisted

the

government'.'01

At

the

Foreign

Office,

Mallet

did

not

find

this

development

'reassuring

or stable

government';'02

but he

still asserted

that,

but for

the CUP's

success,

reactionaries

would

have

massacredChristians

everywhere, as

they

had

done

in

Adana

during

the

counter-revolution'03

or

his

part,

Hardinge

reiterated

his belief

that a

militarydespotism,

presumably

under

Mahmud

$evket

Pasha,

would

be

the best

safeguard

of

the

constitutional

regime. '0

In

the

meantime,

in

order to

establish

direct contacts with the

CUP,

T.B.

Hohler, the First

Secretaryto the

Embassy, was instructed

o see Cavid

Bey,

an

influential

figure

of

the inner

circle

of

the

CUP,

who

was

very likely

to

come

to

the

fore as

a

financial expert. Hohler

pointed

out

to him

that

Britain's

policy

was to

help

set

up

a stable

government

and a reformed

administration

n

Turkey,

and that this

policy was

being pursuedregardless

of who

was

in

power.

In

answer to

Cavid

Bey's complaint

that the

British

Embassy hadrefrained

rom

makingdirect

contact with the CUP as

opposed

to

other

embassies, Hohler

emphasized the fact that

It

had been

impossible to know

who did

represent

the

real governing

force of the country, for from ministersand valis down, all authority

was

subjected

to

the

irresponsible

interference

of

the

Committee,

whose chief was

not even known to

the members

themselves,

and who

apparently

varied from

time to

time.

In

view

of the

fact that there

was so

much dissent

rather than

unity within

the

CUP,

it

was,

Hohler

pointed out,

impossible

for

the

Embassy

to know

who

was the

right person

or

group

to

approach.

He

then

urged

upon

Cavid

Bey

the

advisability

of

the CUP taking

responsibleoffice and

coming to

the

fore. The latter suggested in return that the CUP members be employed

under

ministers

as

Miistesar like

parliamentary

under-secretaries

n

Britain

through

whom

official

contactmight

be made.'05

While

tightening

up his

links with the

CUP,

Lowther gave a

cold

shoulder

to Kamil

and

Nazlm

Pashas,who

came to the

Embassy to pour

out

their

grievances

as

regards

internal

politics. But,

Lowther

did not attach

much

importance

to the

gloomy picture

they had

drawn.

For one thing,

Kamil's

foreboding

might

be

accountedfor by

his

natural

disappointmentat

the victory of his political rival, FeridPasha, as an outwardally of the CUP.

For

another,

they had been

hardly in

touch with

anybody

other than their

own

supporters.'

Lowther's

'ill-treatment'

caused Kamil to

write

directly

to

Grey asking

for

protection.

He

suggested

thatLowther be

instructed, if

possible together with

his

French and

Russian

colleagues, to

do

what he

could to

neutralize the

German

influence at

Constantinople.Though

the

Foreign

Office

acknowledged

his letter

promising him

protection of the

sort




16/23

BRITAIN

AND

OTTOMAN DOMESTIC

POLITICS,

1908-9

15

thathe had been

given

in the

past,

his

suggestion

as

to Lowther's

dealings

was

politely gnored,

while his conductof

affairs

during

he Bosnian

Crisis

was flattered. 07

Ismail

Kemal,an

ally

of KamilPasha

during

he

counter-revolution,

as

to

receive

his

shareof this 'cold' attitude

ater

n the autumn f

1909,

when

he went to see Grey in

the Foreign

Office

in

London,

but was received

insteadby Tyrrell,

Grey's

Private

Secretary.

he

latter imply

old

him

that

his

criticism f the CUPfor

having

replaced

Abdiilhamid'secretcamarilla

did not seem to

hold

water

any longer

as therewas a certain nclination

n

the

partof the CUPto take

office

and

responsibility.

n

addition,

t

was

high

time, Tyrellpointed

out to him

that

they

all

dropped

ncrimination

gainst

eachotherandputtheirheads ogetheror theregenerationf thecountry.'08

As couldbe

expected,under hese

circumstances, avid'sappointment

as Finance

Minister

elighted

he

Foreign

Office.

