Prepared for Program on Information Science – Brown Bag Talks MIT June 2014 Navigating the Changing Landscape of Information Privacy Dr. Micah Altman <[email protected]> Director of Research, MIT Libraries Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
his talk provides an overview of the changing landscape of information privacy with a focus on the possible consequences of these changes for researchers and research institutions. Personal information continues to become more available, increasingly easy to link to individuals, and increasingly important for research. New laws, regulations and policies governing information privacy continue to emerge, increasing the complexity of management. Trends in information collection and management — cloud storage, “big” data, and debates about the right to limit access to published but personal information complicate data management, and make traditional approaches to managing confidential data decreasingly effective. Information Science Brown Bag talks, hosted by the Program on Information Science, consists of regular discussions and brainstorming sessions on all aspects of information science and uses of information science and technology to assess and solve institutional, social and research problems. These are informal talks. Discussions are often inspired by real-world problems being faced by the lead discussant.
Text of June2014 brownbag privacy
1. Prepared for Program on Information Science Brown Bag Talks
MIT June 2014 Navigating the Changing Landscape of Information
Privacy Dr. Micah Altman Director of Research, MIT Libraries
Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
2. DISCLAIMER These opinions are my own, they are not the
opinions of MIT, Brookings, any of the project funders, nor (with
the exception of co-authored previously published work) my
collaborators Secondary disclaimer: Its tough to make predictions,
especially about the future! -- Attributed to Woody Allen, Yogi
Berra, Niels Bohr, Vint Cerf, Winston Churchill, Confucius,
Disreali [sic], Freeman Dyson, Cecil B. Demille, Albert Einstein,
Enrico Fermi, Edgar R. Fiedler, Bob Fourer, Sam Goldwyn, Allan
Lamport, Groucho Marx, Dan Quayle, George Bernard Shaw, Casey
Stengel, Will Rogers, M. Taub, Mark Twain, Kerr L. White, etc.
Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
3. Collaborators & Co-Conspirators Privacy Tools for
Sharing Research Data Team (Salil Vadhan, P.I.)
http://privacytools.seas.harvard.edu/peopl e Research Support
Supported in part by NSF grant CNS-1237235 Capturing Contributor
Roles in Scholarly Publications
4. Related Work Vadhan, S. , et al. 2010. Re: Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Human Subjects Research Protections. Available
from: http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/irb/Vadhan.pdf Reprints
available from: informatics.mit.edu Capturing Contributor Roles in
Scholarly Publications
5. Roadmap * Level setting what is confidential information? *
* Little Data, Big Data, & Privacy * * Elements of A Modern
Framework for Managing Confidential Information * Capturing
Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
6. Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications What
is confidential information?
7. Personally identifiable private information is common v. 24
(January IAP Session 1) Includes information from a variety of
sources, such as Research data, even if you arent the original
collector Student records such as e-mail, grades Logs from
web-servers, other systems Lots of things are potentially
identifying: Under some federal laws: IP addresses, dates,
zipcodes, Birth date + zipcode + gender uniquely identify ~87% of
people in the U.S. [Sweeney 2002] Try it:
http://aboutmyinfo.org/index.html With date and place of birth, can
guess first five digits of social security number (SSN) > 60% of
the time. (Can guess the whole thing in under 10 tries, for a
significant minority of people.) [Aquisti & Gross 2009]
Analysis of writing style or eclectic tastes has been used to
identify individuals Tables, graphs and maps can also reveal
identifiable information Brownstein, et al., 2006 , NEJM 355(16),
7Managing Confidential Data
8. Data Points on Data Privacy Capturing Contributor Roles in
Scholarly Publications 2010
9. Whats wrong with this picture? v. 24 (January IAP Session 1)
Law, policy, ethics Research design Information security Disclosure
limitation Name SSN Birthdate Zipcode Gender Favorite Ice Cream #
of crimes committed A. Jones 12341 01011961 02145 M Raspberry 0 B.
Jones 12342 02021961 02138 M Pistachio 0 C. Jones 12343 11111972
94043 M Chocolate 0 D. Jones 12344 12121972 94043 M Hazelnut 0 E.
Jones 12345 03251972 94041 F Lemon 0 F. Jones 12346 03251972 02127
F Lemon 1 G. Jones 12347 08081989 02138 F Peach 1 H. Smith 12348
01011973 63200 F Lime 2 I. Smith 12349 02021973 63300 M Mango 4 J.
