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8/12/2019 111201 Maoism Versus Hybrid Theory
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Maoism versus Hybrid theory - Is the military being
distracted by this latest doctrinal buzz-word?
By Stuart Lyle
Mao Zedong, the father of Communist China, led the Red Army to victory against the
Chinese Nationalist government in what became the premier illustration of
revolutionary warfare for scholars and would-be practitioners alike.1Not only did he
practice and lead a successful revolution, he also wrote an enduring theory of
insurgency warfare that is viewed as the most influential of any work on the subject.
His theory of Protracted and Guerrilla war has been the intellectual basis for
numerous other revolutionary movements and insurgencies from South America to
South East Asia. Such famous revolutionary leaders as Fidel Castro and Ho Chi
Minh led insurgency campaigns along the theoretical lines of Maos teachings.
However, despite the fact that Maos theory of insurgency warfare has dominated the
intellectual realm of insurgency theory, there are analysts who challenge its overall
relevance to modern irregular warfare. Relevance is more important than yesterdays
dominance2and many writers have stressed that the character of warfare is in the
process of drastic change. One such school of thought that proclaims itself unique
from the traditionalist irregular warfare theories is the concept of Hybrid Wars.
According to disciples of hybrid war theory, these adversaries are decidedly
contemporary and are the fledgling pioneers of a new, unique form of warfare that
was born during the 2006 Second Lebanon War between the Lebanese non-state
actor Hezbollah and Israel. In that instance hybrid warfare passed from a concept to
a reality.3At the time, the leader of Hezbollah, Nasarallah, also proclaimed the dawn
of a new strategic era in light of his organisations success. He claimed that
Hezbollah was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense
either. It was something in between. This is the new model.4This theory has taken
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root within Western strategic doctrine and is influencing future defence planning. The
British Armys current counterinsurgency manual includes hybrid threats within the
introductions definition of insurgency. But are Western militaries blindly adhering to
the latest buzz-word or theoretical fashion? Some would say yes and there is danger
in this. This article will challenge the assertion of hybrid warfare advocates by
illustrating that the so-called hybrid adversaries discussed in todays literature are
not a new reality. Rather, they are merely the modern manifestations of traditional
Maoist insurgency theory that have adapted Maos teachings to their individual
circumstances. Therefore, the relevance today of Maoist insurgency theory will be
made apparent.
What is Maoism?
Maos theory of peoples war was a genuinely modern approach [that] relied on an
ability to exploit the surrounding population and harness their manpower.5With an
enormous rural population this strategy seemed ideal for China at the time. However,
originally Maos was not the strategy chosen by the Chinese Communist Party.
Under influence from Soviet advisors, the Party leadership employed the Marxist-
Leninist approach of the urban proletariat-led revolution. However, as predicted by
Mao, this approach was unsuccessful, with the Red Army suffering several costly
setbacks in quick succession. The Party leadership turned to Mao for guidance.
Having assessed the demographics of China at that time Mao rightly judged the route
to success would be to lead the rural peasants in revolt as he did not view the urban
population as substantial or strong enough to seriously challenge the governments
power.6He also saw the remote rural peasantry as more susceptible to alternative
political direction due to their isolation from government infrastructure and influence
in contrast with the urban working class. The support of the surrounding population
was crucial to the military aspect. The insurgents would live amongst the rural people
and hide in plain sight rather than seek refuge in the wilderness like a classic guerrilla
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force. Mao stressed that the importance of the political over the military aspect of his
strategy was crucial, writing that political mobilization is the most fundamental
condition for winning the war.7The Red Army would defeat the enemys will to fight
over time and isolate the government from the population rather than the other way
around.
Militarily and politically the format of Maos protracted war was broken into three
phases;
1. Strategic Defensive; establishment of political legitimacy and simple
survival are the primary goals. As the insurgency is very weak militarily its
actions are directed for propaganda purposes and politically oriented
violence only against local government representatives. This can include
terrorism and assassination. The political leadership of the insurgency
would begin to form shadow governments at the most local level.