Lowther, escribed

im

as

'intelligent,an exceptionallygood

orator, and debater,

genial, liberal

minded'.109

With

the Turkish

decisionto invite German

General

von der

Goltz

to

reorganize

he

TurkishArmy, Britain's

sincerity

in

desiring a strong

Ottoman

Empire

was

put

to the test. It first

aroused ears

in

the Foreign

Office.WhileAlwynParker ound he wholedispatchunpleasant',Mallet

expressed

his

concernthat the Turkish

Army

would 'become

more

and

more

imbued with

German deas

and, having forged the weapon,

the

Germansare

likely to use it

in

a general

conflagration'.

t

then

fell to

Hardinge

o make

Britain's

ine

clear: We

may

not

like the

Germanizingf

the Turkish

Army,

but it

is

to our

advantage

hat

Turkey hould

be

strong,

and we

can

hardlyblamethe Turks or

turning o a German

General

who

has

already done wonders to

their

army.' Grey was more explicit in

determininghe line of the policy andits limits: 'It remains o be seen

whether he

new regime will

be strongenoughto use

Germanhelp, and

retain ts own

policy,

which shouldbe a good

understanding ith Russia

and

Bulgaria

s the

counterpoise

o

German ressure.''110

A

month ater,

when

the cloudsof

war

gathered ver the

Balkansbetween

Turkey

and

Greece this time

over Crete, with Bulgaria

waiting to take

advantage,Parkernow seemed

glad that the Turkish

army, under the

training

f

von

der

Goltz,

would

steadilybecomemoreandmore

powerful,

deterring ulgariarommoving o realizeheraspirationsn Macedonia. '

There s no

doubt hat

withthe advent f

the YoungTurks evolutionAnglo-

Turkish

elations ook

a sharp urnfor the better.The

revolution n itself

constituted

radical

hange

n

the

political tatusquo of the

Balkans ndof

the Near

East,

ntroducing new dimension o the

considerationsn terms




17/23

16

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

of balance of power

within

the

concept

of

Europeansystems

of alliances.

It

was regarded

as

a severe

blow

to

German

prestige,

and

very

much like a

seesaw, British influence gained ascendancy.The Britishrespondedswiftly

to this welcomed development,

first

clearing up

all

the

obstacles

that

they

themselves

had

put

in

front of

the

previous regime,

for

example,

the

suspension of the Anglo-Russian

scheme for a

mobile

force,

and the

agreementas to the future

withdrawalof

Macedonian

gendarmerie

officers

and

so

forth,

thus

giving

the

newly

born

regime

a

politically

vital

breathing

space. '

Some of the myths that

have

gathered

around

the

Anglo-Russian

understanding

of

1907, leading

to

explanations

to what is sometimes

seen

as British reluctance to

prop up

the

Anglophile Young

Turk

regime

are not

always fully supportedby primary

sources. This is

not to

say,

however,

that

Russia was disregarded

as a

power

factor. What seems to

have

been

the

case,

as far as the British were

concerned,

was

that

they recognized,

from

the outset, the slightly different effect that Russia as

an

ally and Turkey

as

a

friend

would have

upon

Britain's

policy.

In

other

words,

Russia and the

Ottoman

Empire had,

as it

were,

different functions

in British

policy-

making.

From

the British

standpoint, Turkey

was

not

a

European

Great

Power, though the Foreign Office seemed to have believed in the possibility

of what it called a

strong

and

regeneratedTurkey.113

The Empire, however, did occupy an important place

in

British

strategicalplanning

in

connection

with

the balance of power

in the

Balkans.

When the Young Turksemerged with Anglophile leanings, it did not lead

the

British

to

give up Russia;

nor

did

it mean

giving a cold-shoulder

to

the

new

regime.

In

essence, there was no need to do so, as the relations with the

two

countries

did

not

present any inconsistency.

In

broader

erms,

Britainneeded

the two at different levels and in different forms and for differentpurposes.

What was, of course, anathema o the Foreign Office, as was recognized at

the early stages

of

the revolution,was the option of supportingTurkeyas a

barrier

against Russia. Given that Russia had long ceased to

be an

expansionist power

in

the Balkans, particularlysince the Russian defeat of

1904-5

at

the hands of the Japanese, but that Austria appeared o be

at the

zenith of her

strengthfollowing

her

annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,the

British

did

not

seem

to

have

miscalculated

the

internationalpolitical arena.

4

The British attitude towards Turkish domestic politics was, to a great

extent,

influenced

by

their

strategical considerations. Bearing

in

mind

the

fact that a

strong Turkey

could

only

be

created by a stable government,

the

British

did not attachmuch importance o the question of who was in power.

