Philippine Solution to the South China Sea Problem: More Problems, Less Solutions?

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PHILIPPINE SOLUTION TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA PROBLEM: MORE PROBLEMS, LESS SOLUTIONS? Rommel C. Banlaoi Paper presented at the International Conference on “Security Environment of the Seas in East Asia: From the East and South China Seas - Power Shift and Response” organized by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), The Nippon Foundation and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Marina Mandarin Hotel, Singapore 28-29 February 2012

INTRODUCTION

To provide an overarching solution to the territorial problem in the South China Sea, the Philippine government launched the idea of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC). Planned to be discussed at the 19th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 6th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia on 17-‐19 November 2011, the idea failed to get into the conference table because of China’s vehement rejection.

Though Vietnam endorsed the idea of ZoPFFC, China argued that the Summits were not the proper forums to discuss the South China Sea issue.1 Even Malaysia said that the Philippine proposal would "only complicate the matter further".2 Cambodia, the next ASEAN Summit Chair and known to be close with China, stressed that while it was not against the idea, "the problem is how to avoid duplication".3 Though other members of ASEAN and EAS chose to be silent on the issue after China made its strong point, the United States supported the Philippine initiative to promote regional stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.4

This paper describes the current security situation in the South China Sea focusing on major incidents occurring in 2011 to the present.5 This paper also presents the “Philippine solution” to the South China Sea problem, examines the merits of this solution, and describes the limitations of Philippine proposal. This paper concludes with a policy recommendation to manage, if not to totally resolve, the current problem in the South China.

CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The year 2011 saw the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea prompting Robert D. Kaplan to describe the South China Sea as “the future of conflict”.6 Increasing assertiveness of claimants manifested through resolute diplomacy, naval capability development, and increased unilateral patrols and surveillance ship activities in disputed waters is the main source of increased

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security tensions. If security tensions continue, the South China Sea will indeed be “ripe for rivalry”.7

Resolute Diplomacy in the Spratlys. All claimants have become more resolute in their foreign policy positions in the South China Sea. They all claim that the South China Sea is part of their sovereignty guaranteed by international laws. Claimants use all possible diplomatic means to assert their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. But clash of sovereignties makes the resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea very difficult.8 It is even argued that the South China Sea disputes will not be resolved in the foreseeable future if sovereignty issues will be continuously raised.9

Using various diplomatic channels, China strongly reiterates its “indisputable sovereignty” of all the waters and features in the South China Sea. In its latest Defense White Paper released in March 2011, China renews its commitment to defend its “vast territories and territorial seas.”10

Taiwan has identical sovereignty claim with China. In August 2011, the Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official statement asserting that their claim in the South China Sea is non-‐negotiable. Taiwan re-‐affirmed that all features in the South China Sea “without a doubt fall under the sovereignty of the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan).”11

The Philippines asserted its sovereignty claim when the Philippine Mission to the United Nations submitted a Note Verbale on 5 April 2011 restating the Philippines’ claim to sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). President Benigno Simeon Aquino III even ordered in June 2011 the use of “West Philippine Sea” (WPS) to refer to its claimed waters in the Spratlys, particularly around the KIG. The Philippines also hosted the Manila Conference on the South China Sea on 5-‐6 July 2011 in the attempt of the Philippine government to internationalize the South China Sea Disputes.

In Vietnam, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung also re-‐affirmed on 9 June 2011 its “incontestable sovereignty” in the South China Sea. The Prime Minister exclaimed, “We are ready to sacrifice everything to protect our homeland, our sea, and our island sovereignty.”12 To raise Vietnam’s international profile on the South China Sea issue, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam organized in Hanoi on 26 April 2011 the Second National Conference on South China Sea with the title “The Sovereignty Disputes in the South China Sea: History, Geopolitics and International Law”.

Malaysia’s claim to sovereignty in the Spratly is based on the continental reef principle outlined by UNCLOS. During the ASEAN Bali Summit in November 2011, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the need to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and to eventually adopt the regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

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Brunei does not occupy any feature in the Spratlys. But in January 2011, the Sultanate of Brunei re-‐asserted its position that the Louisa Reef being claimed by Malaysia is part of Brunei’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Naval Capability Development. All claimants in the South China Sea strongly uphold the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. But all claimants are also developing and enhancing their naval capabilities to assert their respective claims.

