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Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS
NO. 6
JANUARY 2020
Stéphane Delory
Ballistic missiles and conventional
strike weapons: Adapting the HCoC to address the dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles
The Hague Code of Conduct aims at curbing the
proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of
mass destruction. Today, with an important increase in
ranges, these weapons are more and more used for a
conventional mission, by a variety of states. This
dissemination illustrates the fact that many stakeholders
master the technologies necessary to build and sustain
these weapons. But it also raises questions on the
possible destabilising effects of these arsenals, even
when they are not linked to WMDs.
This paper develops the factors that have led to a
reconsideration of the use of ballistic missiles for
conventional strikes, and evokes possible ways for the
HCoC to react to this evolution.
Specifically, it proposes three options for the HCoC.
First, it could continue to draw attention to the
proliferation of missiles, regardless of their vocation.
Second, an extension of the scope of the Code could be
considered, which could extend its field of action to
include regional security and stabilisation. Third, the
Code could focus less on the delivery vehicle itself and
more on the payload, enabling it to refer to all missiles
carrying WMDs. This final proposition is described as
more complex but potentially interesting as it would
provide for regulation of emerging technologies such
as hypersonic glide vehicles.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
2
DISCLAIMER
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The
contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the
European Union.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
3
CONTENTS
Introduction 5
The main initiators of conventional ballistic strikes 7
The proliferation and dissemination of conventional ballistic missiles:
Technological aspects 9
The utility of conventional ballistic systems 11
Integrating conventional ballistic missiles into the HCoC 15
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
4
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
5
Introduction
The Hague Code of Conduct was designed
at a time when the proliferation of ballistic
missiles was closely associated with that of
weapons of mass destruction. However, the
HCoC is now faced with changes in ballistic
technology which fundamentally alter the
link between ballistic missiles and weapons
of mass destruction. Over short ranges,
ballistic missiles are increasingly used for
conventional strike missions. The same
development holds true, more gradually, for
longer-range missiles.1
The Code aims to prevent the proliferation
of ballistic weapons ‘capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction’, and not
ballistic missiles per se. This phrasing
suggests a possible distinction based on the
purpose of the missiles and, therefore, that
no anti-proliferation mechanism exists for
missiles whose purpose is exclusively
conventional. In this regard, the Code could
be adapted to take into account
conventional ballistic missiles. But this
distinction is clearly specious: by definition,
any ballistic missile2 is capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction.3 We must
attempt to define the parameters involved
in conventional applications of ballistic
missiles and decide how to take these into
account.
By making no reference to payload or
range, the Code differs from the initial
approach of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). By defining minimal criteria
(a range of 300 km and a payload of 500
kg), the MTCR distinguished between
missiles subject to regulation and those
weapons or technologies that could be
freely exported. These criteria were heavily
inspired by the technical features of the SS-
1c Scud and first-generation nuclear
weapons. They applied to the main types of
missile proliferated by states in search of
delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, and were therefore probably
sufficient to halt the proliferation of such
systems in the 1980s and 1990s. However,
these criteria have turned out to be poorly
suited to subsequent technological
developments. They now apply to a majority
1. In this paper, very short-range missiles are defined
as those with a range of less than 300 km, short-
range missiles as those with a range of less than 800
km, and long-range missiles as those with a range of
over 1,000 km. In terms of conventional strikes, mis-
siles with ranges greater than 1,000 km are rare, and
the majority are not precise enough to generate a
predictable military effect on the target. Instead, they
are primarily used for “political” strikes—that is,
those aimed at civilian targets which are meant to
force the targeted political power to change its mili-
tary position in a conflict.
2. In speaking of ballistic missiles here, we include
those with manoeuvrable warheads and quasi-
ballistic missiles (which spend the majority of their
flight within the atmosphere). Guided heavy rockets
(missiles of 600 mm and above) are treated as ballis-
tic missiles, as the traditional distinction between
these systems and ballistic missiles (in terms of
range, trajectory, and type of guidance system) is
fading.
3. In fixing the payload limit for regulated missiles at
500 kg, the MTCR was guided by the minimum car-
rying capacity of a first-generation nuclear missile.
However, proliferating nuclear powers and those
who are not members of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are now
capable of designing weapons whose mass is likely
lower. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict reminds us
that the use of chemical weapons remains a current
problem. The increasing precision of missiles makes
it possible to reduce the quantity of chemical agents
needed to produce a significant military effect. We
should take heed of cases in which low-payload
delivery systems are used to carry chemical weapons.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
6
of weapons and technologies whose
purposes are primarily conventional. By
leaving the MTCR’s range and payload
criteria unchanged, the Code has diverged
fundamentally from the MTCR, whose
implicit objective is to regulate the
proliferation of missiles in their own right,
and not just delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction.
