pact carbon transition

PACT: Pathways for Carbon Transition

Deliverable D6

3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions

September 2011

EC/DG Research

Project 225 503

Authors: B. Château, B. Bougnoux

Dissemination level: PU

PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"

PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 0

Table of content

1 Abstract .............................................................................................................. 4

2 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 0

2.1 Limits to the development of the current energy system ............................... 0

2.2 Post-carbon transition .................................................................................... 1

2.3 Defining, designing and quantifying post-carbon transition scenarios ........... 2

3 Outlines and main features of the 3 post-carbon transition scenarios ......... 3

3.1 The social expectations as regard welfare .................................................... 3

3.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ................................... 5

3.3 Two visions of long term EU post-carbon situations ...................................... 6

3.4 Three transition scenarios to post-carbon for the EU .................................... 8

3.5 Scenario outlines ........................................................................................... 0

3.5.1 International context ................................................................................ 0

3.5.2 EU context .............................................................................................. 1

3.5.3 Local transitions ...................................................................................... 3

4 Spacecraft ........................................................................................................... 5

4.1 International context ...................................................................................... 5

4.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................... 5

4.1.2 Policies, opportunities and constraints of major World players ............... 6

4.2 The EU and member countries context ......................................................... 8

4.2.1 Economic model ..................................................................................... 8

4.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ........................... 11

4.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies ................. 13

4.3 Local transitions........................................................................................... 14

4.3.1 Local players policies and actions ......................................................... 15

4.3.2 changes in urban schemes ................................................................... 16

4.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU .......................................... 18

5 Smartphone ...................................................................................................... 21

5.1 International context .................................................................................... 21

5.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................. 21

5.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players .................................... 22



5.2 The EU and member countries context ....................................................... 24

5.2.1 Economic model ................................................................................... 24





5.3.2 Changes in urban schemes .................................................................. 32

5.3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU ........................................... 34

6 Hard Way .......................................................................................................... 38

6.1 International context .................................................................................... 38

6.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................. 38

6.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players .................................... 39

6.2 The EU and member countries context ....................................................... 41

6.2.1 Economic model ................................................................................... 41





6.3.2 Changes in urban schemes .................................................................. 48

6.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU .......................................... 50

7 Quantifying carbon transition pathways ........................................................ 52

7.1 From scenario storylines to quantitative models inputs ............................... 53

7.1.1 Identification of relevant exogenous inputs of the models ..................... 53

7.1.2 Linking the storylines to the relevant exogenous inputs of the models . 58

7.1.3 Quantifying the relevant exogenous inputs of the models ..................... 58

7.2 Socio-economy, energy and CO2 projections in PACT transition scenarios 70

7.2.1 Socio-economy, EU-27 ......................................................................... 70

7.2.2 End-use technologies and energy needs, EU-27 .................................. 76

7.2.3 Global energy outlook ........................................................................... 79

7.2.4 CO2 emissions outlook ......................................................................... 83

8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 86

9 Annex 1: brief description of VLEEM/TILT ....................................................... 0

10 Annex 2: brief description of the POLES model ......................................... 4

11 Annex 3: linkage between scenario statements and models inputs ....... 11



12 Annex 4: scenario projections .................................................................... 14

12.1 EU-27 as a whole ..................................................................................... 14

12.1.1 Socio-economy .................................................................................. 14

12.1.2 End-use technologies and energy needs ........................................... 16

12.2 Core cities ................................................................................................ 18

12.3 1st rings .................................................................................................... 19

12.4 Small/medium cities ................................................................................. 20

12.5 Sparse settlements................................................................................... 21



List of figures Figure 3-1: Visions of the post-carbon transitions .................................................................................................. 6

Figure 7-1: VLEEM/TILT overview .......................................................................................................................... 53

Figure 7-3: GDP assumptions, PACT scenarios ...................................................................................................... 66

Figure 7-4: assumptions on oil availability, PACT scenarios .................................................................................. 66

Figure 7-5: Biomass potentials in PACT scenarios ................................................................................................. 67

Figure 7-6: Biomass use in PACT scenarios............................................................................................................ 67

Figure 7-7: Improvements in carbon intensities, PACT scenarios .......................................................................... 68

Figure 7-8: Carbon values, PACT scenarios ........................................................................................................... 69

Figure 7-9: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios ................................................................................................... 71

Figure 7-10: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios ................................................................................................. 72

Figure 7-11 : EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios ..................................................................................................... 73

Figure 7-13: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios ................................................................................ 77

Figure 7-15: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios ....................................................................... 78

Figure 7-18: Oil prices on World markets, PACT scenarios .................................................................................... 80

Figure 7-19: EU primary energy, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................. 81

Figure 7-21: Electricity generation mix, world, PACT scenarios ............................................................................ 82

Figure 7-22: Electricity generation mix, EU-27, PACT scenarios ............................................................................ 83

Figure 7-26: CO2 emissions by sector, EU-27, PACT scenarios .............................................................................. 85

Figure 9-1: VLEEM overview .................................................................................................................................... 0

Figure 10-1 : Overview of the POLES model ............................................................................................................ 5

Figure 10-2 : Oil and gas production module .......................................................................................................... 9

List of tables

Table 7-1: Quantitative assumptions for the 3 scenarios, VLEEM-TILT ................................................................. 60

Table 7-2: UN-2008 population medium projections ............................................................................................ 65

Table 7-3: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................... 71

Table 7-4: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................... 72

Table 7-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios ...................................................................................... 73

Table 7-6: EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios .................................................................... Erreur ! Signet non défini.

Table 7-7: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios ..................................................... Erreur ! Signet non défini.

Table 7-8: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios .............................................. Erreur ! Signet non défini.

Table 7-9: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios ............. Erreur ! Signet non défini.

Table 7-10: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios .................................. Erreur ! Signet non défini.

Table 7-11: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios ........................................ Erreur ! Signet non défini.



1 Abstract

Post-carbon transition scenarios for the European Union (EU) are based on the 3

following observations:

a) because of limits in oil and gas resources, and because of climate change, the

World will not have the possibility to continue for long developing on fossil fuels as it

did in the past;

b) something else (energy efficiency/thriftiness, renewables, nuclear, carbon capture

and sequestration (CCS), either forced or anticipated, will take the lead well before

the end of the century;

c) because of time delays for nuclear and CCS to prove sustainability on large

amounts, renewables and efficiency/thriftiness might well be the core of the

"something else".

What is called "post-carbon transition" is precisely the process through which

"something else" will substitute progressively and massively for fossil fuels, and start

shaping new technological clusters, new economic and social organisations, new

behaviours and preferences, i.e. new energy-technology paradigm.

Depending on its social and political dimensions, at local, national and international

levels, the post-carbon transition may take very different routes, with different

consequences as to the green house gases (GHG) emissions trajectories up to 2050.

3 scenarios are therefore elaborated and quantified to capture three "extreme" routes

towards post-carbon EU.

These scenarios do not necessarily include quantitative targets for GHGs mitigation

or fossil fuels market shares by 2050: PACT focuses more on post-carbon transitions

and less on the description of future post-carbon worlds, which may be achieved in a

more or less distant future. But for easing the comparison among transition routes,

Businessas usual

Growthwith

anticipation of limits

Limits to growth

New welfare

Spacecraft

Smartphone

Hardway

More GDP focussed

More « beyond GDP » focussed

More attention to wealth

More attention to environment

Welfare expectations

Balance wealth/ environment



and clarifying their consequences for policy making, we have assumed similar GHGs

concentration in 2050 for all scenarios, around 500 ppmv for energy CO2.

Scenario 1, "Spacecraft" : a highly centralized while cooperative project, the

wedding of speed and technology, working well with absolute physical limitation in

resources.

"Spacecraft" (SC) describes a centralized transition process duly planned and

managed by governments and big industrial and financial stakeholders, in a rather

consensual movement among main GHGs emitting countries worldwide. In particular,

they agree to commit themselves to mandatory reduction objectives of the carbon

intensity of the GDP, accounting for carbon content of imported and exported goods.

"Spacecraft" is highly technology oriented. Centralized technologies and innovation

driven by big industries, in particular the "green" ones, are the pillars of a fast World

economic development, respectful of the limits in natural resources and climate in

this transition process.

The EU is expected to experience a moderate-to-high GDP growth in this scenario,

thanks to a high World demand for its high value products and services, despite the

fierce competition of China and Emerging Countries for current goods and services,

and the technology leadership of the USA.

Maximizing the GDP on the long term within a globalized World remains the priority

of national and EU policies. "Spacecraft" is a scenario where the demographic

decline stops, immigration is encouraged and the human capital increases steadily in

the EU-27. The consumption model and the behaviours remain roughly unchanged.

Local transitions are mostly driven by policies and strategies decided and

implemented by Governments and big players. Local players still play an important

role, but limited to the practical implementation of the national and EU policies and

measures.

Urban sprawl is stopped in relative terms (share of the total population concerned),

but continues in absolute terms. Small/medium cities, in particular close to big cities,

expand rapidly. Spatial networking among these dynamic cities and with big cities is

developing fast, in particular thanks to new fast rail infrastructures.

Electric and plug-in hybrid cars chase out the conventional ICE cars in the stock

around 2040; together with biofuels, this contribute to decrease by a little more than

85% the direct specific CO2 emissions per km of cars. Very energy efficient building

concepts are generalized in the construction everywhere after 2015, while new

retrofitting techniques allow for drastic energy savings in existing buildings.

On-shore and off-shore wind, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), biomass and other

centralized renewables contribute to roughly 40% of electricity generated in the EU,

and nuclear 35%.

The total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will grow by 20% between 2000

and 2050, but the contribution of fossils will decrease in the same time by 1/3.



The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at 38Gt around 2020 and

then decrease steadily, with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2

concentration in the atmosphere will stabilize around 500 ppmv in 2035. In the EU-

27, the CO2 emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 2 from 2000

to 2050.

Scenario 2, "Smartphone ": a bottom-up carbon transition process in which social

networking and ICTs plays a critical role.

"Smartphone " starts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when it

become obvious that Governments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a real

and effective governance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climate

change. Instead, EU and member states governments, which are fully aware of the

nature and urgency of the climate and resources problems, rely as much as possible

on local / regional authorities, NGOs and citizens to address these issues. Although

there is no global commitments on GHG mitigation, most cities in Europe, US, China

and other main emerging countries adopt and implement drastic energy and climate

plans.

The EU is expected to experience a low - but smart, much better distributed - GDP

growth in this scenario, for two reasons: a weak World demand for its high value

products and services, and a weak internal demand resulting from moderate

demographic perspectives and deep changes in people preferences and

consumption pattern ("beyond GDP" perspective). There is a clear social preference

for a life more balanced between jobs, family and self-accomplishment in this

scenario.

"Smartphone " is oriented on small and smart technologies, which are supported by a

social movement towards more autonomy, more connectivity and more self-reliance.

Consumers want to become more and more actors as well, which is enabled by

network operators investing in smart grids. Nevertheless, few believe that technology

will "save the world". Individual behaviours and social organization appear as

important. ICTs, decentralized "green" technologies (photovoltaïcs for instance) and

innovation driven by new, small size, industries accompany this "grass root"

phenomenon.

Local transitions are the bulk of the overall transition movement, and they are mostly

driven by local and regional authorities in the one side, citizens and NGOs in the

other side. Local players play a critical role, both in the design and the practical

implementation of policies and measures mostly decided at the local and regional

levels. These local and regional policies take fully account of changes in social

behaviours and consumption preferences to reach climate change objectives within

local energy and climate plans.

Urban sprawl is stopped and then regresses, both in relative and absolute terms. Big

cities, both cores and 1st rings, are strongly densified, and small/medium cities

nearby expand rapidly. Isolated small/medium cities continue to loose population.



Spatial networking among big cities and with medium cities nearby is developing fast,

in particular thanks to new fast rail infrastructures.


around 2040; together with biofuels, they contribute to decrease by almost 75% the

direct specific CO2 emissions per km of cars. Very energy efficient building concepts

are generalized in the construction everywhere after 2015, associated with PV in

zero-energy and +energy buildings in many cases. Thermal retrofitting in existing

buildings is generalized, although less efficient than in "Spacecraft".

Electricity needs will increase by 50% between 2000 and 2050; wind power,

photovoltaïcs, limited CSP, biomass and other decentralized renewables will

contribute to more than half the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear

25%.

Total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will decrease by almost 30%

between 2000 and 2050, while the contribution of fossils will decrease in the same

time by 2/3.

The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at a little lower level than in

"Spacecraft" (37Gt), and later (around 2030), and then decrease steadily, with a 2050

level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will

also stabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035. In the EU-27, the CO2 emissions related

to energy will decrease by almost a factor 3 from 2000 to 2050.

Scenario 3, "Hard Way": a Business-as-usual scenario, that account for

development/adjustment through violent/brutal crises.

"Hard Way" describes a carbon transition process which is imposed by the growing

problems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies to address

in due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment.

Globalization and international relations are driven mostly by national interest

considerations, paving the way for increasingly conflicting relations among nations.

No global governance mechanisms neither for climate change, nor for oil and gas

resources.

Depletion policies of main oil and gas producing countries (Gulf countries, Russia, ...)

are mostly driven by domestic considerations and geo-political aspects. This means

in particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in the Persian Gulf.

This results in increasing tensions on oil and gas markets, with fast rising and highly

fluctuating prices, possible physical shortages in the case of EU, which, after a while,

convince an increasing number of persons and industries to switch away from these

energies and turn to renewables and electricity as fast as possible.

In this scenario, the EU is expected to experience first an economic recession,

followed by a slow recovery, for three reasons: a weak World demand for its high

value products and services, a depressed internal demand resulting from a fear

concerning the future (savings first) and supply crisis on oil, gas and main imported

minerals.



In general terms, "Hard Way" is similar to "Spacecraft" as regard life styles and

consumption model for the two first decades. But afterwards, the long lasting bad

economic conditions and the resulting social tensions, force an increasing number of

people, in particular with low income, to change their way of life and consumption

pattern towards something closer to "Smartphone ".

EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. Environmental concerns remain

strong, but the bad economic context and the absence of clear public support make

the adoption and implementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions rather

difficult.

"Hard Way" is not so favourable for technology innovation and development of new

infrastructures that are capital intensive, basically for economic and financial reasons.

Nevertheless, the increasing lack of reliability of centralized energy systems favours

the supply and demand of decentralized solutions.

Local transitions participate to a large extent to the overall carbon transition

movement, and they are mostly driven by the changes in attitudes in a growing part

of the population, because the difficult economic conditions in the one side, and

because an increasing lack of confidence in the conventional energy system in the

other side. But local and regional authorities remain mostly followers in this process,

partly for policy reasons, partly because of financial constraints .

Urban sprawl continues, core cities and 1rings are stabilized and remaining

population and households are absorbed by small/ medium towns, in particular in the

periphery of core cities. Spatial networking among big cities continues to be

developed, but at a low pace. Investment in new motorways and airport

infrastructures is strongly reduced.


around 2040, but with a lower electricity/motor fuel ratio for hybrids as compared to

the previous scenarios; altogether, with the contribution of biofuels, the specific CO2

emissions per km of cars decrease by almost 70%. There are no significant changes

in existing standards for buildings construction in all EU countries. Competitiveness,

in a context of high prices for oil and gas, remains the main driver of the construction

of low energy and very low energy buildings beyond the actual regulations. Same for

zero / +energy buildings. Thermal retrofitting in existing buildings is rather moderate

for financial reasons.

Electricity needs fluctuate around 2000 level up to 2050; wind power, photovoltaic,

limited CSP, biomass and other decentralized renewables will contribute to more

than half the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 20%.

Total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will decrease by almost 35%

between 2000 and 2050, while the contribution of fossils will decrease in the same

time by 2/3.

The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up still at a little lower level

than in "Smartphone " (35Gt), and before (around 2025), and then decrease steadily,



with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2 concentration in the

atmosphere will also stabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035. In the EU-27, the CO2

emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 3 from 2000 to 2050.

Conclusion

The 3 scenarios describe very different pathways to post-carbon situations in Europe,

resulting in very contrasted social, economic and technology panoramas in 2050.

Demography, economic growth, World tensions on resources and climate, policies,

behaviours and life styles, technologies, are the main discriminating factors among

scenarios.

Nevertheless, these very different routes could lead to similar reduction in CO2

emissions of the EU, and similar levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, by

2050. But with very different prices for oil and gas, and very different values (i.e.

constraint) for CO2:

- "Hard Way" is the scenario in which the oil prices will reach the highest levels (close

to an average 250 US$2005/bbl in 2050, with the highest fluctuations), but the lowest

carbon value (lowest constraint, around 100 US$2005/t), and the lowest GDP/capita;

- "Smartphone " is the scenario with the highest carbon value (constraint), around

800 US$2005/t in 2050, with also high oil prices (around 200$2005/bbl in 2050) and

higher GDP/capita than in "Hard Way";

- "Spacecraft" is the scenario in which the increase of oil prices is the slower (around

140 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with a rather high carbon value (around 400 US$2005/bbl

in 2050) and a much higher GDP/capita as compared to the other two scenarios.

These scenarios do not attempt to indicate to policy makers and stakeholders what

route must be chosen, but to give them two clear messages:

- The EU may reduce in any case by large amounts its consumption of fossils in the

next 40 years, and therefore reduce its CO2 emissions in the same proportion, but

the social, economic and policy costs would be very high if this transition is not

properly planned and implemented;

- There not one single way for planning and implementing properly the transition.

Indeed, social forces are currently pushing in two very different directions: some tend

to reproduce the recipes that have cooked the economic growth of the OECD

countries during the last 50 years (even if this economic model seems a bit tired

these days), while others consider this model obsolete and fight for inventing a new

"beyond GDP" model. Depending on which social forces will become predominant,

the transition pathways, even if duly planned and managed, will be very different.



2 Introduction

2.1 Limits to the development of the current energy system

Before the turn of the century, oil and gas resources will prove to be too limited to

allow production to meet World demand growth at current trends. Coal, which

displays much larger resources in the ground, can easily substitute for oil and gas for

big, highly concentrated heat production: electricity generation, energy intensive

industries,...Substituting for oil and gas in transport is technically feasible (through

synthetic fuels), but much more difficult and very costly. Coal has already been used

extensively in buildings in the past (and still currently in some countries), but at the

expense of great inconvenience for people, and of severe local pollutions, not

acceptable any more in most countries. Altogether, getting back to coal on such a

large extent, even with modern technologies, would create very severe environmental

damages, both local (SO2, dust,...) and global (green house gases emission), unless

carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is mastered in due time at a sufficient scale.

Indeed, as shown by the results of the Very Long Term Energy Environment

Modelling (VLEEM) study1 (fig below), such a movement back towards coal would

make CCS at a very large scale a pre-condition to avoid most likely climatic

disasters. If CCS is not timely mastered at such a large scale, the social, economic

and political consequences of these climatic disasters would plunge the World in a

great turmoil, with dramatic consequences on wealth and welfare2.

Figure 2-1: CO2 emissions and storage in Europe in the fossil paradigm, VLEEM

The question is: could nuclear replace coal for electricity generation on a very large

scale at the global level in case CCS cannot develop beyond well-known but rather

limited geological storages? In principle, yes, as shown by the VLEEM study. But

under very strict conditions as to the security and wastes aspects. Hence, the recent

accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan has enlighten worldwide the nature

and the magnitude of the security and waste aspects, and this will probably slow

1 www.VLEEM.org

2 On this matter, see "Stern review"

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120

CO

2 E

mis

sio

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Gt

CO

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Emissions

Stored

Total



down for years, maybe decades -if not stop - the recent rebound of the electro-

nuclear industry. It has become therefore most unlikely that nuclear might offer a

solution to the replacement of coal at the magnitude and speed requested to avoid

climatic disasters.

On paper, renewable energy (solar, wind, biomass,...) seems to be more than

abundant in regard to future World energy demand levels, and could well substitute

for fossil fuels in all end-uses of energy. But when getting into the details of costs,

location and intermittency of the energies, the picture is much less appealing. As

shown by the VLEEM study, renewables could solve the resource shortage and

climatic problems raised by the fossil fuels, but only under very drastic conditions

including energy efficiency, storage (daily and seasonally) and international trade. It

is not just a matter of changing the primary energy inputs in the same processes and

appliances to supply the same needs, but to change the whole energy-technology

paradigm.

To summarise, it is becoming more and more obvious that:

a) the World will not have the possibility to continue for long developing on fossil fuels

as it did in the past;

b) the turn to "something else (energy efficiency/thriftiness, renewables, nuclear,

CCS)", either forced or anticipated, will take place well before the end of the century;

c) because of time delays for nuclear and CCS to prove sustainability on large

amounts, renewables and efficiency/thriftiness might well be the core of the

"something else": this is one of the basic assumption of this study.

2.2 Post-carbon transition

What is called "post-carbon transition" is precisely the process through which

"something else" will substitute progressively and massively for fossil fuels, and start

shaping new technological clusters, new economic and social organisations, new

behaviours and preferences, i.e. new energy-technology paradigm.

Depending on its social and political dimensions, at local, national and international

levels, the post-carbon transition may take very different routes, with different

consequences as to the GHG emissions trajectories up to 2050.

3 scenarios are elaborated and quantified to capture three "extreme" routes towards

post-carbon EU.

- "Spacecraft" (SC) describes a transition process duly planned and managed by

governments and big stakeholders in a rather consensual movement worldwide,

driven by the recognition of the limits (resources and climate), and the willingness to

anticipate and manage them in due time.

- "Smartphone " (SP) describes a bottom-up managed transition process, where

municipalities, NGOs and citizen networking play a leader role in redesigning welfare

and security values.



- "Hard Way" (HW) describes a transition process poorly managed, imposed by the

recurrent and more and more severe crises resulting from the competition for scarce

oil resources and from growing extreme climatic events; to some extent, "Hard Way"

looks like a business-as-usual scenario without a "happy ending".

2.3 Defining, designing and quantifying post-carbon transition scenarios

The purpose of the scenarios is twofold:

- to recognize that there is not a unique "post-carbon" EU and a unique path to it, and

to draw the consequences of the uncertainties on these matters as to the future

possible energy systems;

- to account for the interactions between the various dimensions of the post-carbon

transition as investigated in phase 1 of the PACT project, within consistent visions of

the transition.

As mentioned above, the definition of the scenarios is driven by the willingness to

capture the extreme routes that frame the field of possibilities in matter of post-

carbon transitions. This definition has taken the form of scenario outlines which have

been circulated, and discussed and challenged within a 2 days seminar held in

Padova (September 2010).

Based on these outlines, a skeleton for scenario story-lines has been elaborated with

three purposes:

- provide a common structure for the story-lines of the 3 scenarios, highlighting the 3

main levels for appraising policies and consequences (international, national, local),

and pointing out the critical points to be addressed in the story-lines for robustness,

consistency and transparency purposes;

- provide a framework for comparing the main features of the post-carbon transitions

considered in the three scenarios;

- provide a clear and understandable linkage between the qualitative statements to

be developed in the story-lines and the corresponding quantitative inputs to be

plugged into the models to quantify the consequences of the scenarios as regard

energy and GHG emissions (VLEEM/TILT3 and POLES4).

Once the skeleton has been adopted, the story-lines have been written, using as

much as possible the findings of the analytical work of phase 1 (deliverables D1, D2,

D3 and D4).

3 Very Long Term Energy Environment Model / Transport Issues on the Long Term; short description

in annex 1 4 Propective Outlook of Long term Energy Systems; short description in annex 2



Then, the main exogenous inputs of the models related to the qualitative features of

the scenarios story-lines have been quantified in 4 steps:

a) collection of data on historical values of these exogenous inputs, including that of

the base year of the models

b) assessment of the boundary values of these inputs (range of uncertainty) within

the frame of the 3 scenarios, for 2025 and 2050, mostly based on the quantitative

inputs of phase 1

c) allocation of specific values within these boundaries to each scenario according to

the scenario story-lines

d) run of the models, check of the consistency and likelihood of the results, fine

tuning of the values allocated to the exogenous inputs.

It must be noted that the scenarios do not necessarily include quantitative targets for

GHGs mitigation or fossil fuels market shares by 2050: PACT focuses more on post-

carbon transitions and less on the description of future post-carbon worlds, which

may be achieved in a more or less distant future. But for easing the comparison

among transition routes, and clarifying their consequences for policy making, we

have assumed similar GHGs concentration in 2050 for all scenarios, around 500

ppmv for CO2.

The comprehensive storylines of the scenarios, including the quantitative elements,

are presented in chapters 4 to 6 hereafter.

3 Outlines and main features of the 3 post-carbon transition

scenarios

The analytical work developed in the phase 1 of the PACT project has clearly

identified two main dimensions that will shape the post-carbon transitions in the EU:

the social expectations as regard welfare, the social trade-off between environment

and wealth.

3.1 The social expectations as regard welfare

The discussion about the social expectations as regard welfare could be summarized

as follows.

a) The current economic model assimilates welfare to GDP/capita and therefore

tends to maximize the GDP/capita, in particular through the diversification of goods

and services.



b) When considering the value of time in addition to the price of goods and services

(as currently done in transport models with global cost functions or as suggested by

G Becker in the nineteen-sixties5), the perception of the mix of goods and services

that maximizes the global individual's utility (= welfare) may change significantly.