It is

obvious that the CUP's co-operative attitudewas much appreciated.In

the

ensuing power struggle after the Young Turk revolution, the Embassy

steered clear of

any action likely to be interpretedas interference.Once

the




18/23

BRITAIN AND

OTTOMAN

DOMESTIC

POLITICS,

1908-9

17

CUP was seen to

be acting as a destabilizing actor,

then came

British

criticismmostly

kept

to

private orrespondence.

et this is not to

say that

the Embassydid

not cold-shoulder he

CUP.

At this

stage,

the

CUP's

nationalisticand

chauvinistic endencieswere regarded

by

the

Foreign

Office as the beginningof the dismembermentf the

Empire, omething

that the Britishdid not wish to see happening.The

Embassy hought

hat

any alternativeo

the CUP mightbe better.But as

soon as they realized,

afterthe suppression f the counter-revolution,hat

the CUP was hand

n

glove with the army,andhadpopular upport,hey

turned ackto it.

It could be

maintained hat British policy was

more influencedby

Turkishattitude owardsBritain han other factors,

as it was to become

obvious n 1910-11. Itwas, afterall, the CUP,and he Army n generalwho

underestimated ritish

friendshipand assistance,'5digging their own

gravesand

preparingheirown political solation,whichwouldbe severely

felt

by Turkey

during

he

Tripoli

and

Balkan

Wars.

NOTES

1. F.

Ahmad, 'Great

Britain's

Relations with the

Young

Turks, 1908-1914', Middle

Eastern

Studies (1966), pp.310-16; F. Ahmad, 'The Late OttomanEmpire', in M. Kent, TheGreat

Powers

and theEnd of the

Ottoman

Empire(London,

1984),

pp.13-17. See, B.

Samardziev,

'British

Policy towards the

Young Turk

Revolution,

1908-1914

(Some

Problems)',

Bulgarian

Historical

Review,3 (1983),

pp.22-43. See also S.

Ak,in,

31 Mart Olayi

(Istanbul,

1972), pp.290-1.

2. Ibid.

3.

Ak$in, 31 Mart

Olayi, p.356.

4.

Fitzmaurice

o Tyrrell,25

Aug. 1908,

Pte. GreyPapers

(FO800/79).

5. Chirolto H.W.

Steed,

6

Dec.

1908,

Pte.

Chirol

Papers The

Times

Archives,

London);

Chirol

to

Tyrrell, 19 Nov.

1909, Grey Papers

(FO800/16).

6. Lowther to Grey, 4 Aug. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

7.

Lowther o Grey,

11

Aug.

1908

and

25 Aug.

1908, Pte.

LowtherPapers

FO800/193B); Grey

Papers

(FO800/79).

8.

Lowther to Grey,

11 Aug.

1908, 25

Aug. 1908 and 31

Aug.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B);

Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

9.

Lowtherto

Grey,

2

Sept.1908,F0371/6559, 31787.

10. Lowther

to

Grey, 12 Oct.

1908,

F0371/559, 31787.

11.

See, for the

arrangement f

the meeting,

F0371/545,

28993; F0371/548,

32132.

12. For

OttomanPolicy during

the

Bosnian

InternationalCrisis, see

H. Unal,

'OttomanPolicy

during

the

Bosnian

Annexation

Crisis,

1908-1909'

(unpublished

Ph.D.

thesis, University

of

Manchester, 1992). See, also 'OttomanPolicy during the BulgarianIndependenceCrisis:

Ottoman-BulgarianRelations at

the Outset of the

Young

Turk

Revolution', Middle

Eastern

Studies,

Vol.34,

No.4

(Oct.

1998), pp.135-76.

13.

Grey

to

Lowther, 13

Nov. 1908,

Pte.

Grey Papers

(FO800/79); Lowther Papers

(FO800/193A).

14. Hardinge

o

Lowther, 17 Nov. 1908,

Pte.

LowtherPapers

FO800/193A); Hardinge o Block,

17

Nov.

1908, Pte. Hardinge

Papers 13.

15. Lowther to

Grey,

14

Sept.1908, Pte.

Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B); Grey

Papers




19/23

18

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

(FO800/79).

16.

Lowther to

Grey,

27

Oct.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B);

Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

17. Lowther to Grey, 27 Oct. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers

(FO800/79);

See

for

rumoursabout

dethronement,

Grey

to

Lowther,

30 Oct.

1908,

Private

telegram,

Grey Papers

(FO800/79);

Lowther to

Grey,

3

Nov.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

18.

Grey to

Asquith,

11

Sept.1908,

Pte.

GreyPapers

(FO800/79).

19.

Grey's

minute,

F0371/559,

31787.

