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WiFiHop - Mitigating the Evil Twin Attack through Multi-hop Detection D. Mónica, C. Ribeiro INESC-ID / IST

WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

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Page 1: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

WiFiHop - Mitigating the Evil Twin

Attack through Multi-hop

Detection

D. Mónica, C. RibeiroINESC-ID / IST

Page 2: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

The Evil Twin Attack

Page 3: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

The Evil Twin Attack

A malicious AP is configured to mimic a legitimate AP, enabling attackers to eavesdrop all wireless communications done by the victims.

Page 4: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

The Evil Twin Attack

A malicious AP is configured to mimic a legitimate AP, enabling attackers to eavesdrop all wireless communications done by the victims.

Page 5: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Existing Techniques

Detection by the network

Manual administrator detection (Netstumbler)

AirDefense

RIPPS

AirDefense

Yin et al. 2007

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Existing Techniques

Client-side detection

ETSniffer

Page 7: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Existing Techniques

Client-side detection

ETSniffer

WifiHop

Page 8: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Objectives

Provide a convinient and usable technique to detect Evil Twin Attacks

Ensuring:

User-sided operation

Operation not detectable by the attacker

Capable of operation in encrypted networks

Non-disruptive operation

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WiFiHop

Page 10: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Approach

Detect a multi-hop setting between the user’s computer and the connection to the internet.

Assumes that the rogue AP will relay traffic to the internet using the original, legitimate AP

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Solution Overview

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Solution Overview

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Solution Overview

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WiFiHop

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Open WiFiHop

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Covert WiFiHop

Encrypted link between Malicious and Legitimate AP

We cannot access payloads of the exchanged packets

Encrypted

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Covert WiFiHop

We modify our scheme not to require payloads

Instead, we measure on the detection of packet lengths

WEP/WPA have deterministic, predictable packet lenghts

We create an watermark using a sequence of packets with pre-determined lengths

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Covert WiFiHop

Analysis of the probability of random generation of the watermark

We looked at the SIGCOMM trace

Total of 4 day sequence of packets

Got the least observed packet length given different analysis periods

Measured the correlations between successive lengths

Measured the amount of extraneous packets inserted amongst the watermark sequence packets

Page 19: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Covert WiFiHop

Page 20: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Covert WiFiHop

Page 21: WiFiHop - mitigating the Evil twin attack through multi-hop detection

Covert WiFiHop

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Covert WiFiHop

k-state finite state machine

Progresses whenever a packet with the proper length is detected

Ignores extraenous packets (machine state never regresses)

Due to packet loss, both the client and the server repeat the requests several times

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Testing network

Profile

DL Rate(Mbps)

ULRate (Mbps)

Low 2 1

Medium

8 5

High 16 12

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Summary

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Final Remarks

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Thank You

[email protected]