Indeed, each consumption opportunity for goods and services has a monetary cost,

but also a time cost: eating a pre-cooked frozen meal takes less time, but it is more

expensive, than purchasing the ingredients and cooking the meal at home. The mix

of goods services that maximizes the utility for a given income when accounting just

for market prices, may be rather different from the mix that maximizes the utility when

considering the value of time.

c) Among goods and services, a distinction worth to be made between two

categories: those which do correspond to a logic of maximisation of opportunities per

unit of time (the logic of hypermarkets), and those which escape this logic and

correspond to another rationale where utility is proportional to time spent (sailing or

fishing for instance).

d) The current productive and economic model (so-called "economy of variety")

undoubtedly focuses more on the first kind of goods and services, assuming that

more diversity means at the same time more value as well as more utility, and

therefore more welfare.

e) Many of the alternative views on welfare consider implicitly or explicitly that welfare

is more complex, that the quality of the opportunities really matters, in particular for

the second category of goods and services above, and that maximizing value

through diversity of goods and services may well not correspond to maximization of

utility if quality -and time in particular - is accounted for in the utility.

f) Practically, the GDP growth in the coming decades will be driven by the balance

between the two above categories of goods and services in people's preferences, i.e.

by the dominant expectations as regard welfare.

In practical terms, the consequences of the expectations as regard welfare on the

transition process will be addressed through several input variables of the models,

among which:

- structure of the time budgets

- equipment of households (in particular private vehicles)

- GDP

- travel speed elasticity to GDP

....

5 Gary S. Becker (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” Economic ]ournal 75 (299), pp. 493-517



3.2 The social balance between environment and wealth

The discussion about the social balance between environmental quality and material

wealth could be summarized as follows.

a) Obviously, sustainability as regard greenhouse gases emissions and climate

change is a major dimension of "post-carbon": therefore, the true nature of the

transition issue is that of the trade-off between maximizing wealth and mitigating

GHGs emissions to respect minimum thresholds of sustainability.

b) First question then: how is socially defined the "minimum threshold of

sustainability"? There are two possible answers to this question, according to social

priorities:

- either an absolute ceiling for GHG concentration, as that advocated by the

EU with the objective of keeping earth temperature increase below 2°C;

- or a macro-economic optimum that pretends to balance the alleged costs of

GHGs mitigation and adaptation with their macro-economic feed-backs

(Nordhaus’ perspective).

Depending on the answer to this question, e.i. the social priority, the level of carbon

constraint accepted by the society would be more or less severe, as the social value

of the carbon reflecting this constraint.

c) Second question: how the society operates the trade-off between wealth

maximisation and respect of the carbon constraint, in particular to which extent the

carbon constraint (and the related social value of carbon) should and could be

integrated in market signals through any internalization mechanism (tax, trading

system,..). Again two answers, reflecting social priorities:

- the carbon constraint is not negotiable, and market signals (carbon tax,

ETS,...) can and must be used, but only as a complementary means to other

policies and measures in order to respect the constraint at the minimum cost;

- reaching the macro-economic optimum is the priority, the level of carbon

constraint and the related carbon social value are consequences of this

optimum; this indicates the optimal price for carbon wherever this price can

be internalized in energy prices (carbon tax, ETS,..) and the necessary

complementary policies and measures to be implemented wherever the

carbon value cannot be internalized in energy prices.

d) Practically, the nature, speed and magnitude of the transition will be dependent on

how the societies, in particular in the EU, will answer these questions. This is a

matter of awareness and values of the population, of democracy in decision making

process, of perception of risks, of stake-holders game, etc...

In practical terms, the consequences of this social trade-offs in the transition process

will be addressed through several input variables of the models, among which:



- carbon price/value in the various sectors

- climate policies and measures: energy efficiency standards, support to renewables

and nuclear, discount rates, investments in public transport,...

- technology options: buildings, transport, electricity generation,...

- land-use options: urbanization, renewable energy production,...

- life styles and consumption preferences

- transport options: soft modes, cars, public transport,..

...

3.3 Two visions of long term EU post-carbon situations

The considerations above can be summarized in the following scheme, showing what

the situation of post-carbon EU might be in the long term.

Figure 3-1: Visions of the post-carbon transitions

Vision 1 of post carbon EU: Growth with anticipation of limits

This vision corresponds to the more commonly accepted one as regard post-carbon

EU. To some extent it is where the "Lisbon strategy" is heading. The main features of

this vision are:

- the current economic model still dominates in the EU in the long term

- the main industrial stake-holders and policy makers have become fully aware that

the market signals do not reflect properly the physical limits (natural resources and

environment) that the World will face in a foreseeable future

Businessas usual

Growthwith

anticipation of limits

Limits to growth

New welfare

Spacecraft

Smartphone

Hardway

More GDP focussed

More « beyond GDP » focussed

More attention to wealth

More attention to environment

Welfare expectations

Balance wealth/ environment



- international governance of climate change and hydrocarbon resources scarcity is

in place, ambitious climate change objectives are reached, based on appropriate

international mechanisms to mitigate GHG emissions

- national climate change policies and measures that go far beyond usual market

mechanisms have been implemented soon enough to be fully effective in 2050

- technologies and services that bring micro energy end-uses and electricity

generation out from fossils are mostly based on centralisation and networks, and they

are fully available and competitive

- economic growth is boosted by innovation and productivity within a new Kondrattief-

Schumpeter Cycle based on "green" technologies.

Vision 2 of post carbon EU: New welfare

This vision of the post-carbon EU is more challenging as compared to the previous

one, because it involves deep changes in individual behaviours, social preferences

and economic organization as compared to today situation. It merges current ideas

about "beyond GDP" with low carbon issues.

The main features of this vision are:

- industrial stake-holders and policy makers have become fully aware that the market

signals do not reflect properly the physical limits that the World will reach in a

foreseeable future;

- but central governments have failed to implement national climate change policies

and measures that go really far beyond usual market mechanisms, prices of fossils

(including taxes) are very high in the EU;

- demand by individuals and local authorities for technologies and services that bring

micro energy end-uses and electricity generation away from fossils has resulted in a

new offer, mostly decentralized and competitive of such technologies and services,

with "paradigm" effects (i.e. effects on behaviours and organisation);

- considerable awareness about limits in resources and environmental problems

among common people, with very tangible consequences on behaviours,

consumption pattern and life styles;

- strong desire of autonomy with large amounts of micro energy consumers-

producers having a strong perception of limits;

- the income per capita increase slowly, but people compensate the lack of growth of

consumption opportunities by more attention to daily life quality and less stress on

time.



3.4 Three transition scenarios to post-carbon for the EU

Three transition scenarios to the 2 future post-carbon EU (the two "visions" above)

are investigated:

- one transition scenario leading to "growth with anticipation of limits", named

"Spacecraft", more or less a successful "Lisbon strategy";

- two transition scenarios leading to "new welfare", one rather positive, named

"Smartphone ", where the transition is socially desired and implemented, and one

rather negative, named "Hard Way", where the transition is imposed by the limits,

and suffered by the people.

The storylines of these 3 scenarios are displayed in the sections 4, 5 and 6 of the

report.

"Spacecraft"

"Spacecraft" (SC) describes a centralized transition process duly planned and

managed by governments and big industrial and financial stakeholders, in a rather

consensual movement among main GHGs emitting countries worldwide, driven by

the recognition of the limits (resources and climate), and the willingness to anticipate

and manage them in due time.

Centralized technologies (economies of scale) and innovation driven by big

industries, in particular the "green" ones, are the pillars of a fast World economic

development, respectful of the limits in natural resources and climate in this transition

process.

The scenario is named "Spacecraft" for three main reasons: a highly centralized

while cooperative project, the wedding of speed and technology, working well with

absolute physical limitation in resources.

"Smartphone"

"Smartphone " describes a smooth bottom-up transition from BAU to new welfare. It

starts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when it become obvious that

Governments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a real and effective

governance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climate change. Instead,

EU and member states governments, which are fully aware of the nature and

urgency of the climate and resources problems, rely as much as possible on local /

regional authorities, NGOs and citizens to address these issues.

ICTs, decentralized "green" technologies (economies of series) and innovation driven

by new, small size, industries accompany this "grass root" phenomenon.



More generally, globalization and multi-lateralism are more and more contested by

countries' populations in this scenario, paving the way to increased protectionism and

bilateral relations, within regional blocks.

The scenario is named "Smartphone " because it describes a bottom-up carbon

transition process in which social networking and ICTs plays a critical role both in

raising the awareness of the common people as regard limits in resources and

climate, and in designing and imposing local, decentralized solutions to these

problems.

"Hard Way"

"Hard Way" describes a carbon transition process which is imposed by the growing

problems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies to address

in due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment. To some

extent, Hard Way can be considered as a Business-as-usual scenario that account

for development/adjustment through violent/brutal crises.

It supposes the continuation of the current trends as regard selfishness of nations,

without emergence of citizens movement against it. More generally, globalization and

international relations continue to be driven exclusively by national interest

considerations in this scenario, paving the way for increasingly conflicting relations

among nations.



3.5 Scenario outlines

3.5.1 International context

Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way

1 International contextHigh international cooperation,

worldwide

Weak international cooperation

worldwide, regional blocksIsolationism and protectionism

1.1 Governance of global issues Global governance Local governance No governance

1.1.1 Climate change and GHG mitigationBinding targets on carbon intensity of

the GDP for main world players

Local climate plans with voluntary

targets of GHG emission per capitaNo target

1.1.2 Availability and Accessibility to oil

and gas resources

Oil and gas markets highly regulated

worldwide

Oil/gas production ceilings and bilateral

agreementsOil/gas production ceilings and market

1.1.3 World tradeGlobalisation efficient to boost the

world economy and tradeRestrictions to globalisation High protectionism

1.1.4 World finance No restriction to financial flows Some restrictions to financial flows Recurrent financial crises

1.2 Major world players policies and

constraintsUS and China heading, main emerging

countries and EU doing well

China and major emerging countries

heading, US resists, EU follower

China and major emerging countries

resisting, US and EU in crisis

1.2.1 USContinued leadership on technology,

high GDP growth

Technology leadership challenged by

China and some Emerging Countries,

medium GDP growth

Isolationism and low GDP growth

1.2.2 ChinaSuccessful continuation of the current

economic model, high GDP growth

Exports based economic model

challenged by moderate world economic

growth

Rising the internal demand is a top

priority, moderate GDP growth

1.2.3 Other Emerging CountriesSucessful economic strategy based

partly on internal demand, high GDP

growth

Moderate exports perspective slow

down the economic development,

medium GDP growth

Low exports perspective slow down

further the economic development,

low/medium GDP growth

1.2.4 EUSuccess on some niche technologies,

medium/high GDP growthEU follower, low GDP growth Recurrent economic crises



3.5.2 EU context


2 EU and member countries contextMedium/high GDP growth,

competitivity first

Low GDP growth, sustainability

first

low/negative GDP growth, escape

from "hell" first

2.1 Economic modelSuccessful continuation of the current

model, successful "Lisbon strategy"

Organized switch towards "beyond

GDP" model

Reccurent crises imposing de-facto a

"beyond GDP" model

2.1.1 Macro-economic objective function GDP maximization Welfare maximizationGDP maximization under severe

constraints

2.1.2 Role and intervention of EU and

member countries Governments

EU, member sates government and big

stake-holders holding sucessfully the

leadership

EU and member sates government

relying increasingly on local/regional

actors

EU, member sates government and big

stake-holders failing to hold or transmit

the leadership

2.1.3 Utility functions, consumption

model, preferences, life styles,...

Working more to earn more and

consume more

More time for oneself, welfare is not

only quantity

Unemployment and low salaries impose

a change in life styles

2.2 The social balance between

environment and wealthLooking for a macro-economic

optimumEnvironmental sustainability first

desparate, but unsuccessfull, quest for

wealth, for more and more people

2.2.1 Environment policies and ETS and taxation first Regulation and subsidies first A little bit of everything

2.2.2 Equity, social exclusion, social

protection, pensions

Social inequity & exclusion increasing,

but limited social unrest because of

increasing wealth

Social inequity & exclusion decreasing

Social inequity & exclusion increasing,

with recurrent social unrest and "system

D"

2.2.3 Education, values, icons, democracy As usual

Education is at the core of the social

transformation towards new values,

new icons

More authoritarian policies, democracy

suffers




2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and

stake-holders strategiesCentralized technologies and

economies of scale, big players

De-centralized technologies and

economies of series, new comers

Conflictual balance between centralized

and de-centralized technologies

2.3.1 Transport

Increasing average speeds for

passengers and freight within the

carbon constraint

New technology clusters with

decentralized electricity generation, high

speed trains

Switching away from gasoline and diesel

as fast as possible

2.3.2 Buildings

New energy-efficient concepts for new

buildings, standardized solutions for

retrofitting of existing buildings

Zero-energy and +energy building

concepts for new construction, drastic

retrofitting of existing buildings

Zero-energy and +energy building

concepts for new construction after a

while, energy switch

2.3.3 Materials

2.3.4 RenewablesMostly centralized: off-shore wind, CSP,

2nd generation biofuels

Mostly decentralized: PV, biomass for

CHPs, geothermy; limited centralized

renewables

Mostly decentralized: PV, biomass for

CHPs, geothermy; limited centralized

renewables

2.3.5 Network energy systems (electricity,

gas, heat/cool)

As usual, smart grids to shave the peak

demand

Heat/cool systems, local electricity

demand/supply balance thanks to

smart grids, gas stopped

As usual but less and less reliable, smart

grids to shave the peak demand



3.5.3 Local transitions


3 Local transitionsDriven by EU and MS

governmentsDriven by local/regional actors

Poorly driven by institutional

actors, people's decisions first

3.1 Local players policies and actions As usualKey role in designing and implementing

the post-carbon transitionAs usual

3.1.1 Municipalities and other

local/regional authorities

Mostly implement policies and measures

decided by governments

Decide and implemente successfully

climate plans As usual

3.1.2 Utilities and services As usualNew local and regional energy players

and services

Mostly "as usual", but some new local

and regional energy players and services

3.1.3 NGOs and citizens associationsLittle weight in major decisions, except

through national votes & politics

Strong weight in local and regional

decisions, active in implementation of

local "solutions"

Little weight in major decisions, except

through votes & politics

3.2 changes in urban schemesUrban sprawl continues, 1st rings

stabilized, densification of growing

cities

Urban sprawl reduced, core cities, 1st

rings and larger medium cities densified

Urban sprawl continues, core cities &

1st rings stabilized, densification of

growing small/medium cities

3.2.1 transport and energy networks,

spatial distribution of dwellings

More high income small households,

less jobs in core cities; more jobs and

less poors in 1st ring; large & dense

masstransit systems around core cities

More balanced social structures in all

urban areas; masstransit system

between core cities, 1st rings and main

surrounding small/medium cities

High income small households in core

cities, families in sparse settlements,

poors in 1st ring; mass transit systems

between core cities and 1st rings

3.2.2 distribution of urban functions Driven by density and fiscal policies;

business services going out from core

cities

New rules for new premisses, for

education, commerces and personal

services

As usual

3.2.3 city spatial networkingFast city networking among core cities,

and between core cities, 1st rings and

surrounding medium/small cities

Fast city networking among core cities,

and between core cities, 1st rings and

main surrounding medium cities

Fast city networking among core cities,

and between core cities & 1st rings;

limited elsewhere

3.2.4 land-use and cities energy

demand/supply balancingNot an issue

Local/regional energy demand / supply

balancing, a resilience target for most

cities

Cities more energy balanced with solar

harvesting and biomass




3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in

the EUNo significant change

Time value for oneself very high, less

material and more cultural/intelectual

Unemployment and lack of money force

people to change

3.3.1 How people move

Transport time budget unchanged,

speed increases steadily driven by high

GDP

Transport time budget unchanged,

speed stabilized, distances shortened

Transport time budget increases, speed

almost stabilized due to low GDP,

distances unchanged

3.3.2 Indoor comfortSocial standards up with income, gap

with social standards reduced

Social standards down because of new

behaviours, gap with social standards

reduced

Social standards unchanged, gap with

social standards increases because

economic context

3.3.3 How people work

Increasing labour time budget and

productivity are the driving forces; tele-

working and tele-meeting when

economically justified

Decreasing labour time budget and slow

progress in productivity; substitution

transport/ICTs very active, tele-working,

tele-meeting

Decreasing labour time budget because

lack of jobs, and increasing labour

productivity, tele-working and tele-

meeting popular for economic reasons

3.3.4 Micro energy consumers producers Marginal developmentThe core of the new energy/technology

paradigm

Significant development because of the

increasing lack of reliability of

conventional systems

3.3.5 LeisureTime budget reduced, strong

development of long distance out-door

leisure activities

Time budget increased by choice,

reduction of % of long distance out-door

leisure activities by choice

Time budget increased by force,

reduction of % of long distance out-door

leisure activities by force



4 Spacecraft

" Spacecraft": a highly centralized while cooperative project, the continuation of the

wedding of economic growth, speed ("doing fast6") and technology, working well with

absolute physical limitation in resources.

4.1 International context

A rather consensual and cooperative context worldwide, driven by the recognition of

the limits (resources and climate), and the willingness to anticipate and manage them

collectively in due time.

4.1.1 Governance of global issues

The PACT analytical work on governance which support this section is available in the PACT deliverable D4.2: "Risks and governance in the transition process towards post-carbon societies".

Climate change and GHG mitigation

After some hesitations, the UN negotiation process overcome the main difficulties at

the occasion of the post-2012 Kyoto Protocole discussions. IPCC is not challenged

anymore, and its conclusions and warnings are taken very seriously by all major

countries around the World.

Most countries of the World, including Emerging Countries, North America, Europe

and Asian and Pacific OECD, agree on a common position on how to achieve a

macro-economic optimum, which is: a) to commit themselves to mandatory reduction

objectives of the carbon intensity of the GDP, accounting for carbon content of

imported and exported goods; b) to use extensively flexible mechanisms to trade

carbon internationally.

In counterpart for the adhesion of the poorest countries to the new Protocole, rich

countries (mostly OECD) accept to pay for their adaptation to climatic change.

Availability and accessibility to oil and gas resources


are mostly driven by prices on international and regional markets. In order to secure

6 The concept of "doing fast" is developed in PACT deliverable D1



the return on exploration-production investment and avoid turbulences on the market

prices, long term contracts constitute the main trading mechanism. Oil and gas

producers and consumers reinforce their relations in order to prevent price shocks.

This could be done within an international, well-balanced institution that could

emerge from a renewed IEA, or/and through upstream/downstream re-integration of

oil and gas industries.

World trade

WTO is strengthened and all World countries join progressively the institution.

Protectionism decreases everywhere, which favours World trade dynamics. No

barriers are settled to compensate for international discrepancies in GHG mitigation

efforts, although GHG embodied in imports/exports is accounted for in CO2 intensity

targets. On the contrary, countries are allowed to partly compensate, through import

taxes, differences in social protection costs.

World finance

The role of IMF is increased, in particular for avoiding major financial crisis that could

jeopardize the World economic development, and for paying for adaptation in poor

countries. Financing investment in developing countries becomes progressively

easier and more secure, for an increasing number of countries, high financial

resources being available and more controlled worldwide.

4.1.2 Policies, opportunities and constraints of major World players

In this scenario, major international players are assumed to continue more or less

their policies and adapt to constraints and opportunities in a rather "business-as-

usual" perspective.

USA

In such an international environment, the USA is expected to enjoy a high GDP

growth, mostly due to the continuation of their technology leadership which boosts

their high value exports.

Binding targets on GHG intensity appear therefore rather easy to reach, thanks to a

high GDP growth mostly supported by low energy/GHG intensity goods and services.

The US doctrine as regard energy security is almost unchanged, although their

foreign policy turns progressively to multi-lateralism along with the overall movement

of increased international cooperation.



China

The dynamism of World trade continues to boost Chinese exports of manufactured

products, resulting in high economic growth perspectives for China for several

decades in this scenario.

To maintain their export potentials, enterprises in China succeed in moderating the

increase of wages, thanks to the huge reserves of workers coming from rural areas;

this would moderate therefore the increase of the internal demand.

Targets on GHG intensity may prove rather difficult to reach, despite a high GDP

growth, because the growth is still supported by the production of manufactured

goods, some of them being rather energy/GHG intensive. Indeed, the accounting of

GHG embodied in imports and exports released the constraint, but, because of the

moderate increase of the internal demand, manufactured goods will still constitute the

bulk of this demand.

China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets, in

particular to make sure that energy shortage won't threat its industrial development

and its export policy.

Multilateralism will be enhanced in China, while the Yuan will be progressively re-

evaluated to avoid major clash with big importing countries and World financing

institutions.

Other Emerging Countries

The other Emerging Countries are expected to continue to suffer from the

competition of China on exports of manufactured goods, but they succeed

implementing high GDP growth strategies mostly supported by internal demands.

Targets on GHG intensity are more or less difficult to reach according to countries,

because of the actual content of the GDP growth in the various countries.

For these countries, in the international environment of this scenario, energy security

is not so much a critical issue.

All these countries work out to develop tighter relations with the USA, China and

Europe. Regional economic relations (Mercosur and ASEAN) are developing slowly.

The European Union

The EU is expected to experience a moderate-to-high GDP growth in this scenario,

thanks to a high World demand for its high value products and services. But the

fierce competition of China and Emerging Countries for current goods and services,



as well as the technology leadership of the USA, do not allow the EU to hope for very

high GDP growth rates in the coming decades in such a scenario.

East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to decline under

the combined effect of economic growth and EU political reinforcement.

Targets on GHG intensity are rather easy to reach for the EU, thanks to the speed

and content of the GDP growth, and because the on-going mitigation efforts.

No major changes should be expected in this scenario for the EU, as regard energy

security issues and international partnership.

4.2 The EU and member countries context

As already said, "Spacecraft" (SC) describes a top-down transition process duly

driven by governments and big stakeholders, who at the same time decide what is

good for the common people (what welfare is) and how to provide it.

4.2.1 Economic model

In "Spacecraft", the EU as a whole and member countries are doing rather well in

GDP growth. How this is achieved, what policies are implemented, to what

consumption model it corresponds, these are the questions that we will address

hereafter to describe the economic model supporting the favourable GDP growth

perspectives. A particular focus is put on three main aspects as regard modelling

purposes: human capital, role of state, values and preferences.

Human capital

Policies dedicated to immigration, birth rate and women activity, working time and

retirement, education, are driven by considerations of GDP maximization within a

international context of fierce economic competition.

Combining a revitalized birth rate with a high level of women participation in the

labour market, as in France today, becomes rapidly a shared objective for the EU

and all the member countries. Measures such as high allowances for 2 to 3 children

families, widespread government supported daycares, social promotion of mothers at

work, etc...may help reaching such an objective. The EU as a whole is back to 1,9

children per woman between 2030 and 2050, while the percentage of women in the

labour market reaches 80% in 2050 (46% in 2000).

Immigration, in particular of high skill people from Emerging Countries and other

emergent countries, is highly supported in the EU, despite residues of nationalism

that fade out along with the resuming economic growth. The growing trend in



immigration from outside the EU speeds up to reach some 2 million people annually

in 2050.

The historical declining trend of the average annual working time in Europe is

expected to smooth down and then to reverse between 2020 and 2030: in 2050,

people will work a little more (2%) than in 2000. This increase is the same for the

average retirement age: the declining historical trend reverse between 2000 and

2020 (already achieved in many countries), the average retirement age reaching 69

years in 2050 against 60 in 2000.

Education policies are mostly focused on the objective to get the appropriate labour

force with the appropriate education and skill levels at the right time to operate the

most efficiently the economic machine. In particular, these policies aim at boosting

the participation level of the youngsters in the university: in 2050, it is expected that

70% of a 25-50 years age class would be graduated from university, against 22% in

2000.

Role and intervention of EU and member states governments

"Spacecraft" is a scenario in which innovation and clean technology development are

the back-bone of the economic growth. This implies a strong support to innovation

and clean business development from EU and member states governments.

More generally, this scenario is characterized by a strong leadership of Governments

and main industrial and financial stakeholders in the transition process. One

manifestation of this leadership is a strong movement of re-regulation of all energy

related businesses, energy being the main source of GHGs emissions.

Another manifestation, that the re-regulation would certainly ease considerably, is a

strong investment policy in strategic capital intensive technologies & infrastructures,

both in energy production and in main energy end-uses (strategic according to the

"Spacecraft" logic). This means in particular a vigorous policy support to nuclear and

centralized renewables (off-shore wind, CSP,...), and to EU high speed train

networks.

In the POLES model, this is captured through two main exogenous inputs which drive

the competition between these capital intensive technologies and infrastructures, and

alternative solutions:

- the discount rates associated with these investments, which are used to translate

both a higher security for private investment due to public guarantee, and a

significant share of public investment;

- the investment costs of the capital intensive technologies and infrastructures being

promoted, which are used to translate both a reduction in private costs due to lower

transaction costs and accelerated investment procedures, and to learning and series

effect.



Taxation, subsidizing and pricing are the main policy instruments used by EU and

national Governments to make sure that the huge investments in capital intensive

technologies and infrastructures will be cost-effective, and to orient consumers

decisions towards targeted technologies and services. The key measures taken by

Governments in this scenario, which can be quantified through POLES exogenous

inputs, are: CO2 taxation, feed-in tariffs for nuclear and renewables, subsidizing

energy efficiency.

Life styles and consumption model

In general terms, "Spacecraft" is a scenario in which Governments and main

stakeholders succeed in fostering a "green economic growth" with high economic

performances, that minimize behavioural and life-styles impacts on common people,

except as regard environmental aspects. Practically, this means that environmental

awareness will be included in education programmes at an early stage, resulting in

an increasing share of the environmental friendliness dimension in utility functions.

But for the rest, only little change can be expected in these utility functions.

In particular, attitudes towards wasting are not expected to change a lot, except when

the relation to environment is immediate (tap water waste for example).

Human capital is the main fuel of the economic performances in this scenario: which

means, as already seen, increasing education and skill in the one side, and

increasing the size and intensiveness of the labour force in the other side. This

results in limitations for increase of the time budget for self-accomplishment, and in

particular for leisure, but more money will be spent on leisure activities: this is likely to

boost low cost air transport for outdoor leisure activities, electronic devices and

services for in-door leisure.