The Code and the MTCR may reflect
different methodological approaches, but
they face the same problem: How can
prevention and anti-proliferation measures
take account of weapons and technologies
whose applications are primarily
conventional? And how can these be
distinguished from delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction?
The question is far from merely rhetorical.
By focusing solely on ‘ballistic missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction’, the Code emphasises a
fundamental principle: that states are
permitted the equipment of their choice in
order to defend themselves, as long as this
is not prohibited or restricted by
international treaties. The MTCR does not
go against this principle, nor do the United
Nations Security Council resolutions passed
during proliferation crises. The member
states of the MTCR voluntarily undertake to
regulate certain types of exports, with no
normat ive consequences under
international law. Security Council
resolutions, which ban particular states from
acquiring ballistic missiles, establish a direct
link between such missiles and illegal
programmes to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. Resolution 1540, whose scope
is more general, requires states to establish
measures to control the proliferation of
both weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. Like the Code and
previous resolutions, it makes a distinction
between delivery systems in their own right
and delivery systems associated with
weapons of mass destruction. Since there is
no international treaty prohibiting the
design, development, acquisition, and
export of ballistic weapons, all of these
actions are legal as long as they are carried
out in conformity with the respective
commitments of states to non-proliferation
agreements and international standards.
Until the 1990s, the acquisition of ballistic
missiles for conventional strike purposes
was merely a theoretical issue, since such
weapons were extremely imprecise. But
many examples of conventional ballistic
strikes have been recorded since 1973 (the
date of the first use of an SS-1c, during the
Yom Kippur War). In particular, these strikes
occurred during the War of the Cities
between Iran and Iraq, by the Afghan forces
of the Najibullah government to break the
siege of Jalalabad in 1989, during US
operations in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and,
more recently, in Yemen. These examples
showed the partial political and, in some
situations, military utility of ballistic missiles,
even if they were imprecise and poorly
suited to a role as conventional strike
weapons.4 Nonetheless, conventional
ballistic strikes were still primarily seen as a
4. The political utility is only partial because the use
of specifically conventional delivery systems only
rarely requires targeted states to radically modify
their declaratory stances. However, the strategic
effects are real: most of the states concerned are
required to adapt their military strategies, both
during and after the conflict..
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
7
costly and militarily ineffective substitute for
airstrikes. Therefore, analysts generally view
North Korea’s success in exporting Scud Bs
and Cs5 and No Dong missiles after the Gulf
War in 1991 as an attempt by purchasing
states to acquire delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction (Pakistan, Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran), or as the result
of a politics of prestige.
Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles, derived from the SS-1c
(1989)
Remarkably, the value of ballistic weapons
as an anti-access system—clearly
recognized in the United States since
1991—has been heavily underestimated.
But this is an important factor in
proliferation: many states see the
acquisition of such systems as part of a
protection and deterrence strategy and not
necessarily as a strategy of aggression.
The main initiators of
conventional ballistic strikes
Until the end of the 2000s, ballistic missiles
were primarily thought of as delivery
systems for nuclear weapons (for powers
that possessed them) or for weapons of
mass destruction (for proliferating
countries). Since the late 1980s, however,
cases emerged of such weapons being
developed for conventional purposes. Thus,
the Soviet SS-21 was designed to be used
for nuclear operations, but also for
conventional deep strikes in the theatre.
The US ATACMS, a heavy guided rocket,
was developed exclusively for conventional
strikes. The operations against Iraq in 1991
and 2003 highlighted the utility of these
systems for US forces, in spite of the
absolute air superiority they enjoyed. The
reactivity and precision of the ATACMS
allowed US ground forces to attack high-
value tactical targets, but also to produce
massive effects against the targets engaged,
particularly using cluster munitions.6
From the mid-1980s, China began to
convert some of its nuclear delivery systems
into conventional delivery systems. It
attempted to increase their precision by
modernising the traditional inertial
5. Recall that the Scud B is derived from the Soviet
Scud 1c, with a roughly identical range and payload
(300 km, 980 kg), but with lower precision: the CEP of
the Scud 1c is 300 m, compared to 500 m or more
for the Scud B. The long-range version (500 km for
750 kg of payload) has an even higher CEP, generally
estimated at over 700 m or even 1 km.
