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ENBANCFELIXB.PEREZandG.R.No.152048AMANTEG.DORIA,
Petitioners,Present:PUNO,C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARESSANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
versusCORONA,CARPIOMORALES,TINGA,CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO,JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRIONandPERALTA,JJ.
PHILIPPINETELEGRAPHANDTELEPHONECOMPANYandJOSELUISSANTIAGO,Respondents.Promulgated:April7,2009xx
DECISION
CORONA,J.:Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent
PhilippineTelegraphandTelephoneCompany(PT&T)asshippingclerkandsupervisor,
respectively,inPT&TsShippingSection,MaterialsManagementGroup.Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the
ShippingSection,respondentsformedaspecialauditteamtoinvestigatethematter.Itwas
discovered that theShippingSection jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods
shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of
tampering,alterationandsuperimposition.On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30
daysfortheirallegedinvolvementintheanomaly.[1]
Theirsuspensionwasextendedfor
15daystwice:firstonOctober3,1993[2]
andsecondonOctober18,1993.[3]
On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by
respondents:InlinewiththerecommendationoftheAVPAuditaspresentedinhisreportofOctober15,1993(copyattached)andthesubsequentfilingofcriminalchargesagainstthepartiesmentionedtherein,[Mr.FelixPerezandMr.AmanteDoriaare]herebydismissedfromthe
serviceforhavingfalsifiedcompanydocuments.[4]
(emphasissupplied)
On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegaldismissal.[5]
TheyallegedthattheyweredismissedonNovember8,1993,thedate
theyreceivedtheabovementionedmemorandum.Thelaborarbiterfoundthatthe30dayextensionofpetitionerssuspensionandtheir
subsequent dismissalwere both illegal.He ordered respondents to pay petitioners their
salaries during their 30day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with
backwagesand13thmonthpay.TheNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the
labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were
accorded due process and that theywere illegally suspended for only 15 days (without
statingthereasonforthereductionoftheperiodofpetitionersillegalsuspension).[6]
PetitionersappealedtotheCourtofAppeals(CA).InitsJanuary29,2002decision,
[7] theCAaffirmed theNLRCdecision insofar as petitioners illegal suspension for 15
daysanddismissalforjustcausewereconcerned.However,itfoundthatpetitionerswere
dismissedwithoutdueprocess.PetitionersnowseekareversaloftheCAdecision.Theycontendthattherewasno
justcausefortheirdismissal,thattheywerenotaccordeddueprocessandthattheywere
illegallysuspendedfor30days.
Weruleinfavorofpetitioners.RESPONDENTSFAILEDTOPROVEJUSTCAUSEANDTOOBSERVEDUEPROCESS
TheCA,inupholdingtheNLRCsdecision,reasonedthattherewassufficientbasis
forrespondentstolosetheirconfidenceinpetitioners[8]forallegedlytamperingwiththe
shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or
request,asitwasthebasisoftheirliabilitytoacargoforwarder.[9]
Wedisagree.
Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find
respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from
which the lossofconfidence resulted.[10]
Other than theirbareallegationsand the fact
thatsuchdocumentscameintopetitionershandsatsomepoint,respondentsshouldhave
providedevidenceofpetitionersfunctions,theextentoftheirduties,theprocedureinthe
handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than
petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting
petitionerstotheallegedtamperingofshippingdocuments.
The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to
petitionersbecauseitwasneverproventhatpetitionersalonehadcontroloforaccessto
these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial
tribunalsshouldnotrelyonlyonthestatementoftheemployerthatithaslostconfidence
initsemployee.[11]
Willfulbreachbytheemployeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorduly
authorized representative isa justcause for termination.[12]
However, inGeneralBank
andTrustCo.v.CA,[13]
wesaid:[L]ossof confidence shouldnotbe simulated. It shouldnotbeusedas a subterfuge forcauses which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not bearbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must begenuine,notamereafterthoughttojustifyanearlieractiontakeninbadfaith.