But such constraints on time-budget for self-accomplishment can be durably

accepted by the European population only if it emerges that the marginal benefit of

not working an extra hour (= the value attached to leisure) becomes lower than the

marginal earnings (salary) from this extra work hour. In other words, as President

Sarkozy suggested to the French people, if common people agree to work more to

earn more. Although this was not historically the case in European countries, the

North-American experience shows that this may well happen also in Europe in the

coming decades.

In the VLEEM model, time budget for self-accomplishment is directly impacted by

time-budget for paid work. Two exogenous inputs are nevertheless used to specify

how the time-budget for self-accomplishment is used, and how it impacts the needs

of energy services:

- the share of activities outside the home (out-door) versus inside (in-door) in this

time-budget



- the share of long distance mobility in out-door activities.

In general terms, "Spacecraft" is a scenario where people are doing things faster and

faster: because the marginal value of time increases substantially, and because the

number of consumption opportunities "within 24hours a day" also increases

dramatically.

4.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth

In "Spacecraft", EU and member countries are committed to binding targets on GHG

intensity of the GDP, that include GHG content of imports, but also flexibility

instruments allowing them to purchase GHG credits from abroad on a rather large

scale. The resulting level of carbon constraint is primarily internalized through carbon

prices, with complementary policies and measures where such internalization is not

feasible or inefficient.

Environment policies and instruments

GHG quotas are imposed to all big emitters: electricity generation, industries,

transport companies, big tertiary. Their magnitude is calibrated according to the

binding targets.

The emission trading system (ETS) is expanded in scope and modalities. It is

generalized to all emitters subject to quotas, and includes possibilities of purchasing

large amounts of GHG credit from abroad or through flexibility mechanisms (Clean

Development Mechanisms -CDM- for example). The carbon price on this European

carbon market is therefore highly correlated to other carbon markets and binding

targets worldwide.

GHG taxation is implemented for small emitters not subject to quotas, and its level is

derived from the trading system (which does not mean that the tax level must be

necessarily identical to the carbon price on the ETS). There is no taxation of carbon

embodied in imports, although this carbon has to be included in binding targets.

In POLES model, this is captured with the exogenous inputs "carbon price", which

can be differentiated among countries, and among sectors within each country.

Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances are generalized to new

buildings and road vehicles, but rather limited for other existing or new devices.

In VLEEM, this is captured through exogenous inputs related to either specific useful

energy consumption levels (new buildings mainly), or through new technologies

deployment (vehicles mainly).

As already said, feed-in tariffs for nuclear and renewables, and subsidies/tax credit

for energy efficiency are also part of the policy instruments in this scenario.



In addition, green and white certificates are generalized for small emitters as a mean

to force third party financing of households investments in renewables and energy

efficiency.

Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensions

There is no particular policy targeted on households income/affluence structure:

governments and major stakeholders continue to believe that a high GDP growth is

enough to solve the social problems related to inequity.

On the same line, nothing is done to modify the on-going trend as regard the social

lodging of poor people, often concentrated in high rise buildings in suburbs of big

cities and small/medium towns.

Social/health expenses coverage systems continue to work as they are today, with

very little change, in the western part of Europe, while they progress more

significantly in the eastern part.

The pension systems reflect both the policies as regard retirement, and the

willingness of the governments not to change too much the rules of the game as

regard social issues. Practically, this means the continuation of a mixed pension

system based partly on repartition, partly on capitalization, with altogether rather high

pension levels calibrated on average salaries.

In VLEEM, this is captured through the diversities in the consumption pattern of the

households according to the age of household's head (in particular retired people),

and through the dwellings location according to the households categories.

Education, values, icons, democracy

Little change in this scenario as regard the content of basic education of children,

except environment and climate change.

As a result, such values as "thriftiness" or "going slow" hardly diffuse in the

population and remain limited to marginal categories. Getting higher income, as fast

as possible, remains the objective function of a large majority of the population.

The main social icons are still related to technology and innovation.

Democracy continues working as usual, with national and EU parliaments playing a

dominant role in the transition process, and with little social control on major choices

on technologies and infrastructures.

This is captured in the models by high speeds of development of these new

centralized technologies and infrastructures and low transaction and implementation

costs.



4.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies

"Spacecraft" is highly technology oriented. The common belief among decision

makers and common people is that technology will "save the World": it is mostly a

matter of getting the appropriate technologies at the right time.

This section is based partly on the analytical work of PACT phase 1, which is

accessible in the PACT deliverables D2, chapter 2 (transport), chapter 3 (buildings),

chapter 4 (renewables) and D3, chapter 4 (industry and materials).

Transport

Speed is a master-word in this "doing fast" scenario. This means in particular that a

strong effort is put on high speed infrastructures for long distance transport:

motorways in Eastern Europe, European high speed trains network for passengers

and freight, airports development for low cost companies.

Road transport is one of the most important area for technology innovation in this

scenario. The European car industry succeeds in keeping a leading role in the World

competition thanks to its innovation strategy in car concepts, fuels and motorization:

electric urban cars, high efficiency and biofuels for conventional vehicles (ICE7), plug-

in hybrids for cars and light vehicles, hydrogen and fuel cells, hybrid trucks for

electrified highways8.

Except for high speed trains, the public support to non road transport remains "as

usual".

Buildings

Low energy buildings become mandatory in construction after 2015 in all EU

countries in this scenario. Among them, passive buildings remain limited until 2025

everywhere: between 0% for small and high rise buildings up to 20% for single family

houses. Afterwards, passive housing concept develop rapidly for single family houses

(SFH), except in Northern Europe: they account for more than half of the SFH built

between 2025 and 2050 in West, East and South Europe. For small and high rise

buildings, this "passive" concept remains at low levels everywhere.

For existing buildings, there is no mandatory targets for thermal retrofitting, except for

social housing. Nevertheless, the combined effect of price incentives (in particular

carbon tax) , "white certificates" and innovation in retrofitting techniques, result in a

drastic reduction of energy consumption for space heating in all kinds of dwellings,

everywhere in Europe.

7 Internal Combustion Engine

8 B. Bougnoux: "Demain, des autoroutes électrifiées ?" in Futuribles, to be published



Materials

There is no particular change in the on-going trends as regard the inclusion of soft

materials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction in this scenario.

The substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging still

remains driven by costs/prices, without particular public incentives.

Recycling of major used materials (steel, aluminium, plastics, glass, paper) is

generalized..

Renewables

In "Spacecraft" scenario, there is a strong public and private support to the

development of centralized renewables dedicated to electricity generation and

substitutes for oil based motor-fuels.

Off-shore wind-power is expected to develop at a high speed, to a high magnitude.

CSP (Concentrated Solar Power) is also expected to develop quickly and in large

amounts in southern Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the rest

of Europe. Photovoltaïcs and direct solar heat would develop mostly in low density

areas, in particular in South Europe.

Thanks to a strong R&D public support, 2nd generation biofuels can be produced

extensively in cost-effective conditions after 2030. Other energy uses of biomass

(direct use, biogas,...:) will remain driven mostly by costs and prices.

Network energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool)

As in other scenarios, electricity will increase significantly its market share in final

energy demand, raising increasing peak demand problems. Smart grids and smart

metering will then be developed essentially to allow increasingly demand response

solutions to shave this peak demand.

Gas networks are expected to continue their deployment in all EU member countries

without particular constraints.

District heating and cooling networks are also expected to continue their deployment

in a business-as-usual (BAU) perspective, where applicable (from an economic

viewpoint).

4.3 Local transitions



In "Spacecraft" scenario, local transitions are mostly driven by policies and strategies

decided and implemented by Governments and big players. Local players still play an

important role, but limited to the practical implementation of the national and EU

policy measures. As said earlier, these policies and strategies aim at changing at

least as possible the current rules of the game of the economy and the society.

4.3.1 Local players policies and actions

This section is partly supported by the analytical work carried out in PACT phase 1 on "anticipatory experiences", and accessible in PACT deliverable D4.1.2 "Societal Dynamics of Energy Transition". The scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal for

such interventions are supposed to remain mostly unchanged in this scenario as

compared to the existing situation.

Municipalities and other local/regional authorities

The fields of intervention of municipalities and other local/regional authorities are

supposed to remain limited to buildings (construction rules and retrofitting), urban and

regional transport infrastructures and services, and local energy supply (mostly

district heating and cooling).

The main instruments are economic (local taxation, pricing and subsidies mostly),

local/regional infrastructure investment and partly regulation.

The logic of theses interventions is basically to finance subsidies and investment with

the revenues of local taxes and infrastructure prices (parking fees, tolls,...).

Their main targets are: building retrofitting, development of public transport for urban

and regional passengers transport, and use of wastes and biomass in local CHP's

(Combine Heat and Power) connected to district heat networks where applicable.

Utilities and services

District heating and cooling services continue to be developed "as usual", within

unchanged market structures.

Electricity continues to be mostly supplied from national grids and large power plants,

with nevertheless some contributions from local CHPs.

There is little development of new integrated energy supply/efficiency services, with

still a clear separation between energy suppliers and demand services in most cases.



Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and citizens associations

Innovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development, including

energy, continue to be implemented here and there, driven by local/regional

institutions, NGOs and citizen association, but they fail to initiate a widespread

replication movement. They remain mostly isolated experiences, because a too wide

gap with the preferences and values of common people in this scenario.

The national policy burden on local authorities as regard climate change remains

small in this scenario, since the focus is massively on technology, which is largely

beyond the scope of intervention of local/regional authorities.

As a consequence, there is only limited monitoring, evaluation and follow-up at the

local and regional levels, the bulk of it being under the responsibility of national

authorities, and submitted to polls constraints.

Education and public awareness as regard environment remains limited, except for

climate change issues.

4.3.2 changes in urban schemes

Analysis of urban schemes to be considered in post-carbon studies and related

definitions of urban areas considered to capture evolutions in urban schemes are to

be found in PACT deliverable D1, chapter 3: "Urbanization and land-use pattern".

Four main evolutions characterize the "Spacecraft" scenario as regard urban

schemes: urban sprawl continues, 1st rings are stabilized, growing cities are

densified (population and jobs) and fast networking among cities is developed.

transport and energy networks, spatial distribution of dwellings

core cities

There is first a large movement of requalification of public space in core cities, aiming

at giving more space for fast public transport and easing the extension /

implementation of district heating / cooling networks where applicable.

There is also a movement towards the requalification of buildings, in particular to

increase the ratio residents / jobs, without necessarily an increase in the average

density (residents + jobs per km²). In other words the resident population and the

number of dwellings are expected to increase in core cities, while the number of jobs

would decrease.

1st ring

This scenario is characterized in particular by a densification of residents and jobs

population in the 1st rings of core cities. This densification results from the migration



of jobs from the core cities while the resident population remains stable. It is

permitted by the re-construction of industrial and commercial waste land mostly, and

partly from the reconstruction, with small and big buildings, of areas previously built

with single family houses .

The other main characteristics of this scenario is a comprehensive integration of

rapid mass transit systems with core cities, and with most small/medium cities in the

periphery.

Extension of district heating / cooling networks remains mostly driven by prices and

costs, with a driving force coming from the densification.

small/medium cities

As in 1st ring, a key aspect of this scenario is the increase and densification of

residents and jobs in small/medium cities, which is permitted by the development of

rapid mass transit system among these cities, and with core cities and 1st rings

nearby (for cities not totally isolated).

Another characteristic is a widespread development of gas networks even in small

cities, which is driven by the attractiveness of this energy for residents and tertiary

services, and allowed by the densification.

sparse settlements

The main feature of "Spacecraft" is the continuation of the increase of the resident

population in sparse settlements, permitted by the average speed increase in daily

transport and the growing income of active people. Nevertheless, this increase is

moderated by three factors: social (aging population), economic (high transport

costs) and political (increased administrative difficulties to build new houses in sparse

settlements).

Another feature of this scenario is the development of car/mass transit platforms at

small/medium city points, in order to avoid car trips from sparse settlements to core

cities and 1st rings.

Spatial distribution of urban functions

For commerce and education, no major change is to be expected as regards the

existing relation between population density and location of premises.

For health and services to the public (post, banks,...), it is expected that the location

of premises will remain driven by costs per person in the catchment area: therefore,

density is likely to be also one of the main drivers of the location.



For other services, whose location is also driven by costs, local fiscal policies are

expected to contribute to a movement from core cities to 1rings and small/medium

cities nearby.

city spatial networking

As said earlier, widespread fast city spatial networking is a particular feature of

"Spacecraft" scenario.

At national and EU level, this means that most EU core cities will be connected

among themselves with either high speed trains or/and low-cost airlines

At regional level, this means that fast mass transit systems will be expanded /

developed first to connect core cities and 1st rings to surrounding small/medium

cities (star development), and then to connect small/medium cities among

themselves (ring development).

Within core cities and 1st rings, the regional mass transit systems is expected to be

fully interconnected to the urban fast public transport systems.

land-use and cities energy supply balancing

Energy supply is mostly centralized in this scenario. This means that energy supply /

demand is expected to remain deeply unbalanced at city level, cities being massively

net energy importers and rural areas massively net exporters. The only noticeable

exceptions are:

- for core cities and 1st rings, the use of geothermal energy (where available) and

wastes to supply district heating networks, when applicable.

- for small and medium cities, and in sparse settlements, the direct use of solar

energy (PV, water heaters), in particular in south Europe.

In general terms, there is no particular land-use conflict raised by energy harvesting

in urban and peri-urban areas in this scenario. This might not be the case elsewhere,

in particular in regions supplying feedstocks for biofuels and where CSP are installed.

4.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU

This section is partly supported by the analytical work carried out in PACT phase 1,

and more precisely by PACT deliverable D2, chapter 5: "Life-style in post-carbon

societies in different urban forms and European countries".

There is little change expected in this scenario as regard current trends in daily life.



How people move

The historical correlations between GDP/capita and average travel speeds are

expected to continue in this scenario, both for passengers and freight. In VLEEM, this

is captured in keeping constant the elasticities of travel speed to GDP.

Daily transport time budget is expected to remain mostly constant, as in the past

(Zahavi's conjecture9), while utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase,

in particular in fast trains and fast mass transit. This is captured in VLEEM through

assumptions on daily transport time budget per person according to residence

location. For long distance trips, the time-budget is related to the time budget for

outdoor leisure activities: week-ends and holidays (see below).

The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality remain mostly

driven by speed, autonomy, convenience and comfort. Therefore, the current

motorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which only depends on where

the people live, their age and the structure of the households. This is captured in

VLEEM with assumptions on saturation levels according to households categories

and residence location.

Nevertheless, for long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speed

trains, low cost airlines and fast mass transit systems progressively outset the use of

cars, for two reasons: speed and convenience (utility of transport time). This is

captured in VLEEM in the following way:

- for long distance, assumptions on the average speed of cars

- for urban and regional trips, assumptions on the share of cars in trips.

Indoor comfort

The social standards regarding thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumed

to be mostly driven by income and age. The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability to

meet the social standards, is assumed to be driven only by income and prices.

As regard sanitary comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to be

driven mostly by income and age.

Life comfort at home is assumed to be mostly determined by equipment variety and

pattern of use, which are assumed to be mostly driven by income.

How people work

9 Y. ZAHAVI, J.M. RYAN, 1980a, « Stability of travel components over time »,

Transportation research record, n°750, pp. 19-26



There is little change expected in the way people work, except a continuation of the

current transformations brought about by the information technologies. Tele-working

is assumed to remain driven mostly by productivity concerns, while tele-meeting

remains driven mostly by travel costs.

Micro energy consumers producers

There is only a little development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,

mostly located in South Europe.

This concerns first PV on buildings, which continues to be connected to the national

grid directly. Indeed, electric cars and plug-in hybrids develop, in particular in core

cities and suburbs, but there is no particular linkage between batteries loading and

PV installations. More generally, there is no global management of the batteries as a

component of the electricity system.

Other self-generation of electricity in buildings, continue developing slow along the

current trends.

Leisure

In the leisure time budget structure, the most striking feature of this scenario is the

increase of the share of outdoor leisure, week-ends and short holidays mostly.

Week-ends outside, which means 3 hours travel maximum, increase in frequency

and length, thanks to the increasing availability of fast modes, fast trains and air (in

particular low cost).

Evolutions of holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:

- time spent in holidays is expected to decrease (higher value of time in relation to

higher income)

- but their frequency is expected to increase (higher income);

- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to increase, thanks to the

economic growth and more peaceful international environment.



5 Smartphone

"Smartphone " : a bottom-up carbon transition process in which ICTs and social

networking plays a critical role both in raising the awareness of the common people

as regard limits in resources and climate, and in designing and imposing local,

decentralized solutions to these problems.


"Smartphone " starts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when it

become obvious that Governments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a real

and effective governance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climate

change. More generally, globalization and multi-lateralism are more and more

contested by countries' populations in this scenario, paving the way to increased

protectionism and bilateral relations within regional blocks.



The UN negotiation process cannot overcome the main difficulties at the occasion of

the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol discussions and no new quantitative targets are settled,

despite IPCC warnings.

This means in particular that a) despite a considerable awareness about climate

change issues, almost no country accept to commit itself to mandatory carbon

reduction objectives b) the flexible mechanisms to trade carbon internationally

disappear.

Instead, in particular in the EU, there is a strong movement at the level of

municipalities, regional authorities, NGOs and common citizens, in favour of drastic

reductions in fossil fuels consumptions and CO2 emissions, supported and eased by

central governments. The percentage of people living and working in cities and

conurbations adopting and implementing climate plans with drastic reductions in CO2

emissions is increasing steadily.

Rich countries (mostly OECD) accept to pay for the adaptation to climatic change of

the poorest countries, but under drastic conditions.





account more and more for domestic population claims and geo-political aspects.

This means in particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in the

Persian Gulf.

Bilateral long term contracts constitute the main trading mechanism. Oil and gas

producers and consumers reinforce bilateral relations. The role of international

organizations like IEA or OPEP remains mostly as it is today.

World trade

WTO is more and more challenged, but continues "as-usual" with some adaptation.

Nevertheless protectionism tends to increase, which slows down World trade

development. Barriers are settled to compensate for international discrepancies in

GHG emissions performances. Rich countries tend to protect themselves against the

social dumping through import taxes.

World finance

The role of IMF is "as-usual", mostly focused to avoid major financial crisis that could

jeopardize the World economic development. Financing investment in developing

countries is becoming easier and less risky, but financial resources are limited. The

US becomes more and more challenged, and they cannot continue to increase their

debt thanks to international transfers.

5.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players

USA

In such an international environment, the USA are expected to enjoy a moderate-to-

low GDP growth, because of a low World economic growth and because their

technology leadership is being challenged by China and Emerging Countries.

There is no federal quantified objective as regard climate change, but an increasing

number of states and big cities commit themselves with very ambitious climate plans.

The US doctrine as regard energy security is "back to independence".

There is a privileged economic partnership with China.



China

The stagnation of the World trade moderate the economic growth perspectives of

China in this scenario. To compensate, Chinese companies are expected to target

more and more the domestic market.

Therefore, wages have to increase more rapidly, in order to the increase the internal

demand in China.

After some successful experiments of ambitious city climate plan based on carbon

ceilings per capita, the Chinese government decides to impose such ceilings to all

Chinese cities. In addition, a quota-trading system for CO2 is implemented, with also

ambitious targets.

China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets.

Bi-lateral relations with the USA will be enhanced.


The other Emerging Countries are expected to follow with success GDP growth

strategies mostly supported by internal demands, but the weakness of the World

economy slow down somehow their GDP growth perspectives.

As in "Spacecraft" rapid increases in wages and incomes are expected.

Environmental concerns are expected to increase a lot in these countries, forcing

municipalities and Governments to adopt ambitious climate policies.

Because of the international environment of this scenario, energy security is

becoming a critical issue in these countries, leading to the adoption of ambitious

independence targets.

Regional economic relations (Mercosur and ASEAN) are expected to develop rapidly

and deeply in this scenario.

The European Union

The EU is expected to experience a low -but smart, much better distributed- GDP

growth in this scenario, for two reasons: a weak World demand for its high value

products and services, and a depressed internal demand resulting from deep

changes in people preferences and consumption pattern.

East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to decrease

rather quickly, mostly because the more depressed internal demand in the richer

west countries.



EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. In addition, there is a strong social

movement towards environmental concerns that ease the adoption and

implementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions.

Energy security issues are on the top of the EU political agenda as regard energy.


As already said, "Smartphone " (SP) describes a bottom-up transition process driven

by a widespread social movement in favour of a new consumption model and a new

relation to the natural environment.


In "Smartphone ", the EU as a whole and member countries are not doing so well in

GDP growth. How this can work from a social point of view, what consumption model

is behind, these are the questions that we will address hereafter to describe the

economic model supporting the low GDP growth perspectives.

Human capital

There is a clear social preference for a life more balanced between jobs, family and

self-accomplishment in this scenario. Policies dedicated to immigration, birth rate and

women activity, working time and retirement, education, are driven by these welfare

considerations, within a international context with more protectionism.

Birth rate is expected to increase again slowly to reach stability levels around 2050

(1,9 children / woman) while women participation in the labour market tends to reach

a saturation level around 60% after 2030 (46% in 2000). As in Germany today,

participation in the labour market is often seen as not compatible with children care.

The labour market is progressively adapted to allow one of the parents to take long

leaves for children care, and come back to job afterwards. Which means that the

saturation level (60%) does not mean that 40% of women keep out from jobs all their

life, but that altogether, 20% of the total labour force is on leave for children care.


emergent countries, is expected to be welcome in the EU, but residues of nationalism

and increased protectionism moderate the immigration flows. The growing trend in

immigration from outside the EU slows down, to reach some 1,5 millions people

annually in 2050 (1,1 in 2000).

The historical declining trend of the average annual working time in Europe is

expected to continue steadily: in 2050, people would work almost 20% less than in

2000. Same for the average retirement age: after a reverse trend between 2000 and

2020 (already achieved in many countries), the declining historical trend would



resume, the average retirement age reaching in 2050 the same level than in 2000

(60).

Education policies aim at boosting the participation level of the youngsters in the

university: in 2050, it is expected that 65% of a 25-50 years age class would be

graduated from university, against 22% in 2000 (a bit less than in "Spacecraft

scenario for economic reasons). These policies are expected to be more balanced

than today between the still predominant economic objective (to get the appropriate

labour force with the appropriate education and skill levels at the right time to operate

the most efficiently the economic machine), and enhanced objectives in culture (in

relation to the increasing social preference and time-use for self-accomplishment)

and social link (in relation to the growing importance of collective goods).


"Smartphone " is a scenario in which the transition is a bottom-up process. This

means that the role of EU and member states is not so much to lead the transition,

but to create the appropriate conditions for this bottom-up process to happen and

develop.

This means first a change in the balance of power and financial means between

central governments and local / regional ones, in favour of the latter.

This means also a strong policy support to the equipment and appropriate use of

information technologies by the people, starting at school.

Last, the laws are adapted to encourage and protect decentralized initiatives in

energy and environment services, while subsidizing mechanisms are systematically

implemented by EU and national governments to support these initiatives. One

consequence would be a re-regulation, if not a re-nationalisation, of big electricity

and gas utilities.

The role of central governments will be also to create the appropriate economic

conditions for energy efficiency technologies and behaviours to develop massively.

This would imply in particular a radical reform of energy pricing (increasing prices

with consumption) and taxation.

The economic and financial context of this scenario is not so favourable for capital

intensive technologies & infrastructures to develop on a large scale, and there is no

clear policy support for this except for EU ICTs and high speed train networks.

In the POLES model, this is captured through:

- high discount rates associated with these investments, which translate both a higher

risk for private investment, and a low level of public investment;

- high investment costs of the capital intensive technologies and infrastructures,

which translate both higher private costs due to high transaction costs and longer

investment procedures, and to very limited earning and series effect.



Subsidizing and regulation are the main policy instruments used by EU and national

Governments to make distributed energy supply cost-effective, and to orient

consumers decisions towards local / regional energy services. The key measures

taken by Governments in this scenario, which can be quantified through POLES

exogenous inputs, are: subsidizing energy efficiency and distributed renewables,

norms for energy efficiency in buildings and cars.


In general terms, "Smartphone " is a "beyond GDP" scenario type in which the usual

quest for economic performances is more balanced by growing concerns about other

aspects of the quality of life, including time-use, goods quality and environmental

friendliness.

Practically, this means drastic changes in utility functions, which would account more

and more for new dimensions as time-use, environmental friendliness,...

In particular, attitudes towards wasting are expected to change a lot, with due

consequences on materials recycling and waste management.

Education less focused on productivity in the one side, and decreasing size and

intensiveness of the labour force in the other side, will result in rather low economic

growth perspective. Therefore, an increasing share of the active population will

experience more time-budget for self-accomplishment, in particular for leisure, while

changes in income redistribution will result in less money to spend in leisure activities

for the wealthier part of the population: this is likely to reduce drastically the share of

expensive outdoor leisure activities (in particular long distance).

This requires a) that people's consumption preferences move towards leisure and

cultural goods and services for which utility depends more on time spent than on

variety b) that the marginal benefit of not working an extra hour (= marginal value of

leisure) grows more rapidly than the marginal earnings (salary) from this extra work

hour, which has been the case in most European countries over the 20th century.

.


In "Smartphone", EU and member countries are fully aware of the problems related

to oil/gas resources and climate change, but fail to convince other main countries to

adopt drastic targets on GHG emissions. Consequently, they refuse to commit

themselves unilaterally to something else than moderate targets. Instead, they

encourage and facilitate the strong voluntary movement at the local and regional

levels towards much more drastic reductions of GHG emissions.