6. ATACMS missiles currently use unitary munitions.
Versions that use guided cluster munitions have
been developed but are not deployed. The versions
that use unguided cluster munitions are no longer
operational. Each rocket can launch 300–950 submu-
nitions.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
8
guidance systems and by developing new
technologies for manoeuvrability and
terminal guidance. China was exempt from
the restrictions of the INF (Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, but faced the
extreme air superiority of the United States
and its allies. It settled on ballistic systems
as its preferred means of ensuring that it
could carry out strikes early in conflict. Its
aim was to neutralise enemy defences and
air and port infrastructures, to destroy
enemy command and control (C2) facilities,
and to ensure air dominance. In the absence
of restrictions from the INF Treaty, and with
its mastery of precision technologies, China
was able to gradually develop strike
systems of increasing ranges (from 300 km
originally to more than 3,000 km currently
for the DF-26).
Other states quickly recognised the
advantages ballistic weapons could offer for
conventional strikes. In 1998, Iran carried
out its first conventional deep strikes
against opposition forces in Iraq. Tehran
was already deploying its missiles alongside
drones, which were used to evaluate the
effects of the strikes. During the 2000s, Iran
developed short-range solid-propellant
systems (Fateh-110), which were exclusively
designed for conventional deep-strike
operations. A series of modernisation
programmes enabled Iran to deploy
systems with a range of over 600 km.
For a long time, analysis of Iranian ballistics
programmes has conflated them with Iraqi
and North Korean programmes—that is,
with the search for strategic capacities that
can deliver weapons of mass destruction.
While Iran has worked intensively to
develop long-range missiles that are closely
associated with its nuclear programme,
developing conventional strike systems was
also a priority. This allowed the country to
pass a number of important milestones. The
single-stage Fateh-110 missile did not allow
for precision strikes beyond 800 km.7 Iran
therefore attempted to develop
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles for longer-
range Shahab-3/Ghadr-type systems (from
1,500 to 2,000 km) and for Qiam missiles
(from 800 to 1,000 km). The system, which is
known as Emad for Shahab-3/Ghadr
missiles, is undoubtedly still too imprecise
to enable very deep conventional strikes
with high precision. It nonetheless
demonstrated a clear desire to master the
technologies involved in such operations.
Yet, at shorter ranges, Iran has operationally
demonstrated its ability to conduct highly-
precise strikes on military assets. The
January 2020 strike in Iraq reportedly
employed Fateh-313 and Qiam.
Iranian Emad/Shahab-3/Ghadr,
Credits: Tasnim News Agency,
The Iranian approach is different from that
of North Korea. Pyongyang is also very
interested in such technologies, but still
7. Beyond a range of 800 km, the speed of a single-
stage missile is typically too high to allow for stable
re-entry.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
9
sees the development of its ballistic
weapons as closely associated with nuclear
weapons. However, the launches it
performed in August 2019 may mark an
important turning point, as the systems
tested seem to be designed for
conventional strikes on the battlefield and
the theatre.8
Other countries have also driven the
dissemination of conventional ballistic
weapons. Turkey and South Korea are
developing their own short-range systems
based on a single-stage missile with
terminal guidance. Like China, South Korea
sees ballistic systems as an excellent way to
carry out strikes against hardened targets,
one that is more reactive and that
guarantees a greater effect than airpower.
Turkey is reproducing the American model
by developing short-range systems to
directly support ground forces.
The United States is now free from the INF
Treaty and has relaunched successor
programmes to the ATACMS. Their aim is to
combine metre-scale precision with a range
of 500 km or more. Meanwhile, Russia has
an excellent conventional strike system in
the SS-26. Its range can be increased by
adapting it to an aerial platform, as the
Kinzhal system can be connected to a
fighter jet or a heavy bomber. This version
also enables a greater number of axes of
penetration with complex flight trajectories,
limiting the effectiveness of defences.
Qatar’s acquisition of very short-range SY-
400 systems also shows the growing
interest that even the smallest military
powers have in these weapons systems.
The proliferation and
dissemination of conventional
ballistic missiles: Technological
aspects
Proliferation during the 1980s was based on
the spread of a particular type of missile
(the SS-1c Scud and its derivatives)9 from,
effectively, a single source (the USSR, then
later North Korea), and on the acquisition of
the technologies specific to this type of
missile. The spread of conventional ballistic
missiles is now taking place in a different
context. Most of the countries developing
them today already have the technological
and industrial resources to produce ballistic
weapons. For instance, many have mastered
the production of the solid composite
propellants required for medium-diameter
rockets and missiles (300–600 mm), which
make up the majority of short-range
systems currently exported and deployed.10
Many have access to (or themselves
produce) the chemical components
(particularly binders), special steels, and
composite materials necessary for solid-
propellant rockets. Another distinctive
aspect of the current phenomenon is that
emerging ballistic powers can rely on
existing technological flows to modernise
both their systems and their industrial
8. The images available show missiles whose charac-
teristics resemble the SS-26 and the ATACMS.