Theburdenofproofrestsontheemployertoestablishthatthedismissalisforcause
in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the
LaborCode. The employers evidencemust clearly and convincingly show the facts on
whichthelossofconfidenceintheemployeemaybefairlymadetorest.[14]
Itmustbe
adequately proven by substantial evidence.[15]
Respondents failed to discharge this
burden.Respondentsillegalactofdismissingpetitionerswasaggravatedbytheirfailureto
observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an
employee, an employermust furnish theworkerwith twowritten notices: (1) awritten
notice specifying thegrounds for termination andgiving to said employee a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side and (2) anotherwritten notice indicating that, upon due
considerationofallcircumstances,groundshavebeenestablishedtojustifytheemployer's
decisiontodismisstheemployee.[16]
Petitionerswereneitherapprisedofthechargesagainstthemnorgivenachanceto
defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served
notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of
tenure. The labor arbiter and theCA correctly found that respondents failed to comply
withthetwonoticerequirementforterminatingemployees.Petitionerslikewisecontendedthatdueprocesswasnotobservedintheabsenceof
ahearinginwhichtheycouldhaveexplainedtheirsideandrefutedtheevidenceagainst
them.Thereisnoneedforahearingorconference.Wenoteamarkeddifferenceinthe
standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its
implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must
provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistanceofhisrepresentativeifhesodesires:ART.277.Miscellaneousprovisions.xxx(b)SubjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenureandtheirrighttobeprotectedagainstdismissalexceptforajustandauthorizedcauseandwithoutprejudicetotherequirementofnoticeunderArticle283of thisCode, theemployershall furnish theworker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing astatementof thecausesfor terminationandshallaffordthelatterampleopportunitytobe heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he sodesires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant toguidelinessetby theDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.Anydecision takenby theemployer shallbewithoutprejudice to the rightof theworker tocontest thevalidityorlegality of his dismissal by filing a complaintwith the regional branch of theNationalLaborRelationsCommission.Theburdenofprovingthattheterminationwasforavalidorauthorizedcauseshallrestontheemployer.(emphasissupplied)
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a
hearingandconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcernedisgiventheopportunityto
respondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebut theevidencepresentedagainsthim:
[17]
Section2.SecurityofTenure.xxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due
processshallbesubstantiallyobserved:ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282of
theLaborCode:(i)Awrittennoticeservedontheemployeespecifyingthegroundorgroundsfor
termination,andgivingsaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhisside.
(ii)Ahearingorconferenceduringwhich theemployeeconcerned,with the
assistanceofcounsel ifhesodesires, isgivenopportunitytorespondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.
(iii)Awrittennoticeofterminationservedontheemployee,indicatingthatupon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify histermination.(emphasissupplied)
Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference)mandatory in cases
involvingthedismissalofanemployee?Cantheapparentconflictbetweenthelawandits
IRRbereconciled?At the outset,we reaffirm the timehonoreddoctrine that, in case of conflict, the
law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.[18]
The authority to
promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or
regulationmustconformtoandbeconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheenablingstatute.
[19]Assuch,itcannotamendthelaweitherbyabridgingorexpandingitsscope.
[20]
Article277(b)of theLaborCodeprovides that, in casesof termination for a just
cause,anemployeemustbegivenampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimself.
Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the
wordamplewhichordinarilymeansconsiderablymorethanadequateorsufficient.[21]
In
this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as
extensiveenoughtocoveractualhearingorconference.Tothisextent,Section2(d),Rule
IoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCodeisinconformitywithArticle
277(b).Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of BookVI of the
LaborCodeshouldnotbetakentomeanthatholdinganactualhearingorconferenceisa
conditionsinequanonforcompliancewiththedueprocessrequirementinterminationof
employment.The test for the fair procedure guaranteed underArticle 277(b) cannot be
whethertherehasbeenaformalpreterminationconfrontationbetweentheemployerand
the employee. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor
similartoaformalhearing.Toconfinetheemployeesrighttobeheardtoasolitaryform
narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing
evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is
overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
proceduresuniversallyapplicabletoeveryimaginablesituation.[22]
Thestandardforthehearingrequirement,ampleopportunity,iscouchedingeneral
languagerevealingthelegislativeintenttogivesomedegreeofflexibilityoradaptability
tomeet thepeculiarities of a given situation.To confine it to a single rigidproceeding
suchasaformalhearingwilldefeatitsspirit.
Significantly, Section 2(d),Rule I of the ImplementingRules ofBookVI of the
Labor Code itself provides that the socalled standards of due process outlined therein
shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal
hearingorconferenceisideal,itisnotanabsolute,mandatoryorexclusiveavenueofdue
process.An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as
implementedbySection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLabor
Code shouldbe interpreted inbroad strokes. It is satisfiednotonlybya formal face to
face confrontation but by anymeaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against
himandtosubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.Ahearingmeans thatapartyshouldbegivenachance toadducehisevidence to
support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the
adjudication of the controversy.[23]
To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation
alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations,
submissionsorpleadings.[24]
Therefore,whilethephraseampleopportunitytobeheard
mayinfactincludeanactualhearing,itisnotlimitedtoaformalhearingonly.Inother
words, the existence of an actual, formal trialtype hearing, although preferred, is not
absolutelynecessarytosatisfytheemployeesrighttobeheard.This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of
termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing. Thus, we
categoricallydeclaredinSkippersUnitedPacific,Inc.v.Maguad:[25]
TheLaborCodedoesnot,ofcourse,requireaformalortrialtypeproceedingbeforeanerringemployeemaybedismissed.(emphasissupplied)
InAutobusWorkersUnionv.NLRC,[26]
weruled:The twin requirementsofnotice andhearingconstitute the essential elementsof
due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard beforejudgment is rendered. In fact, there isnoviolationofdueprocesseven ifnohearingwas conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of thecontroversy.Whatisfrowneduponisthedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.
xxxxxxxxx
Aformaltrialtypehearingisnotevenessential todueprocess.It isenoughthat the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain theirrespective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence onwhich afair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases ofcomplaintslodgedbeforetheLaborArbiter.(emphasissupplied)In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development
Corporation,[27]
wehadtheoccasiontostate:
[W]ellsettledisthedictumthatthetwinrequirementsofnoticeandhearingconstitutetheessentialelementsofdueprocessinthedismissalofemployees.Itisacardinalruleinourjurisdictionthattheemployermustfurnishtheemployeewithtwowrittennoticesbeforetheterminationofemploymentcanbeeffected:(1)thefirstapprisestheemployeeoftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand(2)thesecondinformstheemployeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim.Therequirementofahearing,ontheotherhand,iscompliedwithaslongastherewasanopportunitytobeheard,andnotnecessarilythatanactualhearingwasconducted.