The ETS is supposed to continue more or less as it is today, with increasing

constraints on GHG quotas imposed to big emitters: electricity generation, industries,

air transport companies, big tertiary. Their magnitude is calibrated according to the

binding targets, which are rather moderate.

The European carbon market remains mostly isolated, with almost no more flexible

instruments; the price of carbon on this market is therefore not correlated to other

carbon markets worldwide.

The Governments fail to impose GHG taxation where it does not exist, and fail to

increase CO2 tax where it already exist.

Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances are generalized to new

buildings and road vehicles at national levels, but almost inexistent for other existing

or new devices.

Instead, as a consequence of ambitious local climate plan, there is a strong local and

regional movement in favour of buildings retrofitting, with ambitious targets, partially

subsidized, but submitted to financial constraints due to the low economic growth.

Subsidies for energy efficiency and distributed renewables are also part of the local /

regional policy instruments in this scenario.

In addition, green and white certificates are generalized for small emitters as a mean

to force third party financing of households investments in distributed renewables and

energy efficiency.


Social policies targeted on households income/affluence structure are implemented

in most EU countries to compensate for the low GDP growth and avoid an explosion

of inequity.

On the same line, improving the social lodging of poor people and favouring the

social mix within cities, is also considered by policy makers as a pre-requisite for

social peace.

Social/health expenses coverage systems is generalized everywhere in Europe.

Everybody is expected to become protected but the coverage of the social/health

expenses is reduced due to relatively low GDP. In parallel, thanks to more

appropriate and healthy people behaviour, and to the use of new health care

technologies that will reduce the need (and cost) of hospitalization, future health care

expenses are also expected to slow down despite people aging.

The pension systems have to adapt deeply to cope with retirement age and

downsizing of the labour force. Practically, this means the generalization of a flat



participation pension system combined with a reinforcement of capitalization, with

altogether rather slow pension levels increase calibrated on price indexes.


Some changes in this scenario as regard the content of basic education of children,

with more importance given to environment and climate change in the one side,

culture in the other side.

Values such as "thriftiness" or "going slow" become more and more popular through

the whole population. Getting higher income remains obviously an objective of a

large majority of the population, but less and less confused with the quality of life:

getting more time for oneself, living in a cleaner environment, eating more "natural",

... become more and more important for the common people .

The main social icons are less and less related to technology and innovation, and

more and more to "cleanliness" and "sustainability".

National and EU parliaments appear to be unable to lead the transition process, and

there is a strong reinforcement of role of the local / regional bodies, with a strong

reinforcement of the social control on major choices on technologies and

infrastructures.


"Smartphone " is oriented on small and smart technologies, which are supported by a

social movement towards more autonomy, more connectivity and more self-reliance.

Consumers want to become more and more actors as well, which is enabled by

network operators investing in smart grids. Nevertheless, few believe that technology

will "save the world". Individual behaviours and social organization appear as

important.

Transport

Mitigation of average travel speed increase is a key policy objective in this scenario.

Investment in new motorways and airport infrastructures is strongly reduced. Only

European high speed trains network for passengers and freight continue to be

developed.

Road transport is one of the most important area for GHG mitigation in this scenario,

both through speed limitations on road and through promotion of car concepts, fuels

and motorization with very low CO2 emissions "at the exhaust pipe": electric urban



cars, plug-in hybrids for cars and light vehicles, hybrid trucks for electrified

highways10.

At local and regional levels, there is a strong public support to the fast development

of public transport both road and rail.

For freight, new infrastructures in ports and waterways are developed.

Buildings

In this scenario, low energy buildings become mandatory in construction after 2015 in

all EU countries. After 2020, very low energy buildings (passive) and/or zero / +

energy buildings become mandatory for single family houses almost everywhere, and

for other buildings where it makes sense from an economic viewpoint.

For existing buildings, targets for thermal retrofitting are established within climate

plans of most cities, with subsidizing procedures. Nevertheless, the low economic

growth context slows down the speed of implementation and reduces the technical

possibilities.

Materials

Inclusion of soft materials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction becomes very

popular, and generalized in this scenario.

Some substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging still are

subject to public incentives, when life cycle analysis prove their relevance as regard

climate change.

Recycling of used materials is generalized for metals (steel, aluminium,..), plastics,

glass and paper.

Renewables

In "Smartphone " scenario, there is a strong public (local and regional) and private

support to the development of renewables dedicated to direct use and distributed

electricity generation.

PV on buildings is expected to develop at a high speed, to a high magnitude, along

with the regulations on zero / + energy buildings in construction. Same for heat

pumps, solar water heaters and direct use of biomass for heating purposes.

For zero / + energy buildings, it is expected that the electricity consumption of the

building is sized so as to be compatible with the solar input: this means in particular

the development of new electrical appliances, whose performances allow to get the

10

B. Bougnoux: "Demain, des autoroutes électrifiées ?" in Futuribles, to be published



same service with the limited available solar amount (as the Smartphone with the

battery).

CSP (Concentrated Solar Power) is also expected to develop in some amounts in

south Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the rest of Europe,

when economic conditions are favourable without specific public support. Same for

windpower in Northern/Western Europe.

Biofuels are submitted to binding targets, but at a rather moderate level.


This scenario is characterized in particular by a rapid and high deployment of the

distributed electricity generation, combined with a reinforcement of local / regional

governance. The structure of the national electricity networks is expected to change

drastically, with the emergence and development of new grid concepts combining

local balances between consumers and micro-suppliers and national interconnection.

Smart grids and smart metering concepts would play a key role in this evolution, as

well as car batteries managed as storage facilities for the local grids.

Gas networks are expected to slow down their deployment in all EU member

countries.

District heating and cooling networks, supported by local authorities, are expected to

develop rapidly in core cities and 1st rings, in particular as a mean to reinforce the

use of non-CO2 fuels (biomass and residues).


In "Smartphone " scenario, local transitions are the bulk of the overall transition

movement, and they are mostly driven by local and regional authorities in the one

side, citizens and NGOs in the other side. Local players play a critical role, both in the

design and the practical implementation of policy measures mostly decided at the

local and regional levels. These local and regional policies take fully account of

changes in social behaviours and consumption preferences to reach climate change

objectives within local climate plans.


The scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal for

such interventions are supposed to change a lot in this scenario as compared to the

existing situation.




In addition to buildings (construction rules and retrofitting), and urban and regional

transport infrastructures and services, the field of intervention of municipalities and

other local/regional authorities as regard energy management, supply and

distribution is widely opened.

Climate plans become mandatory for all conurbations and cities above 50000

inhabitants.

Retrofitting existing buildings, both dwellings and tertiary, become mandatory within

these climate plans, with an appropriate mechanism for subsidizing and sanctions.

Thanks to changes in national tax system, the financial availabilities of municipalities

and other local/regional authorities are drastically increased, and allow for ambitious

actions for subsidizing building retrofitting and local renewables, and for developing

local/regional infrastructure in transport and energy distribution and management.

National laws are adapted so as to allow local regulations to be implemented to

chase away all sources of diffused emissions of GHG above certain thresholds, for

vehicles and buildings.

These actions, incorporated in the local climate plans, do reflect the pressure that

citizens and NGOs put on the local and regional elected decision makers.

Their main targets are:

- building retrofitting, systematization of zero / +energy concepts in new construction

wherever relevant,

- development of public transport for urban and regional passengers transport,

- eradication of the use of Internal Combustion Engines (ICE) within the city

boundaries,

- generalization of local smart grids concepts, in particular to make distributed

electricity generation possible on a large scale and to manage the electricity storage

capacity created by the batteries of electric and hybrid vehicles,

- use of wastes and biomass in local combined heat and power plants (CHPs)

connected to district heat networks where applicable,.


District heating and cooling services experience a strong development and merge

progressively with energy efficiency services within the buildings, which results in a

better optimization of the whole system.

New service companies show up and develop in relation to the deep changes of the

energy market structures at the local and regional levels:



- management of the local smart grids and their relation with national grids and large

power plants,

- relations between the local grid and the micro energy consumers-producers

- maintenance and optimization of distributed electricity supply and direct use of

renewables (solar heaters, biomass,..)

- local and regional CHPs

- centralized management of batteries.

The usual separation between energy suppliers and demand services is expected to

disappear progressively in most cases, paving the way for new services combining in

an optimal way energy supply and energy efficiency.

NGOs and citizens associations

More and more innovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development,

including energy, show up here and there, driven by local/regional institutions, NGOs

and citizen association. They initiate a widespread replication movement all over

Europe, since they cope more and more with the preferences and values of common

people in this scenario.

National policies, which fail to drive the transition movement, are mostly focused to

give to local/regional authorities the power and means to "do the job".

In that respect, for equity reasons, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up at the local

and regional levels become mandatory, and it is under the responsibility of national

authorities to check that this is done effectively.

Education and public awareness as regard environment become very important, in

particular for climate change and natural resources issues.

5.3.2 Changes in urban schemes

Three main evolutions characterize the "Smartphone " scenario as regard urban

schemes: urban sprawl is stabilized, then reduced, core cities and, mostly, 1rings are

densified (population and jobs) and networking among cities is developed.


core cities

There is first a large movement of requalification of public space in core cities, aiming

at giving more space for pedestrians and bicycles in the one side, public transport in

the other side. Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks are

carried out wherever relevant.



There is also a movement towards the requalification and reconstruction of existing

buildings, aiming at increasing the average density of resident population together

with an increase of the ratio residents / jobs. In other words the resident population

and the number of dwellings are expected to increase significantly in core cities,

while the number of jobs would stabilize.

1st ring

This scenario is characterized also by the densification of residents and jobs

population in the 1st rings of core cities. This densification results from the re-

construction of industrial and commercial waste land and from the reconstruction,

with small and big buildings, of areas where single family houses were built

previously.

The other main characteristics of this scenario is a comprehensive integration of

mass transit systems with core cities, and with some important small/medium cities in

the periphery.

Extension of district heating / cooling networks is financially supported by the local

authorities, and benefit from the densification of the area.

small/medium cities

In this scenario, only the small/medium cities around core cities experience an

increase and densification of residents and jobs, which is permitted by the

development of mass transit system between these cities and with core cities and 1st

rings nearby. For the other small/medium cities, the current declining trends are

expected to continue. Altogether the overall population of small/medium cities

stabilizes.

Gas networks are expected to develop only in the small/ medium cities close to core

cities, thanks to the densification.

sparse settlements

The main feature of "Smartphone " is the stabilization, then the decrease of the

resident population in sparse settlements, for three reasons: social (aging

population), economic (high transport costs, high property tax, low incomes) and

political (severe restriction in permits to build new houses in sparse settlements).

Another feature of this scenario is that nothing is done to increase the accessibility of

people living in sparse settlements, all the reverse. This is nevertheless well

accepted because of the increasing importance of ICTs, which enable people to

spent an increasing part of their time in their homes, while remaining connected to

business and consumption opportunities.




For education, commerce, health and services to the public (post, banks,...), it is

expected that new rules are established for the location of new premises, based on

the concept of accessibility: therefore, density, availability of public transport and

travel speeds are likely to become the main drivers of the location.

For other services, location remains driven by costs, i.e. local fiscal policies.

city spatial networking

City spatial networking is also an important feature of "Smartphone " scenario.

At national and EU level, this means that most EU core cities will be connected

among themselves mostly with high speed trains.

At regional level, mass transit systems are expected to be expanded / developed

mostly to connect core cities and 1st rings to surrounding main medium cities (star

development).

Within core cities and 1st rings, the regional mass transit systems is expected to be

fully interconnected to the urban public transport systems.

land-use and cities energy supply balancing

In this scenario, energy supply / demand is expected to become progressively more

balanced at city level first, regional level second.

Cities are expected to become less and less energy importers along with the

combination of drastic reduction in energy consumption with systematic development

of the local harvesting of solar energy and ambient heat (heat pump) and the use of

geothermal energy and waste.

In peri-urban areas, wind power and biomass are expected to play an increasing role;

the conflicts that this would raise, from a landscape and land-use viewpoints, are

nevertheless rapidly solved, thanks to the change in population mentality.

Elsewhere, in particular in regions supplying feedstocks for biofuels and where off-

shore wind is installed, possible land-use conflicts are supposed to be overcome

thanks to the public support to renewables.

5.3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU

There is a lot of changes expected in this scenario as regard current trends in daily

life.



How people move


expected to fade out progressively in this scenario, both for passengers and freight.

In VLEEM, this is captured in bringing the elasticities of travel speed to GDP down to

zero.

In such a context, progress in accessibility is mostly due to a reduction in the travel

distances, which is permitted by a better location of dwellings and urban

functionalities.

Thanks to progress in accessibility, daily transport time budget is expected to remain

mostly constant, as in the past (Zahavi's conjecture), despite the slowing down of

speed increase. Utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase, in particular

in fast trains and mass transit. This is captured in VLEEM through assumptions on

daily transport time budget per person according to residence location. For long

distance trips, the change in the time-budget is related to the change in the time

budget for outdoor leisure activities: week-ends and holidays (see below).

The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality become more and

more influenced by environmental considerations (and less and less by power and

speed), even if autonomy, convenience and comfort remain attractive qualities. The

current motorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which not only depends

on where the people live, their age and the structure of the households, but also by

cultural changes as regard car ownership. This is captured in VLEEM with

assumptions on lower saturation levels (as compared to current views from today)

according to households categories and residence location.

For long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speed trains and

mass transit systems progressively outset the use of cars, for two reasons: speed

and convenience (utility of transport time).

Indoor comfort

The social standards as regard thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumed

to reflect new attitudes as regard health and relation to environment: lower

temperature in bedrooms in winter for example, higher cooling temperature in

summer.... The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability to meet the social standards, are

assumed to be driven not only by income and prices, but also by "thriftiness"

attitudes: better management of the heating/cooling system, day/night, part time/part

space,....

As regard healthy comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to be driven

mostly by income and age, but with an increasing attitude against wasting.



Life comfort at home is assumed to be more and more determined by in-door access

to cultural goods through internet, and to be increasingly less related to the number

and variety of appliances, mostly driven by income.

How people work

Current transformations brought about by the information technologies, in particular

as regard social networking, make teleworking and telemeeting more and more

popular and well accepted. This is considered as a mean to respect the GHG quotas

for companies submitted to the ETS.


There is a strong development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,

everywhere in Europe, with some exception in Northern part.

This concerns first PV on buildings, which tend to become the core of the local

electricity systems, but also other self-generation of electricity in big buildings (in

particular CHPs).

Along with the development of electric cars and plug-in hybrids vehicles, a strong

linkage is established between batteries, PV and CHP installations, and local smart

grids, which create a lot of opportunities for new services. A global management of

the batteries as a component of the electricity system is implemented, and participate

to the supply / demand balance at the local level.

Leisure

In the leisure time budget structure, there are two striking features in this scenario:

- the reduction of the share of long distance outdoor leisure, in particular long

distance weed-ends and short holidays,

- the increasing share of cultural activities, both in-door and out-door.

Long distance week-ends and short holidays (3 hours travel maximum), which are

constrained by a lower accessibility to fast trains and low availability of low cost air

transport, are expected to stabilize and to focus more on cultural goods.

Long holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:

- time spent in long holidays is expected to re-increase (higher expectation for "doing

slow" and for culture)

- and therefore their frequency is expected to re-decrease (a matter of overall time

available);



- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to decrease, because less

availability and higher costs of air transport, and because less favourable

international context.



6 Hard Way

"Hard Way": a carbon transition process which is imposed, at least in the EU, by the

growing problems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies to

address in due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment.

To some extent, the Hard Way can be considered as a Business-as-usual scenario,

that account for development/adjustment through violent/brutal crises.


"Hard Way" supposes the continuation of the current trends as regard selfishness of

nations, without emergence of citizens movement against it. More generally,

globalization and international relations continue to be driven exclusively by national

interest considerations in this scenario, paving the way for increasingly conflicting

relations among nations.



The UN negotiation process cannot overcome the main difficulties at the occasion of

the post-2012 Kyoto Protocole discussions and the Protocole is abandonned. IPCC

disappears, and information on climate change related issues become extremely

confusing. Extreme climatic events multiply, but relation to GHGs emissions continue

to be discussed.

This means in particular that a) no country commits itself to mandatory carbon

reduction objectives b) the flexible mechanisms to trade carbon internationally

disappear.

Rich countries do not accept to pay for the adaptation to climatic change of the

poorest countries.



are mostly driven by domestic considerations and geo-political aspects. This means

in particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in the Persian Gulf.

Oil and gas are more and more traded through market places. The role of

international organizations like IEA or OPEP in market regulation is more and more

challenged. There are no global governance mechanisms for oil and gas resources.



This results in increasing tensions on oil and gas markets, with fast rising and highly

fluctuating prices, possible physical shortages in the case of EU, which, after a while,

convince an increasing number of persons and industries to switch away from these

energies and turn to renewables and electricity as fast as possible.

World trade

WTO is more and more challenged, as protectionism tends to increase, which slows

down World trade development. Nevertheless, big trans-national companies succeed

in avoiding barriers against social dumping to be implemented. Carbon embodied in

imports and exports is not an issue.

World finance

IMF is more and more challenged, being unable to avoid financial crisis this jeopardizes the World economic development. Financing investment in developing countries is becoming more risky, with less financial resources. The US remains a secure place for international funds, but the financial leadership switches from the US to China.

6.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players

USA

In such an international environment, the USA is expected to have a rather bad

economic growth perspectives, because of a low World economic growth and

because a steady decrease of the value of the dollar against other major international

currencies. In addition, their technology leadership is being challenged by China and

Emerging Countries.

There is no federal quantified objective as regard climate change, and the number of

states and big cities that commit themselves with very ambitious climate plans remain

rather small. But the conjunction of extreme climatic events with difficult life

conditions of an increasing part of the population oblige progressively the federal

government, the states and municipalities to take "visible" actions.

The US doctrine as regard energy security is "back to independence".

Isolationism is back again strongly.



China

The economic growth perspectives of China are rather bad in this scenario, first

because of the depressing World market, and because difficulties in raising the

domestic market.

Indeed, Chinese and foreign companies competing on the World market succeed in

moderating steadily the increase of the wages in order to maintain/increase the

competitiveness of Chinese products in a context of depressed World demand.

Concern of the Chinese Government on climate issues remain rather strong in this

scenario, in particular due to the high sensitivity of China to the consequences of the

climate change. After some successful experiments of ambitious city climate plan

based on carbon ceilings per capita, the Chinese government decides to impose

such ceilings to all Chinese cities. In addition, a quota-trading system for CO2 is

implemented, with also ambitious targets.

China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets.

No major change of the Chinese foreign policy is expected in this scenario; in

particular the Yuan should remain at low levels against major foreign currencies in

order to protect the competitiveness of Chinese products on international markets.


The economic perspectives of the other Emerging Countries are also darkened by

the weakness of the World economy and the slow increase of the internal demand.

As a matter of fact, to remain competitive on depressed World markets and in a

context of stronger price aggressivity of China, increase in wages and incomes have

to be slowed down.

In this difficult economic context, environmental concerns mostly fade out, and

climate change is no more on the political agenda, neither of the central government,

nor of the local/regional authorities.

Because of the international environment of this scenario, energy security is

becoming a critical issue in these countries, leading to the adoption of ambitious

independence targets.

No major change is to be expected in the international relations, including regional

economic relations.

The European Union

The EU is expected to experience first an economic recession, followed by the slow

recovery in this scenario, for three reasons: a weak World demand for its high value



products and services, a depressed internal demand resulting from a fear concerning

the future (savings first) and supply crisis on oil, gas and main imported minerals.

East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to widen,

mostly because selfish attitudes of the richer west countries.

EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. Environmental concerns remain

strong, but the bad economic context and the absence of clear public support make

the adoption and implementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions rather

difficult.

Energy security issues are on the top of the EU political agenda as regard energy.

Independence becomes the master word, nuclear, renewables, unconventional gas

and energy efficiency being the main tools.

Movement toward isolationism is strong.


As already said, "Hard Way" (HW) describes a transition process mostly forced by

the circumstances, without due preparation and organization.


In "Hard Way", the EU as a whole and member countries are doing rather bad in

GDP growth, although income maximization remain iconized in the population. How

this can work from a social point of view, what it means as to the consumption model,

these are the questions that we will address hereafter to describe the economic

model supporting the bad GDP growth perspectives.

Human capital

People clearly claim for jobs and money in this scenario, that are more and more

difficult to find. Policies dedicated to immigration, birth rate and women activity,

working time and retirement, education, are driven by these considerations, within a

temptation towards isolationism.

Policy attempts to revitalize birth rate fail because of the fear about the future in the

population: fertility ratios remain at the same low levels as today (1,4 children /

woman for the EU average). Women participation in the labour market tends to reach

a saturation level around 60% after 2030 (46% in 2000), mostly because a structural

lack of job opportunities: this is not the result of a social choice, but of the economic

constraints.


emergent countries, is expected to remain welcome in the EU, but revitalized

nationalism and increased isolationism oblige government to limit the immigration



flows. The growing trend in immigration from outside the EU reverse down, to

stabilize around 1 million people annually (1,1 in 2000).

As a consequence of the difficult conditions of the labour market, the historical

declining trend of the average annual working time in Europe is expected to continue,

but more slowly: in 2050, people would work almost 8% less than in 2000.

Conversely, to save the pension system as it is, the declining historical trend of the

average retirement age is expected to reverse (already the case in many countries),

the average retirement age reaching 69 in 2050 (60 in 2000).

Education policies aim at boosting the participation level of the youngsters in the

university, but within severe economic constraints: in 2050, it is expected that 55% of

a 25-50 years age class would be graduated from university, against 22% in 2000

(much less than in "Spacecraft scenario for economic reasons). These policies are

expected to remain driven by the predominant economic objective to get the

appropriate labour force with the appropriate education and skill levels at the right

time to operate the most efficiently the economic machine.


"Hard Way" is a scenario in which the transition process is suffered and not driven.

This means that the role of EU and member states is merely to adapt to events when

they happen and to find solutions when problems and crisis arise.

Basically, this scenario is a "business-as-usual" one as regard this aspect11.

This means that current policies as regard energy and transport are expected to

continue, in particular the on-going movement towards de-regulation.

No drastic changes are expected in pricing and taxation policies.


In general terms, "Hard Way" is similar to "Spacecraft" as regard life styles and

consumption model -more or less what is experienced today by a majority of people-

at least for the two first decades. But afterwards, the long lasting bad economic

conditions and the resulting social tensions, force an increasing number of low

income people to change their way of life and consumption pattern towards

something closer to "Smartphone ".

Practically, this means changes in utility functions occurring after 2030, which would

account more and more for new dimensions as time-use, quality rather than variety,...

Attitudes towards wasting are expected to change, but mostly for economic reasons.

11

History teaches us that when countries, especially the EU is up against the wall, it reacts at the proper level! Up to a point, of course…



In a general context of a hard socio-economic context, people are expected to spend

less time at work mostly because a lack of job opportunities, with decreasing or

slowly increasing incomes, and a lack of confidence in the future. In fact, the gap

between poor and rich people is expected to widen, with an increasing number of

people in the first category, those beyond retirement age, autonomous youngsters

and people out of the job market or unemployed in particular. Life styles and

consumption pattern of rich people do not really change, while those of low income

people are forced to change for economic reasons. In particular these low income

people are expected to have more time for themselves, but with bad economic and

psychological conditions to benefit this increasing time.

One of the consequences is that the share of the population that can enjoy expensive

outdoor leisure activities (in particular long distance) is expected to decrease sharply.

In the VLEEM model, this is captured in the following way:

- the share of out-door versus in-door activities in this time-budget, which is supposed

to go down

- the share of long distance mobility in out-door activities, which is also supposed to

decrease.


In "Hard Way", EU and member countries are not committing themselves any more

to binding targets on GHG emissions, mostly because of the bad socio-economic

context. GHG mitigation is mostly a consequence of the policies implemented to get

rid of imported oil and gas because of the very tense situation of the World and

regional markets of these commodities.


The ETS is supposed to collapse before 2020, as well as the carbon market based of

flexibility instruments (CDM, JI).

Taxing carbon is not on the political agenda any more.

In POLES model, this is captured with a carbon price on the ETS that decreases

down to zero and zero carbon price outside the ETS, in the EU..

Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances for new buildings and

road vehicles are kept as they are in all countries, and never concern other existing

or new devices.

Buildings retrofitting remains mostly limited to current renovation movement, which is

expected to slow down due to the low economic growth.



Feed-in tariffs for centralized renewables remain, but with decreasing levels, as well

as subsidies for energy efficiency and distributed renewables.

Green and white certificates are more or less stabilized at current levels.


As said earlier, "Hard Way" is a scenario where un-equity and social exclusion

worsen significantly, the gap between rich and low income people widening a lot.

The reason why this does not turn into a major social explosion is the combination of

"withdrawal into oneself" and progressive changes in values and preferences among

low income people. But this makes the whole European society less integrated and

more fragile.

In particular no change is to be expected in the social lodging of poor people, more

and more confined in high rise buildings "ghettos" in the suburbs of big cities.

Social/health expenses coverage systems exclude more and more people in Europe,

as the unemployment ratio and the share of the population out of the job market

increase. In addition, the coverage of the social/health expenses is reduced due to

relatively low GDP.

The pension systems remain more or less at it is, with altogether an increasing share

of the population out of it, and rather slow pension levels increase mostly calibrated

on price indexes.


Basic education of children does not change so much, with nevertheless more

importance given to environment and climate change issues.

Values such as "thriftiness" or "going slow" start becoming more and more popular

through the low income population after a while. Getting higher income remains

obviously the objective function of the rich people, but more and more people, in

particular among the income ones, become adepts of the new philosophy "getting

more (satisfaction) with less (money)".