9. I.e., the Scud B, Scud C, and Scud D, as well as the
No Dong, which adopts the Scud propulsion system.
10. Short-range systems are primarily used for deep
strikes on the battlefield, and are generally deve-
loped around solid propellants, which offer greater
reactivity and safety than liquid propellant systems.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
10
resources. As well as intangible trade
between states (or industries), which
encourages cooperation and the transfer of
expertise, current calculation methods
facilitate the modelling and simulation of
prototypes. High-technology components
produced by civil industry can be used to
improve navigation and guidance systems.
Industrial precision tools allow for higher-
quality assembly, and special materials
(steels and composites) and the dual nature
of certain civil industries (chemistry,
ceramics, composites) provide easier access
to materials that can substantially improve
missile performance. Furthermore, additive
printing is likely to accelerate the process of
dematerialising trade.11
The proliferation model of the 1980s, which
was based on the physical transfer of
components of missiles and/or the
production line, is largely a thing of the past.
Industrial and technological developments
make the engineering involved considerably
easier, in terms of weapon propulsion,
steering, and guidance. The case of Iran is
particularly striking. Since the late 2000s,
Tehran has demonstrated its capacity to
develop large-diameter solid-propellant
launchers (Sejjil),12 to guide quasi-ballistic
missiles,13 to install terminal sensors on
relatively fast missiles (Khalij Fars), and,
more recently, to develop manoeuvrable
warheads. Similarly, North Korea offers an
example of the particularly rapid
development of solid-propellant missiles
without any previous expertise.
Industrialised states like South Korea are
capable of developing their existing
capacities relatively quickly and, by using
earlier imports of foreign expertise, of
developing highly competitive national
industries. We should emphasise that, for a
large number of states, greater weapons
precision is highly dependent on the use of
GPS-like systems, as they lack the industrial
and technological capacities to design and
build high-precision navigation systems
(inertial measurement units, stellar tracking
systems). The increasing vulnerability of GPS
systems to signal jamming or disruption
limits their long-term value for missile
navigation and guidance systems, which
operate in increasingly hostile
electromagnetic conditions. For this reason,
despite the fact that emergent ballistic
powers are increasingly able to produce
relatively precise missiles, such development
is still only partial and must be made more
concrete through the acquisition of more
robust industrial capacities for producing
navigation systems.
However, the role of technology is not
restricted to the modernisation of delivery
systems; it also involves the transformation
11. On these issues, see Mark Bromley and Giovan-
na Maletta, “The Challenge of Software and Tech-
nology Transfers to Non-Proliferation Efforts,” SI-
PRI, April 2018; Arnaud Idiart, “The Role of Intan-
gible Transfer of Technology in the Area of Ballistic
Missiles: Reinforcing the Hague Code of Conduct
and the MTCR,” Food-for-Thought Paper, FRS,
December 2017; and Kolja Brockmann and Sibylle
Bauer, “3D Printing and Missile Technology Con-
trols,” SIPRI Background Paper, SIPRI, November
2017.
12. The manufacture and casting of large-diameter
rocket motors (approximately one metre or more in
diameter) presents a number of technical difficul-
ties that most proliferating countries have not been
entirely able to overcome. Iran’s ability to produce
such missiles is yet to be fully explained.
13. Quasi-ballistic flight within the atmosphere
requires permanent guidance of the missile during
its flight, and therefore real-time calculation of the
vehicle’s aerodynamic behaviour.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
11
of C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control,
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance) resources, which make it
possible to make full use of the precision
and reactivity of missiles by identifying
targets precisely. Only a decade ago,
surveillance and targeting capacities were
highly dependent on national satellite
resources and heavy airborne platforms.
The spread of modern ISR methods
expands the range of targets, particularly
against military objectives (troop
concentrations, mobile targets, vulnerable
military infrastructure, etc.). The
combination of strike methods and
targeting does not only expand the range
of potential missions that may employ
ballistic weapons, but also clearly reinforces
the conventional deterrence capacity of the
states that possess them.
The utility of conventional
ballistic systems
The actual utility of ballistic systems for
conventional strikes depends on a number
of factors. Traditionally, ballistic weapons
enable a combination of speed, range, and
payload, distinguishing them from cruise
missiles, whose speed and payload are far
lower, and which are typically used for
different missions.