20. Lowther to

Grey,

31 Aug.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B);

Grey Papers

(FO800/79);

Lowtherto

Hardinge,

20 Dec.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

21. Lowtherto

Hardinge,

20 Dec.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

22.

Ak,in, 31 Mart

Olayi, p.31.

23.

Lowtherto

Grey,

31

Oct. 1908,

F0371/553, 36562,

and

minutes;

F0371/554,

37658.

24. Lowther to Grey, 27 Oct. 1908, Pte. Lowther Papers (FO800/193B); Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

25.

Hardinge

o

Lowther,

17 Nov.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193A).

26.

Lowtherto

Grey, 20 Dec.

1908,

FO800/546,

45084.

27. Ibid. Mallet's

minute.

28.

Grey

to

Lowther,

15 Dec.

1908,

FO371/558, 43816.

29. Lowtherto

Hardinge,8 Dec. 1908 and 22

Dec. 1908, Pte.

Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

30.

Lowther

o

Montgomery,

2

Sept.1908,Private

Telegram;Grey

to

Lowther,

9

Sept. 1908,

Pte.

Grey Papers

(FO800/79). See for further

details S.

Ak~in,

Yiiz

Soruda Ittihat

ve Terakki

e

Jon Tuirkluik

Istanbul,1972) p.46;

P. P.

Graves,

Briton

and Turk

London,

1941),pp.107-8.

31. A minuteby a ForeignOffice official is a verystrikingexampleof this line: 'it is to be hoped

that

Kiamil will

get his vote of

confidence

if

Ahmed Riza is the

alternative'

FO371/546,

43987).

32.

Lowther

to Grey,

29 Dec.

1908, Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B);

Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

33.

Grey

to

Lowther,

27

Nov.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193A);

Grey Papers

(FO800/79).

34.

Lowtherto

Hardinge,

22

Dec.

1908,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

35.

F0371/546, 43987;

Hardinge

o

Lowther,29 Dec.

1908, Pte. Lowther

Papers

FO800/193A).

36.

Lowther

to

Hardinge,

6 Jan.

1909,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

37.

Lowther

does not

seem to have

been

pleased

with

Kamil's

proceeding(Lowther o

Grey,

12

Feb. 1909 and 14 Feb. 1909, F0371/60, 5723, 5828).

38.

Ak~in,

Ittihat

ve

Terakki,

p.33-8.

39.

Lowtherto

Grey, 15 Feb.

1909,

F0371/760; Greyto

Lowther,

17

Feb

1909,

F0371i61.

40.

Lowther

to

Hardinge,

16 Feb.

1909,

Pte.

LowtherPapers

(FO800/193B).

41.

Hardinge

o

Lowther,

22

Feb.

1909,

Pte.

Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193A);

Hardinge's

minute

on

Lowtherto

Grey,

22

Feb.

1909,

F0371/768, 7056.

42.

Grey

to

Lowther, 17

Feb.

1909,

F0371/761,7180,7179; Hardinge o

Lowther,23 Feb.

1909,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193A).

43.

Lowther

o

Grey, 8

Feb, 1909, Pte. Lowther

Papers

FO800/193B);

GreyPapers

FO800/79).

44.

Lowther

to

Hardinge,

16 Feb.

1909;

Lowther to

Gorst, 26

Feb.

1909,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

45.

Lowther

to

Hardinge,

2

March

1909, Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

46.

Lowther

to

Grey, 16 March

1909,

Pte.

Lowther Papers

(FO800/193B);

Grey

Papers

(FO800/79).

47.

Lowther to

Hardinge,

2

March

1909, 10 March

1909,

24

March 1909

and 31 March

1909,

Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B); Grey

Papers

(FO800/192).

48.

Colonel

Surtees stated

that 'the

general

state of

discipline

in

the officer

ranks s

decidedly a

danger

and

unless

authorities

ake

up

the

question

strongly

andabsolutely

forbid

all military

interference n

politics,

it will

not be

surprising

f

we find

ourselves

sliding into a

military




20/23

BRITAIN

AND OTTOMAN DOMESTIC

POLITICS, 1908-9

19

revolution'

(Surtees to Lowther,27 Feb.

1909,

F0195/2323).

See also Lowther to

Grey,

14

April

1909, F0371/770,

14544;

F0421/250;

Cabinet

Papers

(CAB37/99,

no.

62).

49.

Lowtherto Grey,

13 April

1909, F0371/770,

13941;

F0421/250.

50. Lowtherto Grey, 13 April 1909,F0371/770,13942, andminutes;F0421/250.

51.

Lowther

to

Grey, 14 April

1909,

F0371/770, 14033, 14035,

14049.