The main social icons are still related to fashion, technology and innovation for a

while, but those related to "new welfare" concept start expanding rapidly after 2030.

Democracy becomes more and more rigid as the economic and social conditions

worsen in the EU. Temptation for authoritarian systems show up here and there.




"Hard Way" is not so favourable for technology innovation and development of new

infrastructures that are capital intensive, basically for economic and financial reasons.

Transport

Investment in new motorways and airport infrastructures is strongly reduced. The

European high speed trains network for passengers and freight continue to be

developed, but a low pace.

Because the fast increasing number of people with low income in the one side, and

soaring oil prices in the other side, car industry and related services adapt to propose

low-cost individual mobility, mixing car downsizing, alternative energy and new

services (car sharing, renting,..). This result in a fast development of the competitive

supply of electric urban cars and plug-in hybrids for cars and light vehicles.

At local and regional levels, support to public transport (road and rail) suffers a lot of

the lack of financial availabilities.

For freight, nothing particular is done.

Buildings

In this scenario, there are no significant changes in existing standards for

construction in all EU countries. Competitiveness, in a context of high prices for oil

and gas, remains the main driver of the construction of low energy and very low

energy buildings beyond the actual regulations. Same for zero / +energy buildings.

For existing buildings, thermal retrofitting is mostly driven by renovation programmes,

which are likely to be slowed down because of the low economic growth context ,

with reduced technical possibilities.

Materials

Inclusion of soft materials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction remains "as

usual".

Substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging, as well as

recycling of used materials, remain mostly driven by prices and costs, in a context

where oil and gas prices are expected to be very high.

Renewables

In "Hard Way" scenario, there is a strong public (local and regional) and private

support to the development of renewables as a mean to get rid of oil and gas imports,

but within severe financial constraints.



In particular, off-shore wind development is strongly supported, but slowed down by

the financial constraints.

Despite bad economic and financial conditions, PV on buildings is expected to

develop at a high speed, to a high magnitude, as an individual response to the

increasing un-reliability of the grid. Solar heat and direct use of biomass are also

expected to develop fast, partly for economic reasons, partly because an increasing

lack of confidence in centralized energy supply.

From the grid viewpoint, PV is considered as a complementary source of electricity

that has to be managed, and which contribute, along with windpower, to the

increasing lack of reliability of the whole electricity system. One of the reason for this

is that smart grid concept and technologies do not develop fast enough, due to

financial constraints.

CSP (Concentrated Solar Plant) is also expected to develop in some amounts in

south Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the rest of Europe,

when economic and financial conditions are favourable.

Biofuels are mostly driven by prices and costs.


In this scenario, electricity supply remain mostly centralized, even if renewables

develop significantly. Despite an increasing share of nuclear in the electricity supply

(for energy security reasons), the random nature of solar and wind, and the

intermittence of these energies, make the peak demand problems more and more

critical. Smart grids and smart metering are developed to allow increasingly demand

response solutions to solve these problems, but at a too slow path for financial

reasons: this makes the overall system more and more fragile and less and less

reliable.

In particular, the too slow evolution of the grid concept and management make it

almost impossible to organize a centralized management of the car batteries as a

storage component of the electricity system.

Gas and district heating and cooling networks are expected to continue their

deployment in all EU member countries at current trends.


In "Hard Way" scenario, local transitions participate to a large extent to the overall

carbon transition movement, and they are mostly driven by the changes in attitudes

in a growing part of the population, because the difficult economic conditions in the

one side, and because an increasing lack of confidence in the conventional energy



system in the other side. But local and regional authorities remain mostly followers in

this process, partly for policy reasons, partly because of financial constraints .


The scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal for

such interventions are supposed not to change significantly in this scenario as

compared to the existing situation.


Buildings (construction rules and retrofitting), urban and regional transport

infrastructures and services, and district heating/cooling remain the bulk of the field of

intervention of municipalities and other local/regional authorities.

Local and regional climate plans are progressively abandoned.

There are no particular local policies towards the retrofitting of existing buildings,

beyond the current renovation programmes, except for social housing.

Municipalities and other local/regional authorities are subject to increasing financial

difficulties that jeopardize the development possibilities for local/regional

infrastructures in transport and energy.

Under the pressure of citizens and NGOs, no restriction is put on the installation of

PV on the roofs of buildings


District heating and cooling services continue developing at current trends

Because of the growing importance of PV on buildings, there is an increasing

demand for local low voltage micro grids and appliances, which drives the

development of new related products and services.

The usual separation between energy suppliers and demand services is expected to

remain as it is in most cases, with little integration of energy supply and energy

efficiency.

NGOs and citizens associations



Innovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development, including

energy, driven by local/regional institutions, NGOs and citizen associations, remain

scarce and fail to initiate a widespread replication movement.

National policy burden on local/regional authorities as regard climate change is weak,

and monitoring, evaluation and follow-up is not an issue, neither at the national level,

nor at the local and regional levels.

Education and public awareness as regard environment are given some importance,

not very much.

6.3.2 Changes in urban schemes

"Hard Way" scenario is in the continuation of historic trends as regard urban

schemes, in a context of declining EU population after 2025: urban sprawl continues,

core cities and 1rings are stabilized and remaining population and households are

absorbed by small/ medium towns, in particular in the periphery of core cities.


core cities

Although population is not expected to increase so much in existing core cities, there

is a requalification of existing dwellings towards high income people, chasing out low

income people.

This dwelling and social structure change supports a continuous increase in the cost

of land, that goes against the location of new jobs in core cities.

Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks are carried out

wherever cost effective.

1st ring

Conversely, there is a progressive change in the dwellings and social structure of the

1st rings, in favour of low income people, with first a significant growth of the total

population, then a decline.

A comprehensive integration of mass transit systems with core cities is carried out

almost everywhere.

Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks are carried out

wherever cost effective.

small/medium cities

In this scenario, small/medium cities around core cities experience an increase and

densification of residents and jobs, mostly for economic reasons (land and property



costs), but other small/medium cities experience a rapid and sharp decline.

Altogether, the global population of these small/medium cities decreases significantly.

Gas networks develop in cities nearby core cities along with current trends.

sparse settlements

The main feature of "Hard Way" is that the resident population in sparse settlements

continues to increase, in particular families with children, mostly for economic

reasons (lower land and property costs) and because no adverse policies (no

restriction in permits to build new houses in sparse settlements).

This is likely to happen despite aging population and worsening accessibility

conditions of people living in sparse settlements, and increased transport costs.


For education, commerce, and services to the public (post, banks,...), location rules

remain mostly unchanged.

For health and other services, location remains driven by costs, i.e. local fiscal

policies.

Spatial city networking

Spatial city networking remain rather limited in the "Hard Way" scenario.

At national and EU level, this means that only major EU core cities will be connected

among themselves with high speed trains.

At local/regional level, mass transit systems are expected to be expanded /

developed mostly to connect core cities and 1st rings, but extensions to surrounding

important medium cities (star development) would concern only the periphery of

major core cities.

Land-use and cities energy demand/supply balancing

In this scenario, energy supply / demand is expected to become progressively more

balanced at city level first, regional level second, thanks to local renewables

development.

Cities are expected to become less energy importers along with the combination of

reduction in energy consumption (for economic reasons) with a large development of

the local harvesting of solar energy and ambient heat (heat pump) and the use of

geothermal energy and waste.



In peri-urban areas, the development of wind power and biomass is slowed down due

to landscape and land-use conflicts. But single family houses in sparse settlements

tend to become more and more self-sufficient thanks to solar (PV and water heater),

roof windpower and direct use of biomass, for two reasons: deficiency of the

conventional energy supply, and high prices of conventional energies.

6.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU

In this scenario, high income people are not expected to change so much their way

of life, while low income people, which population would grow faster, are forced after

some time to change radically their way of life.

How people move


expected to fade out progressively in this scenario, both for passengers and freight.

In VLEEM, this is captured in bringing the elasticities of travel speed to GDP down to

zero.

In such a context, progress in accessibility is slow because of the economic context,

and mostly due to an increase in the transport time budget, in particular for people

living in small cities and in sparse settlements..

Utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase a little, in particular in fast

trains and mass transit.

The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality remain driven by

speed, autonomy, convenience and comfort for high income people, but economic

and environmental considerations become more and more important for low income

people. The current motorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which not

only depends on where the people live, their age and the structure of the households,

but also by cultural changes as regard car ownership for an increasing part of the

population.

For long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speed trains and

mass transit systems progressively outset the use of cars, for two reasons: speed

and convenience (utility of transport time).

Indoor comfort

The social standards as regard thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumed

to remain driven by income and prices for high income people, while low income

people are forced progressively to adopt new attitudes for economic reasons: lower



temperature in bedrooms in winter for example, higher cooling temperature in

summer.... The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability to meet the social standards, are

assumed to be driven only by income and prices.

As regard healthy comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to be driven

mostly by income and age, but with an increasing attitude against wasting for low

income people.

Life comfort at home is assumed to remained determined by equipment variety and

pattern of use, which are assumed to be mostly driven by income and prices.

How people work

Tele-working and tele-meeting develop along the current trends.


There is a strong development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,

everywhere in Europe (with some exception in Northern part for PV)..

This concerns PV on buildings and other self-generation of electricity in big buildings

(in particular CHPs), which are considered as appropriate responses to the

increasing lack of reliability of the grid.

Despite the development of electric cars and plug-in hybrids vehicles, the linkage

between batteries, PV and CHP installations in the one side, the grid in the other

side, remain marginal. There is no global management of the batteries as a

component of the electricity system, although the nexus PV-batteries participate to

the supply / demand balance at the micro level.

Leisure

In the leisure time budget structure, there are two striking features in this scenario:

- an increasing share of low cost leisure activities, both in-door and out-door, mostly

resulting from the increasing share of low income people,

- the reduction of the share of long distance outdoor leisure, in particular long

distance weed-ends and short holidays, which remain the privilege of high income

people, whose population is decreasing.

Long holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:

- their frequency is expected to re-decrease for low income people, mostly for

economic reasons, while it continues increasing for high income people,



- time spent in long holidays is expected to stabilize for low income people, while it

would continue to decrease for high income people

- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to decrease, mostly because

the decreasing population that can afford it, and because less favourable

international context.

7 Quantifying carbon transition pathways

Two models are used to quantify the carbon transition pathways:

- VLEEM/TILT (Very Long Term Energy Environment Model / Transport Investigation

on the Long Term), which aim at quantifying the long term impacts of the transition

scenarios on the needs of energy services in the EU12;

- POLES (Prospective Outlook of long term Energy Systems), which aim at

translating the long term needs of energy services into energy balances for the EU,

accounting for the relations with the rest of the world, in particular World and regional

oil, gas and coal markets13.

There are three main steps in the quantification procedure: identification of the

exogenous inputs of the models impacted by the scenario storylines, quantification of

these inputs according to the qualitative statements of the storylines, run of the

model. This quantification procedure is iterative, so that a global consistency can be

achieved between the storylines, the models inputs and the long term energy and

GHGs projections.

As seen earlier, none of the scenarios is bound to specific global GHGs

concentration target in 2050. It is assumed that most countries worldwide, in

particular the big ones, are aware that dividing by 2 the World anthropogenic GHGs

emissions by 2050 would keep the GHG concentration around 450ppmv and avoid

major climatic problems, and that this would imply for industrialized countries to

reduce their own emissions by a factor 4. But at the same time, the socio-economic

and political conditions that prevail in each scenario are more or less far away from

those actually required to reach such objectives, both globally and for industrialized

countries, in due time: either this remain the objective, but likely to be reached in the

longer term (mostly consistent with "Smartphone " philosophy), or there is a kind of

World consensus on the optimal trade-off between mitigation and adaptation that can

be reached in 2050 (mostly consistent with "Spacecraft"), or even no one care

anymore with global objectives, each country trying to solve alone its own problems,

low GDP growths and turmoil on oil and gas markets doing the job (mostly consistent

12

A brief description of VLEEM / TILT model is given in annex 1. 13

A brief description of POLES model is given in annex 2.



with "Hard Way"). Therefore, the distance to this 450ppmv concentration target in

2050 vary according to scenarios, and this gap is one of the result that must be

considered when assessing the overall consistency of the scenario.

7.1 From scenario storylines to quantitative models inputs

To quantify the carbon transition pathways described by the above scenarios with the

help of the models, it is necessary to translate the qualitative information from the

storylines into quantitative assumptions on appropriate exogenous variables and

parameters of the models. This is done in two steps: identification of the exogenous

inputs of the models likely to be impacted by the scenario storylines, formalization of

the linkage between both.

7.1.1 Identification of relevant exogenous inputs of the models

VLEEM/TILT

The comprehensive description of the model and its development during the PACT

project is available in PACT deliverable D5.

The figure below summarizes how VLEEM/TILT works, and the main influences on

the needs of energy services, some of them being dependant on where the people

live: climate, urban zone mostly.

Figure 7-1: VLEEM/TILT overview

Scenario storylines do impact all the boxes in this figure, but the red ones are

particularly important as regard carbon transitions as captured in the scenarios.

The tables hereafter point out the exogenous inputs that mostly drive, within these

red boxes:

- the total population and number of households, and their distribution among

households categories and living areas (urban schemes)

Demography

Education - information Activity

Time use-Production, wealth

Needs of energy services

«Food-feeding» « Shelter »

« Self-accomplishment »

« Transport»

« Other production»



- the production, economic growth and wealth

- passengers accessibility and mobility, modal structure and transport technology

- dwelling stock structure and characteristics, and technology

DEMOGRAPHY, HOUSEHOLDS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Categories Exogenous inputs

Fertility Urban Fertility rate 0-24 years

Rural Fertility rate 25-49 years

Social structure Urban % Singles in population below 75

Rural % of population below 50 living in two persons households

% population more than 75 living with their children or in community

% population 25-49 single with one child

Migrations from outside EU Persons (millions/year)

Households (millions/year)

of which singles (millions/yar)

Urban sprawl Sparse settlements Share of population in sparse settlements

Distribution of urban households according to urban zones

Singles, no child % in core cities

2 pers. households, no child % in 1st ring suburb

Singles with 1child % in small/medium cities

households more than 2 pers

ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTION, WEALTHExogenous inputs

Time use at work hours/year

Activity level retirement age

% active (2nd hh's adult)

Education-information % tertiary education (25-45 years old)

Production, wealth Utilisation rate of production potential

Elasticity of labour productivity to information



MOBILITY, passengersCategories Exogenous inputs

car equipment saturation levels core cities % households, singles, no child

1st ring suburb % households, 2 pers. households, no child

small/medium cities % households, singles with 1child

sparse settlements % households, households more than 2 pers

Speed control elasticity speed/GDP, passengers

average car speed

Modal split Short distance km per day per person in soft modes

km/car/year

% car in urban mobility (pkm)

% car in regional mobility (pkm)

Loading factor of cars (car pooling)

Long distance %pkm normal trains in rail

% air in pkm (outside extra Europe)

time budget core cities daily mobility time budget (h/day/person)

1st ring suburb

small/medium cities

sparse settlements

share of mobility long distance in increase in time budget for self accomplishment

Distance / speed calibration* urban Calibrated annual mobility per capita (% decrease per period)

regional Car speeds (km/h)

Average transport speed, all modes

core cities average speed, car urban

1st ring suburb average speed, public urban

small/medium cities

sparse settlements average speed, car regional

Technology long distance % vkm in elec mode for plug-in hybrid

regional

urban

Hybrids plug-in date introduction to market

Elec urban cars Market deployment logistic parameters

Fuel cells-H2

* Iterative calibration procedure untill distance / speed fits with time budget



BUILDINGS, HouseholdsCategories Exogenous inputs

Housing replacement and renovation

core cities percentage of the stock of dwelling replaced yearly

1st ring suburb percentage of the stock of dwelling renoved-maintained per year

small/medium cities

sparse settlements

Structure of construction core cities % single family houses

1st ring suburb % small flats buildings (<5floors)

small/medium cities % big flats buildings (=>5floors)

sparse settlements

Deployment of new efficient buildings according to climatic/geographic zones (%)

Nordic % Low energy houses

single family houses % Low exergy houses

small flats buildings (<5floors) % Passive houses (very low energy)

big flats buildings (=>5floors) % Zero energy houses

Eastern % Plus energy houses

single family houses

small flats buildings (<5floors)

big flats buildings (=>5floors)

South




West




Technology

Nordic Efficiency gains through retrofitting (%) single family houses



Eastern




South single family houses



West






POLES

The comprehensive description of the model and its development during the PACT

project is available in PACT deliverable D5.

The figures below summarize how POLES works, and the main influences on the

supply/demand equilibria of the World regions/countries considered and on the

world/regional markets for oil, gas, coal and CO2.

Figure 7-2: POLES overview

Scenario storylines, through assumptions on GDP, demography and resources and

carbon constraints do impact all energy demand / supply balances of all regions and

countries all over the world, and therefore the tensions on the World and regional

energy and CO2 markets, that in turn impact the EU.

But in addition, these storylines impact directly the drivers of the energy demand and

supply evolutions in the EU. For EU energy demand, VLEEM / TILT already provide

Fossil Fuel

Supply

Electricity

Transformation

System

New &

Renewable

Energies

Sectoral Final

Energy DemandFinal Energy Demand

Net Final Energy Demand

Total Energy Demand

Primary Energy Supply

Fossil Fuels

Imports / Exports



details on the future evolutions for passenger transport and for buildings: for the

corresponding POLES exogenous inputs, it is just a matter of re-calibration of theses

inputs and of the corresponding demand functions parameters.

The table below summarize the POLES exogenous inputs that are involved in the

scenario quantification.

Exogenous POLES variables and parameters for translation

7.1.2 Linking the storylines to the relevant exogenous inputs of the models

The next step is link the above exogenous models inputs to the corresponding

qualitative statements of the storylines. For that purpose, the storylines have been

properly structured in standard sections, sub-sections, and bullet points, either to

make a direct link between the bullet point and the corresponding quantitative inputs

when relevant (direct impact), or to point out an indirect influence that participates to

the overall consistency of the scenario and has to be considered in the quantification.

The comprehensive tables showing the linkage between the qualitative statements of

the scenario storylines and the quantitative inputs of the models are displayed in

annex 3.

7.1.3 Quantifying the relevant exogenous inputs of the models

The next step is to translate the qualitative scenario statements corresponding to the

bullet points into quantitative assumptions on the corresponding exogenous

variables/parameters of the models. For that purpose, the following method was

adopted:

GDP

Population

Technology trends, demand functions per sector

CO2 value

Ultimate ressouces oil & gas

Recovery rate of Ultimate oil resources

Production capacity Gulf

Potentials for renewables

Costs of energy supply technologies

nuclear

coal

Discount rates, public (supported) investments

Gas penetration

Dem

and

Su

pp

ly



a) For each exogenous input considered, a range of likely values for future target

years (2025 and 2050) is estimated within the boundaries of the 3 scenarios,

b) Within these boundaries, a specific value of the input is associated to each

scenario.

This method does not pretend to result in the most accurate assumption for one

particular input in one particular scenario, but to keep an overall consistency within

each scenario first, across the 3 scenarios second.

Uncertainty and range of variation

Making an assumption on an exogenous input of a model means that the future

values of this input are uncertain, and that there is no formal mean to reduce this

uncertainty. This assumption can be understood as the most likely value that would

take this variable/parameter at that time in the future, because of the various

influences impacting it in that particular scenario.

In that sense, the scenarios considered in the study frame the range of uncertainty

about the various exogenous variables / parameters of the models, and therefore the

range of values that the assumptions can take.

Practically, the estimation of the range of values for each exogenous inputs for the

future target years is done in three steps:

- assessment of the historical evolution and actual trends of the exogenous variable /

parameter,

- assessment of the possible inflexions of these trends in the future due to the

influences of the scenario,

- assessment of the extreme values (minimum, maximum) that can be taken by the

exogenous variables / parameters in 2025 and 2050 within the 3 scenarios.

Linking values to qualitative statements of scenario storylines, VLEEM/TILT

The next step consists in linking firmly one particular value within the above range to

one particular scenario, for each exogenous input of VLEEM / TILT considered.

When only 3 scenarios are considered, this is rather straightforward. Each extreme

value (min / max) is attached to one particular scenario, by definition of the range of

likely values. The only thing to do therefore, is to attached an intermediate value

within the range to the third scenario. This is done comparing the qualitative

statements of the 3 scenarios for the same item (bullet point) and deducting whether

the intermediate value is identical or closer to one of the extremes, or just in the

middle of the range.

The synthetic tables summarizing the quantification of the exogenous inputs for the

three scenarios, and for the EU-27 as a whole, are displayed below.



Table 7-1: Quantitative assumptions for the 3 scenarios, VLEEM-TILT

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

Balance

Intermediate value

DEMOGRAPHY, HOUSEHOLDS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

Fertility

Urban

Fertility rate 0-24 years 0,1 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10

Fertility rate 25-49 1,46 1,30 1,70 1,30 1,90 1,70 1,90 1,50 1,70 1,30 1,30

Rural

Fertility rate 0-24 years 0,1 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10

Fertility rate 25-49 1,46 1,30 1,70 1,30 1,90 1,70 1,90 1,50 1,70 1,30 1,30

Social structure

Urban

% Singles in population below 75 12% 13% 15% 14% 18% 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 18%

% of population below 50 living in two persons households16% 14% 18% 12% 20% 14% 12% 16% 15% 18% 20%

% population more than 75 living with their children or in community5% 3% 7% 1% 10% 3% 1% 7% 10% 3% 1%

% population 25-49 single with one child 3% 3% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3% 5% 7% 3% 3%

Rural

% Singles in population below 75 8% 11% 13% 11% 15% 11% 11% 12% 12% 13% 15%

% of population below 50 living in two persons households22% 20% 22% 18% 22% 20% 18% 21% 19% 22% 22%

% population more than 75 living with their children or in community5% 3% 7% 1% 10% 3% 1% 7% 10% 3% 1%

% population 25-49 single with one child 2% 3% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3% 5% 7% 3% 3%

Migrations from outside the EU

Persons (millions/year) 1,1 1,0 1,4 1,0 2,0 1,4 2 1,2 1,5 1,00 1,00

Households (millions/year) 1 0,95 1,30 0,90 1,80 1,30 1,80 1,13 1,35 0,95 0,90

of which singles 0,8 0,90 1,20 0,80 1,60 1,20 1,60 1,05 1,20 0,90 0,80

Share of population in sparse settlements 33% 30% 34% 25% 35% 33% 33% 30% 25% 34% 35%

Distribution of urban households according to urban zones

M1 - Single

core cities 38% 35% 45% 35% 50% 40% 43% 35% 35% 45% 50%

1st ring suburb 29% 25% 35% 25% 40% 25% 25% 35% 40% 25% 25%

small/medium compact cities 34% 30% 40% 25% 40% 35% 33% 30% 25% 30% 25%

M2 - 2 pers. Households, no child

core cities 24% 25% 35% 25% 40% 30% 33% 25% 25% 35% 40%

1st ring suburb 33% 30% 40% 30% 45% 30% 30% 40% 45% 30% 35%


M3 - 2 pers. Households, 1child

core cities 28% 25% 35% 25% 40% 30% 33% 35% 40% 25% 25%

1st ring suburb 37% 35% 45% 35% 50% 30% 28% 45% 35% 45% 50%


M4 - >2 pers. Households

core cities 20% 15% 25% 10% 25% 20% 18% 25% 25% 15% 10%

1st ring suburb 39% 35% 45% 30% 45% 30% 23% 35% 35% 45% 45%


Smartphone The hard way2025 2050 Spacecraft

ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTION, WEALTH

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

hours/year 1796 1692 1739 1472 1833 1739 1833 1692 1472 1716 1653

retirement age 59,9 65 67 60 69 67 69 65 60 67 69

% active, 2nd household's adult 46% 55% 65% 60% 80% 65% 80% 55% 60% 55% 60%

% tertiary education (25-45 years old) 22% 50% 60% 55% 70% 60% 70% 55% 65% 50% 55%

Utilisation rate of production potential 91% 85% 92% 80% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 85% 80%

Elasticity of labour productivity to information 1,5 1,5 2,2 1,3 2,5 2,2 2,5 2,0 2,1 1,5 1,3

2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way



MOBILITY, passengers: car equipment, modal split, speed and time budget

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

car equipment ratios, saturation levels

core cities

single househods 35% 40% 53% 39% 52% 53% 52% 40% 39% 47% 39%

2 persons households, no child 92% 90% 120% 90% 120% 120% 120% 90% 90% 105% 90%

2 persons households, one child 57% 50% 67% 50% 67% 67% 67% 50% 50% 58% 50%

households with more than 2 pers. 109% 100% 133% 100% 133% 133% 133% 100% 100% 117% 100%

