ENBANCFELIXB.PEREZandG.R.No.152048AMANTEG.DORIA,

Petitioners,Present:PUNO,C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARESSANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,

versusCORONA,CARPIOMORALES,TINGA,CHICONAZARIO,

VELASCO,JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDODECASTRO,

BRIONandPERALTA,JJ.

PHILIPPINETELEGRAPHANDTELEPHONECOMPANYandJOSELUISSANTIAGO,Respondents.Promulgated:April7,2009xx

DECISION

CORONA,J.:Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent

PhilippineTelegraphandTelephoneCompany(PT&T)asshippingclerkandsupervisor,

respectively,inPT&TsShippingSection,MaterialsManagementGroup.Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the

ShippingSection,respondentsformedaspecialauditteamtoinvestigatethematter.Itwas

discovered that theShippingSection jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods

shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of

tampering,alterationandsuperimposition.On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30

daysfortheirallegedinvolvementintheanomaly.[1]

Theirsuspensionwasextendedfor

15daystwice:firstonOctober3,1993[2]

andsecondonOctober18,1993.[3]

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by

respondents:InlinewiththerecommendationoftheAVPAuditaspresentedinhisreportofOctober15,1993(copyattached)andthesubsequentfilingofcriminalchargesagainstthepartiesmentionedtherein,[Mr.FelixPerezandMr.AmanteDoriaare]herebydismissedfromthe

serviceforhavingfalsifiedcompanydocuments.[4]

(emphasissupplied)

On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and

illegaldismissal.[5]

TheyallegedthattheyweredismissedonNovember8,1993,thedate

theyreceivedtheabovementionedmemorandum.Thelaborarbiterfoundthatthe30dayextensionofpetitionerssuspensionandtheir

subsequent dismissalwere both illegal.He ordered respondents to pay petitioners their

salaries during their 30day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with

backwagesand13thmonthpay.TheNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the

labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were

accorded due process and that theywere illegally suspended for only 15 days (without

statingthereasonforthereductionoftheperiodofpetitionersillegalsuspension).[6]

PetitionersappealedtotheCourtofAppeals(CA).InitsJanuary29,2002decision,

[7] theCAaffirmed theNLRCdecision insofar as petitioners illegal suspension for 15

daysanddismissalforjustcausewereconcerned.However,itfoundthatpetitionerswere

dismissedwithoutdueprocess.PetitionersnowseekareversaloftheCAdecision.Theycontendthattherewasno

justcausefortheirdismissal,thattheywerenotaccordeddueprocessandthattheywere

illegallysuspendedfor30days.

Weruleinfavorofpetitioners.RESPONDENTSFAILEDTOPROVEJUSTCAUSEANDTOOBSERVEDUEPROCESS

TheCA,inupholdingtheNLRCsdecision,reasonedthattherewassufficientbasis

forrespondentstolosetheirconfidenceinpetitioners[8]forallegedlytamperingwiththe

shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or

request,asitwasthebasisoftheirliabilitytoacargoforwarder.[9]

Wedisagree.

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find

respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from

which the lossofconfidence resulted.[10]

Other than theirbareallegationsand the fact

thatsuchdocumentscameintopetitionershandsatsomepoint,respondentsshouldhave

providedevidenceofpetitionersfunctions,theextentoftheirduties,theprocedureinthe

handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than

petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting

petitionerstotheallegedtamperingofshippingdocuments.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to

petitionersbecauseitwasneverproventhatpetitionersalonehadcontroloforaccessto

these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial

tribunalsshouldnotrelyonlyonthestatementoftheemployerthatithaslostconfidence

initsemployee.[11]

Willfulbreachbytheemployeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorduly

authorized representative isa justcause for termination.[12]

However, inGeneralBank

andTrustCo.v.CA,[13]

wesaid:[L]ossof confidence shouldnotbe simulated. It shouldnotbeusedas a subterfuge forcauses which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not bearbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must begenuine,notamereafterthoughttojustifyanearlieractiontakeninbadfaith.

