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“Japanese Perspectives on the South China Sea and the
East China Sea”
Vice Admiral Masanori Yoshida (Ret.) 1
Percentage of trade on SLOC to the entire trade: 99.6%
Crude Oil 99.6%
86.7%
LPG 91.0%
72.0% Corn 100%
98.7%
Wheat 86.0%
51.5%
96.4%
50.6%
LNG
South-East Asia Oceania
Middle East
・エネルギー白書2014 エネルギー庁・海運統計要覧2014 日本船舶協会(社)・農林水産物輸出入概況 2013年
U.S.
Beef 99.6%
50.9%
legend
80%
65%
Export Dependence
Export dependence to local area
Importance of Sea-borne Transportation for Japan
Significance of the Sea for Prosperity
Korean Peninsula
East China Sea
South China Sea
Indian Ocean
Pacific Ocean
Sea Lane of Communication
Sea of JapanTrade Value of Total World Trade in SCS
LNG More than 1/3
Crude Oil More than 1/2
Number of Ship and Vessels at Chokepoint
Singapore Strait Strait of MalaccaSuez Canal Panama Canal
Source: MOT, Jan 2015
Threats to Japan’s Sea Lanes
South China Sea
UNCLASS
Self Defense Fleet HQ
Regional District HQ
Air Base for MPAsAir Base for Helos
Maizuru District
Ominato District
Yokosuka District
Kure District
Naha(Okinawa)
Iwo-to
Sasebo District
Location of the Main JMSDF Bases
5
Geopolitical Characteristics of Sasebo District
Sasebo
Okinawa
Senkaku
PLAN Tokai fleet headquarters
(Ninbo)
480km
Sasebo District
6
UNCLASS
7
Japan’s Senkaku Islands in ECS
Access Denial against the U.S.
Maintain access to Pacific Ocean
Restriction in Okinawa’s operation
Pressure for unification of Taiwan
Strategic Importance for China 1895 Integrated into Japan’s territory (No claim by China)
1968 Reported oil resources on the seabed around Senkaku
1971 China started to claim her sovereignty of Senkaku
1992 China declared her Territorial Sea Law, included Senkaku
2013 Suddenly announced the establishment of “ECS ADIZ”
Invasion into Japan’s Territorial Waters around Senkaku
Source : Japan Coast Guard HP(BLUE: within Contiguous Zone RED: within Territorial Waters)2008
2012.9Transfer of the ownership of the SK to GOJ
2010.9Collision incident by Chinese illegal fishing boat against JCG Patrol Ship
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Period of my command
▲ 9月14日(金)付の朝日新聞夕刊1面
Activity of the Chinese government vessels in the outskirts of the Senkaku Islands
In a year after nationalization(Japanese government acquisition of the Senkaku Islands )
Intruded into Japan’s territorial waters ship: 216 boats Contiguous-zone cruise ship: 1055 boats 9
※参考JIANGWEIーⅡ級FF
February 5, 2013 Emergency press briefing by the Minister of Defense. - PLAN vessel radiated fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer on January 30 in the East China Sea. - Radiated fire-control radar is unusual. - When it makes a mistake by one step, it is a very dangerous situation.
FC RadarJIANGWEI-Ⅱ class FF 522
FC Radar Radiated by PLANThe View of the Japanese Government
Defense Minister Onodera
10
East China Sea
ADIZ
Senkaku Islands
Announcement of the Establishment of “Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in ECS” in November 2013.
Chinese Short Term, Tactical Goal “A series of incidents around the Senkaku Islands aims
to appeal the issue of right of possession to international society by suggesting escalation”
Response of JCG and JMSDF(on the scene) “Without escalating military tension into military
conflict or war, make them understand Japanese will≒ maintain presence wherever they go”
Our Situation Awareness and Reaction at that Time
12
★ Importance of maintaining and sharing ISR and COP(Mutual understanding of the situation)
· To anticipate China‘s intent and future action· Respond to China's unique war (“Hybrid Warfare”)· To suppress flare up of domestic nationalism in each country
★ Importance of presence(Balance of power and stabilization of crisis)JCG (front) – JMSDF (rear-guard) –7Th Fleet (sub rear-guard)
★ Importance of collaboration between politics and diplomacy(Prevention of Escalation)
· Application of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty· Provide opportunities for diplomacy
Lessons Learned from the East China Sea in those Days
13
What is Chinese Strategy?○ “New Great Powers”
In the principally important China-U.S. relationship, disparity is decreased and China gains advantage. While avoiding direct confrontation, China pressures neighboring countries・・・
“Changing Status-Quo by Power”
→ Non-militarized coercion→ Maritime-style
“People’s War”
What is U.S. Strategy?○ Ground Strategy
ex. “Containment of Soviet”・・・no longer exists.
Re-balancing・・・Policy ≠ Strategy
ASB, Offshore control・・・operational concept ,
≒Military strategy≠Ground strategy ≠Regional strategy
○ Now may be「Wait-and-see approach」?
China-U.S. Power Conflict in Asia-Pacific Region
Lessons Learned from the East China Sea from other Days
14
15
Beijing View (My Analysis)
・ Power shift occurs only between the U.S. and China.
・ China’s relations with its neighbors is determined within the framework of China-U.S. relationship.
・ Japan is no longer a great power, it is one of China’s many neighbors.
・ Assertively project power until China’s national interests (that have been infringed by neighboring countries including Japan) are regained.
Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea
Philippines
China
Spratly Islands
Vietnam
Malaysia
Brunei
TaiwanChinaVietnamMalaysia
PhilippinesBrunei
Philippines
History of China’s Occupation of Islands in SCS
China’s Reclamation of Reefs in SCS
(“DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016”)
Fiery Cross Reef2014.8 2015.3 2016.5
Subi Reef2015.1
2015.32015.9
2016.5
Case of USN/T-AGOS/IMPECCABLE, 2009 in SCS
On the deck of Chinese Fishery boat, there is a man with a long pole who is attempting to hook IMPECCABLE’s cable array in the water.
Two Chinese Fishery boats are disturbing IMPECCABLE’s course.
IMPECCABLE is spraying water at Chinese Fishery boat approaching to her.
Chinese officer on Public Vessel is on the scene and observes IMPECCABLE and their Fishery boats.
20
・Strategic importance of South China Sea
・Lack of ISR capability of the states in theregion
・Lack of balancing power
・Complexity of politics and diplomacy
Differences between SCS and ECS
• Capacity building for the states in the region (with a focus on Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia)
• Low-intensity presence (Joint training exercises with the surrounding states, P.P., HA/DR multi-lateral training)
• High-intensity presence (Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training, joint warning and surveillance, expansion of Japanese and U.S.-Japan ISR areas)
• Enactment of multi-lateral accident response plans (GSOMIA, ACSA members)
21
Measures for Stabilization in the SCS
Regional Non-Traditional Challenges
What Are the Challenges?
Challenges:
➣ Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear/Missiles Threats
➣ Changing the Status Quo by Force
“Hybrid Warfare” in Gray Zone Situation
Non-Traditional Threats
Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 1
• Providing High Level of VigilanceMaintaining 24/7 High Density ISR PosturePreserving Credible Deterrence against AggressionSending Collective Messages of Like-Minded Partners
Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 2
• Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Regional Navies Enhancing Interoperability Sending Messages of Strong Will to Preserve Rules
Based Order
Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 3
• Capacity Building Support & Defense Equipment and Technology CooperationProviding Reassurance to the Regional PartnersContributing to Prevention of Changing Status Quo
by Force
Way Ahead: Maritime Security Web of Partners
WPNSIONS
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