2. Strategic Stalemate; as the insurgency gains support and increases
military capabilities it seeks to make some territorial gains by expanding
its operations. It consolidates its strongholds and begins to conduct itself
as the de factolocal government in isolated areas. Larger military actions,
such as raids, are conducted to attrite government forces and steal
supplies. They can also be to keep government forces at bay while more
regular forces are being trained.
3. Strategic Counter-Offensive; after building up areas of control and more
regular forces, the level and intensity of more conventional actions can be
increased until a final offensive can be mounted. This decisive campaign
will defeat the government forces militarily, but must only be attempted
once they have been defeated politically with regards the population and if
conventional success is all but guaranteed.
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The Hybrid challenge
It is this theory that formed the bedrock principles for a great many insurgency
movements over the latter half of the twentieth century. In recent years, however,
advancements in technology coupled with globalisation have led some to think that
insurgencies have evolved. Hybrid warfare is one of these schools of thought. In its
essence this term attempts to capture the blurring and blending of previously
separate categorizations of different modes of conflict.8No longer will it be possible
to categorise these as regular or irregular warfare, rather they will be multi-modal.9
The official US doctrinal definition of hybrid conflicts is;
Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a
tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means
or activities in the operational battlespace. Rather than a single
entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a
combination of state and non-state actors.10
But what makes them unique from traditional (Maoist) insurgencies? The authors
claim that these conflicts have both a physical as well as conceptual dimension; the
former, a struggle against an enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and
support of the combat zones indigenous population,the home fronts of the
intervening nations, andthe international community.11The inclusion of criminal
activity is viewed as a new feature, the purpose of which is to either further
destabilizes local government or abets the insurgent or irregular warrior by providing
resources.12Likewise is the coordination and simultaneity of the irregular and regular
force, state and non-state, in a unified effort separating hybrid insurgencies from
compound ones where there is no inter-relation/coordination between irregular and
regular actions. There is also a tactical level element that is said to make hybrid wars
unique. They are alleged to blend regular and irregular tactics, under a decentralised
command structure and featuring both simple and sophisticated technologies in
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innovative ways.13Hezbollah utilised advanced anti-tank systems, surface-to-surface
anti-ship missiles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (systems that previously were,
certainly collectively, the sole preserve of state militaries) in classic guerrilla-style
ambushes and raids. Hoffman, the principle architect of hybrid theory, claims that the
Wests treatment of recent opponents as traditional irregular enemies has been the
reason behind the difficulties faced since 9/11.
New reality or false assertions?
Is the hybrid challenge a new concept and reality or is this simply another re-
branding exercise utilising selective interpretations of selective case-studies in order
to appear unique and thus simply further complicating doctrinal debates? As will be
seen, an examination of the challenges to hybrid warfare theory will illustrate that the
supposed unique characteristics of it are present in Maoist doctrine.
As evident by looking at the three stages of Maos theory the Red Army also
simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular,
terrorism and criminal means or activities as their strategy. The stages were not as
prescriptive as they appear on paper. Mao advocated fluidity in campaigning.
Mobile [irregular] warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional [conventional]
warfare where it is possible and necessary.14As the insurgency progressed Mao
undertook conventional actions firstly only in certain areas and only when ready. In
other areas where the government forces were stronger the Red Army continued in a
guerrilla fashion. Therefore, at some stage there were certain to be instances of
concurrent conventional and irregular actions in neighbouring operational areas. The
shift between stages of the insurgency is not sudden but gradual; in directing
operations we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla
characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage.15This also does not
exclude the possibility of guerrilla-type actions occurring during the conventional
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stage, so long as they are necessary. Mao also wrote that The concept that guerrilla
warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of
regular forces is incorrect16, indicating a need to coordinate between the different
types of actions.