Among the claimants, China’s naval capability development is the most controversial and the much talked about. In August 2011, China’s first aircraft carrier, Varyag, started its sea trial and navigated the waters near the disputed South China Sea. China also started in 2011 the construction of its indigenous aircraft carrier to be finished in 2015.13 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy also deployed in 2011 some of its 60 new HOUBEI-‐class (Type 022) wave-‐piercing catamaran hull missile patrol boats in its coastal waters near the South China Sea.14 The PLA Navy has also expanded in 2011 its force of nuclear-‐powered attack submarines (SSN). China’s two second-‐generation SHANG-‐class (Type 093) SSNs started its operations in 2011 and it has been reported that as many as five third-‐generation Type 095 SSNs will be added in the coming years.15

In Vietnam, the Defense Ministry confirmed in August 2011 that the country would get its six Kilo Class submarines from Russia “within six years.”16 On 7 December 2011, the Rosoboronexport and the Zelenodolsk Gorky Plant finished the shipping of Vietnam’s first two Gepard Class corvettes and have just signed a contract for additional two units.17 But unlike the first two corvettes, which are armed with surface attack weapons, the additional two corvettes will concentrate on anti-‐submarine warfare.18 Vietnam also received on 5 March 2011 its First Gepard class frigate from Russia, naming it the Dinh Tien Hoang, in honor of the first Vietnamese emperor.

In June 2011, the Philippines and the U.S. navies held their 11-‐day Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Train (CARAT) in the Sulu Sea, a water less than 100 nautical miles away from the South China Sea. On 17 August 2011, the Philippine Navy (PN) received the delivery of second-‐hand Hamilton Class Cutter (named BRP Gregorio del Pilar) from the United States. The PN announced that it planned to acquire eight more of this kind “within five years” to patrol its vast maritime waters.19 President Aquino III even announced on 23 August 2011 his dream of acquiring a submarine.20 In October 2011, the Philippine Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine Corps held their Amphibious Landing Exercise (Phiblex) in the waters West of Palawan, a maritime area close to the South China Sea.

The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), for its part, announced in September 2011 the deployment of its Scorpene Class submarines in Sabah, an island very close to the Spratlys.21 The RMN also held its annual Operation Sea Training Exercise (OSTEX) on 15 July 2011 in the East Malaysian portion of the South China Sea, close to the disputed Spratly Islands.22

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Meanwhile, Taiwan announced in October 2011 its willingness to deploy missiles in Itu Aba Island to assert its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea. The Taiwan Navy has four Kidd class destroyers, eight Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, eight Knox class frigates, six La Fayette class frigates, two Zwaardvis class submarines and two older Tench class submarines.23

Finally, Brunei, though the most benign and low profile among the claimants, also joined the region in naval development. In January 2011, the Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) received two new Darussalam class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) from Germany.24 In November 2011, the RBN commissioned a new fast interceptor boat (FIB 25-‐012) called KDB Mustaed.25 The RBN also has in its Muara Naval Base four Itjihad Class corvettes, two Serasa Class Amphibious Warfare Craft (LCM), three Bendeharu Class patrol boats, personnel launchers and patrol boats among others.26

Increased Unilateral Patrols and Surveillance Ship Activities in the South China Sea. In an attempt to protect their territorial waters and assert their sovereignty in their claimed features in the South China Sea, claimants increased their maritime patrols and enhanced their surveillance ship activities in the disputed area in 2011. These maritime patrols and surveillance ship activities led to some serious events that raised security tensions in the South China Sea.

One major event was the 26 May 2011 Cable Cutting Incident involving three Chinese surveillance ships and Vietnamese state-‐owned Binh Minh 02 seismic survey ship. Reports said that the China Maritime Surveillance Ship 84, escorted by two other ships, cut a cable towing seismic monitoring equipment belonging to Binh Minh 02, which at that time was conducting drilling and seismic survey activities in an oil-‐rich area called Block 48. The Chinese government argued that the three Chinese ships were just conducting their “maritime law enforcement activities” in their “jurisdictional area” where Vietnam ship was “illegally operating”.27 But the Vietnamese government protested that the Binh Minh 02 was operating in Vietnam’s continental shelf and was not a disputed area.