1st ring suburb





small/medium compact cities





sparse settlements





elasticity speed/GDP, passengers 0,19 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,00 0,00 0,19 0,00

km per day per person in soft modes

core cities 0,82 0,80 1,00 0,75 1,20 0,80 0,75 1,00 1,20 0,90 1,20

1st ring suburb 0,55 0,50 0,70 0,40 1,00 0,50 0,40 0,70 1,00 0,60 1,00

small/medium compact cities 0,66 0,60 0,80 0,50 1,00 0,60 0,50 0,80 1,00 0,70 1,00

sparse settlements 0,33 0,30 0,40 0,25 0,50 0,30 0,25 0,40 0,50 0,35 0,50

km/car/year

core cities 11533 10000 10500 8500 9500 10500 9500 10000 8500 10250 8500

1st ring suburb 17557 16000 16500 14000 15000 16500 15000 16000 14000 16250 14000

small/medium compact cities 12975 11500 12000 10000 11000 12000 11000 11500 10000 11750 10000

sparse settlements 11070 9500 10000 9000 10000 10000 10000 9500 9000 9750 9000

% car in urban mobility (pkm)

core cities 58% 50% 65% 40% 70% 65% 70% 50% 40% 58% 40%

1st ring suburb 79% 70% 85% 60% 85% 85% 85% 70% 60% 78% 60%


sparse settlements 77% 75% 85% 70% 85% 85% 85% 75% 70% 80% 70%

% car in regional mobility (pkm)

core cities 75% 70% 80% 60% 75% 80% 75% 70% 60% 75% 60%

1st ring suburb 84% 80% 85% 75% 90% 85% 90% 80% 75% 83% 75%


sparse settlements 83% 80% 85% 75% 90% 85% 90% 80% 75% 83% 75%

Relative increase of car load factor due to car pooling

All trips 0% 2% 0% 5% 0% 0% 2% 5% 0% 2%

time budget transport (h/day/person >6, daily)

core cities 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11

1st ring suburb 1,23 1,23 1,29 1,23 1,35 1,23 1,23 1,23 1,23 1,29 1,35

small/medium compact cities 1,07 1,07 1,18 1,07 1,29 1,07 1,07 1,07 1,07 1,18 1,29

sparse settlements 1,00 1,00 1,15 1,00 1,30 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,15 1,30

share of long distance mobility in increase of

time budget for self accomplishment 20% 20% 20% 20% 5% 8% 4% 2% 7% 0%

Modal split for long distance travel

% air in pkm (outside extra Europe) 10% 13% 17% 10% 20% 17% 20% 13% 10% 15% 10%




MOBILITY, passengers: technology, calibration speed, time budget, distance

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

% vkm in elec mode for plug-in hybrid

long distance 0% 5% 0% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 0% 0%

regional 5% 20% 10% 50% 20% 50% 10% 20% 5% 10%

urban 20% 40% 40% 80% 40% 80% 30% 60% 20% 40%

date introduction to market for new technologies

Hybrids plug-in 2012 2015 2015

Elec urban cars 2012 2015 2015

Fuel cells-H2 2050 2050 2050

Market deployment logistic parameters

B 10 10 10

r 0,65 0,75 0,85

Calbration speed, time and distance

Annual mobility per capita (% decrease per period)

urban 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 0%

regional 0% 0% 15% 15% 0% -8%

Car speeds (km/h)

average 28,5 29,0 28,2 27,9 26,5 27,1 26,2

urban 21,6 21,5 20,0 19,5 16,7 18,2 18,2

regional 27,0 26,6 27,5 21,8 19,0 25,0 25,2

long distance 102,3 105,0 105,0 95,0 90,0 100,0 100,0

Transport speed, all modes

urban 18,7 18,2 17,8 15,8 16,6 15,5

regional 27,4 28,1 23,5 21,8 26,0 26,0

Transport speed, Core cities (km/h)

Individual urban 16,2 16,0 14,0 12,0 16,2 16,0

Public urban 16,5 16,0 19,0 19,0 18,0 19,0

Transport speed, 1st ring (km/h)


Public urban 17,0 16,0 25,0 26,0 18,0 22,0

Transport speed, Other cities (km/h)


Public urban 15,0 15,0 20,0 30,0 16,0 15,0

Transport speed, Sparse (km/h)

Individual regional 26,5 28,0 20,5 18,5 22,4 22,0

%pkm normal trains in rail 11% 2% 6% 5% 6% 14%




BUILDINGS, Households, construction and renovation

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

Housing replacement and renovationpercentage of the stock of dwelling replaced yearly

core cities 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1%

1st ring suburb 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 0,1% 0,5% 0,5% 0,1% 0,1%

small/medium compact cities 0,1% 0,3% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1%

sparse settlements 0,1% 0,3% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,1% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3%

percentage of the stock of dwelling renoved-maintained per year

core cities 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5%

1st ring suburb 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5%

small/medium compact cities 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5%

sparse settlements 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5%

Structure of constructionCore cities

% single family houses 0% 5% 0% 5% 5% 5% 0,0% 0,0% 3% 3%

% small flats buildings (<5floors) 10% 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% 15% 15%

% big flats buildings (=>5floors) 80% 90% 80% 90% 75% 75% 90% 90% 83% 83%

1st ring

% single family houses 5% 15% 5% 15% 15% 15% 5,0% 5,0% 10% 10%



other cities

% single family houses 20% 50% 20% 50% 50% 50% 20% 20% 35% 35%




BUILDINGS, Households, technology retrofitting

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

Efficiency gains through retrofitting according to climatic/geographic zones (%)

Single family houses

Nordic 10% 30% 10% 30% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10%

Eastern 15% 40% 15% 40% 40% 40% 28% 28% 15% 15%

South 15% 40% 15% 40% 40% 40% 28% 28% 15% 15%

West 20% 60% 20% 60% 60% 60% 40% 40% 20% 20%


Nordic 10% 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10%

Eastern 15% 30% 15% 30% 30% 30% 23% 23% 15% 15%

South 15% 30% 15% 30% 30% 30% 23% 23% 15% 15%

West 20% 50% 20% 50% 50% 50% 35% 35% 20% 20%


Nordic 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%

Eastern 15% 20% 15% 20% 20% 20% 18% 18% 15% 15%

South 15% 20% 15% 20% 20% 20% 18% 18% 15% 15%

West 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 35% 35% 30% 30%




BUILDINGS, Households, technology new buildings

2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050

Deployment of new efficient buildings according to climatic/geographic zones (%) Nordic


Low energy houses 50% 80% 0% 80% 80% 80% 50% 0% 50% 40%

Low exergy houses

Passive houses (very low energy) 20% 50% 20% 100% 20% 20% 50% 100% 20% 60%

Zero energy houses

Plus energy houses


Low energy buildings 50% 80% 0% 80% 80% 80% 50% 0% 50% 40%

Low exergy buildings

Passive buildings (very low energy) 20% 50% 20% 100% 20% 20% 50% 100% 20% 60%



Low exergy buildings


Eastern



Low exergy houses 0% 10% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


Zero energy houses 0% 10% 0% 50% 0% 0% 10% 50% 0% 25%

Plus energy houses 0% 10% 0% 30% 0% 0% 10% 30% 0% 15%



Low exergy buildings 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%






South















West


















Linking values to qualitative statements of scenario storylines, POLES

The method is a little different for POLES inputs, for two reasons.

First, many of the so-called exogenous inputs that drive the energy demand and

supply for the EU-27 in POLES, have to be calibrated with the detailed projections of

VLEEM / TILT, and cannot be considered anymore as pure exogenous.

Second, it was not in the scope of the PACT project to investigate in details the

modalities and consequences of the carbon transition for the other countries outside

the EU. Although, as shown earlier, the World context is an important component of

the scenarios as regard the EU.

For this reason, the assumptions considered for the other World countries / regions

outside the EU-27 have been taken from previous scenarios designed and quantified

for the European Commission and for the World Energy Council in the recent years14,

and from internal Enerdata's forecasts15.

The tables below display the most important exogenous assumptions taken for these

countries / regions for the 3 scenarios.

The demographic assumptions are based on UN 2008 Medium projections for all

scenarios and all countries / regions except the EU (see above).

Table 7-2: UN-2008 population medium projections

The macro-economic assumptions are taken from a range of assumptions

considered in previous forecasts, for scenarios that are close enough to those

14

WEC scenarios ( 2008-2009) and scenarios developed for the EC in the ADAM project (2005-2009) in particular 15

Enerfuture©

Population (Million)

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

OECD 1 138 1 219 1 283 1 324 1 345 1 350

North America 415 456 503 537 561 577

US 286 314 346 370 389 404

Europe 519 551 567 576 579 576

Pacific 204 212 213 211 205 197

Japan 127 128 124 117 110 102

Non OECD 4 931 5 613 6 392 6 985 7 456 7 800

E Europe / Eurasia 342 338 337 331 321 311

Russia 146 141 135 129 122 116

Asia 3 199 3 579 3 998 4 275 4 451 4 538

China 1 263 1 340 1 439 1 471 1 464 1 426

India 1 016 1 171 1 367 1 485 1 565 1 614

Middle-East 168 210 255 293 326 353

Africa 805 1 014 1 275 1 523 1 769 1 997

Latin America 416 472 526 563 588 600

Brazil 174 196 209 217 220 219

World 6 068 6 832 7 675 8 309 8 801 9 150

EU27 481 501 507 507 503 496



considered in this study (according to the storylines). For the EU-27, they are taken

from VLEEM/TILT results.

Figure 7-3: GDP assumptions, PACT scenarios

The assumptions on oil ultimate recoverable resources are taken from ASPO16,

assuming possible increases in "Spacecraft" and to some extent in "Smartphone "

(technological progress), but not in "Hard Way". Assumptions on maximum

production of the "Gulf" countries considered a range between a maximum of 35

millions barrels per day ("Spacecraft") and a minimum of 26 ("Hard Way", almost the

level of today).

Figure 7-4: assumptions on oil availability, PACT scenarios

The assumptions on biomass potentials are taken from the ADAM project, and

summarized in the figure below, for the World and for the EU.

16

ASPO: Association for the Study of Peak Oil and gas

Scenario 1 :SC Scenario 2 : SP

Scenario 3 : HW



Figure 7-5: Biomass potentials in PACT scenarios

Below are the assumptions about the actual use of the biomass potentials in the

World according to scenarios, and about the imports from the EU. Imports are

forbidden in "Smartphone " scenario, while authorized in the other two scenarios.

Figure 7-6: Biomass use in PACT scenarios

The assumptions which drive renewable electricity, nuclear and CCS in the EU-27

result from a mix of VLEEM/TILT results about zero and energy+ houses in the one

side (decentralized photovoltaïcs), and assumptions on discount rates, feed-in tariffs

and investment costs in the other side.

The assumptions on the discount rates used in the choice of power generation

technologies are taken from the range of values considered in the previous WEC

study. Here are the assumptions taken in the 3 PACT scenarios, for centralized and

decentralized technologies, which drive in particular the renewables and nuclear:

– 4% (centralized) to 6% (decentralized) in Spacecraft

« Post-Carbon »

BAU

S1 - SC

200 EJ/pa

(EU10 EJ/pa)

S3 - HW

300 EJ/pa(EU15 EJ/pa)

S2 - SP

100 EJ/pa(EU 5 EJ/pa)

More attention

to Environment

More attention

to Wealth

More GDP focussed

Less GDP focussed

Bio-energy potentials& share of bio-energy used (dotted line), World Bio-energy imports in EU27



– 6% (decentralized) to 8% (centralized) in Smartphone

– 10% (decentralized) to 12% (centralized) in Hard Way

Additional assumptions on CCS are necessary; they are the same for the 3

scenarios:

– Anticipation by economic actors of the filling up of CO2 storage capacities

– Actors may stop using CCS technologies, taking into account the life-time of

existing CCS facilities and the remaining space for CO2 storage

– Limited geological CO2 storage capacity in the EU27 (14.3 GtCO2 maximum)

In Poles, the carbon constraint is summarized through an assumption on values of

the ton of CO2, which reflect either a market price (in case of ETS for example), or a

shadow price of the constraint (non ETS constraint for example). These values can

differ from country/region to country/region and across sectors. The nature of the

carbon constraint changes from one scenario to the other: imposed from "above" in

Spacecraft, self-imposed in Smartphone , almost negligible in Hard Way. Altogether,

it has been considered that the relative level of constraint across the scenarios was:

Scenario 2 (SP) > Scenario 1(SC) > Scenario 3 (HW)

In Spacecraft, the carbon constraint "from above" is expressed as binding targets on

carbon intensity of the GDP. The figure below show the differences between

Spacecraft and Smartphone as regard the improvements in carbon intensities of the

GDP across the world.

Figure 7-7: Improvements in carbon intensities, PACT scenarios

In addition, the following assumptions were made:

– Sector-based differentiation of the carbon value in S1 "Spacecraft" : ETS (1

global market) vs Non-ETS

– Region-based differentiation of the carbon value in S2 "Smartphone ":

Developed vs Emerging countries

Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone



– No differentiation in S3 " Hard Way" : one single small tax (to exclude coal in

final demand)

The figure below displays the carbon values resulting from the constraints considered

in the 3 scenarios.

Figure 7-8: Carbon values, PACT scenarios

Spacecraft Smartphone Hard Way



7.2 Socio-economy, energy and CO2 projections in PACT transition

scenarios

The detailed data tables are displayed in annex 4.

7.2.1 Socio-economy, EU-27

Here are the main projections calculated with the VLEEM/TILT model for the EU-27

as a whole, as regard demography, macro-economy, urbanization, dwellings and

mobility.

Demography

The expected population in 2050 is roughly in a range 500 - 600 millions inhabitants

in the EU-27, according to scenarios: almost 100 millions inhabitants more than in

2000 in "Spacecraft" (the highest demography), almost the same population than in

2000 in "Hard Way" (the lowest demography). These differences come from the

differences in assumptions regarding birth rates and immigration.

In all scenarios, the share of old, retired people is expected to increase a lot: a factor

two or more in 2025, two ("Spacecraft") to almost three in 2050 ("Hard Way"). The

highest the total population in 2025 and 2050, the lowest the share of people above

75 years old (6% in 2000, 13% to 16% in 2050).

"Spacecraft" is the only scenario where the share of young people (<25 years old) is

constant over time. In the other two scenarios, it decreases. In "Smartphone "

nevertheless, the decrease (down from 28% to 26% between 2000 and 2025) stops

around 2025. In "Hard Way", it continues after 2025, down to 23%.

As a consequence the share of the population between 25 and 75 years old, i.e. the

bulk of the active population, decreases sharply between 2000 and 2025 (from 66%

to 61%-62%), then more smoothly afterwards (down to 59%-61% in 2050).

Because first the population aging, and second the so-called "decohabitation", the

structure of the households is expected to change a lot in all scenarios: the share of

households with one person explodes from 28% in 2000 to 45%-47% in 2050. Almost

one household on two will be a "single". Reversely, the share of families with more

than two person is expected to decrease dramatically, from 40% (2000) down to 23%

("Hard Way"), 24% ("Smartphone ") or 27% ("Spacecraft"). Consequently, the

number of households, i.e. the number of homes, is expected to increase significantly

in all scenarios, much more than the population, while the average household size

will continue to decrease: +85 millions (+45%) between 2000 and 2050 in

"Spacecraft", +64 millions (+34%) in "Smartphone " and +50 millions (+27%) in "Hard

Way".



Figure 7-9: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios

Urbanization

In "Spacecraft", the share of the population living in core cities and sparse

settlements will decrease very little, 1 point each, and the share of homes will remain

almost stable. But because the steady growth of the total population and number of

homes, this will result in absolute increases of population and homes in these two

areas.

The most striking urban evolution in this scenario is the shift of population from 1st

rings of core cities to small/medium cities, in particular those close to core cities: the

share of population living in first rings will loose 4 points between 2000 and 2050

(from 24% to 20%), the absolute number of people living there remaining stable

around 120 millions. But because the evolution of the social structure of these living

areas, a much faster decrease of households size in 1st rings, we observe a reverse

phenomenum for households and homes: +2 points for the share of homes in 1st

rings (+25 millions homes), -1 point for small/medium cities (+20 millions homes).

In "Smartphone ", the share of the population living in core cities and 1st rings will

increase steadily: from 16% to 19% between 2000 and 2050 in core cities (+ 25

millions inhabitants), from 24% to 31% in 1st rings (+50 millions). In 2050, half the

total population will live either in core cities or in the immediate suburbs; 75% of the

total population increase between 2000 and 2050 will be hosted by these urban

areas. We will have a similar evolution for households and homes, although still more

rapid in the 1st rings: +15 millions households in core cities between 2000 and 2050

(45% increase), +44 millions households (x2) in 1st rings.

The share of the population in small/medium cities will decrease very little (from 27%

in 2000 to 25% in 2025 and 26% in 2050), while that of sparse settlements will

decrease sharply (from 33% to 24%), its total population loosing almost 30 millions

persons. Similarly, and more pronounced, the share of households will decrease

sharply in both living areas, while the absolute number of homes will increase just a

little (+4 millions in small/medium cities, +2millions in sparse settlements between

200 and 2050). Behind these global figures, one has to keep in mind very different

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

25-75

>75

<25

Population (Millions)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

>2 pers

2 pers

1 pers

Households (Millions)



situation between small/medium cities and sparse settlements rather close to core

cities, for which population and households will continue to grow, and those far away

from the core cities that will experience a real decline (already observed in some

countries).

In "Hard Way", the structural evolution of the population is much smoother than in

the two previous scenarios. The share of the population living in core cities and 1st

rings is expected to grow a little (+1point for core cities, +2points for 1st rings,

between 2000 and 2050, as well as their respective populations (+4 millions and +7

millions respectively). The situation is more contrasted for households in core cities,

with much faster increases (+4points and +18 millions households), because of the

rapid decrease of average household size in this area.

The shares of the population and households living in small/medium cities shrink in

this scenario between 2000 and 2050 (from 27% down to 23% and 19%

respectively), as well as the total population and number of households (-23 millions

persons and -6 millions households). The share of the population living in sparse

areas increase a little (+2points), as well as the total population (+5 millions). Same

for the households, with a more drastic increase in absolute values (+22 millions

homes).

Figure 7-10: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios

Macro-economy and welfare

The GDP growth is strongly contrasted across the scenarios, both in global terms

and per capita. In "Spacecraft" the total GDP will increase by 70% between 2000 and

2025, and be multiplied by 3.5 between 2000 and 250, while in "Smartphone ", the

increase will be limited to 33% up to 2025 and only 57% by 2050. The perspective is

even worth in "Hardway": +14% up to 2025 (= recession between 2010 and 2025),

+26% by 2050. The contrasts are a bit less strong in GDP per capita, because of the

differences in population, but nevertheless important.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

sparse settlements

small/medium towns

1st ring suburbs

Core cities

Population by zone of residence (Millions)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Households by zone of residence (Millions)



Conversely, the quality of life, as measured by the ratio time for self-accomplishment

versus time for paid work looks much better in "Smartphone " than in "Spacecraft":

from 1.8 in 2000 to 2.4 in 2050 in "Smartphone ", 1.9 in "Spacecraft". Indeed, the

ratio is also going up in "HardWay", but more because lack of jobs than because of

social choices as in "Smartphone ".

Two major reasons explain these differences in GDP: the volume of labour, much

higher in "Spacecraft" because of the demography and work rules, and the

productivity, also higher in Spacecraft because of technology and a more rapid

adaptation of workers skills. In "Hardway", a third reason plays a strong role, the high

structural unemployment ratio.

Table 7-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios

Dwellings

The stock of homes built before 2000 will remain at a high and similar magnitude in

all scenarios in 2050, between 150 millions ("Smartphone ") and 160 millions

("Spacecraft"), i.e. around 60% of the total stock (65% in "Hard Way"). Two

consequences are to be expected: the needs for thermal energy will remain highly

determined by the performances of the stock built today; because of the average

decrease of household size, the m² per person, and therefore the need for

thermal/cooling energy per capita, will increase significantly.

The share of the single family houses in the stock of homes will remain close to 50%

in the two scenarios where the urban sprawl is assumed to continue ("Spacecraft"

and "Hard Way"), while it will decrease to 38% in "Smartphone ", in which more

urban densification is assumed. This means that the average m² per capita (and the

related needs for thermal/cooling energy) will increase more slowly in the latter

scenario.

Figure 7-11 : EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

GDP (index) 100 171 133 114 345 157 126

%population at work 43% 39% 38% 35% 41% 34% 34%

Volume of labor hours (index) 100 94 84 79 113 66 69

Labor productivity 100 183 157 145 305 237 183

GDP/capita index 100 157 125 111 290 144 129

self-accomplishment / work ratio 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,1 1,9 2,4 2,1

2025 2050

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

2026-2050

2001-2025

<=2000

Homes by year of construction (Millions)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

big buildings

small buildings (<5 stores)


Homes by building types (Millions)



Mobility

In "Spacecraft", the combination of the urban development, high income and speed

iconisation result first in a continuous upward trend in car motorization: 1 car for 1.8

persons in 2050 against 1 for 2.5 persons in 2000. As a consequence, the passenger

traffic in cars will continue to increase for urban and regional trips, both in absolute

terms and in share in passenger traffics: +28% increase for urban passenger traffic in

cars, +9points in urban modal share (82% in 2050); +35% increase for regional

passenger traffic in cars, +6 points in regional modal share (89% in 2050).

Consequence of the urban development in this scenario, the average distance

travelled per year per inhabitant in urban areas will decrease a little (-8% between

2000 and 2050) moderating the increase of the total urban passenger traffic to 15%,

while that in regional trips will increase a little (+5%), the increase of the total regional

passenger traffic growing by 25%.

Public transport and slow modes will therefore decline a little, both in absolute terms

and in modal share, in urban and regional traffics: -10% for the public transport of

passengers in urban and regional areas, -5% for slow modes.

The situation is reverse for long distance passenger traffics, which will be multiplied

by four between 2000 and 2050. The quest for higher speeds will not favour cars

anymore, but high speed trains and airplanes. The total long distance passenger

traffic in cars is expected to remain mostly unchanged in volume for the next

decades, around 1000 billions passengers-km per year, but its modal share will

shrink from 75% in 2000 down to 19% in 2050. Annual long distance travelled in

Europe per capita in high speed trains and airplanes in 2050 will be close to 7000km

in average, against roughly 300 km in 2000.

Altogether, the annual mobility per capita is expected to increase from 11500 km per

year in 2000 to almost 18000 km in 2050, while the share of cars in this mobility will

decrease from 78% (2000) to 52% (2050).

In "Smartphone ", the annual mobility per capita will increase much less, from 11500

km per year in 2000 to roughly 12000 km in 2050, but the share of cars will also

decrease less rapidly (63% in 2050). Three main reasons for this: less GDP, average

speed control and less car attractivity (1 car for 2.2 persons in 2050).

The average distance travelled per year per inhabitant in urban areas remain almost

stable, which will result in a global 14% increase of the passenger traffic in urban

areas between 2000 and 2050, very close to the evolution in "Spacecraft" despite

huge differences in demography and urbanization. But the evolution of the modal

split of this urban traffic will be very different: the share of traffic in cars will decrease

from 73% down to 57%, while that of slow modes will increase from 6% to 8%. In

absolute terms, the passengers traffic in cars will decrease a little (roughly 10%),



while that in public transport will increase by 83% and that in slow modes will roughly

double.

Consequence of the urban development in this scenario, the average distance

travelled per year per inhabitant in regional areas will decrease substantially (-34%

between 2000 and 2050) bringing down the total regional passenger traffic (-27%).

The share of cars in this traffic will also go down by almost 10 points, from 83% to

74%.

The long distance passengers traffic will double from 2000 to 2050, while the share of

cars will go down from 75% (2000) to 61% (2050). These evolutions are much

smoother than in "Spacecraft": it is obviously the direct consequence of the combined

effect of less income, higher transport costs, constraints on air transport, and change

in people preferences as regard leisure. Nevertheless, air traffic within Europe is

expected to double, and the traffic in high speed trains will be 50% higher than the

total rail traffic of 2000.

Altogether the rail traffic in Europe will be multiplied by four between 2000 and 2050

in this scenario.

In "Hard Way", surprisingly, motorization rate will rise fast between 2000 and 2025,

even faster than in "Spacecraft" (mostly because of the differences in the

demographic evolutions), and decline afterwards (mostly for economic reasons): in

2050, there will be one car for 2 persons in average. Consequently, the share of cars

in the urban and regional passenger traffics will remain fairly stable up to 2025 (73%

and 82-83% respectively), and then decline steadily to 57% (urban) and 74%

(regional) in 2050.

The total urban and regional passenger traffics will grow a little up to 2025 and then,

either decline (urban) or stabilize (regional): in 2050, the passenger traffic in urban

areas will be 3 % above that of 2000, while the regional passengers traffic will be 5%

above 2000 level. Per capita, this means an increase in mobility from 3500 km/

cap/year in urban areas in 2000 to 3700km/cap/year in 2050, from 5100 km/cap/year

for regional trips in 2000 to 5400 km/cap/year in 2050. The contribution of Public

transport in urban areas will increase by 70% between 2000 and 2070, from 370

billions pass-km to 620, while that of slow modes will increase by 50%, up to 140

billions pass-km. For regional trips, the contribution of public transport will increase

by 60%, from 420 to 670 billions pass-km, between 2000 and 2050.

The growth of the long distance traffic will be even more slower than in "Smartphone

", mostly for economic reasons (low income and rather high transport costs). But the

long distance traffic will be more unequal than in the other scenario, with a high share

due to high income people moving fast in airplanes and, mostly, high speed trains.

Consequently, the share of cars in the long distance traffic will decline much faster

than in "Smartphone ", down from 75% in 2000 to 31% in 2050. The air traffic will not

grow so fast (only 65% above 2000 level in 2050), while high speed rail will grow

almost too times faster than in "Smartphone " (1050 billions pass-km in 2050).



Figure 7-12: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

7.2.2 End-use technologies and energy needs, EU-27

Transport

In all scenarios, plug-in hybrids and electric cars are assumed to replace the existing

internal combustion engine (ICE) cars, more or less rapidly depending on the

economic context, but certainly in a comprehensive way before 2050. The main

difference across scenarios is the electric autonomy of the plug-in hybrids, in

particular for daily urban and regional trip, and the structure of the km driven by cars

(very low electric mode for long distance).