Inseparateinfractionreports,petitionerswerebothapprisedoftheparticularacts
or omissions constituting the charges against them. Theywere also required to submittheirwrittenexplanationwithin12hoursfromreceiptofthereports.Yet,neitherofthemcomplied.Hadtheyfoundthe12hourperiodtooshort,theyshouldhaverequestedforanextensionoftime.Further,noticesofterminationwerealsosenttotheminformingthemofthebasisoftheirdismissal.Infine,petitionersweregivendueprocessbeforetheyweredismissed.Even if no hearingwas conducted, the requirement of due process hadbeenmet since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy.(emphasissupplied)
Our holding inNational SemiconductorHKDistribution, Ltd. v. NLRC[28]
is of
similarimport:
Thattheinvestigationsconductedbypetitionermaynotbeconsideredformalorrecordedhearingsorinvestigationsisimmaterial.Aformalortrialtypehearingisnotatalltimesandinallinstancesessentialtodueprocess,therequirementsofwhicharesatisfiedwherethepartiesareaffordedfairandreasonableopportunitytoexplaintheirside of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the naturalsequenceofnotice,hearingandjudgment.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an
employeewithampleopportunitytobeheardanddefendhimselfwiththeassistanceofa
representativeorcounselinwaysotherthanaformalhearing.Theemployeecanbefully
affordedachancetorespondtothechargesagainsthim,adducehisevidenceorrebutthe
evidenceagainsthimthroughawidearrayofmethods,verbalorwritten.After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter,
memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like
relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the sworn
statementsofhiswitnesses.Forthispurpose,hemaypreparehisexplanationpersonally
orwith the assistance of a representative or counsel.Hemay also ask the employer to
provide him copy of recordsmaterial to his defense.Hiswritten explanationmay also
includearequestthataformalhearingorconferencebeheld.Insuchacase,theconduct
of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist
substantialevidentiarydisputes[29]
orwherecompanyrulesorpracticerequiresanactual
hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the
decisionswehaverenderedsofaronthispointoflaw.ThisinterpretationofSection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIof
theLaborCodereasonablyimplementstheampleopportunitytobeheardstandardunder
Article277(b)of theLaborCodewithout unduly restricting the languageof the lawor
excessively burdening the employer. This not only respects the power vested in the
Secretary of Labor and Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay
down theguidelines for the implementationofArticle277(b).More importantly, this is
faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its
implementingrulesandregulationsshallberesolvedinfavoroflabor.In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing
requirementindismissalcases:
(a) ample opportunity to be heard means anymeaningful opportunity (verbal or
written)giventotheemployeetoanswerthechargesagainsthimandsubmit
evidenceinsupportofhisdefense,whetherinahearing,conferenceorsome
otherfair,justandreasonableway.
(b)aformalhearingorconferencebecomesmandatoryonlywhenrequestedbythe
employee inwriting or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company
ruleorpracticerequiresit,orwhensimilarcircumstancesjustifyit.
(c)theampleopportunitytobeheardstandardintheLaborCodeprevailsoverthe
hearingorconferencerequirementintheimplementingrulesandregulations.PETITIONERSWEREILLEGALLYSUSPENDEDFOR30DAYS
Anemployeemaybevalidlysuspendedbytheemployerforjustcauseprovidedby
law.Suchsuspensionshallonlybeforaperiodof30days,afterwhichtheemployeeshall
eitherbereinstatedorpaidhiswagesduringtheextendedperiod.[30]
In this case, petitioners contended that theywerenotpaidduring the two15day
extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension.Respondents failed to
adduceevidence to thecontrary.Thus,weuphold the rulingof the laborarbiteron this
point.
Where the dismissal waswithout just or authorized cause and therewas no due
process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.[31]
In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of
the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution.[32]
Fourteenyearshave transpiredfromthe timepetitionerswerewrongfullydismissed.To
orderreinstatementatthisjuncturewillnolongerserveanyprudentorpracticalpurpose.
[33]
WHEREFORE, thepetition isherebyGRANTED.Thedecisionof theCourtof
AppealsdatedJanuary29,2002inCAG.R.SPNo.50536findingthatpetitionersFelix
B.Perez andAmanteG.Doriawere not illegally dismissedbutwere not accordeddue
process andwere illegally suspended for 15 days, isSETASIDE. The decision of the
labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 110693093 is hereby
AFFIRMEDwiththeMODIFICATIONthatpetitionersshouldbepaidtheirseparation
payinlieuofreinstatement.SOORDERED.