Smith 12350 02021973 63400 M Coconut 16 K. Smith 12351 03031974
64500 M Frog 32 L. Smith 12352 04041974 64600 M Vanilla 64 M. Smith
12353 04041974 64700 F Pumpkin 128 N. Smith- Jones 12354 04041974
64800 F Allergic 256 9Managing Confidential Data
10. Name SSN Birthdate Zipcode Gender Favorite Ice Cream # of
crimes committed A. Jones 12341 01011961 02145 M Raspberry 0 B.
Jones 12342 02021961 02138 M Pistachio 0 C. Jones 12343 11111972
94043 M Chocolate 0 D. Jones 12344 12121972 94043 M Hazelnut 0 E.
Jones 12345 03251972 94041 F Lemon 0 F. Jones 12346 03251972 02127
F Lemon 1 G. Jones 12347 08081989 02138 F Peach 1 H. Smith 12348
01011973 63200 F Lime 2 I. Smith 12349 02021973 63300 M Mango 4 J.
Smith 12350 02021973 63400 M Coconut 16 K. Smith 12351 03031974
64500 M Frog 32 L. Smith 12352 04041974 64600 M Vanilla 64 M. Smith
12353 04041974 64700 F Pumpkin 128 N. Smith 12354 04041974 64800 F
Allergic 256 Whats wrong with this picture? v. 24 (January IAP
Session 1) Identifier Sensitive Private Identifier Private
Identifier Identifier Sensitive Unexpected Response? Mass resident
FERPA too? Californian Twins, separated at birth? 10Managing
Confidential Data
11. The Ethical View of Confidentiality v. 24 (January IAP
Session 1) Related to over the content, context, control, and use
of information describing an individual. Confidentiality is
violated if something is learned about an individual outside of the
intended context and use 11Managing Confidential Data
12. The Legal View of Privacy v. 24 (January IAP Session 1)
Overlapping laws Different laws apply to different cases All
affiliates subject to university policy (Not included: EU
directive, foreign laws, classified data, ) 12Managing Confidential
Data
13. Its Complicated Contract Intellectual Property Access
Rights Confidentiality Copyright Fair Use DMCA Database Rights
Moral Rights Intellectual Attribution Trade Secret Patent Trademark
Common Rule 45 CFR 26 HIPAA FERPA EU Privacy Directive Privacy
Torts (Invasion, Defamation) Rights of Publicity Sensitive but
Unclassified Potentially Harmful (Archeological Sites, Endangered
Species, Animal Testing, ) Classified FOIA CIPSEA State Privacy
Laws EAR State FOI Laws Journal Replication Requirements Funder
Open Access Contract License Click-Wrap TOU ITAR Export
Restrictions
14. Current Approached to Managing Confidential Information v.
24 (January IAP Session 1) Information technology/security
constrain access to information Legal Vet and bind those who can
access information Statistical Anonymize/deidentify information
14Managing Confidential Data
15. Information Security Model v. 24 (January IAP Session 1)
[NIST 800-100, simplification of NIST 800-30] Law, policy, ethics
Research design Information security Disclosure limitation System
Analysis Threat Modeling Vulnerability Identification Analysis -
likelihood - impact - mitigating controls Institute Selected
Controls Testing and Auditing Information Security Control
Selection Process 15Managing Confidential Data
16. SO MANY CONTROLS!!! v. 24 (January IAP Session 1) Access
Control Low (impact) Medium-High (impact), adds Policies; Account
management *; Access Enforcement; Unsuccessful Login Attempts;
System Use Notification; Restrict Anonymous Access*; Restrict
Remote Access*; Restrict Wireless Access*; Restrict Mobile
Devices*; Restrict use of External Information Systems*; Restrict
Publicly Accessible Content Information flow enforcement;
Separation of Duties; Least Privilege; Session Lock Security
Awareness and Training Policies; Awareness; Training; Training
Records Audit and Accountability Policies; Auditable Events *;
Content of Audit Records *; Storage Capacity; Audit Review,
Analysis and Reporting *; Time Stamps *; Protection of Audit
Information; Audit Record Retention; Audit Generation Audit
Reduction; Non-Repudiation Security Assessment and Authorization
Policies; Assessments* ; System Connections; Planning;
Authorization; Continuous Monitoring 16Managing Confidential
Data
17. SO MANY CONTROLS!!! v. 24 (January IAP Session 1)
Configuration Management Low (impact) Medium-High (impact), adds
Policies; Baseline*; Impact Analysis; Settings*; Least
Functionality; Component Inventory* Change Control; Access
Restrictions for Change; Configuration Management Plan Contingency
Planning Policies; Plan * ; Training *; Plan Testing*; System
backup*; Recovery & Reconstitution * Alternate storage site;
Alternate processing site; Telecomm Identification and
Authentication Policies; Organizational Users*; Identifier
Management; Authenticator Management *; Authenticator Feedback;
Cryptographic Module Authentication; Non-Organizational Users