Another Cable Cutting Incident occurred on 9 June 2011 involving Chinese fishing vessel Number 62226 and PetroVietnam’s Viking 2 seismic survey ship. The Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs narrated:

At 6 a.m. on 9th June 2011, when the Viking 2 vessel, chartered by PetroVietnam (PVN), was conducting seismic explosion survey at lot 136/03: 6o47,5’ North – 109o17,5’ East in the continental shelf of Vietnam, the fishing boats from China No. 62226 supported by two Chinese fishing enforcement vessels No. 311 and 303 traveled the Viking vessel at the front and then turned direction and accelerated.

Despite the warning flare of the Vietnamese side, the fishing boat No. 62226 intentionally ran into the exploration cable of the Viking 2 vessel and the specialized cable-‐cutting device of the fishing

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boat No. 62226 got trapped into the cable net of the Viking 2 vessel, making the Viking 2 vessel not operate normally.28

But the Chinese government explained that the cable cutting took place when Vietnamese ships chased Chinese fishing boats in the waters near the Vanguard Bank (Wan An). While moving away, the Chinese fishing boat No. 62226 reached the cable of Viking 2. In order to escape Vietnam’s hot pursuit, the Chinese fishermen cut the cable. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry, “The Vietnamese ship put the lives and safety of the Chinese fishermen in serious danger.”29

Aside from Vietnam-‐China cable cutting incidents in the South China Sea, the Philippines and China also got into several incidents in 2011 that raised the security tensions in the Spratlys. These incidents were the following:

• 25 February 2011. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reported that the Chinese Jianhu V Class missile frigate Number 560 fired three shots at three Filipino fishing vessels (Jaime DLS, Mama Lydia DLS and Maricris 12) operating the waters near the Quirino (Jackson) Atoll. The Atoll is only 140 nautical miles west of Palawan Island. But the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines denied the firing incidents.30

• 2 March 2011: Two Chinese maritime patrol vessels (Number 71 and Number 75) threatened to ram MV Veritas Voyager, an energy research vessel of Forum Energy commissioned by the Philippine government. The research vessel was conducting a seismic survey in the Reed Bank, just 85 nautical miles north of Palawan Island. The MV Veritas Voyager called for help prompting the AFP to send two units of OV10 jets to the Reed Bank to look into the incident. But the Chinese government said that Patrol Vessels 71 and 75 were just doing their jobs.31

• 6 May 2011. The AFP reported a sighting of a Chinese maritime research vessel in Abad Santos (Bombay) Shoal. This shoal, which surrounds a lagoon, is still unoccupied but is under the control of the Philippines. Though the Chinese government denied the incident, it stressed that there was nothing wrong for Chinese vessels to navigate in Chinese territorial waters.

• 19 May 2011: Two unidentified fighter jets, alleged to be Chinese, are sighted near Palawan Island. The AFP reported that these two fighter jets, believed to be MIG-‐29, harassed an Air Force OV-‐10 “Bronco” while patrolling the Philippines territory in Palawan.32 The Chinese Embassy in Manila denied the incident.

• 21 May 2011. The AFP reported another sighting of Chinese Maritime Patrol Vessel 75 navigating near Southern Bank together with Salvage Research Ship 707.

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• 24 May 2011: While Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie was enjoying his “goodwill” visit to the Philippines on May 21-‐25 to “improve” Philippines-‐China relations, the Philippine military discovered in the same period some Chinese ships unloading construction materials near the unoccupied, but still Philippine controlled, Amy Douglas Bank.33 Based on the report of the Philippine military, China has erected an undetermined number of posts, and placed a buoy near the breaker of the Amy Douglas Bank. The AFP reported that Filipino fishermen saw a Chinese Marine Surveillance Vessel aided by ships of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy laying steel posts and a buoy in the Iroquois Reef Amy Douglas Bank, 100 nautical miles off Palawan. The AFP considered the presence of PLA Navy ships in the waters of Amy Douglas Bank as an incursion. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) brought this incident to the attention of the Chinese Embassy in Manila. But the Chinese Embassy denied any incursion of Chinese ships and argued that the ship sighted was just a Chinese Marine Research Vessel “conducting normal maritime research activities in the South China Sea”.34

• 6 June 2011. The Naval Forces West of the Philippine Navy based in Palawan, reported that its naval troops dismantled a foreign marker, suspected to be Chinese, that was erected in the Boxall Reef, 105 nautical miles from mainland Palawan and only 20 nautical miles from Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal).35 The Chinese Embassy in Manila denied Chinese ownership of the marker. But China asserted that the Boxall Reef belonged to China arguing that the reef was very close to Mischief Reef.