In "Spacecraft", the more advanced batteries technology and the small share of long

distance trips in car-km result in a high share of electric km. This share is much more

reduced in "Smartphone ", and further more in "Hard Way". Surprisingly, the car-km

0,30

0,35

0,40

0,45

0,50

0,55

0,60

2000 2025 2050

SC

SP

HW

Motorization rate (pers / car)

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Slow modes

air (intra EU)

High speed rail

normal rail

public road

Cars

Modal split passenger traffic (%)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Car Public Slow modes

Urban passenger traffic (billions pass-km)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Regional passenger traffic (billions pass-km)

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Long distance passenger traffic (billions pass-km)



driven by hybrid vehicles in thermal mode is in the same range for the 3 scenarios

(despite strong differences in total car traffic), "Hard Way" having the highest level in

2050, followed by "Smartphone " and "Spacecraft".

As a result, the consumption of oil based motor fuels for cars is also in the same

range for the 3 scenarios (around 38-46 Mtoe, 25% of 2000 level), with similar levels

of biofuels (21 to 25 Mtoe, 13-15% of the motor-fuel consumption of 2000). There are

much sronger differences across scenarios as regard the electricity consumption of

cars, between 80 TWh ("Hard Way"), 130 TWh ("Smartphone ") and 310 TWh

("Spacecraft"). In "Hard Way" and "Smartphone ", most of this electricity will be

generated with solar PV. Altogether, it is expected that in all scenarios, but for

different reasons, the total CO2 emissions of cars will be reduced more or less by a

factor three to four between 2000 and 2050.

Figure 7-13: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios

Figure 7-14: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios

Buildings

There is no major difference across scenarios as regard the structure of the new

construction according to building concepts: due to the climatic geography of Europe,

passive concepts (including zero energy and +energy concepts) will represent

around 45% of the new construction and low energy/exergy standards the remaining

55%. The penetration rate of these new concepts in the total stock, and therefore

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

ICE Elec Hybrids plug-in

car stock by technology (millions)

020406080

100120140160180

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

Car energy consumption (Mtoe)

biofuels

elec

GPL+GNV

diesel

gasoline

0

50

100

150

200

2000 2025 2050

CO2 emissions of cars (gCO2/veh-km)

SC

SP

HW



their contribution to "post-carbon", is highly dependent on the demographic

assumptions of the scenarios: highest for "Spacecraft" and lowest for "Hard Way".

Existing buildings are also subject to thermal retrofitting in the 3 scenarios, but at

speeds and effectiveness dependent on the scenarios.

As a consequence, the level of the total useful energy for thermal needs of homes in

2050 will be close (5% below) to the 2000 level in "Spacecraft", despite a 45%

increase in the stock of homes (+85 millions homes). Taking into account the

increase in the performances of heating and cooling systems in the meantime, this

means that the final energy consumption will be around 30% below 2000 level in

2050.

In "Smartphone " and "Hard Way", the 2050 level will be almost 20% below that of

2000, and part of this useful energy (around 25%) will be supplied by home systems

of zero energy and + energy concepts. Taking into account the increase in the

performances of heating and cooling systems in the meantime, this means that the

final energy consumption will be around 60% below 2000 level in 2050.

Figure 7-15: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

Figure 7-16: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios

-50

0

50

100

150

200

SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 <2000 in 2025 <2000 in 2050 2001-2025 2026-2050

Stock of homes by construction year and building concept (millions)

Passive Low energy Standard (=2000)

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

useful energy for thermal uses of homes by construction

year (PJ)

<=2000 2001-2025 2026 - 2050

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

SC SP HW SC SP HW

2000 2025 2050

useful energy for thermal uses of homes by building

concept (PJ)

Passive Low energy Standard (=2000)



7.2.3 Global energy outlook

Primary energy and World oil market

The World primary energy consumption is expected to peak in all scenarios before

2050. In "Spacecraft" it will peak around 2045 and then plateau more or less

afterwards; in 2050, the World energy consumption will be roughly 90% above 2000

level. In "Smartphone ", the peak will occur sooner, 2040, and will be followed by a

decline; in 2050, the World consumption will be a little more than 50% above 2000

level. The peak will occur even sooner in "Hard Way", around 2035, at lower level

than in the previous scenarios, with a very slow decline afterwards; in 2050, the

World consumption level will be a little less than 50% above 2000 level.

It will be roughly the same type of evolution, but more drastic, for fossil fuels. In all

scenarios, the consumption of fossil fuels will peak up between 2025 ("Hard Way")

and 2035 ("Smartphone "), and then decline rapidly. In 2050, the World consumption

of fossil fuels will be close to 2000 level in all scenarios, with nevertheless less oil,

much more gas and a little more coal.

Nuclear will develop in all scenarios, but at very different pace according to

scenarios: rapidly in "Spacecraft" after 2015, very slowly in "Hard Way", in the middle

in "Smartphone ". In 2050, nuclear will contribute to roughly 20% of the primary

energy requirement in "Spacecraft" and less than 10% in "Hard Way".

Renewables will experience the fatest development in all scenarios, and will

contribute to 25%-30% of the World primary energy consumption in 2050.

Figure 7-17: World primary energy, PACT scenarios

Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone

Scenario 3 : Hard Way



World oil consumption will decline in all scenarios, immediately after 2010 in "Hard

Way", but only after 2025 in "Smartphone " and 2030 in "Spacecraft". Nevertheless,

because of differences in depletion policies all over the world, the tensions on the

World oil market will increase regularly in all scenarios up to 2030 (a little slower in

"Spacecraft" despite a higher demand), bringing the long term price17 in a range 110-

130 US$2005/bbl in 2030. Afterwards, these tensions will continue to increase at a

similar pace in "Spacecraft" (140 US$2005/bbl in 2050) , but they will explode in

"Smartphone " and, moreover, in "Hard Way", bringing the long term oil price in a

range 220-240 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with large fluctuations around this long term

trend.

Figure 7-18: Oil prices on World markets, PACT scenarios

In the EU-27, the situation is much more contrasted across scenarios regarding the

evolution of the primary energy consumption: the growth will resume after 2020 in

"Spacecraft", to reach in 2050 a level 25% above that of 2000, while it will decrease

sharply after 2010 in the other two scenarios; in 2050, the primary energy

consumption will be 30% lower than in 2000 in "Smartphone ", and 35% in "Hard

Way".

In all scenarios, the EU consumption of fossil fuels will decrease sharply after 2010,

with levels in 2050 ranging from 1/3 ("Smartphone " and "Hard Way") to 2/3

("Spacecraft") of 2000 level. In any case, they will contribute to 50% or less to the

primary energy consumption in 2050.

Nuclear energy will increase a lot after 2025 in "Spacecraft" (doubled in 2050 as

compared to 2000), but it will almost disappear in 2050 in "Hard Way" or come back

to 2000 level after a decline between 2010 and 2030 in "Smartphone ".

As for the world, renewables will experience the fatest development in all scenarios.

They will contribute to 35%-45% of the EU primary energy consumption in 2050.

17

The so-called long term price refer to the long term market equilibrium price (as driven by market fundamentals). This price can be very different from spot prices which are influenced by short term financial speculation. Historically, spot prices have been recorded at maximum levels two times above the long term market equilibrium price.



Figure 7-19: EU primary energy, PACT scenarios

Electricity mix

The World nuclear capacity will grow in all scenarios, but at different paces. In 2050,

the World capacity will reach 1800 GW (400 GW in 2000) in "Spacecraft", 1200 GW

in "Smartphone " and 800 GW in "Hard Way". In the EU, the situation is very

different. The total capacity will further decline until 2020 in all scenarios, but it will re-

increase as soon as 2020 in "Spacecraft", to reach 330 GW in 2050 (145 GW in

2000), and re-increase after 2035 (100 GW) in "Smartphone " to come back to the

2000 level in 2050. In "Hard Way", the decline will continue all over the period, down

to 50 GW.

For renewable electricity (wind power, photovoltaic, CSP, biomass, etc...), the

perspective is bright for all scenarios, in the World as in the EU-27. The World

renewable electricity capacity will be close to 11 000 GW in 2050 in "Spacecraft" and

"Smartphone " (roughly 1000 GW in 2000), and 6000 GW in "Hard Way". In the EU,

this generating capacity will be close to 1200 GW in 2050 in "Spacecraft" and

"Smartphone " (180 GW in 2000), and close to 700 GW in "Hard Way".

Scenario 2 : SmartphoneScenario 1 : Spacecraft




Figure 7-20: Nuclear and renewables, World and EU-27, PACT scenarios

World electricity needs will increase rapidly in all scenarios: from 15000 TWh in

2000 to more than 60 000 TWh in 2050 in "Spacecraft", 53000TWh in "Smartphone ",

and 40 000 TWh in "Hard Way". Renewables will contribute to roughly 50% to the

electricity generated in 2050 in all scenarios. The nuclear electricity will increase also

in all scenarios in absolute terms, but at very different pace according to scenarios. In

2050, its contribution will range from 20% ("Hard Way") to 25% ("Spacecraft") of the

World electricity generated.

Figure 7-21: Electricity generation mix, world, PACT scenarios

In the EU, electricity needs will be multiplied by almost 2.5 between 2000 and 2050 in

"Spacecraft". Wind power, solar (mostly CSP), biomas and other centralized

renewables will contribute to 40% to the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and

nuclear 35%. In "Smartphone ", the increase of electricity needs will be limited to

50% during the same period; wind power, photovoltaïcs, limited CSP, biomas and

other decentralized renewables will contribute to more than half the electricity

Nuclear capacity, World Nuclear capacity, EU27

Renewables capacity, World Renewables capacity, EU27





generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 25%. In "Hard Way", electricity needs will

fluctuate around 2000 level up to 2050; wind power, photovoltaic, limited CSP,

biomass and other decentralized renewables will contribute to more than half the

electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 20%.

Figure 7-22: Electricity generation mix, EU-27, PACT scenarios

7.2.4 CO2 emissions outlook

CCS

Although basic assumptions on CCS are rather conservative in all scenarios, CCS

does play nevertheless a role in CO2 mitigation, in particular in the EU. Two sectors

are mostly concerned: thermal electricity generation and steel. For EU electricity

generation, CCS will develop immediately after 2010 in "Spacecraft", after 2015 in

"Smartphone ", and only after 2030 in "Hard Way". Because the evolution of the

electricity generating mix, the EU thermal power capacity equipped with CCS will

peak around 60 GW in "Spacecraft" (peak in 2030) and in "Smartphone " (peak in

2040), and then start decreasing. In "Hard Way", CCS equipped thermal electricity

will reach 35 GW in 2050, but will keep on increasing afterwards.

Around 45% of the identified CO2 storage capacity of the EU will be filled up with

cumulative CO2 stores in "Spacecraft" and in "Smartphone " in 2050, but only 10% in

"Hard Way".

Figure 7-23: CCS in the EU-27, PACT scenarios



CCS power capacity (EU27)Cumulative CO2 stored

over total storage capacity (EU27)



World CO2 outlook

For all scenarios, by construction, long-term concentrations are around 500 ppmv for

CO2 and 650 ppmv eq for all green house gases.

But, more surprisingly, emissions paths are also close across the scenarios, which

results from contradictory effects of the economic growth in the one side, and climate

policies in the other side.

In "Spacecraft", the World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at 38Gt

around 2020 and then decrease steadily, with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. CO2

concentration in the atmosphere will stabilize around 500 ppmv in 2035.

Energy-CO2 emissions will peak up later (around 2030) and at a little lower level in

"Smartphone " (37Gt), and then decrease steadily, with a 2050 level also close to

that of 2000. CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will also stabilize around 500

ppmv after 2035.

In "Hard Way", the energy-CO2 emissions will peak up earlier (around 2025), at an

even lower level than in "Smartphone " (35Gt); then they will decrease steadily, with

a 2050 level also close to that of 2000. CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will also

stabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035.

Figure 7-24: World CO2 emissions and concentration, PACT scenarios

European outlook

Emissions paths are more contrasted in Europe across scenarios, than at World level

In the EU-27, the CO2 emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 2

from 2000 to 2050 in "Spacecraft", and by almost a factor 3 in "Smartphone " and in

"Hard Way".

In 2020, the reduction of CO2 emission will be in a range -21% to -33% according to

scenarios.

/ 1990 levels Short-term (2020) Longer-term (2050)

• S1 - Spacecraft -21% CO2 emissions close to F2

• S2 - Smartphone -33% CO2 emissions slightly over F3

• S3 - Hard Way -26% CO2 emissions F3



Figure 7-25: Overall EU-27 CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios

The downwards trajectories of sectoral energy-CO2 emissions are very similar for

"Smartphone " and "Hard Way", differences in GDP growth being compensated by

differences in climate policies: they decrease by more than 70% in the building

sector, 55% in the transport, 65% in industry and 70% in electricity generation. The

main differences with "Spacecraft" are in the buildings ("only" 35% reduction between

2000 and 2050) and power generation ("only" 40% reduction between 2000 and

2050). Trajectory is similar for transport, but quite different for industry (stability of

CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2030 in "Spacecraft"), although the emission level

of industry in 2050 is above, but not far, in "Spacecraft" as compared to the other two

scenarios.

Figure 7-26: CO2 emissions by sector, EU-27, PACT scenarios

Households – Services – Agriculture

Transport

IndustryPower Generation



8 Conclusion

The 3 scenarios describe very different pathways to post-carbon situations in Europe,

resulting in very contrasted social, economic and technology panoramas in 2050.

Demography, economic growth, World tensions on resources and climate, policies,

behaviours and life styles, technologies, are the main discriminating factors among

scenarios.

Nevertheless, these very different routes could lead to similar reduction in CO2

emissions of the EU, and similar levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, by

2050. But with very different prices for oil and gas, and very different values (i.e.

constraint) for CO2:

- "Hard Way" is the scenario in which the oil prices will reach the highest levels (close

to an average 250 US$2005/bbl in 2050, with the highest fluctuations), but the lowest

carbon value (lowest constraint, around 100 US$2005/t), and the lowest GDP/capita;

- "Smartphone " is the scenario with the highest carbon value (constraint), around

800 US$2005/t in 2050, with also high oil prices (around 200$2005/bbl in 2050) and

higher GDP/capita than in "Hard Way";

- "Spacecraft" is the scenario in which the increase of oil prices is the slower (around

140 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with a rather high carbon value (around 400 US$2005/bbl

in 2050) and a much higher GDP/capita as compared to the other two scenarios.

It may be argued, of course, that the timing of the change in the scenarios could be

different as compared to those considered in this study, resulting in different profiles

for GHGs trajectories, and different levels of stabilization of CO2 equivalent

concentration: higher level of concentration - and higher increase in temperature at

the surface of Earth-if the transition is slower than that described in the scenarios,

and the reverse if it is faster. This is mostly a matter of appreciation of the speed of

policy design and implementation, not a problem of internal consistency of the

scenarios.

These scenarios do not attempt to indicate to policy makers and stakeholders what

route must be chosen, but to give them two clear messages:

- The EU may reduce in any case by large amounts its consumption of fossils in the

next 40 years, and therefore reduce its CO2 emissions in the same proportion, but

the social, economic and policy costs would be very high if this transition is not

properly planned and implemented;

- There not one single way for planning and implementing properly the transition.

Indeed, social forces are currently pushing in two very different directions: some tend

to reproduce the recipes that have cooked the economic growth of the OECD

countries during the last 50 years (even if this economic model seems a bit tired

these days), while others consider this model obsolete and fight for inventing a new

"beyond GDP" model. Depending on which social forces will become predominant,



who will take the lead and with which socio-economic objectives, the transition

pathways, even if duly planned and managed, will be very different.



9 Annex 1: brief description of VLEEM/TILT

VLEEM: Very Long term Energy Environment Model (VLEEM)

VLEEM simulates the needs of energy services over the very long term, in relation to

fundamental drivers linked to demography, life-styles and information embodied in

technologies, socio-economic organizations and skills.

Figure 9-1: VLEEM overview

Accessibility

Developer(s): Bertrand Chateau (Enerdata), Hector Lopez (LET), Brieuc Bougnoux (Enerdata)

Contact person(s): for questions regarding the model please contact Bertrand Chateau

([email protected]). For further information please see the model’s web site:

www.VLEEM.org , which contains a rich description of the model.

Status: Developments to include richer simulation of mobility and transport technologies.

Planned development: urbanization and land use.

Applications (past, current, planned): analysis of sustainable worldwide energy development

over the 21th century in different energy paradigms (EU Research Programme, FP6).

Assessment of sustainable mobility up to 2050 in France (PREDIT, on-going since 2004).

Assessment of pathways for carbon transition (on-going PACT and PASHMINA research

programme, EU-FP7)

Demography

Education - information Activity

Time use-Production, wealth

Needs of energy services

«Food-feeding» « Shelter »

« Self-accomplishment »

« Transport»

« Other production»



Linkages with other models: with POLES model in PACT research programme.

Formulation

Modeled processes: combination of several sub-models:

- demographic: population by age categories and households by size are driven by fertility

and mortality assumptions, and distributed among urban and rural areas taking into account

internal and external migrations.

- life-styles: life-styles are appraised within households cohorts characterized by age,

education level and living area; life-styles are captured through daily time-budget allocated

to 5 main socio-cultural functions: food-feeding, shelter, mobility, self-accomplishment and

working-for-money, and through material preferences (car ownership for instance).

- macro-economic : economic growth is driven by labor hours and productivity; labor hours

are driven by active population (age between end of education and retirement, activity

levels according to status within the household), time budget allocated to working-for-

money and unemployment rate; productivity is driven by an information ratio calculated

from access rates to primary, secondary and tertiary education. Difference is made between

production value and wealth, depending on the information ratio (reflecting differences

between exchange rates and purchasing power parities for GDP evaluation).

- needs of energy services: for every socio-cultural function, needs of energy services are

calculated for each household cohort, depending on number of households / population,

wealth / production value, time budget, equipment; needs of energy services are also

calculated for material inputs for infrastructures and goods involved in the socio-cultural

functions (buildings, transport infrastructures, food production,...). Needs of energy services

are displayed in matrices with two dimensions:

- exergy requirement

- spatial / power density

Time horizon: 2100, 25 years steps.

Spatial Resolution: 10 macro regions

Scope: The model is structured so as to support back-casting analysis.

Literature:



1. Bertrand CHATEAU, Vincent BAGARD, Nathalie GLOT-SANCHEZ, Jaime PEREZ,

Nathalie QUERCIA, www.VLEEM.org, VLEEM 1, " Modelling the dynamics of the

needs of energy services in VLEEM. Final report -- August 2002 -- Annex 1"

Inputs

[name of variable in the model, type of variable, units, year or period, geographic reference

as applicable]

Initial energy demand data per end-use Base year GDP at market exchange rates and ppp Population by area and age class, base year Households by area and size, base year Fertility and mortality ratios, base year Participation rates to education: primary, secondary, tertiary, per area Time budget structure, base year transport equipment ratios and modal average speeds and shares base year Material inputs in infrastructures and equipment, and for food production Parameters to calibrate needs of energy services Parameters to calibrate information ratio

Outputs

[name of variable in the model, type of variable, units, year or period, geographic reference

as applicable]

population by age class and households by size categories, per area Information ratio economic production volume and wealth travel speed for passengers and freight, according to areas time-budgets per household cohort material inputs for infrastructures and goods involved in socio-cultural functions needs of energy services per socio-cultural function and type of services

Software & Hardware

Modeling software: Excel

Policy relevance



Policy variables:

Mainly used to assess conditions for sustainability in the long term.

Geographical scale and time horizon:

Any composition of the 10 macro-regions. Policy analysis is usually done using data until

2100.

Integration with policy-relevant evaluation /decision tools:

Analysis of the role of demographic structures, education and life-styles on the needs for

energy services, a pre-requisite to assess energy demand on the very long term

Performance

Strengths: endogenous growth and knowledge accumulation, accounting for fundamental

drivers of human behaviors.

Weaknesses: lack of land use dynamics, poor macro-economics.



10 Annex 2: brief description of the POLES model

POLES: Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems

General information

The POLES model is a World simulation model for the energy sector. It works in a year-

by-year recursive simulation and partial equilibrium framework, with endogenous

international energy prices and lagged adjustments of supply and demand by World region.

Developed under research programmes of the European Commission, the model is fully

operational since 1997 and enables to produce:

- detailed long term (up to 2050) World energy outlooks with demand, supply and price

projections by main region;

- CO2 emission Marginal Abatement Cost curves by region, and emission trading systems

analyses;

- technology improvement scenarios exogenous or with endogenous features and

analyses of the value of technological progress in the context of CO2 abatement policies.

Issues addressed

Long-term (2050) simulation of World energy scenarios / projections and international

energy markets analysis.

National / regional energy balances, integrating final energy demand, new and renewable

energy technologies diffusion, electricity and the transformation system, fossil fuel supply.

Impacts of energy prices and taxes policies. Energy RTD strategies. Greenhouse Gas

emissions and abatement strategies.

Costs of international GHG abatement scenarios with different targets, entitlements,

flexibility systems and constraints.

Developments in energy technology, with impacts of public and private investment in

R&D and cumulative experience with “learning by doing”.

Model characteristics



The POLES model is a global sectoral model of the World energy system. It has been

developed in the framework of a hierarchical structure of interconnected sub-models at the

international, regional, national level. The dynamics of the model is based on a recursive

(year by year) simulation process of energy demand and supply with lagged adjustments to

prices and a feedback loop through international energy prices.

Figure 10-1 : Overview of the POLES model

Structure of the model

In the current geographic disaggregation of the model, the World is divided into 47

countries or regions (table 1)

Table 1 : Geographic disaggregation of POLES

Egypt, Algeria-Lybia, Morroco-Tunisia

Gulf countries

North Africa

Sub-saharan Africa

Middle-East

Africa / Middle-East

India

China, South Korea

South Asia

South-East AsiaAsia

Mexico

Brazil

Central America

South AmericaLatin America

Russia, UkraineCIS

Japan, Australia & New ZealandSouth PacificJapan – South Pacific

> Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,

Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,

Sweden, UK, Turkey

> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,

Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic,

Baltic States

EU-15

EU-25

EU-27

Europe

Unites States, CanadaNorth America

CountriesSub-RegionRegion

Egypt, Algeria-Lybia, Morroco-Tunisia

Gulf countries

North Africa

Sub-saharan Africa

Middle-East

Africa / Middle-East

India

China, South Korea

South Asia

South-East AsiaAsia

Mexico

Brazil

Central America

South AmericaLatin America

Russia, UkraineCIS

Japan, Australia & New ZealandSouth PacificJapan – South Pacific

> Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,

Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,

Sweden, UK, Turkey

> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,

Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic,

Baltic States

EU-15

EU-25

EU-27

Europe

Unites States, CanadaNorth America

CountriesSub-RegionRegion

International Energy Markets

Coal Oil Gas

RegionalEnergyBalances

Prices(t+1)

Imports /Exports (t)

POP GDP

Resources

Cons, Prod

Emissions

Em

issio

n C

onstr

ain

t

Te

ch

no

logie

s

46 Regions

International Energy Markets

Coal Oil Gas

RegionalEnergyBalances

Prices(t+1)

Imports /Exports (t)

POP GDPPOP GDP

ResourcesResources

Cons, Prod

Emissions

Cons, Prod

Emissions

Em

issio

n C

onstr

ain

tE

mis

sio

n C

onstr

ain

t

Te

ch

no

logie

sT

ech

no

logie

s

46 Regions



The largest countries are treated, as far as energy demand is concerned, by a detailed

model. The other countries and other sub-regions are dealt with in more compact but

homogeneous models.

For the purpose of the WEC scenario study, the results of the model are aggregated across

countries and sub-regions according to the precise definition of the WEC regions.

For each region, the model articulates four main modules dealing with :

- final energy demand by main sector

- new and renewable energy technologies

- the conventional energy and electricity transformation system

- fossil fuel supply

While the simulation of the different energy balances allows for the calculation of import

demand / export capacities by region, the horizontal integration is ensured in the energy

markets module, the main inputs of which are import demand and export capacities of the

different regions. Only one World market is considered for the oil market (the "one great

pool" concept), while three regional markets (America, Europe, Asia) are identified for

coal, in order to take into account for different cost, market and technical structures.

Natural gas production and trade flows are modelled on a bilateral trade basis, thus

allowing for the identification of a large number of geographical specificities and the

nature of different export routes.

The comparison of import and export capacities and the changes in the

Reserves/Production ratio for each market determines of the variation of the prices for the

subsequent periods.

Final Energy Demand module

In the detailed demand model for the main countries or regions, the consumption of energy

is disaggregated into key homogeneous sub-sectors.

In each sector energy consumption is calculated for substitutable fuels on one hand and for

electricity on the other, while taking into account specific energy consumption (electricity

in electrical processes and coke for the other processes in steel-making, feedstock in the

chemical sector, electricity for heat and for specific uses in the Residential and Tertiary

sectors). Each demand equation combines a revenue or activity variable elasticity, price

elasticity, technological trends and, when appropriate, saturation effects. Particular

attention has been paid to the treatment of price effects.

Furthermore the model includes some detailed demand technologies for :



- road transport sector: 6 types of vehicles are simulated in the model (oil ICE, electrical,

pluggable hybrids, hydrogen ICE, hydrogen fuel cell, gas fuel cell)

- buildings: low and very low energy buildings are modelled in addition to standard

buildings.

The penetration of these explicit technologies depends on the speed of the stock renewal

(and renovation for buildings) and their relative competitiveness.

Table 2 : Sectoral disaggregation of energy demand in POLES

New and Renewable Energy technologies diffusion module

Most studies on international energy perspectives either disregard new and renewable

energy technologies as offering insufficient economic potential for development in the

medium term or, conversely, try to assess their potential in a purely technical approach in

order to show that their contribution to World energy supply can be important. The

approach adopted in the New and Renewable Energy module of the POLES model tries to

supersede these limits while recognising the difference between technical and economical

potentials as well as the time-constant which characterise the diffusion process. Elements

such as learning-curves and "niche-markets" have been introduced, which allow a truly

dynamic approach of the development and diffusion of these technologies.

