111201 Maoism Versus Hybrid Theory

8/12/2019 111201 Maoism Versus Hybrid Theory

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Maoism versus Hybrid theory - Is the military being

distracted by this latest doctrinal buzz-word?

By Stuart Lyle

Mao Zedong, the father of Communist China, led the Red Army to victory against the

Chinese Nationalist government in what became the premier illustration of

revolutionary warfare for scholars and would-be practitioners alike.1Not only did he

practice and lead a successful revolution, he also wrote an enduring theory of

insurgency warfare that is viewed as the most influential of any work on the subject.

His theory of Protracted and Guerrilla war has been the intellectual basis for

numerous other revolutionary movements and insurgencies from South America to

South East Asia. Such famous revolutionary leaders as Fidel Castro and Ho Chi

Minh led insurgency campaigns along the theoretical lines of Maos teachings.

However, despite the fact that Maos theory of insurgency warfare has dominated the

intellectual realm of insurgency theory, there are analysts who challenge its overall

relevance to modern irregular warfare. Relevance is more important than yesterdays

dominance2and many writers have stressed that the character of warfare is in the

process of drastic change. One such school of thought that proclaims itself unique

from the traditionalist irregular warfare theories is the concept of Hybrid Wars.

According to disciples of hybrid war theory, these adversaries are decidedly

contemporary and are the fledgling pioneers of a new, unique form of warfare that

was born during the 2006 Second Lebanon War between the Lebanese non-state

actor Hezbollah and Israel. In that instance hybrid warfare passed from a concept to

a reality.3At the time, the leader of Hezbollah, Nasarallah, also proclaimed the dawn

of a new strategic era in light of his organisations success. He claimed that

Hezbollah was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense

either. It was something in between. This is the new model.4This theory has taken


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root within Western strategic doctrine and is influencing future defence planning. The

British Armys current counterinsurgency manual includes hybrid threats within the

introductions definition of insurgency. But are Western militaries blindly adhering to

the latest buzz-word or theoretical fashion? Some would say yes and there is danger

in this. This article will challenge the assertion of hybrid warfare advocates by

illustrating that the so-called hybrid adversaries discussed in todays literature are

not a new reality. Rather, they are merely the modern manifestations of traditional

Maoist insurgency theory that have adapted Maos teachings to their individual

circumstances. Therefore, the relevance today of Maoist insurgency theory will be

made apparent.

What is Maoism?

Maos theory of peoples war was a genuinely modern approach [that] relied on an

ability to exploit the surrounding population and harness their manpower.5With an

enormous rural population this strategy seemed ideal for China at the time. However,

originally Maos was not the strategy chosen by the Chinese Communist Party.

Under influence from Soviet advisors, the Party leadership employed the Marxist-

Leninist approach of the urban proletariat-led revolution. However, as predicted by

Mao, this approach was unsuccessful, with the Red Army suffering several costly

setbacks in quick succession. The Party leadership turned to Mao for guidance.

Having assessed the demographics of China at that time Mao rightly judged the route

to success would be to lead the rural peasants in revolt as he did not view the urban

population as substantial or strong enough to seriously challenge the governments

power.6He also saw the remote rural peasantry as more susceptible to alternative

political direction due to their isolation from government infrastructure and influence

in contrast with the urban working class. The support of the surrounding population

was crucial to the military aspect. The insurgents would live amongst the rural people

and hide in plain sight rather than seek refuge in the wilderness like a classic guerrilla


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force. Mao stressed that the importance of the political over the military aspect of his

strategy was crucial, writing that political mobilization is the most fundamental

condition for winning the war.7The Red Army would defeat the enemys will to fight

over time and isolate the government from the population rather than the other way

around.

Militarily and politically the format of Maos protracted war was broken into three

phases;

1. Strategic Defensive; establishment of political legitimacy and simple

survival are the primary goals. As the insurgency is very weak militarily its

actions are directed for propaganda purposes and politically oriented

violence only against local government representatives. This can include

terrorism and assassination. The political leadership of the insurgency

would begin to form shadow governments at the most local level.