Theburdenofproofrestsontheemployertoestablishthatthedismissalisforcause

in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the

LaborCode. The employers evidencemust clearly and convincingly show the facts on

whichthelossofconfidenceintheemployeemaybefairlymadetorest.[14]

Itmustbe

adequately proven by substantial evidence.[15]

Respondents failed to discharge this

burden.Respondentsillegalactofdismissingpetitionerswasaggravatedbytheirfailureto

observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an

employee, an employermust furnish theworkerwith twowritten notices: (1) awritten

notice specifying thegrounds for termination andgiving to said employee a reasonable

opportunity to explain his side and (2) anotherwritten notice indicating that, upon due

considerationofallcircumstances,groundshavebeenestablishedtojustifytheemployer's

decisiontodismisstheemployee.[16]

Petitionerswereneitherapprisedofthechargesagainstthemnorgivenachanceto

defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served

notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of

tenure. The labor arbiter and theCA correctly found that respondents failed to comply

withthetwonoticerequirementforterminatingemployees.Petitionerslikewisecontendedthatdueprocesswasnotobservedintheabsenceof

ahearinginwhichtheycouldhaveexplainedtheirsideandrefutedtheevidenceagainst

them.Thereisnoneedforahearingorconference.Wenoteamarkeddifferenceinthe

standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its

implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must

provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the

assistanceofhisrepresentativeifhesodesires:ART.277.Miscellaneousprovisions.xxx(b)SubjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenureandtheirrighttobeprotectedagainstdismissalexceptforajustandauthorizedcauseandwithoutprejudicetotherequirementofnoticeunderArticle283of thisCode, theemployershall furnish theworker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing astatementof thecausesfor terminationandshallaffordthelatterampleopportunitytobe heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he sodesires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant toguidelinessetby theDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.Anydecision takenby theemployer shallbewithoutprejudice to the rightof theworker tocontest thevalidityorlegality of his dismissal by filing a complaintwith the regional branch of theNationalLaborRelationsCommission.Theburdenofprovingthattheterminationwasforavalidorauthorizedcauseshallrestontheemployer.(emphasissupplied)

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a

hearingandconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcernedisgiventheopportunityto

respondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebut theevidencepresentedagainsthim:

[17]

Section2.SecurityofTenure.xxx

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due

processshallbesubstantiallyobserved:ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282of

theLaborCode:(i)Awrittennoticeservedontheemployeespecifyingthegroundorgroundsfor

termination,andgivingsaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhisside.

(ii)Ahearingorconferenceduringwhich theemployeeconcerned,with the

assistanceofcounsel ifhesodesires, isgivenopportunitytorespondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.

(iii)Awrittennoticeofterminationservedontheemployee,indicatingthatupon

due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify histermination.(emphasissupplied)

Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference)mandatory in cases

involvingthedismissalofanemployee?Cantheapparentconflictbetweenthelawandits

IRRbereconciled?At the outset,we reaffirm the timehonoreddoctrine that, in case of conflict, the

law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.[18]

The authority to

promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or

regulationmustconformtoandbeconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheenablingstatute.

[19]Assuch,itcannotamendthelaweitherbyabridgingorexpandingitsscope.

[20]

Article277(b)of theLaborCodeprovides that, in casesof termination for a just

cause,anemployeemustbegivenampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimself.

Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the

wordamplewhichordinarilymeansconsiderablymorethanadequateorsufficient.[21]

In

this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as

extensiveenoughtocoveractualhearingorconference.Tothisextent,Section2(d),Rule

IoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCodeisinconformitywithArticle

277(b).Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of BookVI of the

LaborCodeshouldnotbetakentomeanthatholdinganactualhearingorconferenceisa

conditionsinequanonforcompliancewiththedueprocessrequirementinterminationof

employment.The test for the fair procedure guaranteed underArticle 277(b) cannot be

whethertherehasbeenaformalpreterminationconfrontationbetweentheemployerand

the employee. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor

similartoaformalhearing.Toconfinetheemployeesrighttobeheardtoasolitaryform

narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing

evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is

overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible

proceduresuniversallyapplicabletoeveryimaginablesituation.[22]

Thestandardforthehearingrequirement,ampleopportunity,iscouchedingeneral

languagerevealingthelegislativeintenttogivesomedegreeofflexibilityoradaptability

tomeet thepeculiarities of a given situation.To confine it to a single rigidproceeding

suchasaformalhearingwilldefeatitsspirit.

Significantly, Section 2(d),Rule I of the ImplementingRules ofBookVI of the

Labor Code itself provides that the socalled standards of due process outlined therein

shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal

hearingorconferenceisideal,itisnotanabsolute,mandatoryorexclusiveavenueofdue

process.An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as

implementedbySection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLabor

Code shouldbe interpreted inbroad strokes. It is satisfiednotonlybya formal face to

face confrontation but by anymeaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against

himandtosubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.Ahearingmeans thatapartyshouldbegivenachance toadducehisevidence to

support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the

adjudication of the controversy.[23]

To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation

alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations,

submissionsorpleadings.[24]

Therefore,whilethephraseampleopportunitytobeheard

mayinfactincludeanactualhearing,itisnotlimitedtoaformalhearingonly.Inother

words, the existence of an actual, formal trialtype hearing, although preferred, is not

absolutelynecessarytosatisfytheemployeesrighttobeheard.This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of

termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing. Thus, we

categoricallydeclaredinSkippersUnitedPacific,Inc.v.Maguad:[25]

TheLaborCodedoesnot,ofcourse,requireaformalortrialtypeproceedingbeforeanerringemployeemaybedismissed.(emphasissupplied)

InAutobusWorkersUnionv.NLRC,[26]

weruled:The twin requirementsofnotice andhearingconstitute the essential elementsof

due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard beforejudgment is rendered. In fact, there isnoviolationofdueprocesseven ifnohearingwas conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of thecontroversy.Whatisfrowneduponisthedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.

xxxxxxxxx

Aformaltrialtypehearingisnotevenessential todueprocess.It isenoughthat the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain theirrespective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence onwhich afair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases ofcomplaintslodgedbeforetheLaborArbiter.(emphasissupplied)In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development

Corporation,[27]

wehadtheoccasiontostate:

[W]ellsettledisthedictumthatthetwinrequirementsofnoticeandhearingconstitutetheessentialelementsofdueprocessinthedismissalofemployees.Itisacardinalruleinourjurisdictionthattheemployermustfurnishtheemployeewithtwowrittennoticesbeforetheterminationofemploymentcanbeeffected:(1)thefirstapprisestheemployeeoftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichhisdismissalissoughtand(2)thesecondinformstheemployeeoftheemployersdecisiontodismisshim.Therequirementofahearing,ontheotherhand,iscompliedwithaslongastherewasanopportunitytobeheard,andnotnecessarilythatanactualhearingwasconducted.

Inseparateinfractionreports,petitionerswerebothapprisedoftheparticularacts

or omissions constituting the charges against them. Theywere also required to submittheirwrittenexplanationwithin12hoursfromreceiptofthereports.Yet,neitherofthemcomplied.Hadtheyfoundthe12hourperiodtooshort,theyshouldhaverequestedforanextensionoftime.Further,noticesofterminationwerealsosenttotheminformingthemofthebasisoftheirdismissal.Infine,petitionersweregivendueprocessbeforetheyweredismissed.Even if no hearingwas conducted, the requirement of due process hadbeenmet since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy.(emphasissupplied)

Our holding inNational SemiconductorHKDistribution, Ltd. v. NLRC[28]

is of

similarimport:

Thattheinvestigationsconductedbypetitionermaynotbeconsideredformalorrecordedhearingsorinvestigationsisimmaterial.Aformalortrialtypehearingisnotatalltimesandinallinstancesessentialtodueprocess,therequirementsofwhicharesatisfiedwherethepartiesareaffordedfairandreasonableopportunitytoexplaintheirside of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the naturalsequenceofnotice,hearingandjudgment.