The military effect of the payload depends
on the precision of its delivery system, even
in cases where the payload is a weapon of
mass destruction. The search for greater
precision therefore goes hand in hand with
the development of ballistic weapons. It
does not mean that the missile is meant for
conventional use, but it is crucial if the
missile is to be used in conventional
missions and if a predictable military effect
is expected.14
For systems derived from Scud technology,
the near-impossibility of significantly
increasing the precision of missiles
originating from North Korea (Scud B, Scud
C, and No Dong) has prevented the states
that possess them from using them in
conventional strike scenarios beyond terror
or harassment strikes (for example, by Iraqi
forces against the United States in 2003, or
by the Houthis), with unpredictable results.
Until the deployment of the Iranian Qiam
missile in the 2010s, most Scud-type
systems proliferated had a CEP greater than
500 m. As a result, they could not provide a
guaranteed military effect except when
coupled with weapons of mass destruction
or used en masse (as with the strikes to
defend Jalalabad). Understandably, in
developing Scud-type systems, proliferating
states have privileged range over precision,
to the detriment of payload, and in most
cases have tried to couple them with
weapons of mass destruction.
The dissemination of ballistic technologies
14. Similarly, it is important to emphasise that range
is not an indicator that a missile has a conventional
purpose. The archetype of the deterrent role of a
short and very short-range arsenal coupled with
weapons of mass destruction is given by North Ko-
rea: by keeping Seoul under the threat of chemical
strikes, it has been able to block any possible South
Korean or US action for nearly thirty years. Some of
the systems used for this are artillery systems. The
North Korean case shows that deterrence capacity
does not depend on the range of the delivery system
but solely on its capacity to target a very high-value
objective using weapons of mass destruction. There-
fore, a short-range delivery system whose technical
characteristics fall below the limits established by the
MTCR may perfectly well deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
12
has profoundly changed this approach.
Except for North Korea, which is still
primarily focused on the development of
long-range missiles and has only recently
begun developing conventional strike
systems, most states with ballistic weapons
now possess systems whose precision is
under 100 m over short ranges. More
advanced states possess missiles that are
precise almost to the metre, even over long
distances.
The reduction of CEPs to below 100 m, and
even to below 50 m for a growing number
of short-range systems, has important
military implications. The combination of
the ballistic missile’s terminal velocity and
its payload, which can easily be over 500 kg,
can cause devastating blast and
overpressure effects on insufficiently
hardened infrastructure. Improving
precision to below 50 m makes it possible
to engage hardened targets and to make
targeted use of cluster or area-effects
munitions (thermobaric explosives). The
improvement in the precision of short-
range ballistic missiles poses a complex
problem, as it considerably increases the
vulnerability of the infrastructure required
for military operations (air bases, troop
stationing zones, logistics centres, etc.).
When used alongside a powerful C4ISR
architecture, the range of potential targets
expands to include military units and mobile
systems, making it possible to target high-
value military objectives (C2, radar systems,
vehicles, units being assembled, etc.).
Depending on the quality of C4ISR, short-
range ballistic systems encourage
systematic interdiction missions far beyond
the battlefield, deep within the theatre. By
generating deep vulnerabilities in the
systems deployed, they create an
interdiction bubble that can prove a major
obstacle to force projection.
With the exception of China, which is
developing ballistic missiles with
conventional payloads for ranges between
500 and 3,000 km, most ballistic powers
only use shorter-range systems. The United
States, which currently only has a system
with a range of 300 km (the ATACMS), is
likely to move towards developing one with
a range of 500–600 km. With the SS-26,
Russia should be able to reach targets up to
600–700 km away. Following changes to the
Fateh-110, Iran now possesses systems with
ranges of between 300 and 700 km,
although the Emad (manoeuvrable-warhead
Shahab-3) is probably still insufficiently
precise for conventional strikes. The
difference in approach between China and
the other ballistic powers is largely
explained by geography and the kind of
targets involved. The aero-naval dimension
of the Pacific theatre requires China to plan
for strikes over long distances (above 1,500
km) against hardened or naval targets
(Japan, Guam, carrier battle groups).15
Furthermore, China’s decision to develop
long-range capacities is fairly recent, and
has more to do with a conventional
deterrence approach than a purely
operational one. By contrast, the
development of ballistic systems against
Taiwan, far closer to Chinese shores, meets
a strictly operational objective.
Conventional ballistic strikes are intended to
have a decapitation effect on Taiwanese
15. In particular, carrier battle groups may be tar-
geted by ASBMs (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles), inclu-
ding DF-21D and possibly DF-26 missiles, which are
meant to prevent the access of US carrier battle
groups to the South China Sea or close to the Ja-
panese coast.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
13
military infrastructures, and so to facilitate
either a political resolution to the conflict or
an invasion.