2. Strategic Stalemate; as the insurgency gains support and increases

military capabilities it seeks to make some territorial gains by expanding

its operations. It consolidates its strongholds and begins to conduct itself

as the de factolocal government in isolated areas. Larger military actions,

such as raids, are conducted to attrite government forces and steal

supplies. They can also be to keep government forces at bay while more

regular forces are being trained.

3. Strategic Counter-Offensive; after building up areas of control and more

regular forces, the level and intensity of more conventional actions can be

increased until a final offensive can be mounted. This decisive campaign

will defeat the government forces militarily, but must only be attempted

once they have been defeated politically with regards the population and if

conventional success is all but guaranteed.


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The Hybrid challenge

It is this theory that formed the bedrock principles for a great many insurgency

movements over the latter half of the twentieth century. In recent years, however,

advancements in technology coupled with globalisation have led some to think that

insurgencies have evolved. Hybrid warfare is one of these schools of thought. In its

essence this term attempts to capture the blurring and blending of previously

separate categorizations of different modes of conflict.8No longer will it be possible

to categorise these as regular or irregular warfare, rather they will be multi-modal.9

The official US doctrinal definition of hybrid conflicts is;

Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a

tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means

or activities in the operational battlespace. Rather than a single

entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a

combination of state and non-state actors.10

But what makes them unique from traditional (Maoist) insurgencies? The authors

claim that these conflicts have both a physical as well as conceptual dimension; the

former, a struggle against an enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and

support of the combat zones indigenous population,the home fronts of the

intervening nations, andthe international community.11The inclusion of criminal

activity is viewed as a new feature, the purpose of which is to either further

destabilizes local government or abets the insurgent or irregular warrior by providing

resources.12Likewise is the coordination and simultaneity of the irregular and regular

force, state and non-state, in a unified effort separating hybrid insurgencies from

compound ones where there is no inter-relation/coordination between irregular and

regular actions. There is also a tactical level element that is said to make hybrid wars

unique. They are alleged to blend regular and irregular tactics, under a decentralised

command structure and featuring both simple and sophisticated technologies in


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innovative ways.13Hezbollah utilised advanced anti-tank systems, surface-to-surface

anti-ship missiles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (systems that previously were,

certainly collectively, the sole preserve of state militaries) in classic guerrilla-style

ambushes and raids. Hoffman, the principle architect of hybrid theory, claims that the

Wests treatment of recent opponents as traditional irregular enemies has been the

reason behind the difficulties faced since 9/11.

New reality or false assertions?

Is the hybrid challenge a new concept and reality or is this simply another re-

branding exercise utilising selective interpretations of selective case-studies in order

to appear unique and thus simply further complicating doctrinal debates? As will be

seen, an examination of the challenges to hybrid warfare theory will illustrate that the

supposed unique characteristics of it are present in Maoist doctrine.

As evident by looking at the three stages of Maos theory the Red Army also

simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular,

terrorism and criminal means or activities as their strategy. The stages were not as

prescriptive as they appear on paper. Mao advocated fluidity in campaigning.

Mobile [irregular] warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional [conventional]

warfare where it is possible and necessary.14As the insurgency progressed Mao

undertook conventional actions firstly only in certain areas and only when ready. In

other areas where the government forces were stronger the Red Army continued in a

guerrilla fashion. Therefore, at some stage there were certain to be instances of

concurrent conventional and irregular actions in neighbouring operational areas. The

shift between stages of the insurgency is not sudden but gradual; in directing

operations we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla

characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage.15This also does not

exclude the possibility of guerrilla-type actions occurring during the conventional


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stage, so long as they are necessary. Mao also wrote that The concept that guerrilla

warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of

regular forces is incorrect16, indicating a need to coordinate between the different

types of actions.

The Strategic Defensive phase can also be said to include terrorism and criminal

activities. Assassination of local officials is a disruptive criminal action and the Red

Army was known for scavenging weapons and equipment from government troops

following clashes. Therefore, the claim that hybrid opponents fuse the irregular with

the regular simultaneously, in conjunction with terrorism and criminality, and in

coordination with each other is not new. The collusion between state and non-state

actors has considerable precedent in the history of Maoism. While Mao had no

significant external sponsorship, the eventual Communist Chinese government

supported the ethnic Chinese Communists in their insurgency in Malaya and, along

with the Soviet Union, the Communist forces in Vietnam. Maoist insurgencies are

every bit as multi-modal as hybrid opponents. From a purely doctrinal perspective,

hybrid threats and the methods they employ seem at best a subset of irregular

warfare17, i.e. an insurgency in the process of progressing from phase two to phase

three of a Maoist protracted war.

