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Block 2
Individual Behavior
To describe the model of rational action
To understand some empirical findings that modify the theory: social preferences
Aim of Block 2
Rational .
Choice .
Theory
LECTURE 4
To understand what rational action implies
To understand the design of experimental studies in social sciences
Aim Lecture 4
Up Until NowSocial Problems are to be explained scientifically
Explanations should consider the link between individual and aggregate behavior
A theory of action is necessary
* We will use Rational Choice Theory for this purpose *
Central AssumptionRational Choice Theory
Decision-makers have logically consistent goals (whatever they are), and, given these goals, choose the best available option.
Rational ChoiceThe Model
AIM:
To explain the decisions of individuals and the individual, and, in particular, the social consequences of those decisions.
Core ElementsRational Choice Model
PreferencesConstraints
Beliefs
OptimalDecision
Outcome(Prediction):Equilibrium
Decision Theory
Social Interactions
Choice Depends On
How individuals rank the available alternatives according to their subjective tastes
Preferences:
In which stock you invest will probably depend on your expectations about the future earnings potential of that stock
Beliefs:
The set of alternatives that are available to an individual (i.e., Ferrari vs Ford)
Constraints:
Utility Maximization
Choose a feasible option that best satisfies the individual’s preferences
Individuals
Conditions on Preferences
An individual can compare all relevant alternatives and rank them
1. Complete
If you prefer A over B, and B over C, then you should prefer A over C
2. Transitive
The relative attractiveness of two options does not depend on other options available to the decision-maker
3. Independent of irrelevant alternatives
Sociology
Social outcomes of the interaction of individuals
Interested in:
Social outcomes from the Equilibrium perspective
Equilibrium Analysis
EconomicsBiologyNon-Life related sciences
Common to other fields
What is it?
It is a situation in which several things that have been interacting, adjusting to each other and to each other’s adjustment, are at last adjusted, in balance, at rest
(Schelling, Micromotives & Macrobehavior)
Equilibrium:
Examples Equilibrium
If prices from place to place do not differ more than transport costs between those places
Market for gasoline:
If, considering where everybody else is sitting, nobody is motivated to move to another seat
The seating pattern
The selfish assumption
Decision-makers are SELF-REGARDING
A common assumption in RCT is that:
(+) TRACTABILITY IN MODELING
Exact predictions, which can be confronted with appropriate data, that might refute the selfishness assumption
Experiments
Is it violated?
It seems to be violated by the fact that many people vote, even in anonymous situations, take part in collective actions, often manage not to overuse common resources, care for the environment, mostly do not evade taxes on a
large scale, donate, and so forth...
The selfish assumption
Don’t discard it yet!
Many factors might give even selfish individuals an incentive to behave pro-socially,
although they are not so motivated.
In reality
Repeated interactions
This is widely studied
*But first a practical*
In laboratory experiments
Practical 3
In the rational choice theory block we will participate in various canonical experiments
Lecture 4
Vernon SmithNobel Prize 2002
(shared with Kahneman)
Demand &
Supply
Experimental Studies
Social Sciences
in
We will cover
Experimental EconomicsWhat are experimental studies in Soc. Sc.
Example of how to coduct an experiment
Coherent ArbitrarinessThe experimental method
Procedural and design issues
What’s Experimental Economics?
Data are collected in a controlled enviornment
Discipline in which
becoming experimental sciences like physics or biology
Social Sciences
Like theoryrunning experiments is an established method to explain and/or describe social activity
Experimental MethodAdvantages of the experiments
ControlInstitutions (i.e., voting rules, communication, etc)Incentives (payoffs) - not always complete control (i.e., altruism)Randomization - avoids some self-selecting problems
ReplicationCheck for robustness, experimental effects, etcGives an incentive to do it rightMake available: data, instructions, program, and procedures
How to conduct an experiment
Example“Coherent Aribitrariness”
Dan Ariely, George Lowestein, Drazen Frelec
Are preferences stable or are they affected by irrelevant information?
How do people evaluate the value of a good?
Do we have preferences over goods we have not consumed?
Are preferences completely random?
Structure ExperimentResearch Question
Design
Treatment Variables
Session.
.
.
Ordinary GoodsValuing ordinary goods
Collection of sessions to evaluate a research question
Are preferences stable or are they affected by irrelevant information?
Are preferences completely random?