The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an

employeewithampleopportunitytobeheardanddefendhimselfwiththeassistanceofa

representativeorcounselinwaysotherthanaformalhearing.Theemployeecanbefully

affordedachancetorespondtothechargesagainsthim,adducehisevidenceorrebutthe

evidenceagainsthimthroughawidearrayofmethods,verbalorwritten.After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the

employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter,

memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like

relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the sworn

statementsofhiswitnesses.Forthispurpose,hemaypreparehisexplanationpersonally

orwith the assistance of a representative or counsel.Hemay also ask the employer to

provide him copy of recordsmaterial to his defense.Hiswritten explanationmay also

includearequestthataformalhearingorconferencebeheld.Insuchacase,theconduct

of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist

substantialevidentiarydisputes[29]

orwherecompanyrulesorpracticerequiresanactual

hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the

decisionswehaverenderedsofaronthispointoflaw.ThisinterpretationofSection2(d),RuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIof

theLaborCodereasonablyimplementstheampleopportunitytobeheardstandardunder

Article277(b)of theLaborCodewithout unduly restricting the languageof the lawor

excessively burdening the employer. This not only respects the power vested in the

Secretary of Labor and Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay

down theguidelines for the implementationofArticle277(b).More importantly, this is

faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its

implementingrulesandregulationsshallberesolvedinfavoroflabor.In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing

requirementindismissalcases:

(a) ample opportunity to be heard means anymeaningful opportunity (verbal or

written)giventotheemployeetoanswerthechargesagainsthimandsubmit

evidenceinsupportofhisdefense,whetherinahearing,conferenceorsome

otherfair,justandreasonableway.

(b)aformalhearingorconferencebecomesmandatoryonlywhenrequestedbythe

employee inwriting or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company

ruleorpracticerequiresit,orwhensimilarcircumstancesjustifyit.

(c)theampleopportunitytobeheardstandardintheLaborCodeprevailsoverthe

hearingorconferencerequirementintheimplementingrulesandregulations.PETITIONERSWEREILLEGALLYSUSPENDEDFOR30DAYS

Anemployeemaybevalidlysuspendedbytheemployerforjustcauseprovidedby

law.Suchsuspensionshallonlybeforaperiodof30days,afterwhichtheemployeeshall

eitherbereinstatedorpaidhiswagesduringtheextendedperiod.[30]

In this case, petitioners contended that theywerenotpaidduring the two15day

extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension.Respondents failed to

adduceevidence to thecontrary.Thus,weuphold the rulingof the laborarbiteron this

point.

Where the dismissal waswithout just or authorized cause and therewas no due

process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full

backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent

computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual

reinstatement.[31]

In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of

the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution.[32]

Fourteenyearshave transpiredfromthe timepetitionerswerewrongfullydismissed.To

orderreinstatementatthisjuncturewillnolongerserveanyprudentorpracticalpurpose.

[33]

WHEREFORE, thepetition isherebyGRANTED.Thedecisionof theCourtof

AppealsdatedJanuary29,2002inCAG.R.SPNo.50536findingthatpetitionersFelix

B.Perez andAmanteG.Doriawere not illegally dismissedbutwere not accordeddue

process andwere illegally suspended for 15 days, isSETASIDE. The decision of the

labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 110693093 is hereby

AFFIRMEDwiththeMODIFICATIONthatpetitionersshouldbepaidtheirseparation

payinlieuofreinstatement.SOORDERED.