There is debate over whether the nature of operations at the tactical level such as

those approaches employed by Hezbollah constitute a form of warfare unique from

conventional and irregular operations.18It is argued that since insurgencies reflect

their environment, the Maoist prototype was bound to change with the rapid

improvement of transport, communications and commercial techniques.19These

represent tactical level improvements but not an alteration of the fundamental nature

of Maoist doctrine. Whats more, most insurgencies will utilise whatever weapons

they have at their disposal and in innovative ways if necessary. At one point the Red


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Army fielded everything from bows and spears to machineguns.20The Vietnamese,

another Maoist insurgency, utilised everything from sharpened bamboo canes for

booby-traps to surface to air missiles against US forces, much like Hezbollah,

illustrating that simply using sophisticated weapons that are normally the preserve of

state militaries does not make the latter instantly different. Besides, if state actors are

potential hybrid opponents then having the capabilities of a state military is not

surprising. Furthermore, conventional state militaries often find innovative uses for

systems that result in a tactical or operational advantage. With Blitzkrieg the

Germans in WWII found a way to integrate the tank, wireless radios and aircraft into

an operational art that confounded the Allies. Why this characteristic is then claimed

as a defining feature specific of a hybrid opponent is unclear.

Some of the more fundamental aspects of Maoism are just as prevalent in the case

of Hezbollah. Maos theory directs the insurgents to attack for military gains but also

for psychological, both against the enemy and for the population. Psychologically,

phase one is directed towards the population and to some extent against local

government. Phase two is directed against the morale of the government forces and

will also continue to target the population for support through propaganda. And finally,

phase three will defeat the enemys will to carry on the struggle. This progressive,

slow psychological defeat of the enemy is at the very heart of Maos protracted war

theory. Furthermore, regarding the Second Lebanon War; Those 34 days were but a

spike in violence during a conflict that has lasted for years and continues today.21It

can be argued that a narrow analysis of Hezbollah in this period alone is ignorant to

the long history of their struggle against Israel. Founded in 1982 Hezbollah began as

a terrorist group, later evolving into a guerrilla force, and finally, over time, developing

more sophisticated, conventional capabilities. It did not suddenly appear in 2006 as

such a developed political and military force. In this respect it is classically Maoist.


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The similarities between the Red Army and Hezbollah continue. Hezbollah is more

than a military force, and therein lies its real strength. It has political, social,

diplomatic, and informational components that provide bedrock support for its military

organizationthese other facets of Hezbollah would over time spawn new forces to

replace those lost in combat.22Hezbollah also engages with communities that the

central Lebanese government has not or cannot provide support for and is often seen

as the government in Southern Lebanon. This function as the de factolocal

government mirrors Maos Communist party with the Chinese peasantry. Mao

instructed his soldiers to aid the popular masseshelp them to gather the harvest

or cultivate their land and send our army doctors to prevent their epidemics.23They

were also to organise entertainment for both soldiers and civilians, pay for any

supplies they take or for anything they damage. The importance Mao placed on such

activities in order to gain popular support is not only a reflection of Hezbollah but is

also regarded as his greatest contribution to insurgency theory.24

In conclusion, hybrid warfare theory appears to have little or nothing new to offer the

subject of insurgency theory. The prominence of the Second Lebanon War and

Hezbollah as the historical basis for the theory is intellectually ignorant of the wider

history of the region and the protagonists involved. It could also be argued that

conceptually it is both unique and not; It is certainly possible that while a hybrid

concept may prove un-unique at the operational and strategic levels; its tactics

constitute a different kind of fighting.25However, the relevance of the tactical level

ingenuity of the hybrid threat as its only constructive feature makes this theory flawed

as the tactical reality will certainly be different with each case-study. Not all groups

will have the same financial and logistical support as Hezbollah. Focusing on the

overall theoretical underpinnings of the hybrid war school of thought, the similarities

with Maos protracted guerrilla war theory are startling. By definition, hybrid forces

share every characteristic of a Maoist group in the course of the transition from