The Strategic Defensive phase can also be said to include terrorism and criminal
activities. Assassination of local officials is a disruptive criminal action and the Red
Army was known for scavenging weapons and equipment from government troops
following clashes. Therefore, the claim that hybrid opponents fuse the irregular with
the regular simultaneously, in conjunction with terrorism and criminality, and in
coordination with each other is not new. The collusion between state and non-state
actors has considerable precedent in the history of Maoism. While Mao had no
significant external sponsorship, the eventual Communist Chinese government
supported the ethnic Chinese Communists in their insurgency in Malaya and, along
with the Soviet Union, the Communist forces in Vietnam. Maoist insurgencies are
every bit as multi-modal as hybrid opponents. From a purely doctrinal perspective,
hybrid threats and the methods they employ seem at best a subset of irregular
warfare17, i.e. an insurgency in the process of progressing from phase two to phase
three of a Maoist protracted war.
There is debate over whether the nature of operations at the tactical level such as
those approaches employed by Hezbollah constitute a form of warfare unique from
conventional and irregular operations.18It is argued that since insurgencies reflect
their environment, the Maoist prototype was bound to change with the rapid
improvement of transport, communications and commercial techniques.19These
represent tactical level improvements but not an alteration of the fundamental nature
of Maoist doctrine. Whats more, most insurgencies will utilise whatever weapons
they have at their disposal and in innovative ways if necessary. At one point the Red
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Army fielded everything from bows and spears to machineguns.20The Vietnamese,
another Maoist insurgency, utilised everything from sharpened bamboo canes for
booby-traps to surface to air missiles against US forces, much like Hezbollah,
illustrating that simply using sophisticated weapons that are normally the preserve of
state militaries does not make the latter instantly different. Besides, if state actors are
potential hybrid opponents then having the capabilities of a state military is not
surprising. Furthermore, conventional state militaries often find innovative uses for
systems that result in a tactical or operational advantage. With Blitzkrieg the
Germans in WWII found a way to integrate the tank, wireless radios and aircraft into
an operational art that confounded the Allies. Why this characteristic is then claimed
as a defining feature specific of a hybrid opponent is unclear.
Some of the more fundamental aspects of Maoism are just as prevalent in the case
of Hezbollah. Maos theory directs the insurgents to attack for military gains but also
for psychological, both against the enemy and for the population. Psychologically,
phase one is directed towards the population and to some extent against local
government. Phase two is directed against the morale of the government forces and
will also continue to target the population for support through propaganda. And finally,
phase three will defeat the enemys will to carry on the struggle. This progressive,
slow psychological defeat of the enemy is at the very heart of Maos protracted war
theory. Furthermore, regarding the Second Lebanon War; Those 34 days were but a
spike in violence during a conflict that has lasted for years and continues today.21It
can be argued that a narrow analysis of Hezbollah in this period alone is ignorant to
the long history of their struggle against Israel. Founded in 1982 Hezbollah began as
a terrorist group, later evolving into a guerrilla force, and finally, over time, developing
more sophisticated, conventional capabilities. It did not suddenly appear in 2006 as
such a developed political and military force. In this respect it is classically Maoist.
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The similarities between the Red Army and Hezbollah continue. Hezbollah is more
than a military force, and therein lies its real strength. It has political, social,
diplomatic, and informational components that provide bedrock support for its military
organizationthese other facets of Hezbollah would over time spawn new forces to
replace those lost in combat.22Hezbollah also engages with communities that the
central Lebanese government has not or cannot provide support for and is often seen
as the government in Southern Lebanon. This function as the de factolocal
government mirrors Maos Communist party with the Chinese peasantry. Mao
instructed his soldiers to aid the popular masseshelp them to gather the harvest
or cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent their epidemics.23They
were also to organise entertainment for both soldiers and civilians, pay for any
supplies they take or for anything they damage. The importance Mao placed on such
activities in order to gain popular support is not only a reflection of Hezbollah but is
also regarded as his greatest contribution to insurgency theory.24
In conclusion, hybrid warfare theory appears to have little or nothing new to offer the
subject of insurgency theory. The prominence of the Second Lebanon War and
Hezbollah as the historical basis for the theory is intellectually ignorant of the wider
history of the region and the protagonists involved. It could also be argued that
conceptually it is both unique and not; It is certainly possible that while a hybrid
concept may prove un-unique at the operational and strategic levels; its tactics
constitute a different kind of fighting.25However, the relevance of the tactical level
ingenuity of the hybrid threat as its only constructive feature makes this theory flawed
as the tactical reality will certainly be different with each case-study. Not all groups