We find this operational approach among
the Russians as well as the Americans,
although each implements it differently. The
United States typically uses ballistic missiles
or heavy guided rockets as deep-strike
artillery, targeting high-value military
targets, anti-air defence systems, or the
command forces accompanying land
manoeuvres. Since 1991, the United States
has fired more than 500 ATACMS missiles
during operations, with long-range strikes
primarily being provided by cruise missiles
and aviation. During the Chechen and
Georgian conflicts, Russia tested different
ballistic strike methods, both to support
ground forces and to eliminate high-value
targets. These operational experiments have
become part of a body of doctrine that sees
deep strikes as the core of Russian capacity
development. The suspension of the INF
treaty will likely push Russia and the United
States to develop ballistic, quasi-ballistic,
and hypersonic strike systems capable of
operating very deep within the theatre—an
approach relatively close to that currently
taken by China towards its own ballistic
systems.
Very deep ballistic strikes raise questions
about the cost and durability of the desired
military effects. While certain types of
objectives need only be targeted once,
many can only be neutralised by multiple
strikes. The unit cost of long-range ballistic
missiles and, in general, the limits of
available stockpiles mean that missions
must be highly specialised, relative both to
the desired military effects and political
considerations. Depending on the objective,
very deep strikes may indicate a state’s
desire to intensify a conflict and widen the
range of targets engaged, moving from the
strictly military to the economic, political, or
social domains.
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System,
US Army, 2006
Very deep strikes on strategic objectives
have a considerable political dimension.
Often, the presence of strategic strike
means within a nation’s arsenal contributes
to conventional deterrence by increasing an
adversary’s political, economic, and societal
costs of entering into conflict. It helps to
protect their territory from potential
adversaries, irrespective of the real military
effect these weapons may produce. The
Iranian case appears to demonstrate the
importance of this deterrence approach. But
we should not overestimate the political
effect. Many examples show that, once
conflict has begun, conventional strategic
strikes with a political goal do not have a
significant impact on states’ determination
to pursue military operations.
Conversely, when they are or may
potentially be coupled with weapons of
mass destruction, these missiles continue to
have a major deterrent effect. The decision
by a state to develop long-range
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
14
conventional ballistic weapons remains an
important signal, one that may suggest a
shift towards using them as delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction—
even if these missiles are designed to carry
out precision strikes. In this particular case,
increasing their range is generally done in
order to make it possible to target the
major actors protecting hostile regional
powers.
However, it would be overly restrictive to
only view the development of the use of
conventional ballistic systems in terms of
increasing range or political deterrence of
hostile powers. Most of the states currently
acquiring or developing conventional
ballistic missiles are above all seeking short-
range capacities in order to increase their
ability to carry out deep strikes on the
battlefield. The limits imposed by the MTCR
are not, in most cases, particularly
restrictive. An operational range limited to
300 km is sufficient in most cases for strikes
on the battlefield and the theatre, and the
500 kg payload limit allows for significant
military effects as long as the missile is
precise enough. For smaller military powers,
short-range ballistic systems are an
important force multiplier, particularly
because the availability of simple but
relatively high-performance C4ISR
architectures makes it possible to optimise
effects. The deployment of such capacities
also figures in zone denial strategies: the
existence of strike systems makes it more
risky for adversaries to deploy troops,
limiting their military options.
On the other hand, the development of the
Fateh systems by Iran demonstrates the
ability of states to adapt their industrial
capacities to their specific strategies, which
may initially be restricted to the battlefield
but may develop towards more ambitious
strategies.
Tehran initially developed these systems for
carrying out battlefield strikes, before
making them more advanced in order to
provide a deep-strike capacity which could
pose a credible threat to enemy military
infrastructures. The development of Zulfiqar
systems, which are derived from the Fateh
systems but have a range of 600–800 km
(compared to 300–500 km for the different
Fateh variants), allows Iran to use strike
strategies that are specifically adapted to its
conventional needs. These missiles also
reinforce its deterrence capacities. Two
strikes against militias close to the so-called
Islamic State in Syria, in 2016 and 2017,
using modernised versions of the Fateh-
110, show these increasing capacities. The
strikes conducted by Iran in January 2020
against military infrastructures in Iraq
provide further evidence that Iranian
ballistic capabilities are now battlefield
weapons. Similarly, the development of the
ASBM Khalij Fars, also derived from the
Fateh-110, allows Tehran to threaten
maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In
South Korea, we can observe an identical
trend to develop national strike concepts
associated with very specific programmes,
in order to respond to different aspects of
North Korean military threats.
Technological developments, the
modernisation of military arsenals, and the
transformation of strike concepts all
increase the speed at which ballistic missiles
are spreading. Other more contingent
factors have also contributed to this spread.