• 18 October 2011. The Philippine Navy Patrol Ship 74 collided with a Chinese fishing vessel that was towing 25 smaller boats in the contested Spratlys waters near the Reed Bank. The Philippine Navy said that the collision was an “accident” and “not a hostile act.” China justified Chinese fishing activities near the Reed Bank and claimed that the actions of the Philippines had harmed the “lawful right and interests of fishermen.”36

• 11-‐12 December 2011. The AFP reported the sightings of two Chinese vessels and a navy ship intruding the waters of Escoda (Sabina) Shoal, 70 nautical miles off Palawan. The DFA conveyed its “serious concerns” to the Chinese embassy in Manila. But the Chinese embassy replied that it saw nothing wrong with the passage of three Chinese vessels and insisted that the Escoda Shoal “is within China’s territorial waters”.37

PHILIPPINE SOLUTION TO THE SPRATLY PROBLEM

Amidst rising security tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) or WPS, the Philippine government proposed the idea of ZoPFFC. It recommends the adoption of a regional mechanism that aims to separate disputed and non-‐disputed areas in

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the SCS pursuant to applicable international laws, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

The Philippine government further explains the idea of ZoPFFC in its official paper entitled, “Philippine Paper on ASEAN-‐CHINA Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C) in the WPS/SCS”. This paper identifies what the Philippine government calls as “10 ways to ZoPFFC”, to wit:

1. Not the whole of the WPS (SCS) is disputed;

2. The area of dispute in the WPS (SCS) is specific, determinable and measurable;

3. The area of dispute can be determined and measured by clarifying the

nature of, and distinction between “territorial disputes” and “maritime claims” in the WPS (SCS);

4. The nature of and distinction between “territorial disputes” and “maritime claims” in the WPS (SCS) can be clarified by: first, recognizing the distinction between geological features (i.e. islands, rocks, low-‐tide elevations) and waters (including continental shelf); and second, by applying the rules governing each of these elements in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

5. The dispute in the WPS (SCS) is principally on the relevant features (i.e., islands, rocks, and low-‐tide elevations). If ever there is a dispute on the water, this is principally caused by the dispute on the features. Under the principle of “la terre domine la mer”, or “the land dominates the sea,” he who owns the land also owns the sea around it. Therefore, if the owner of the land is disputed, then the sea around it could also be assumed as disputed;

6. However, the extent of adjacent waters projected from the island is limited, finite, determinable, definite, and measurable under UNCLOS (1'.e., Article 121, Regime of Islands);

7. Once the extent of adjacent waters is determined and measured in accordance with international law, specifically UNCLOS, then the extent of dispute both on the relevant features [“territorial dispute”] and maritime zones [“maritime claims dispute”] generated from the said features, can already be determined;

8. Once the extent or limit of the disputed area (relevant features + adjacent waters) is determined; the same can now be segregated from the rest of the non-‐disputed waters of the WPS (SCS);

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9. The disputed area (relevant features + adjacent waters) can be segregated from non-‐disputed waters (and continental shelf) of WPS (SCS) by enclaving the said disputed area. Enclaving will literally operationalize the “shelving of territorial disputes” and pave the way for effective and meaningful cooperation among the claimant countries in the WPS (SCS).

10. Therefore, joint cooperation in the Enclave (as Joint Cooperation Area) could be conducted among the claimant countries. Outside of the Enclave, the littoral states in the semi—enclosed sea can also engage in appropriate cooperative activities under Part IX of UNCLOS, while exercising their sovereign rights over these bodies of waters under Articles 3,4, 55, 57, and 76 of UNCLOS.38

Since not the whole of the WPS/SCS is disputed, the Philippine government recommends the separation of disputed and non-‐disputed areas to manage the conflict in the SCS. Non-‐disputed areas are waters and continental shelves, which are “beyond the disputed relevant features.”39 In non-‐disputed areas, claimants can develop them unilaterally based on the principle of sovereign rights in accordance with the application of EEZ, continental shelf, and other maritime zones provided for by UNCLOS.

Disputed areas are the Spratlys and the Paracels. The Philippine government explains that “disputed relevant features (and their adjacent waters) could be

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segregated from the rest of the waters of the SCS by enclaving the said features. The adjacent waters of the relevant features could be determined by applying Article 121 of UNCLOS.”40 To promote cooperation and avoid conflict in the disputed areas, the Philippine government recommends the pursuance of joint development by converting all disputed territorial features as “enclaves” and declare these “enclaves” as “Joint Cooperation Areas” (JCA) that could be demilitarized.