RENATOC.CORONAAssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
REYNATOS.PUNOChiefJustice
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice
(OnOfficialLeave)MA.ALICIAM.AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice
CONCHITACARPIOMORALESAssociateJustice
DANTEO.TINGAAssociateJustice
MINITAV.CHICONAZARIOAssociateJustice
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice
ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURAAssociateJustice
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice
ARTUROD.BRIONAssociateJustice
DIOSDADOM.PERALTAAssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant toSection13,ArticleVIIIof theConstitution, Icertify that theconclusions intheabovedecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
Onofficialleave.[1]
Records,pp.7071.[2]
Id.,pp.7273.
[3]Id.,pp.7475.
[4]Id.,p.76.
[5]Id.,p.39.
[6]DecisionpennedbyCommissionerIreneoB.Bernardo,andconcurredinbyPresidingCommissionerLourdesC.Javier
andCommissionerJoaquinA.Tanodra.[7]
Decisionof theCourt ofAppeals, pennedbyAssociate Justice (now retiredAssociate Justiceof theSupremeCourt)RubenT.Reyes,andconcurred inbyAssociate JusticesRenatoC.DacudaoandMarianoC.delCastilloof theNinthDivisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
[8]Rollo,p.34.
[9]Records,p.107.
[10]CommercialMotorsCorporationv.Commissioners,etal.,G.R.No.14762,10December1990,192SCRA191,197.
[11]Santosv.NLRC,G.R.No.L76991,October28,1988,166SCRA759,765.DeLeonv.NLRC,G.R.No.52056,October
30,1980,100SCRA691,700.[12]
LABORCODE,BookVI,Title1,Art.282(c).[13]
G.R.No.L42724,9April1985,135SCRA569,578.[14]
ImperialTextileMills,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.101527,19January1993,217SCRA237,244245.[15]
StarlitePlasticIndustrialCorp.v.NLRC,G.R.No.78491,16March1989,171SCRA315,324.[16]
OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookVI,Rule1,Sec.2(a)and(c).[17]
Section2(d),RuleI,ImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCode.[18]
SeeContev.Palma,332Phil.20(1996)citingKilusangMayoUnoLaborCenterv.Garcia,Jr.,G.R.No.115381,23December1994,239SCRA386.
[19]Id.citingLinaJr.v.Cario,G.R.No.100127,23April1993,221SCRA515.
[20]Implementingrulesandregulationsmaynotenlarge,alterorrestricttheprovisionsofthelawtheyseektoimplement
theycannotengraft additional requirementsnotcontemplatedby the legislature (PilipinasKao, Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,423Phil.834[2001]).
[21] WEBSTERS THIRD NEW COLLEGIATE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED,p.74,1993edition.[22]
CafeteriaWorkersv.McElroy,367U.S.886(1961).[23]
Gonzalesv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.52789,19December1980,101SCRA752.Inthelandmarkcaseonadministrativedueprocess,AngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations(69Phil.635[1940]),this
Courtlaiddownsevencardinalprimaryrights:(1)Thefirstoftheserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludestherightoftheparty
interestedoraffectedtopresenthisowncaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.xxx(2)Not onlymust the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidencetending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunalmust consider the evidencepresented.xxx
[24]RizalCommercialBankingCorporationv.Commissionerof InternalRevenue,G.R.No.168498,16 June2006,491
SCRA213.[25]
G.R.No.166363,15August2006,498SCRA639.[26]
353Phil.419(1998).[27]
G.R.No.165995,14August2007,530SCRA132.
[28]353Phil.551(1998).
[29]SeeClevelandBoardofEducationv.Loudermill,470U.S.532(1985)(BrennanJ.,concurringinpartanddissentingin
part)citingArnettv.Kennedy,416U.S.134(1974)(MarshallJ.,dissenting).[30]
OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookV,RuleXXIII,Sec.9,asamendedbyDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentOrderNo.9(1997).
[31]Agabonv.NLRC,G.R.No.158693,17November2004,442SCRA573,610.
[32]Pandayv.NLRC,G.R.No.67664,20May1992,209SCRA122,126127.
[33]SealandService,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.90500,5October1990,190SCRA347,355.
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