Description of the task performed by subjects
Ask subjects if they want to buy the good for a price equal to a random anchor
Random anchor: Last two digits of their Social Security Number (SSN)
Experiment:
Design:
Laboratory Experiments
They create decision-dependent financial incentives
To measurePeople’s behavior in situations in which true opportunity cost for their decisions exists, and are known by the researcher
Collection of sessions to evaluate a research question
Ordinary Goods
Description of the task performed by subjects
Ask subjects if they want to buy the good for a price equal to a random anchor
Random anchor: Last 2 digits of their Social Security Number (SSN)
Previous slideResearch Question:
Design:
Give monetary value to 4 goods (market value around $70)
Elicit their willingness to pay (WTP) for the good
Ordinary Goods
Environment/parameters of interest varied by the experimenter
High, middle, low anchors
Treatment Variables:
Between-subjects variations: different subjects get different parametersavoids “contamination” between treatments
+
Different qualities of similar goods+Within-subjects variations: same subjects get different parameters
Control for individual characteristicsMust control for sequence effects (i.e., due to learning)
Session: Group of subjects doing the experiment at the same timeOne session with 55 students
Ordinary Goods
Subjects with high SSNs pay more
Arbitrariness
Coherence:Subjects pay more for better goods
Cordless trackball < Cordless keyboardAverage wine < Rare wine
Last digits SSN
CordlessTrackball
CordlessKeyboard
AverageWine
RareWine
01-20 $8.64 $16.09 $8.64 $11.73
41-60 $13.45 $29.27 $12.55 $18.09
81-100 $26.18 $55.64 $27.91 $37.55
Novel Goods
Subjects listen to annoying sounds for 30 seconds Hypothetical question asking whether they are willing to listed
to the sound for 300 seconds for a payment equal to the anchor Anchor: First 3 digits of their SSN Elicit their willingness to accept (WTA) “X” seconds of the
sound
Research Question:
Design:
How do we form preferences of goods we have not consumed?Is there a stable valuation of hedonic experiences (pleasure or pain)?
Ascending x=100, 300, 600Descending x=600, 300, 100
Novel Goods
High, middle, low values of “X”
Treatment Variables:
Between-subjects treatment variables:
+
Ascending or descending sequences of “X”+
Within-subjects treatment variables:
Session:One session with 90 students
High and low anchors (above or below the median)+
Novel Goods
Subjects willingness to accept is lower for low anchors
Arbitrariness
Coherence:Willingness to accept increases with duration
but signiécant interaction between anchor and duration[F(2,176) 5 4.17, p 5 0.017].
If subjects have little idea about how to price the soundsinitially, and hence rely on the random anchor in coming up with
TABLE II
The eventMeanrank
1 Missing your bus by a few seconds 4.32 Experiencing 300 seconds of the same sound you experienced 5.13 Discovering you purchased a spoiled carton of milk 5.24 Forgetting to return a video and having to pay a éne 5.45 Experiencing a blackout for an hour 5.86 Having a blood test 6.07 Having your ice cream fall on the èoor 6.08 Having to wait 30 minutes in line for your favorite restaurant 6.29 Going to a movie theater and having to watch it from the second row 6.7
10 Losing your phone bill and having to call to get another copy 7.311 Running out of toothpaste at night 8.1
The different events that subjects were asked to order-rank in terms of their annoyance, at the end ofExperiment 3. The items are ordered by their overall mean ranked annoyance from the most annoying (lowernumbers) to the least annoying (high numbers).
FIGURE IIIMean WTA (in Dollars) for the Three Annoying Sounds
The data are plotted separately for subjects whose three-digit anchor was belowthe median (low anchor) and above the median (high anchor). Error bars are basedon standard errors.
86 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Coherence Arbitrariness
Valuations are highly sensitive to arbitrary anchor values
Summary
For all goods?
After an initial valuation, choices are coherent
Initial choices exert a large effect on subsequent choices
Back to experimental design
Partners: always play with same group+
More Jargon
Matching Procedures: way of grouping subjects in repeated games
Strangers: randomly rematched before playing each game+Absolute Strangers: Subjects do not play with the same subject more than once
+
Incentive Compatible:Monetary incentives are aligned with the variable of interest (it doesn’t pay to lie)
The Experimental Method
Theory testing/selection+
Goals for an experiment
Search for empirical regularities+
Advice policy makers+
The Experimental Method
Lack of realism+
Some objections:
Representativeness of subjects+
Can lower costs+
Deception
Easier to study rare situations (Milgram-authority obedience)+
Advantages
Easier to design experiments+
Lost of control of+Disadvantages
Subjects don’t believe the instructionsSubjects try to outguess the experimenter
Experimental Method
Checklist Rational actors have preferences that allow them to
choose best
RCT makes predictions that can be tested experimentally
Experimental studies in social sciences have a specific theory-based structure
Questions?