In the JCA, the Philippine government says that the following joint cooperative activities can be pursued: 1) Joint development. 2) Marine scientific research; 3) Protection of the marine environment; 4) Safety of navigation and communication at sea; 5) Search and rescue operation; 6) Humane treatment of all persons in danger or distress at sea; 7) Fight against transnational crimes.41

President Benigno Simeon Aquino III summarizes the wisdom of ZoPFFC in

the following words: “What is ours is ours, and with what is disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.” DFA Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario expounds the idea of ZoPFFC by saying, “There is a need to segregate the disputed area from non-‐disputed area. What is ours and is ours, and what is disputed can be shared.”42

MORE PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

It is very unfortunate that the idea of ZoPFFC as the Philippine solution to the South China Sea Dispute is problematic for other claimants. Though Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam expressed its support to the Philippine proposal, some claimants and ASEAN members rejected it.

China has expressed strong opposition to ZoPFFC as it challenges “China’s 9-‐dash line claim”. The Philippine paper on ZoPFFC even underscores that the 9-‐dash line claim of China “is bereft of any legal basis under international law”.43 Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario even described China’s 9-‐dash line claim as “the core of the problem” that must be “subjected to rules-‐based regime of UNCLOS.”44 Though the Philippine government argues that the ZoPFFC proposal is consistent with the rules based framework of managing international disputes, China vehemently opposes Manila’s proposal because Beijing is not ready to bring the South China Sea Disputes before international adjudication.45

In fact, China hijacked the agenda of the 2011 ASEAN/EAS Summits in Bali when it warned participants not to discuss ZoPFFC and the South China Sea Dispute. Thus, participants failed to discuss ZoPFFC at the 2011 Bali Summits. Secretary del Rosario admitted, “ZoPFFC was not brought up at all. We’re the only one who brought up the ZoPFFC. All the interventions were on maritime security in the West Philippine Sea.”46 The Philippine government planned to raise ZoPFFC again in the next ASEAN/EAS Summits. But without the concurrence of China, it is utterly difficult for the Philippines to move the ZoPFFC proposal forward.

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Malaysia also expressed its “fundamental concerns” on ZoPFFC. Dato’ Sri Anifah Aman, Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued an official statement arguing that the Philippine concept of disputed and non-‐disputed areas in the South China Sea could be a source of disputes, particularly in the context of the Sabah Problem.47 Minister Aman raised the following points against ZoPFFC:

1. Malaysia has fundamental concerns with the Philippine’s proposal on the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C);

2. The Philippines’ proposal is premised on the need to segregate the disputed area from the non-‐disputed area. The issue is, what may be considered as being disputed by one party, is considered as an established fact by another. Therein lies the source of the dispute to begin with. This is especially true in the case of the Philippines’s claim over Sabah, whose integrity and sovereignty is recognized by the international community as being part of Malaysia. For this reason, this proposal cannot be used as a basis to address the South China Sea issue. To Malaysia, this is non-‐negotiable;

3. Malaysia emphasized that ASEAN’s attention should instead be directed towards the effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the eventual realization of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). We should not be distracted from this effort; and,

4. Malaysia strongly feels that it is not opportune for ASEAN to embark on such an ambitious endeavor, which is a non-‐starter and will be counter-‐productive to our genuine effort to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.48

Cambodia joined China and Malaysia in rejecting the ZoPFFC. When media asked the Cambodian Foreign Minister on his take on the issue, he reportedly laughed and raised the issue of duplication. Though the Cambodia Foreign Minister explained that his government was not totally against ZoPFFC, he, however, stressed to avoid the problem of duplication.49

Cambodia is the next Chair of ASEAN. With the reputation of Cambodia of being a “China’s ally in ASEAN”, putting ZoPFFC into the official ASEAN agenda will be a great challenge to the Philippine government. ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan lamented that ZOPFFC was already put in the diplomatic back burner and that it "remains to be discussed further”.50 In diplomatic parlance, it means that the ZoPFFC has already been "shelved".51

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The year 2011 saw the escalation of security tensions in the South China Sea. Increasing assertiveness of claimants through resolute diplomacy, naval capability development, and increased unilateral patrols and surveillance ship activities in disputed waters contributed immensely to the current security situation.