Recent improvements to air defences, which
place increasing constraints on the use of
aviation for interdiction missions, offer a
reason to acquire strike systems capable of
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
15
neutralising and/or penetrating defences. In
parallel, on a more global scale, the spread
of anti-missile defences and their constant
improvements provide strong incentives for
states to modernise their weapons (quasi-
ballistic missiles over short ranges, and
hypersonic missiles over longer ranges). The
modernisation of anti-missile defences, both
at the terminal stage and in terms of exo-
atmospheric interception, may have other
consequences. In the long term, it could
counteract the current trend of developing
ground-to-ground ballistic systems,
favouring air-to-ground systems with
greater manoeuvring capacity, range, and
terminal velocity.16 It may also provide the
conditions for the systematic development
of hypersonic weapons, initially using glide
vehicles and, in the longer term, scramjets.
The transfer of hypersonic glide vehicle
technology should be treated as a serious
issue in the dissemination of conventional
strike systems.
Integrating conventional
ballistic missiles into the HCoC
Since there is no difference between a
conventional ballistic missile and one
capable of delivering a weapon of mass
destruction, how should the Code deal with
the likely spread of ballistic missiles used for
conventional purposes, and take future
developments into account?
There are a number of elements to consider.
First, the emergence of industrial actors
operating outside the MTCR, violations of
the MTCR by certain exporters belonging to
the regime, technological exchanges
between member states of the regime, and
the spread of civilian technology which,
even if not considered dual-purpose,
facilitates the design and production of
ballistic missiles: all of these mark a shift
from proliferation to dissemination. Ballistic
weapons and their related technologies are
no longer rare, and their acquisition or
development is sustained by a growing
number of technological and industrial
sources, and by states. We are witnessing
the democratisation or even the
normalisation of the ownership and use of
short-range systems, which may extend to
longer-range systems. The increased range
and improved precision of heavy rockets,
whose characteristics increasingly resemble
very short-range and short-range SRBMs
(from 150 km to over 300 km), are also
making the use of ballistic weapons more
normalised.
More generally, the dissemination of
ballistic weapons reflects a technological
and doctrinal transformation of military
operations. These are characterised by a
substantial increase in combat distances,
from the tactical level to the theatre, and
even the strategic level. Operative
engagement distances within the theatre
have also become far longer. From this
point of view, the popularisation of the
concept of A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial)
reflects the increasing spread of weapons
systems capable of operating over several
hundred kilometres. In parallel, current
operational concepts based on speed give
ballistic systems and their derivatives an
important place in military funding.
16. The Russian Kinzhal system, a ground-to-air
version of the SS-26, is a typical example of this
likely development. The concept has already been
adopted by China, Israel, and the United States.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
16
Finally, the development of hypersonic
technologies using glide vehicles, which will
likely represent the main development in
ballistic weapons in the decades to come,
forces us to reconsider the definition of
what counts as a ballistic system. Over long
ranges (3,000 km and over), such weapons
are deployed using a space launcher or a
ballistic missile. But the glider performs
much of its flight within the atmosphere or
at its limits. It is therefore tempting for
states developing these technologies to
distinguish hypersonic weapons systems
from ballistic weapons systems, since the
majority of the flight of a hypersonic missile
is non-ballistic. However, drawing a
distinction within the weapon system
between the launcher (ballistic propeller)
and the hypersonic weapon itself (glide
vehicle) would undermine the credibility of
the Code. Possessing a hypersonic weapons
system is effectively equivalent to
possessing a ballistic weapons system.
Conversely, including hypersonic missiles in
the Code without modifying its goal is hard
to accept, as the Code could only refer to
vehicles coupled with launchers or ballistic
missiles. This would exclude hypersonic
systems propelled by scramjets. In the
medium term, however, such systems will
approach or surpass the speed of SRBMs,
even while using an entirely non-ballistic
trajectory.
Given these different elements, the options
available to states who subscribe to the
Code are relatively simple. Firstly, they can
maintain the stance adopted in recent years
and continue to make member states more
aware of the question of ballistic missiles in
their own right, without drawing a
distinction between systems effectively
coupled with weapons of mass destruction
and those which, currently, are not.
Prototype of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle
(HTV-2), DARPA, U.S.
While the Code covers all ballistic systems,
most of the issues under discussion have to
do with the arsenals of states whose ballistic
missile programmes involve weapons of
mass destruction (or programmes for such
weapons), in violation of their international
commitments and UN restrictions. But while
this question remains a crucial one, it
neglects the growing impact of the spread
of conventional ballistic weapons on the
security of states. On the other hand, this
stance makes it more difficult to
accommodate new technologies involving
ballistic systems, particularly for hypersonic
programmes which, with the exception of
the Russian strategic programme, remain
associated with conventional strikes.
