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Router and Routing Protocol Attacks FIST Conference 2003 - September Edition FIST Conference 2003 - September Edition Balwant Rathore, CISSP Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected] [email protected] Moderator, PenTest Group Moderator, PenTest Group http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PenTest http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PenTest Consultant, Mahindra British Telecom Ltd. Consultant, Mahindra British Telecom Ltd.

Switch and Router Security Testing

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Page 1: Switch and Router Security Testing

Router and Routing Protocol Attacks

FIST Conference 2003 - September EditionFIST Conference 2003 - September Edition

Balwant Rathore, CISSPBalwant Rathore, CISSP

[email protected]@mahindrabt.com

Moderator, PenTest GroupModerator, PenTest Group

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PenTesthttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/PenTest

Consultant, Mahindra British Telecom Ltd.Consultant, Mahindra British Telecom Ltd.

Page 2: Switch and Router Security Testing

2© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Router and Routing Protocol Attacks

Overview of Routing Protocols

Router Security Common Issues

Routing Protocol Attacks Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) Attacks

Autonomous System Scanning

Routing Information Protocol (RIP) AttackS

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Attacks

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) AttackS

Page 3: Switch and Router Security Testing

3© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Introduction

What is routing Protocol Protocols that are used by routers

To communicate with each other To determine appropriate path over which data

can be transmitted To make dynamic adjustment to its conditions

Many improvements on host security

Core technology still uses unauthenticated services

Page 4: Switch and Router Security Testing

4© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Router security common issues

Miss-configurations

IP Packet Handling bugs

SNMP communitystring

Weak password or weak password encryption

DoS because of malformed packets

Above mentioned attacks are commonly known

If attacked with routing protocol impact is very high

Any NIDS can detect most of them

Page 5: Switch and Router Security Testing

5© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Safeguard

Up to date patching

Strong SNMP communitystring

Strong encryption

Proper ingress/egress implementation

Proper management implementation Encrypted Sessions

Strong Passwords

Run on Non standard ports

Route Filtering

Page 6: Switch and Router Security Testing

6© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Routing Protocol Attacks

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) Attacks

Autonomous System Scanning

Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Attack

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Attacks

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Attacks

Page 7: Switch and Router Security Testing

7© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) overview

Layer 2 Protocol

Used to find out Cisco devices

Protocol is not routed

Sent periodically to multicast address [01:00:0C:CC:CC:CC]

So limited only for local segment

The default period is 60 second

Implemented in every Cisco device

Page 8: Switch and Router Security Testing

8© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) overview

Contain information about sending router/s Host Name Connected Port Running Platform Version show cdp neighbors [type number] [detail]

Page 10: Switch and Router Security Testing

10© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) Attack

IRPAS CDP

Operates in two modes: Flood and Spoof

Flood mode Send garbase cdp messages

IOS 11.1.(1) was rebooted after sending long device ID

Later version store the messages and fill the memory

While debugging these message most IOS will reboot

Page 11: Switch and Router Security Testing

11© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) Attack

Smart way to perform this attack Run two processes of IRPAS CDP Send 1480 kb message to fill up the major part of memory Send another message to fill length of 10 octet

Spoof mode

Targeted for social engineering or to confuse administrator

You can give proof of concept

Page 12: Switch and Router Security Testing

12© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Safeguards

Disable CDP if not required no cdp run: disables CDP globally

no cdp enable: disables CDP on an interface (interface command)

Highly recommended to disable at Border Routers/Switches etc…

Page 13: Switch and Router Security Testing

13© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Autonomous System Scanning

Used to find AS of routers

IRPAS’s ASS supports IRDP, IGRP, EIGRP, RIPv1, RIPv2, CDP, HSRP and OSPF

Operates in Active and Passive mode Passive mode: Listens to routing protocol packets

Active mode: Discover routers asking for information

You can scan range of AS$

Spoofed IP can be used

Page 14: Switch and Router Security Testing

14© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Routing Information Protocol (RIP v1) Overview

Routing Decisions are based on number of hops

Works only within a AS

Supports only 15 hops

Not good for large networks

RIP v1 communicates only it’s own information

RIP v1 has no authentication.

Can’t carry subnet mask so applies default subnet mask.

Page 15: Switch and Router Security Testing

15© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Routing Information Protocol (RIP v2) Overview

It can communicate other router information

RIP v2 supports authentication upto 16 char password

It can carry subnet information.

Doors are open to attackers by providing authentication in clear text.

Page 16: Switch and Router Security Testing

16© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Attack

Identify RIP Router by performing a Scan nmap –v –sU –p 520

Determine Routing Table If you are on same physical segment, sniff it

If remote: rprobe + sniff

Add a route using srip to redirect traffic to your system

Now you knows where to send it.

Page 17: Switch and Router Security Testing

17© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Safeguards

Disable RIP use OSPF, security is always better

Restrict TCP/UDP 520 packets at border router

Page 18: Switch and Router Security Testing

18© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Attack

OSPF is a Dynamic Link State Routing Protocol

Keeps map of entire network and choose shortest path

Update neighbors using LSAs messages

Hello packets are generated every 10 second and sent to 224.0.0.5

Uses protocol type 89

Page 19: Switch and Router Security Testing

19© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Attack

Identify target: scan for proto 89

JiNao team has identified four ospf attacks

http://152.45.4.41/projects/JiNao/JiNao.html Max Age attack

Sequence++ attack

Max Sequence attack

Bogus LSA attack

Page 20: Switch and Router Security Testing

20© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Attack

nemiss-ospf can be used to perform ospf attacks Tuff to use coz of the complexity of OSPF

Good for skilled N/W admin

Some time doesn’t work properly

Page 21: Switch and Router Security Testing

21© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Safeguards

Do not use Dynamic Routing on hosts wherever not required

Implement MD5 authentication You need to deal with key expiration, changeover and

coordination across routers

Page 22: Switch and Router Security Testing

22© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) overview

Allows interdomain routing between two ASs

Guarantees the loop-free exchange

Only routing protocol which works on TCP (179)

Routing information is exchanged after connection establishment.

Page 23: Switch and Router Security Testing

23© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Attacks

Large network backbone gives special attention on it’s security

Medium size networks are easier target

Packet Injection Vulnerabilities are specially dangerous coz flapping penalties

Page 24: Switch and Router Security Testing

24© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Attacks

Identify BGP Router

It has many problem same as TCP SYN Flood

Sequence number prediction

DOS

Possible advertisement of bad routes

Page 25: Switch and Router Security Testing

25© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Further Readings

Router Exploits www.antionline.com

http://anticode.antionline.com/download.php?dcategory=router-exploits&sortby=

http://www.packetninja.net/.

http://www.phenoelit.de/irpas/

RIP Spoofing http://www.technotronic.com/horizon/ripar.txt.

Page 26: Switch and Router Security Testing

26© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Questions ?

Page 27: Switch and Router Security Testing

27© Balwant Rathore, CISSP [email protected]

Thank you for you time !