The Philippine government proposed ZoPFFC as the solution to the South China Sea problem. But the Philippine proposal raised more problems and than solutions to the conflict. Though the Philippine government had the backing of some ASEAN members in pursuing ZoPFFC, major claimants, particularly China and Malaysia, opposed the idea. The Philippine government even failed to bring ZoPFFC in the official agenda of the 2011 ASEAN/EAS Summits in Bali.

Despite this set-‐back, there is a need to point out that the ZoPFFC has its merits in managing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly the general idea of joint development that China and other claimants support. Though the Philippine government “failed to gain support at the last ASEAN Summit in Bali”, the ZoPFFC could still “be an effective way to address the core problems” in the South China Sea.52 ZoPFFC failed to get enough support from ASEAN and EAS participants because the devil was in the details.

There is no doubt that the problems in the South China Sea are complex and complicated. But there is no shortage of idea to solve these problems.53 What is needed is a strong political will for all parties to “compromise and abide by all agreements” and to acknowledge regional interests as integral part of national interests.54

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END NOTES 1T.J. Burgonio, “President Aquino’s Spratlys Plan Hold Until Next Year”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (20 November 2011). 2Nusa Dua, “ASEAN Backs Away from Maritime Stand Against China”, Energy Daily (15 November 2011). 3Ibid. 4Aurea Calica, “Sea Dispute: Noy Gets US Support”, Philippine Star (20 November 2011). 5For excellent analyses of situations in the South China Sea prior to 2011, see Carl Ungerer, Ian Storey and Sam Bateman, “Making Mischief: The Return of the South China Sea Dispute”, ASPI Special Report, Issue 36 (December 2010) and Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Disputes: Increasing Stakes, Rising Tensions (Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation, November 2009). Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Environment in East and South China Seas” (Paper presented at the International Conference on Maritime Security Environment in East Asian Waters organized by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), Tokyo, Japan on 16-‐17 February 2011). 6Robert D. Kaplan, “The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict”, Foreign Policy (September/October 2011). 7The term “ripe for rivalry” was originally coined by Aaron L. Friedberg in his "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-‐33. 8Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Clash of Sovereignties in the Spratlys”, Philippine Star (30 June 2011). Also at http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=701324&publicationSubCategoryId=200. 9Sam Bateman, “Managing the South China Sea: Sovereignty is not the Issue”, RSIS Commentaries (29 September 2011). 10Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2010 (31 March 2011). 11Maritime Information Center, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) reiterates its position on the South China Sea” (23 August 2011) at http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=T02&pid=0000000065. 12“Vietnam’s Top Leader Add Fire to South China Sea Dispute”, Deutche Press Agentur (9 June 2011). 13Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington DC: Department of National Defense, 2011). 14 Ibid. p. 4. 15 Ibid., 16“Vietnam to Get Sub Fleet in 6 Years: State Media”, Defense News (4 August 2011) at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110804/DEFSECT04/108040303/Vietnam-‐Get-‐Sub-‐Fleet-‐6-‐Years-‐State-‐Media. 17“Vietnam’s Russian Restocking”, Defense Industry Daily (11 December 2011) at http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Vietnam-‐Reportedly-‐Set-‐to-‐Buy-‐Russian-‐Kilo-‐Class-‐Subs-‐05396/ 18Ibid. 19“Philippines would be Purchasing Eight ex Hamilton class Over Five Years”, RP Defense (2 June 2011) at http://rpdefense.over-‐blog.com/article-‐philippines-‐would-‐be-‐purchasing-‐eight-‐ex-‐hamilton-‐class-‐over-‐five-‐years-‐75533441.html 20 Alexis Romero, “Submarine for Navy: Noy Bares AFP Shop List”, Philippine Star (24 August 2011). 21“Malaysia’s Scorpene-‐class Submarines in Service to be Vested Interests To Stick to the Nansha”, http://www.9abc.net/index.php/archives/26140 22“RMN Holds Annual Drills in South China Sea”, Jane’s Defense Weekly (15 July 2011).