52.

Ibid. and

minutes.The

correspondent

f

The

limes,

P.P.

Graves,

was

watching

events

closely

in the

streets of

ConstantinopleGraves,

Briton

and

Turk,pp.127-9).

53.

Interestingly, he news about

the overthrowof the

CUP produced

a

shocking

effect

among

Armenian

circles abroad,which

still considered

he

CUP

'friendly'

to their

interests

Friends

of

Armeniato the

ForeignOffice,

14

April 1909,

F0371/770,

14186).

54. Lowtherto Grey, 14

April

1909, CabinetPapers

(CAB/37/99,

no.

62.)

55. Lowtherto

Hardinge,

14

April

1909, Pte. Lowther

Papers

(FO800/193B).

56.

Surtees to

Lowther,

14

April

1909, F0195/2323.

57. See

for

Grey'scongratulations

o

him,

15

April 1909,Private

Telegram,

preparedby Mallet,

GreyPapers(FO800/79).

58.

Lowtherto

Grey,

15 April 1909,

FO371/770,14172,14182.

59.

Grey

to

Lowther, 15

April

1909, F0371/770,14182.

60. Lowtherto

Lamb,

15

April

1909, FO195/2330.

61.

Lamb to

Lowther,

15

April 1909,

F0195/2328.

62. Lowtherto

Grey,

16

April

1909,

F0371/770,14223.

63.

Ibid.,

minutes.

64.

Sampson to

Lowther,

15

April 1909 and

16 April

1909,

F0195/2304.

65. Satow to

Lowther,

16

April

1909, FO195/2328.

66.

Though

the

Consular Officer's first

impression

turned out to be baseless

(Sampson

to

Lowther, 17 April 1909, received on 18 April 1909, F0195/2304), the Albanians'defiant

attitude

remained

unchanged hroughout.

See reportsand

telegrams

from

Satow to

Lowther,

16 April 1909, 19

April 1909, 20

April

1909, 21 April 1909 and

23 April

1909,FO195/2328.

67.

See

for

instance, Surteesto

Lowther, 17

April 1909, F0195/2323.

68.

Lowther

o

Grey,20 April

1909,

F0371/770,15582;

F0421/250;

Cabinet

Papers CAB37/99,

no.

64.) Ismail Kemalalleges that

it

was

him

who

instigated

Lowther o

instruct he

Consuls

(IsmailKemal, Memoirs

of

ismail

KemalBey

(London, 1920),

p.343.Ahmad

and

AkEin

reat

this

together with some other

circumstantial vidence as

proving that the

BritishEmbassy

was behind

the

counter-revolution

Ahmad, 'Great Britain's

Relations',

p.314; Ak,in, 31

Mart,

pp.138-9). This view is

not borne out

by

British documents.

Obviously, Lowther as

Ambassador was

responsible

for providing his

Consuls

with information and

even

occasionally argument. n fact, before Lowtherinstructed hem, some Consuls had already

asked the

Embassy for

informationand

argument(see for

example,

Grey to Lowther, 16

April

1909,

F0195/2328,

'Vali

himself at head

of

Monastir Committee

represents

Constantinople

movement as

reactionary.

s

it

liberal

...?').

On

the

other

hand,

it

seems

arguable

whetherLowther

had much

confidence in

Ismail Kemal. In

writing to Hardingehe

said: 'Ismail

Kemal has bolted

of which

I

am

glad,

as

I

do

not

trust

him'. On 20

April,

Lowther

did not like

the presence of

Kamil Pasha in the

Embassy, and

'got rid of him',

hoping

that

the

ex-GrandVizier would

not return.

See Lowtherto

Hardinge,20 April

1909,

Pte.

LowtherPapers

(FO800/193B).

69.

It

is

interesting

o note that at

this

juncture he

Foreign

Office did not

encourage he

Serbian

attemptto arrive at an understandingwith Bulgariaostensibly againstany Austrianmove

(Grouitch

to

the

Foreign

Office,

15

April

1909 and

Grey

to

Whitehead,15 April

1909,

F0371/770,

14122).

70.

Lowther

to

Consuls,

16

April 1909,

FO195/2330, 2314.

71. Lowtherto

Consuls,

17

April

1909, F0195/2330.

72.

Sampson

(Adrianople)

o

Lowther,

17

April 1909, received on

18 April

1909, F0195/2304;

Lamb

(Salonica)

to

Lowther,

16

April

1909, 17

April 1909, 18 April

1909, 1

Documents

Britain and Young Turk