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Ecosystems in the city
Workshop on Vehicular Networks and Sustainable MobilityTestbed
Alexandre Sousa ([email protected], [email protected]).
Associação Porto Digital.
ISMAI — Instituto Universitário da Maia
April 24, 2015
Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructureBudget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much aspossibleThe added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the networkThe ecosystemAPI, creative commons license, allow creating derivedcontent
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10
Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructureBudget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much aspossibleThe added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the networkThe ecosystemAPI, creative commons license, allow creating derivedcontent
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10
Porto Digital infrastructure
The needed utilities infrastructureBudget limitations: build it in layers, reuse as much aspossibleThe added-value is in the cars and trucks, not the networkThe ecosystemAPI, creative commons license, allow creating derivedcontent
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 2 / 10
If I was your boss ...
... and you were my smart teamManagement prep talk: do more with less, ...Security and privacy: know-how, budget, hubris, simplicity(a few war stories)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 3 / 10
The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)Il y a du feu dans les toilettesFault tolerance, heisenberg bugsMechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year carWhat is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, amalicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worstpossible moment and with the worst possibleconsequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10
The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)Il y a du feu dans les toilettesFault tolerance, heisenberg bugsMechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year carWhat is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, amalicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worstpossible moment and with the worst possibleconsequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10
The budget approach
Airbus A 340, 5K per line of code (25 years ago)Il y a du feu dans les toilettesFault tolerance, heisenberg bugsMechanical failure vs electronic failure, my 15 year carWhat is secure software: even worse than fault-tolerant, amalicious person is going to try to make it fail in the worstpossible moment and with the worst possibleconsequences
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 4 / 10
The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the USNATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)The city factor: Porto vs LisboaThe stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10
The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the USNATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)The city factor: Porto vs LisboaThe stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10
The know-how approach
Small smart teams accomplish a lot5 in Portugal, 50 in Denmark, 100 in the USNATO command and control (Pentaghon, Kosovo,Afghanistan, 5 people, 3 from telecom school PT army)The city factor: Porto vs LisboaThe stupidity factor (the million dollar bug)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 5 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Assumptions are the mother of all evil
Forget that an address change has security implicationsand it had to be loggedProved secure military protocol, it failed ... (randomnumber that wasn’t)Nothing is secure? There’s the one time padsTwo way authentication, two channels ... SMS + web butsmartphone (my obsolete OS phone)Malware in the firmware (1974 airforce report, KenThompson in ACM Turing Award 84 lecture)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 6 / 10
Intuition traps
Beware of your intuitionA rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a catpass below it?SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attackThe visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10
Intuition traps
Beware of your intuitionA rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a catpass below it?SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attackThe visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10
Intuition traps
Beware of your intuitionA rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a catpass below it?SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attackThe visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10
Intuition traps
Beware of your intuitionA rope around the spherical earth, 1 meter slack, can a catpass below it?SSL, public-key cryptography, the birthday attackThe visual microphone
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 7 / 10
Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 MThe Regulations problem, why are they important?The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in PortoThe fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10
Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 MThe Regulations problem, why are they important?The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in PortoThe fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10
Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 MThe Regulations problem, why are they important?The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in PortoThe fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10
Simplicity
Low tech solutions: children’s labor, how to fire a person,75 euros 25 cents vs 8.35 MThe Regulations problem, why are they important?The million dollar bug: one sentence ... and trusting others,... it could have destroyed the work of everyone in PortoThe fraud MBA
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 8 / 10
Solution for the security of Regulations
Scientific council opposition, use children again ...Literate programmingVisual comparison (LATEX dot level precision)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 9 / 10
Solution for the security of Regulations
Scientific council opposition, use children again ...Literate programmingVisual comparison (LATEX dot level precision)
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 9 / 10
Conclusion
Hubris, don’t be too cockyTrust no one, know a little about the related fieldsDefense in depthAnalogical solutions combined with digital solutionsSimplicityThink out of the box
Vehicular Net Workshop Ecosystems in the city 10 / 10