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Strategic Stalemate to Strategic Offensive. The fact that they have not fully evolved

into the Strategic Offensive phase, to the standard necessary to completely defeat

the Israeli military, is perhaps the reason why Hezbollah was not able to maintain the

momentum of their victory and advance into Israeli territory. Regardless, the

assertion by the likes of Hoffman that future conflict will be multi-modalor multi-

variantrather than simple black or white characterization of one form of warfare26is

accurate in one respect. Future wars willbe multi-modal, but this is only a

continuation of insurgency history since Mao, rather than a recent development. They

will not be simply black or white but fluid, just as Mao wrote in the first half of the

last century. Hybrid Warfare theory is not new and whether those so-called hybrid

opponents, and the academics who study them, realise it or not they are simply the

modern patrons of Maos insurgency theory, a theory that still holds tremendous

relevance today as the dominant insurgent theory. As such, military professionals

and defence leaders would be better advised to return to Maos classic texts rather

than be misdirected by the hybrid concept. Such an examination of the original works

would yield a far more effective understanding of the true character of the most

prominent insurgencies around the globe, thus preventing one from being lost

amongst the latest doctrinal buzz-words that offer little true value. Whats more, to

base ones defence planning on a doctrine that is the result of selective analysis is

both foolish and dangerous. Rather than trying to adapt to this new enemy the

military would be wise to re-examine the lessons to be learned from other Maoist

insurgencies such as Malaya and Vietnam and apply them to defence planning

strategies. Whilst the individual characteristics of each conflict would undoubtedly be

unique, the fundamentals are consistent throughout and are ultimately of far greater

importance.


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About the author

Stuart Lyle is currently a post-graduate student studying a full-time Master in Strategy

and International Securityat the University of Hull (UK) and has previously completed

an undergraduate BA in War and Security Studiesat the same institution. Prior to this

was a short period of service as an officer in the British armed forces. Stuart has had

work published previously regarding terrorism/counter-terrorism and his particular

areas of interest are terrorism, counter-insurgency, military/naval history and

maritime strategy.

Disclaimer

The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate viewon the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enablepoliticians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others withan interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on thefuture needs of Britains defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profitcompany.

UK Defence Forum papers are archived at www.ukdf.org.uk - the last three yearsbeing accessible only to members and subscribers. Prior to that they are in thepublic domain subject to usual conventions.

Members wishing to comment on papers can access a noticeboard via the membersarea of the website www.ukdf.org.uk

December 2011

1Marks, T.Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1996), p. 1

2Mattis, J. & Hoffman, F. Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings, (November 2005),

p. 183Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,Joint Force Quarterly, Issue. 52, 1

STQuarter, (2009),

p. 394

Quoted in Hoffman, F. Further Thoughts on Hybrid Threats, Small Wars Journal, (2009),www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/further-thoughts-on-hybrid-thr/, (accessed on 17

December, 2010), (emphasis added)5MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to bin Laden, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2009),

p. 15-166Ibid, p. 46

7Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p. 518Hoffman, F. Hybrid Treats: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable, ORBIS, Vol. 588, (Summer 2010),

p. 19Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 3510

Cited in Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts, Small Wars Journal, (2009),www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/thoughts-on-hybrid-conflict/,(accessed on 08 November,

2010)11

McCuen, J. Hybrid Wars,Military Review, (March-April 2008),www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mccuen08marapr.pdf, (accessed on 29 January, 2011)


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12Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 3513Ibid, p. 3914

Mao, in Chailand, G. (ed.) The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age,(London: University of California Press, 1994), p. 98515Ibid, p. 985

16Quoted in Hammes, T. The Sling and the Stone, p. 5417Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts18Ibid19

MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p. 1120Griffith, S. B., in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 4721

Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts22

Ibid23Quoted in MacKinlay, J. The Insurgent Archipelago, p. 1824Ibid, p. 1925

Glenn, R. Thoughts on Hybrid Conflicts26Hoffman, F. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, p. 35

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111201 Maoism Versus Hybrid Theory