will have the same financial and logistical support as Hezbollah. Focusing on the
overall theoretical underpinnings of the hybrid war school of thought, the similarities
with Maos protracted guerrilla war theory are startling. By definition, hybrid forces
share every characteristic of a Maoist group in the course of the transition from
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Strategic Stalemate to Strategic Offensive. The fact that they have not fully evolved
into the Strategic Offensive phase, to the standard necessary to completely defeat
the Israeli military, is perhaps the reason why Hezbollah was not able to maintain the
momentum of their victory and advance into Israeli territory. Regardless, the
assertion by the likes of Hoffman that future conflict will be multi-modalor multi-
variantrather than simple black or white characterization of one form of warfare26is
accurate in one respect. Future wars willbe multi-modal, but this is only a
continuation of insurgency history since Mao, rather than a recent development. They
will not be simply black or white but fluid, just as Mao wrote in the first half of the
last century. Hybrid Warfare theory is not new and whether those so-called hybrid
opponents, and the academics who study them, realise it or not they are simply the
modern patrons of Maos insurgency theory, a theory that still holds tremendous
relevance today as the dominant insurgent theory. As such, military professionals
and defence leaders would be better advised to return to Maos classic texts rather
than be misdirected by the hybrid concept. Such an examination of the original works
would yield a far more effective understanding of the true character of the most
prominent insurgencies around the globe, thus preventing one from being lost
amongst the latest doctrinal buzz-words that offer little true value. Whats more, to
base ones defence planning on a doctrine that is the result of selective analysis is
both foolish and dangerous. Rather than trying to adapt to this new enemy the
military would be wise to re-examine the lessons to be learned from other Maoist
insurgencies such as Malaya and Vietnam and apply them to defence planning
strategies. Whilst the individual characteristics of each conflict would undoubtedly be
unique, the fundamentals are consistent throughout and are ultimately of far greater
importance.
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About the author
Stuart Lyle is currently a post-graduate student studying a full-time Master in Strategy
and International Securityat the University of Hull (UK) and has previously completed
an undergraduate BA in War and Security Studiesat the same institution. Prior to this
was a short period of service as an officer in the British armed forces. Stuart has had
work published previously regarding terrorism/counter-terrorism and his particular
areas of interest are terrorism, counter-insurgency, military/naval history and
maritime strategy.
Disclaimer
The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate viewon the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enablepoliticians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others withan interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on thefuture needs of Britains defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profitcompany.
UK Defence Forum papers are archived at www.ukdf.org.uk - the last three yearsbeing accessible only to members and subscribers. Prior to that they are in thepublic domain subject to usual conventions.
Members wishing to comment on papers can access a noticeboard via the membersarea of the website www.ukdf.org.uk
December 2011
1Marks, T.Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1996), p. 1
2Mattis, J. & Hoffman, F. Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings, (November 2005),
p. 183Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,Joint Force Quarterly, Issue. 52, 1
STQuarter, (2009),
p. 394
Quoted in Hoffman, F. Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats, Small Wars Journal, (2009),www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/further-thoughts-on-hybrid-thr/, (accessed on 17
December, 2010), (emphasis added)5MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to bin Laden, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2009),
p. 15-166Ibid, p. 46
7Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p. 518Hoffman, F. Hybrid Treats: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable, ORBIS, Vol. 588, (Summer 2010),
p. 19Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 3510
Cited in Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts, Small Wars Journal, (2009),www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/thoughts-on-hybrid-conflict/,(accessed on 08 November,
2010)11
McCuen, J. Hybrid Wars,Military Review, (March-April 2008),www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mccuen08marapr.pdf, (accessed on 29 January, 2011)
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12Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 3513Ibid, p. 3914
Mao, in Chailand, G. (ed.) The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age,(London: University of California Press, 1994), p. 98515Ibid, p. 985
16Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p. 5417Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts18Ibid19
MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p. 1120Griffith, S. B., in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 4721
Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts22
Ibid23Quoted in MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p. 1824Ibid, p. 1925
Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts26Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 35
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