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23Frederik Van Lokeren, “The Naval Balance of Power: The South China Sea”, The Geopolitical and Conflict Report (12 May 2011) at http://gcreport.com/index.php/analysis/190-‐the-‐naval-‐balance-‐of-‐power-‐the-‐south-‐china-‐sea 24Waleed PD Mahdini, “New Sea Power for Brunei”, Free Republic (8 January 2011) at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-‐news/2653421/posts 25KDB stands for Kapal Diraja Brunei (meaning Royal Brunei Ship in Malay). See “Muara Naval Base, Brunei Darussalam” at http://www.naval-‐technology.com/projects/muara-‐naval-‐base/ 26Ibid. 27“China Reprimands Vietnam Over Offshore Oil Exploration”, Nam Viet News (30 May 2011) at http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/china-‐reprimands-‐vietnam-‐over-‐offshore-‐oil-‐exploration/. 28“Again, Chinese Boats Cut Cable of PVN’s Vessels”, People’s Army News Paper Online (9June 2011) at http://www.qdnd.vn/qdndsite/en-‐us/75/72/183/161/163/150636/Default.aspx 29For an excellent analysis of the cable cutting incidents, see Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 30, Number 2, (2011), pp. 77-‐104. 30Tessa Jamandre, “China fired at Filipino fishermen in Jackson atoll”, Vera Files (2 June 2011) at http://verafiles.org/2011/06/02/9535/. 31For an excellent scholarly analysis of the Reed Bank incident, see Ian Storey, “China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident”, China Brief, Volume 11, Issue Number 8 (6 May 2011). 32Rene Acosta, “Oban Downplays Harassment of Air Force Plane by Chinese Fighter Jets”, Business Mirror (19 May 2011). 33For a detailed analysis of the Amy Douglas Bank incident, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “A Mischief Reef in the Making?”, Newsbreak (2 June 2011) at http://archives.newsbreak-‐knowledge.ph/2011/06/02/a-‐mischief-‐reef-‐in-‐the-‐making/ 34 “China denies incursion into West Philippine Sea”, Philippine Star (3 June 2011). 35Dona Pazzibugan, “Philippine Navy Dismantles Foreign Marker on Spratlys”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (15 June 2011). 36 Alexis Romero, “AFP Unfazed by China Threats in Spratlys”, Philippine Star (28 October 2011). 37“China: Intrusion Charge Groundless”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (10 January 2012). 38Philippine Paper on ASEAN-CHINA Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C) in the West Philippine Sea (WPS)/South China Sea (SCS) at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?um=1&hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&tab=iw&q=cache:XwxT_QtzQwsJ:http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/trung-‐tam-‐du-‐lieu-‐bien-‐dong/doc_download/364-‐philippine-‐paper-‐on-‐asean-‐-‐china-‐zone-‐of-‐peace-‐freedom-‐friendship-‐and-‐cooperation-‐in-‐the-‐south-‐china-‐sea+zone+of+peace+freedom+friendship+and+cooperation+(zopff/c)&ct=clnk 39Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Albert F. del Rosario, “On West Philippine Sea” (Delivered at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bali, Indonesia on November 15, 2011) at http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/the-‐secretary-‐of-‐foreign-‐affairs-‐on-‐the-‐west-‐philippine-‐sea-‐november-‐15-‐2011/ 45Aileen S.P. Baviera, “The South China Sea Disputes: Is the Aquino Way the ASEAN Way?, RSIS Commentaries (5 January 2012). 46 T.J. Burgonio, “President Aquino’s Spratlys Plan Hold Until Next Year”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (20 November 2011). 47Dato’ Sri Anifah Aman, “Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C)” (Press Statement during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Bali, Indonesia, 15 November 2011). http://kln.gov.my/web/guest/home?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_Yt06&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-‐

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2&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=5&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_struts_action=%2Fasset_publisher%2Fview_content&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_urlTitle=press-‐statement-‐by-‐the-‐minister-‐of-‐foreign-‐affairs-‐during-‐the-‐asean-‐ministerial-‐meeting-‐english-‐version-‐only&_101_INSTANCE_Yt06_type=content&redirect=%2Fweb%2Fguest%2Fhome 48 Ibid. 49Rey O. Arcilla, “Two-‐Track Approach”, Malaya (22 November 2011) at http://www.malaya.com.ph/nov22/edrey.html 50Ibid. 51Ibid. 52Fahlesa Munabari, “A look into ASEAN-‐China’s DOC”, The Jakarta Post (7 February 2012). 53National Defense College of the Philippines, Foreign Service Institute and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, The South China Sea Reader (Papers and proceedings of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation and Progress, Manila, 5-‐6 July 2011), p. 9. 54Ibid.

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Philippine Solution to the South China Sea Problem: More Problems, Less Solutions?