Geographies of Evasion and the Prospects for REDDRobin Biddulph (robin.biddulph@geography.gu.se)

ABSTRACT

Recent research in Cambodia focusing on property rights interventions in the form of community forestry andsystematic land titling has generated a “Geographies of Evasion” hypothesis. The suggestion here is that whenthe development industry attempts to extend rights that host governments are unwilling to enforce the resultwill not be a rejection of development industry overtures. Rather host nation elites will cooperate with thesponsors of the development industry interventions using performance indicators to create a facade of success.However, behind this facade, the interventions will be resisted by the simple expedient of ensuring that they areonly implemented in places where they will not make a substantial difference.

Much of the analysis of the Cambodia case is built on theoretical insights from African experience. The keyingredients for the Geographies of Evasion identified in Cambodia are readily found throughout the World, andcertainly in countries which are undergoing processes of deforestation. These include: Shadow Stategovernance; landscapes dichotomised into resource rich and resource poor areas; a development industry withambitions that exceed those of the host country political elite; transparent, results-based management.

In the context of REDD the Geographies of Evasion thesis suggests that a long capacity building and policy reformprocess may provide the means by which rational host governments are able over a period of years or evendecades to sponsor REDD in some places and continued deforestation in others. If the Geographies of Evasionthesis is to be believed, REDD will prove ineffective, but this ineffectiveness will be concealed and downplayedfor many years before an inevitable descent into scandal and blame.If there is a key to preventing this outcome, it lies in ceasing to promote REDD on the basis of claims that avoideddeforestation and degradation is cheap and easy relative to other forms of climate intervention. Achieving REDDwould not be cheap and it would not be easy politically or technically.

Overview

• Introduction: ”good policy” and academic critique

• Geographies of Evasion in Cambodia

• The relevance for REDD in Africa and globally

Context

• Shadow state governance (formal leadership grounded in the informal economy)

• Resource-rich/resource-poor landscape (more or less resource cursed)

”Good Policy is Unimplementable”

• Interventions need to be (over-) sold to get supported and financed;

• Resistance gets under-played,

• Difficulties get under-played, and

• Potential benefits get exaggerated

Behind the policy facade

• Smart operators get worthwhile things done (even if not exactly what was on the packet), or

• Disastrous misconceived interventions end in failure

• (Failure now may prevent success later so worth preventing)

Geographies of Evasion: Origins in Cambodia

Cambodia Case I Land Titling

• Tenure insecurity described as a national problem which is ”everywhere”

• Tenure insecure in forests, former conflict areas

• Tenure in smallholder rice landscapes rather secure

• Land titling only implemented in smallholder rice landscapes

Cambodia Case II Community Forestry

• Promoted as restoring ’traditional’ and ’historical’ forest-based livelihoods

• Those livelihoods centred around hard-wood resin-producing trees

• Community forestry only implemented in areas where the trees have already been cut

• So again, the policy solution avoids the places where the problem it addresses is found

Geography of Evasion

• Western Development industry programme does not have genuine host nation political support

• (often = Development Industry seeks to extend rights that host nation leadership are not prepared to enforce)

• Host nation channels interventions to places where those rights already exist de facto or where they do not matter

Geographies of Evasion theory explains:

• How things might go wrong

• Why things might go wrong

• How problems might be identified early

• ’might’ = patterns, tendencies not universal laws

Ingredients for a Geography of Evasion

• An ambitious rights-based international development agenda (”overreach”)

• Shadow-state governance

• A more or less dichotomized landscape (resource rich areas and resource poor areas)

• Policy facade represents host government as a progressive ’development partner’ and the landscape as fairly homogenous

Relevance to REDD

• A Western political project (climate fear) attempting to use carrot and stick to achieve change

• Rational for host nation governments to resist (support deforestation in one place and avoided deforestation in another)

• A phased approach provides a window of opportunity for a geography of evasion...

First phase of REDD

• National Dialogue

• Capacity Building

• Demonstration Activities

Perfect for a prolonged Geography of Evasion

Geography of Evasion predicts:

• Policy dialogue, capacity building etc will provide the rationale for a slow start and small scale

• Deforestation will continue in places where it is lucrative

• Pilots and demonstration activities will take place where forest is already degraded or where deforestation is not a threat

• Facade of achievement will be maintained using indicators that conceal this state of affairs

Empirical questions

• Where is deforestation occurring most rapidly? (Which countries, which parts of countries)

• Where are REDD activities taking place?

Indications thus far?

• Guyana – REDD support to a country without deforestation (0.45% baseline) (Helmers, 2010)

• Odtar Meanchey province, Cambodia- pilot activities in province with high deforestation, but in part of province with low deforestation (Bradley 2009)

The right question?

• For a geographer, ’where’ is always the right question.

• Does the ”Geographies of Evasion” hypothesis help us to ask the right questions to identify when REDD is being derailed?

• Or am I barking up the wrong tree?