A slightly different approach could include
the problem of conventional arms systems
more systematically within discussions and
debates. Currently centred on non-
proliferation, the Code could extend its field
of action to include regional security and
stabilisation. The aim would not be to
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
17
change the focus of the Code, and the issue
of delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction would remain central. Rather,
this extension would make states more
aware of the destabilising impact of the
spread of conventional strike systems,
which can encourage pre-emptive
approaches and even decapitation strikes.
Therefore, member states could pay closer
attention to the spread of heavy rockets
and SRBMs. States should also be made
aware of the need to report their launches
and to demonstrate transparency about this
type of arsenal. By specifically including
conventional delivery vehicles, the Code
could better address hypersonic systems,
whether aerobic or not, because of their
potentially destabilising nature.
There is a potential link between this
second approach and a third one, less
widely agreed upon and more complex to
implement, which focuses more closely on
the payload rather than the ballistic missile
alone. A number of missiles currently
produced and exported were designed
exclusively as conventional systems, not
dual ones. While they retain a dual capacity
by definition, they can only be adapted to
carry weapons of mass destruction under
the following double condition: the state
that possesses the delivery system must
have a weapons of mass destruction
programme, and the ballistic missile itself
must be adapted, a potentially complex
process. For instance, the sale of an SS-26
to Armenia or Algeria may represent a
military risk for neighbouring countries, but
does not for the moment represent a
proliferation issue. By contrast, the export of
Fateh-110s from Iran to Syria is far more
problematic. The Fateh-110 is documented
as exclusively conventional, but Syria is
technically capable of adapting it to deliver
chemical weapons.
This final approach would be complex to
negotiate among the members of the Code,
but it would likely offer a number of long-
term advantages by providing a more
precise definition of ‘proliferating’ delivery
systems, without thereby giving carte
blanche for the acquisition of all
conventional systems. In the absence of a
distinction between conventional and non-
conventional missions, the Code risks losing
all relevance. The connection between
ballistic delivery systems and weapons of
mass destruction was natural when the
Code was created, but it can no longer be
maintained except if ballistic carriers remain
an exceptional weapon, rather than an
ordinary part of military arsenals.
Categorising missiles more precisely may
also allow us to evaluate and potentially
integrate technological developments,
particularly for hypersonic systems, which,
in terms of their mission, are only
marginally distinct from ballistic systems,
whether conventional or coupled with
weapons of mass destruction.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
18
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
19
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Stéphane Delory is a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Straté-
gique. He conducts research on missile defence, balistic proliferation and security policy in
the Black sea.
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
20
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
21
Previously published
Opening HCoC to cruise missiles: A proposal to overcome political hurdles, HCoC Research
Paper, Issue 5, by Stéphane Delory, Emmanuelle Maitre and Jean Masson, Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique, February 2019.
The role of intangible transfer of technology in the area of ballistic missiles – reinforcing the
Hague Code of Conduct and the MTCR, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 4, by Arnaud Idiart,
Group French Export Compliance advisor, Airbus, July 2017.
The use of the existing WMD free zones as an exemple and a potential Framework for
further initiatives banning ballistic missiles, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 3, by Benjamin
Hautecouverture, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June
2017.
Limiting the proliferation of WMD means of delivery: a low-profile approach to bypass di-
plomatic deadlocks, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 2, by Renaud Chatelus, collaborator and
PhD candidate at the University of Liège, May 2017.
The HCoC: current challenges and future possibilities, HCoC Research Paper, Issue 1, By Dr
Mark Smith, Defence & Security Programme, Wilton Park, 2014.
Papers can be downloaded on the https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/ website.
HCOC RESEARCH PAPERS
Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons
22
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
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www.frstrategie.org
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https://eeas.europa.eu
USEFUL LINKS
www.hcoc.at
www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc
This project is financed by the
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This project is implemented by the Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique
CONTACTS
THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT
The objective of the HCoC is to prevent and curb the prolifera-
tion of ballistic missiles systems capable of delivering weapons
of mass destruction and related technologies. Although non-
binding, the Code is the only universal instrument addressing this issue today. Multilateral instrument of
political nature, it proposes a set of transparency and confidence-building measures. Subscribing
States are committed not to proliferate ballistic missiles and to exercise the maximum degree of re-
straint possible regarding the development, the testing and the deployment of these systems.
The Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, with the support of the Council of the European Union,
has been implementing activities which aim at promoting the implementation of the Code, contrib-
uting to its universal subscription, and offering a platform for conducting discussions on how to further
enhance multilateral efforts against missile proliferation.
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