RENATOC.CORONAAssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

REYNATOS.PUNOChiefJustice

LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING

AssociateJustice

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO

AssociateJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)MA.ALICIAM.AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

AssociateJustice

CONCHITACARPIOMORALESAssociateJustice

DANTEO.TINGAAssociateJustice

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIOAssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURAAssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRIONAssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTAAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toSection13,ArticleVIIIof theConstitution, Icertify that theconclusions intheabovedecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO

ChiefJustice

Onofficialleave.[1]

Records,pp.7071.[2]

Id.,pp.7273.

[3]Id.,pp.7475.

[4]Id.,p.76.

[5]Id.,p.39.

[6]DecisionpennedbyCommissionerIreneoB.Bernardo,andconcurredinbyPresidingCommissionerLourdesC.Javier

andCommissionerJoaquinA.Tanodra.[7]

Decisionof theCourt ofAppeals, pennedbyAssociate Justice (now retiredAssociate Justiceof theSupremeCourt)RubenT.Reyes,andconcurred inbyAssociate JusticesRenatoC.DacudaoandMarianoC.delCastilloof theNinthDivisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

[8]Rollo,p.34.

[9]Records,p.107.

[10]CommercialMotorsCorporationv.Commissioners,etal.,G.R.No.14762,10December1990,192SCRA191,197.

[11]Santosv.NLRC,G.R.No.L76991,October28,1988,166SCRA759,765.DeLeonv.NLRC,G.R.No.52056,October

30,1980,100SCRA691,700.[12]

LABORCODE,BookVI,Title1,Art.282(c).[13]

G.R.No.L42724,9April1985,135SCRA569,578.[14]

ImperialTextileMills,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.101527,19January1993,217SCRA237,244245.[15]

StarlitePlasticIndustrialCorp.v.NLRC,G.R.No.78491,16March1989,171SCRA315,324.[16]

OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookVI,Rule1,Sec.2(a)and(c).[17]

Section2(d),RuleI,ImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCode.[18]

SeeContev.Palma,332Phil.20(1996)citingKilusangMayoUnoLaborCenterv.Garcia,Jr.,G.R.No.115381,23December1994,239SCRA386.

[19]Id.citingLinaJr.v.Cario,G.R.No.100127,23April1993,221SCRA515.

[20]Implementingrulesandregulationsmaynotenlarge,alterorrestricttheprovisionsofthelawtheyseektoimplement

theycannotengraft additional requirementsnotcontemplatedby the legislature (PilipinasKao, Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,423Phil.834[2001]).

[21] WEBSTERS THIRD NEW COLLEGIATE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

UNABRIDGED,p.74,1993edition.[22]

CafeteriaWorkersv.McElroy,367U.S.886(1961).[23]

Gonzalesv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.52789,19December1980,101SCRA752.Inthelandmarkcaseonadministrativedueprocess,AngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations(69Phil.635[1940]),this

Courtlaiddownsevencardinalprimaryrights:(1)Thefirstoftheserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludestherightoftheparty

interestedoraffectedtopresenthisowncaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.xxx(2)Not onlymust the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidencetending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunalmust consider the evidencepresented.xxx

[24]RizalCommercialBankingCorporationv.Commissionerof InternalRevenue,G.R.No.168498,16 June2006,491

SCRA213.[25]

G.R.No.166363,15August2006,498SCRA639.[26]

353Phil.419(1998).[27]

G.R.No.165995,14August2007,530SCRA132.

[28]353Phil.551(1998).

[29]SeeClevelandBoardofEducationv.Loudermill,470U.S.532(1985)(BrennanJ.,concurringinpartanddissentingin

part)citingArnettv.Kennedy,416U.S.134(1974)(MarshallJ.,dissenting).[30]

OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookV,RuleXXIII,Sec.9,asamendedbyDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentOrderNo.9(1997).

[31]Agabonv.NLRC,G.R.No.158693,17November2004,442SCRA573,610.

[32]Pandayv.NLRC,G.R.No.67664,20May1992,209SCRA122,126127.

[33]SealandService,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.90500,5October1990,190SCRA347,355.