The module dedicated to the simulation of new and renewable technologies identifies ten

generic technologies which are representative of the solutions to be implemented in

different types of countries and might have a non negligible quantitative contribution in the

long-term development of energy systems. The time horizon of the model (2050) in fact

allows to consider that, given the development time-constants, the technologies that might

have a significant role to this horizon should today be at least identified and have passed

the first stages of development. Twelve technologies have been selected in the current

version of the model :

Substituable

FuelsElectricity

Transport

Fuels

Industry

Steel industry X X

Chemical industry X X

Non Metallic Mineral X X

Other industries X X

Transport

Road / passenger X

Road / goods X

Rail / passenger X

Rail / goods X

Air transport X

Other X

Tertiary X X

Residential X X

Agriculture X X

Substituable

FuelsElectricity

Transport

Fuels

Industry

Steel industry X X

Chemical industry X X

Non Metallic Mineral X X

Other industries X X

Transport

Road / passenger X

Road / goods X

Rail / passenger X

Rail / goods X

Air transport X

Other X

Tertiary X X

Residential X X

Agriculture X X



Table 3 : New and renewable technologies in POLES

Electricity and Transformation System module

While the transformation system for conventional fossil fuels is treated in a relatively

aggregated way through the use of conversion, transport and distribution efficiency ratios,

which is acceptable in a World model, the electricity system deserves a much more

detailed treatment. In fact the electricity system is in any country not only one of the main

energy consuming sectors but also probably the major sector for inter-fuel substitution. A

last characteristic is that, because of the particularly long lifetime of equipment, this sector

displays much higher price-elasticities in the long-term than in the short-term.

In order to take into account the capacity constraints in the electricity production system

the module simulates the evolution of existing capacities at each period as a function of

equipment development decisions taken in preceding periods and thus of the anticipated

demand and costs at the corresponding time. In the current version of the model, twelve

electricity generation technologies, conventional and new are identified:

Table 4 : Electricity generation technologies in POLES

Combined Heat and Power (decentralized, competing with grid)

Biomass Conventional thermal

Rural Photovoltaic

Solar Thermal Power plants

Small Hydro

Wind Turbines (on-shore & off-shore)

Biofuels for transport

Fuel Cell Vehicle (PEM)

Stationary Fuel Cell (Gas and Hydrogen) (decentralized, competing with grid)

Photovoltaic (windows) (decentralized, competing with grid)

Biomass Gasif. with Gas Turbines

New and Renewable Technologies

Combined Heat and Power (decentralized, competing with grid)

Biomass Conventional thermal

Rural Photovoltaic

Solar Thermal Power plants

Small Hydro

Wind Turbines (on-shore & off-shore)

Biofuels for transport

Fuel Cell Vehicle (PEM)

Stationary Fuel Cell (Gas and Hydrogen) (decentralized, competing with grid)

Photovoltaic (windows) (decentralized, competing with grid)

Biomass Gasif. with Gas Turbines

New and Renewable Technologies

Super Critical Pulverised Coal*

Integrated Coal Gasif. Comb. Cycle*

Coal Conventional Thermal

Lignite Conventional Thermal

Large Hydro

Nuclear LWR

New Nuclear Design

Oil Fired Gas Turbines

Oil Conventional Thermal

Gas Turbines Combined Cycle*

Gas Fired Gas Turbines

Gas Conventional Thermal

Large Scale Power Generation

Super Critical Pulverised Coal*

Integrated Coal Gasif. Comb. Cycle*

Coal Conventional Thermal

Lignite Conventional Thermal

Large Hydro

Nuclear LWR

New Nuclear Design

Oil Fired Gas Turbines

Oil Conventional Thermal

Gas Turbines Combined Cycle*

Gas Fired Gas Turbines

Gas Conventional Thermal

Large Scale Power Generation

* : Coal and gas technologies considered with and without carbon capture and storage



Oil and gas production module

Oil and gas production is simulated for each region using a full discovery-process model

for the main producing countries and simplified relations for minor producing countries.

For each main producing country the available data cover the estimate of Ultimate

Recoverable Resources for oil and for gas, the cumulative drilling and cumulative

production since the beginning of fields development and the evolution of reserves.

Cumulative discoveries are then calculated as the sum of cumulative production and

remaining reserves. For base producers, oil or gas production then depends on a depletion

ratio, applied to the remaining reserves (discoveries - cumulative production) in each

period.

Figure 10-2 : Oil and gas production module

International Energy Prices module

In the current version of the model, the basis for international oil price modelling combines

a Target Capacity Utilisation Rate model for the Gulf countries and the global oil R/P ratio

as a long-term explanatory variable. This reflects the fact that most applied analyses of the

oil market points to the fact that, as experienced in the seventies and eighties, the shorter

term variations or shocks in the price of oil can be explained by the development of under-

or over- capacity situations in the Gulf region.

Coal and natural gas prices are computed for each one of the three main regional markets

with regional coal and gas trade matrixes and price variations linked respectively to coal

production capacities and to the gas R/P ratio of the key residual producers for each region.

Gbl

Oil in place

Recoverable Resources

Discoveries

Reserves Cumulative Prod.

Pproduction

Cumul. Drilling



Inputs

Historical data

The energy balance data for the POLES model are extracted from the international energy

database Enerdata, which also includes international macro-economic data concerning

GDP, the structure of economic activity, deflators and exchange rates. Technico-economic

data (energy prices, equipment rates, costs of energy technologies ...) are gathered both

from international and national statistics.

Assumptions

Basic assumptions on the drivers of energy demand concern:

- GDP

- Population

- Technological trends per sector and sub-sector

- Basic assumptions on the drivers of energy supply concern:

- Ultimate recoverable resources for oil and gas

- Trends in recovery rates for oil

- Trends in investment costs and performances of individual technologies

(electricity generation, renewables, coal production)

- Potentials for renewables

- Discount rates

Outputs

The main outputs of the model are:

- Projections of energy flows for each country / region in a structure similar

to that of a standard IEA-type energy balance

- Detailed projections on energy consumption per sector and sub-sector,

input/output of power plants, new energy technologies and electricity

production capacities development

- Oil, gas and coal prices on international markets, and detailed energy

prices at the consumer level

- Investment related to electricity generation and renewables



11 Annex 3: linkage between scenario statements and models inputs

VLEEM/TILT POLES

1 International context

1.1 Governance of global issues1.1.1 Climate change and GHG mitigation

UN negociation

bindings targets and carbon leakage CO2 max

flexibility instruments

GHG trading CO2 price

who pays for what?

1.1.2 Availability and Accessibility to oil and gas resources

Depletion policies: Gulf countries, Russia, ...Ultimate ressouces oil & gas,

Recovery rate of Ultimate oil

resources, Production capacity Gulf

trade mechanisms: long term contracts, gré-à-gré, markets,...

IEA role and extension, other global governance of access to ressources

1.1.3 World trade

WCO and protectionism GDP growth per county/zone

barriers to GHG imports

social protection issues ppp

1.1.4 World finance

IMF

financing investment in developping countries

US debt

1.2 Major world players policies and constraints1.2.1 US

economic growth and content GDP growth + sectoral breakdown

coping with climate change CO2 max, CO2 price

energy securityDiscount rates, public (supported)

investments, costs nuclear, coal

international partnership

1.2.2 China


wages and internal demand ppp





1.2.3 other BRICs


wages and internal demand ppp





1.2.4 EU

economic growth and content see below 2.1.1, 2.1.2 GDP growth + sectoral breakdown

East/West descrepancies GDP growth + sectoral breakdown


energy securityPolicy objectives: % renewable,

efficiency gain, max gaz Russia



VLEEM/TILT POLES

2 EU and member countries context2.1 Economic model2.1.1 Human capital

fertility, immigation fertility rates, immigration flows

working time and retirement policies hours/year, retirement age

women's activity support policies % active

education, culture % tertiary education

participation to collective goods, support to ederly

2.1.2 Role and intervention of EU and member countries Governments

de-regulation, re-regulation of energy related business, re-nationalisation Discount rates

investment policy in strategic capital intensive technologies & infrastructuresDiscount rates, costs nuclear, CCS, non

conventional gas

taxation, subsidizing and pricing policy prices to final consumers

support to economic activity

Utilisation rate of production

potential, Elasticity of labour

productivity to information GDP growth + sectoral breakdown

2.1.3 Utility functions, consumption model, preferences, life styles,...

inclusion of time and environment friendliness in utility functions

car equipment saturation, elasticity

speed/GDP, elasticities energy

services to affluence budget coefficient

attitude towards wastingelasticities useful energy to energy

services

leisure model % leisure time budget per activity

marginal benefit of not working versus marginal earnings from workhours/year, retirement age, % active

in second household adult

2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth2.2.1 Environment policies and instruments

GHG quotas: scope and magnitude CO2 max ETS

GHG trading system: scope and magnitude CO2 price ETS

GHG taxation: modalities, magnitude, carbon leakage CO2 price non ETS

regulations and norms on technologies, buildings, cars,...

% new efficient building per type in

construction, energy efficiency gains

through retrofitting, CO2/km for new

cars

feed-in tarriffs, subsidies, tax credit,... tarriffs and costs

green, white certificates

others

2.2.2 Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensions

households income/affluence structure

poors lodging: where, what type of buildings

social/health expenses coverage

pensions mechanisms

2.2.3 Education, values, icons, democraty

environment and climate change in basic education

spread of de-growth / sobriete values

car equipment saturation, elasticity

speed/GDP, elasticities energy

services to affluence budget coefficient

social icons

how democraty works, from EU to local

2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies2.3.1 Transport

infrastructures for long distance: motorways, fast trains (passengers,

freight), airports, waterways, ports

elasticities spedd / GDP for

passengers and freight

car industry strategies: efficiency, electric propulsion,...% new technologies in car sales,

efficiency gains

public support to non road transport% slow modes, % car in urban and

regional, km/car/year

2.3.2 Buildings

structure of building concepts in construction

% single family houses, % new

efficient building per type in

construction

insulation standards new buildings insulation standards

retrofitting mandatory targets targets

2.3.3 Materials

soft materials in construction (wood, straw,...)

material substitution: buildings, vehicles, packaging

recycling

2.3.4 Renewables

windpower targets

solar: CSP, PV, heat targets

biomass: direct use, biofuels, biogas,... targets

others targets

2.3.5 Network energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool)

smart grids, smart metering, local grids

gas deployment infra coef

district heat/cool deployment infra coef



VLEEM/TILT POLES

3 Local transitions3.1 Local players policies and actions3.1.1 Municipalities and other local/regional authorities

objectives/instruments local policies towards climate change CO2 max / city type

objectives/instruments local policies towards building, construction

and retrofitting

% single family houses & % new


construction, % retrofitting

objectives/instruments local policies towards transport% slow modes, % car in urban and

regional, car speed urban

objectives/instruments local policies towards energy solar PV targets/city type, district

heat/biomas/city type, co-generation

3.1.2 Utilities and services

district heating services % dwellings connected

local supply/demand electricity balance

integrated supply/efficiency serviceselasticity useful energy to energy

services

3.1.3 NGOs and citizens associations

local innovative experiences% single family houses & % new


construction, % retrofitting

policy burden on local authorities

monitoring, evaluation and follow-up

education and public awareness

elasticity energy service to affluence,

elasticity useful energy to energy

services

3.2 changes in urban schemes3.2.1 transport and energy networks, and spatial distribution of

dwellings among the 4 quadrants

requalification of public space and buildings in core cities, district

heating networks, densification of residents

% households per type, % slow

modes, % car in urban and regional,

TC and car speed

% dwellings connected to district

heating

densification of residents in 1st ring, mass transit system with core

cities, district heating networks

% households per type, % dwelling

types in construction, % dwelling

replacement, % slow modes, % car in

urban and regional , TC and car speed

% dwellings connected to district

heating

densification of residents in small/medium cities, mass transit system

with core cities nearby, gas network



replacement, % slow modes, % car in

urban and regional, TC and car speed % dwellings connected to gas

population in sparse settlements, intermodal platforms with mass

transit systems



replacement, % car in urban and

regional, TC and car speed

3.2.2 transport networks and spatial distribution of urban

functions among the 4 quadrants

commerces

education

health

services to the public (post, banks,...)

services to business

3.2.3 city networking

networking among core cities % fast train, air

networking between core cities and surrounding small/medium cities % car in regional, speed TC regional

networking among small/medium cities% normal trains, % car in regional,

speed TC regional

3.2.4 land-use and cities energy supply balancing

core cities: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), wastestargets: solar PV district heat/ co-

generation/wastes, geothermal

1st rings: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), wastes, wind targets: solar PV district heat/ co-

generation/wastes, geothermal, wind

small/medium cities: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps),

wastes, windtargets: solar PV district heat/ co-

generation/wastes, geothermal, wind

sparse settlements: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps),

wastes, biomass, windtargets: solar PV , geothermal, wind,

biomass

3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU3.3.1 How people move

time budget and utility time budget transport per quadrant

speed and accessibilityaverage urban/regional speed per

quadrant

quality and image of transport modes% car in urban & regional, per

quadrant

3.3.2 Indoor comfort

thermal comfort, winter and summerelasticities energy services to

affluence

healthy comfort elasticities energy services to

affluence

life comfort at home: equipment, use patternelasticities energy services to

affluence

3.3.3 How people work

teleworking time budget transport per quadrant

telemeeting

3.3.4 Micro energy consumers producers

solar PV electricity and batteries

other self-generation of electricity

electric cars and batteries

3.3.5 Leisure

time budget structure: at home (appliance dependant versus non

appliance dependant) versus outside: daily, week-end, holidaysstructure time budget leisure per

quadrant

week-ends outside: where, how long, how frequent % air

holidays: what type, where, how long, how frequent %air, fast train



12 Annex 4: scenario projections

12.1 EU-27 as a whole

12.1.1 Socio-economy

Demography Table 12-1: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios

Urbanization Table 12-2: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios

Macro-economy and welfare Table 12-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Population (millions) 482 531 517 502 584 535 476

% <25 28% 27% 26% 25% 28% 26% 23%

% >75 6% 12% 13% 13% 13% 15% 16%

% 25-75 66% 61% 61% 62% 59% 59% 61%

Households (millions) 187 244 239 237 272 251 238

% 1 pers 28% 42% 42% 43% 46% 45% 47%

% 2 pers 32% 28% 31% 30% 27% 31% 30%

% >2 pers 40% 29% 27% 27% 27% 24% 23%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Core cities 16% 16% 18% 16% 15% 19% 17%

% 1st ring suburbs 24% 22% 27% 26% 20% 31% 26%

% small/medium towns 27% 29% 25% 24% 32% 26% 23%

% sparse settlements 33% 33% 30% 34% 32% 24% 35%


% Core cities 18% 18% 18% 20% 18% 20% 22%

% 1st ring suburbs 23% 25% 30% 26% 25% 35% 25%

% small/medium towns 27% 25% 22% 21% 26% 21% 19%

% sparse settlements 32% 32% 29% 33% 31% 25% 34%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

GDP (index) 100 171 133 114 345 157 126

%population at work 43% 39% 38% 35% 41% 34% 34%

Volume of labor hours (index) 100 94 84 79 113 66 69

Labor productivity 100 183 157 145 305 237 183

GDP/capita index 100 157 125 111 290 144 129

self-accomplishment / work ratio 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,1 1,9 2,4 2,1

2025 2050



Dwellings Table 12-4: EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios

Mobility Table 12-5: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Dwellings (millions) 185 242 237 235 270 250 237

<=2000 185 172 172 172 161 150 155

single family houses 92,7 85,9 85,8 85,9 79,2 70,2 76,7

small buildings (<5 stores) 61,3 57,7 57,2 57,7 54,4 53,4 50,7

big buildings 30,6 28,9 28,6 28,9 27,3 26,8 27,3

2001-2025 69,1 65,4 62,1 69,1 65,4 62,1

single family houses 33,5 18,2 27,5 33,5 18,2 27,5

small buildings (<5 stores) 20,7 13,4 13,1 20,7 13,4 13,1

big buildings 14,9 33,8 21,5 14,9 33,8 21,5

2026-2050 40,5 34,2 20,4

single family houses 19,3 6,2 9,1

small buildings (<5 stores) 12,4 7,9 3,9

big buildings 8,8 20,1 7,4

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,41 0,50 0,46 0,53 0,56 0,46 0,50

Passenger traffics (Gpkm) 5521 7358 6103 6517 10430 6531 6673

Urban (Gpkm) 1718 1847 1848 1825 1972 1950 1776

Car (%) 73% 80% 65% 73% 82% 57% 57%

Public (%) 21% 15% 28% 22% 14% 35% 35%

Regional (Gpkm) 2476 2774 2160 2534 3105 1817 2585

Car (%) 83% 85% 79% 82% 89% 74% 74%

Public (%) 17% 15% 21% 18% 11% 26% 26%

Long distance (Gpkm) 1328 2737 2095 2157 5353 2763 2313

Car (%) 75% 37% 68% 53% 19% 61% 31%

Public (%) 25% 63% 32% 47% 81% 39% 69%

Cars (%) 78% 66% 71% 70% 52% 63% 55%

Public (%) 20% 33% 27% 29% 48% 34% 43%

road 9% 6% 9% 7% 2% 4% 5%

rail 8% 21% 14% 16% 36% 26% 35%

High speed 0% 13% 4% 9% 30% 10% 16%

air (intra EU) 3% 6% 4% 5% 10% 4% 3%

2025 2050



12.1.2 End-use technologies and energy needs

Transport Table 12-6: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios

Table 12-7: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios

Buildings Table 12-8: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Cars


Car stock (millions) 196 262 237 262 323 243 236

ICE 100% 57% 83% 83% 0% 1% 1%

Elec 0% 7% 3% 3% 20% 19% 19%

Hybrids plug-in 0% 36% 14% 15% 80% 80% 80%

Km/year/car ('000) 13,0 11,9 11,6 11,7 11,2 10,7 10,2

Traffic cars (Gveh-km) 2550 3110 2764 3069 3609 2595 2416

urban (%) 38% 39% 37% 38% 39% 36% 36%

regional (%) 43% 43% 36% 41% 46% 30% 47%

long distance (%) 19% 17% 28% 21% 16% 35% 16%

ICE( %) 100% 48% 83% 82% 0% 0% 0%

Elec (%) 0% 4% 1% 2% 8% 7% 7%

Hybrids plug-in (%) 0% 48% 15% 17% 92% 93% 93%

of which elec mode (%) 0% 25% 16% 10% 55% 31% 19%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Energy cars (Mtoe) 164 122 125 140 86 76 78

dont gasoline 129 41 48 53 13 15 16

diesel 33 54 55 63 25 28 30

GPL+GNV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

elec 0 6 1 1 27 11 7

biofuels 3 21 21 23 21 23 25

gCO2/vkm car (direct) 181 78 95 95 29 45 53

l/100km ICE 7,9 5,9 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,7 5,7

gep/km ICE 64 49 49 49 26 27 27

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 13% 12% 12% 18% 18% 15%

% Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 74% 74% 74% 82% 82% 85%

% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 13% 13% 14% 0% 0% 0%

dont <=2000 185 172 172 172 161 150 155

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 19% 18% 19% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 69 65 62 69 65 62

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 45% 44% 44% 45% 44%

% Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 56% 55% 56% 56% 55% 56%

% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 41 34 20

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 44% 43%

% Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 57% 56% 57%

% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050



Table 12-9: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios

PJ 2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Useful energy (PJ) 5,49 5,66 5,42 5,33 5,22 4,52 4,43

heating, air cond' 4,29 4,23 4,10 4,10 3,87 3,44 3,45

hot water 1,19 1,42 1,32 1,23 1,35 1,08 0,97

dwellings <=2000 5,49 3,82 3,76 3,71 3,03 2,72 2,79

% Low Cons. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

% Med. Cons. 0% 75% 76% 75% 100% 100% 100%

% Stand. Cons. 0% 25% 24% 25% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 1,84 1,66 1,62 1,77 1,59 1,55

% Low Cons. 31% 31% 31% 31% 30% 30%

% Med. Cons. 30% 37% 26% 69% 70% 70%

% Stand. Cons. 39% 33% 43% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 0,41 0,21 0,09

% Low Cons. 35% 39% 43%

% Med. Cons. 65% 61% 57%

% Stand. Cons. 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050



12.2 Core cities

Demography Table 12-10: Core cities demography, PACT scenarios

Mobility Table 12-11: Core cities mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

Buildings Table 12-12: Core cities dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% <25 23% 20% 23% 14% 19% 23% 8%

% >75 7% 18% 14% 22% 21% 16% 28%

% 25-75 69% 62% 62% 64% 61% 61% 63%


% 1 pers 41% 52% 47% 56% 56% 49% 62%

% 2 pers 29% 28% 29% 31% 28% 30% 32%

% >2 pers 30% 20% 24% 13% 16% 21% 6%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Cars



Km/year/car ('000) 11,5 10,5 10,0 10,3 9,5 8,5 8,5

Passenger traffics (Gpkm)

Urban (Gpkm) 361 411 416 392 439 435 390

Car (%) 58% 65% 50% 58% 70% 40% 40%

Public (%) 36% 29% 42% 36% 25% 49% 51%

Regional (Gpkm) 149 169 154 162 181 144 174

Car (%) 75% 80% 70% 75% 75% 60% 60%

Public (%) 25% 20% 30% 25% 25% 40% 40%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 11% 12% 13% 16% 17% 17%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 17% 15% 16% 0% 0% 0%

dont <=2000 33 33 32 33 32 30 32

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 22% 20% 22% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 11 11 13 11 11 13

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 7 7 6

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050



12.3 1st rings

Demography Table 12-13: 1st rings demography, PACT scenarios

Mobility Table 12-14: 1st rings mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

Buildings Table 12-15: 1st rings dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% <25 28% 21% 21% 24% 18% 18% 22%

% >75 5% 10% 11% 9% 11% 13% 11%

% 25-75 68% 69% 68% 66% 71% 69% 67%


% 1 pers 25% 55% 51% 48% 62% 52% 48%

% 2 pers 30% 23% 28% 23% 24% 30% 28%

% >2 pers 45% 22% 21% 29% 15% 18% 24%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

Cars



Km/year/car ('000) 17,6 16,5 16,0 16,3 15,0 14,0 14,0

Passenger traffics (Gpkm)

Urban (Gpkm) 817 824 950 923 836 1062 879

Car (%) 79% 85% 70% 78% 85% 60% 60%

Public (%) 18% 12% 26% 20% 13% 35% 36%

Regional (Gpkm) 298 300 310 337 305 310 346

Car (%) 84% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75%

Public (%) 16% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 15% 20% 16% 21% 26% 18%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 11% 9% 11% 0% 0% 0%

dont <=2000 42 39 39 39 36 36 36

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 16% 16% 16% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 20 32 21 20 32 21

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 11 18 3

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050



12.4 Small/medium cities

Demography Table 12-16: Other cities demography, PACT scenarios

Mobility Table 12-17: Other cities mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

Buildings Table 12-18: Other cities dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% <25 26% 26% 24% 23% 29% 25% 25%

% >75 5% 12% 13% 13% 12% 13% 13%

% 25-75 69% 62% 63% 63% 59% 62% 62%


% 1 pers 25% 38% 39% 40% 38% 39% 43%

% 2 pers 34% 27% 29% 29% 24% 30% 25%

% >2 pers 41% 35% 32% 31% 38% 31% 33%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

CarsCar ownership

(car/pers.) 0,40 0,46 0,45 0,52 0,53 0,45 0,48


Km/year/car ('000) 13,0 12,0 11,5 11,8 11,0 10,0 10,0

Passenger traffics

(Gpkm)

Urban (Gpkm) 252 303 242 236 359 241 209

Car (%) 72% 80% 65% 73% 85% 60% 60%

Public (%) 16% 9% 19% 15% 6% 19% 22%

Regional (Gpkm) 935 1122 802 874 1331 715 837

Car (%) 83% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75%

Public (%) 17% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 12% 6% 4% 17% 9% 8%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 13% 16% 16% 0% 0% 0%

dont <=2000 49 46 46 46 42 42 36

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 18% 18% 18% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 16 7 5 16 7 5

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 12 4 4

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050



12.5 Sparse settlements

Demography Table 12-19: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios

Mobility Table 12-20: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios

Buildings Table 12-21: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% <25 27% 29% 27% 27% 31% 27% 24%

% >75 7% 12% 14% 13% 15% 19% 17%

% 25-75 66% 59% 59% 61% 54% 54% 59%


% 1 pers 25% 31% 32% 33% 34% 37% 39%

% 2 pers 33% 33% 35% 34% 30% 34% 32%

% >2 pers 42% 35% 32% 33% 35% 29% 29%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW

CarsCar ownership

(car/pers.) 0,48 0,63 0,60 0,66 0,70 0,60 0,63


Km/year/car ('000) 11,1 10,0 9,5 9,8 10,0 9,0 9,0

Passenger traffics

(Gpkm)

Urban (Gpkm) 287 310 240 274 338 212 298

Car (%) 77% 85% 73% 78% 85% 70% 70%

Public (%) 17% 9% 18% 15% 10% 19% 20%

Regional (Gpkm) 1093 1182 893 1162 1287 648 1227

Car (%) 83% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75%

Public (%) 17% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25%

2025 2050

2000

SC SP HW SC SP HW


% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 12% 9% 13% 17% 14% 16%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 14% 15% 13% 0% 0% 0%

dont <=2000 60 55 55 55 51 42 51

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 19% 19% 19% 0% 0% 0%

2001-2025 22 15 23 22 15 23

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 43% 43% 43% 43% 43%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

2026 - 2050 12 4 7

% Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 43% 43%


% Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%

2025 2050