Device identification and authentication Incident Response
Policies; Training; Handling *; Monitoring; Reporting*; Response
Assistance; Response Plan Testing Maintenance Policies; Control*;
Non-Local Maintenance Restrictions*; Personnel Restrictions* Tools;
Maintenance scheduling/timeliness 17Managing Confidential Data
18. SO MANY CONTROLS!!! v. 24 (January IAP Session 1) Media
Protection Low (impact) Medium-High (impact), adds Policies; Access
restrictions*; Sanitization Marking; Storage; Transport Physical
and Environmental Protection Policies; Access Authorizations;
Access Control*; Monitoring*; Visitor Control *; Records*;
Emergency Lighting; Fire protection*; Temperature, Humidity, water
damage*; Delivery and removal Network access control; Output device
Access control; Power equipment access, shutoff, backup; Alternate
work site; Location of information system components; information
leakage Planning Policies, Plan, Rules of Behavior; Privacy Impact
Assessment Activity planning Personnel Security Policies; Position
categorization; Screening; Termination; Transfer; Access
Agreements; Third- Parties; Sanctions Risk Assessment Policies;
Categorization Assessment; Vulnerability Scanning* 18Managing
Confidential Data
19. v. 24 (January IAP Session 1) System and Services
Acquisition Low (impact) Medium-High (impact), adds Policies;
Resource Allocation; Life Cycle Support; Acquisition*;
Documentation; Software usage restrictions; User installed software
restrictions; External information System Services restrictions
Security Engineering; Developer configuration management; Developer
security testing; supply chain protection; Trustworthiness System
and Communications Protection Policies; Denial of Service
Protection; Boundary protection*; Cryptographic key Management;
Encryption; Public Access Protection; Collaborative computing
devices restriction; Secure Name resolution* Application
Partitioning; Restrictions on Shared Resources; Transmission
integrity & confidentiality; Network Disconnection Procedure;
Public Key Infrastructure Certificates; Mobile Code management;
VOIP management; Session authenticity; Fail in known state;
Protection of information at rest; Information system partitioning
System and Information Integrity Policies, Flaw remediation*;
Malicious code protection*; Security Advisory monitoring*;
Information output handling Information system monitoring; Software
and information integrity; Spam protection; Information input
restrictions & validation; Error handling Program Management
Plan; Security Officer Role; Resources; Inventory; Performance
Measures; Enterprise architecture; Risk management strategy;
Authorization process; Mission definition 19Managing Confidential
Data SO MANY CONTROLS!!!
20. So Many Laws!!! Contract Intellectual Property Access
Rights Confidentiality Copyright Fair Use DMCA Database Rights
Moral Rights Intellectual Attribution Trade Secret Patent Trademark
Common Rule 45 CFR 26 HIPAA FERPA EU Privacy Directive Privacy
Torts (Invasion, Defamation) Rights of Publicity Sensitive but
Unclassified Potentially Harmful (Archeological Sites, Endangered
Species, Animal Testing, ) Classified FOIA CIPSEA State Privacy
Laws EAR State FOI Laws Journal Replication Requirements Funder
Open Access Contract License Click-Wrap TOU ITAR Export
Restrictions
21. Statistics is complicated, too! Published Outputs * Jones *
* 1961 021* * Jones * * 1961 021* * Jones * * 1972 9404* * Jones *
* 1972 9404* * Jones * * 1972 9404* Modal Practice The correlation
between X and Y was large and statistically significant Summary
statistics Contingency table Public use sample microdata
Information Visualization Managing Confidential Datav. 24 (January
IAP Session 1) 21
22. Practical Steps to Manage Confidential Research Data v. 24
(January IAP Session 1) Identify potentially sensitive information
in planning Identify legal requirements, institutional
requirements, data use agreements Consider obtaining a certificate
of confidentiality Plan for IRB review Reduce sensitivity of
collected data in design Separate sensitive information in
collection Encrypt sensitive information in transit Desensitize
information in processing Removing names and other direct
identifiers Suppressing, aggregating, or perturbing indirect
identifiers Protect sensitive information in systems Use systems
that are controlled, securely configured, and audited Ensure people
are authenticated, authorized, licensed Review sensitive
information before dissemination Review disclosure risk Apply
non-statistical disclosure limitation Apply statistical disclosure
limitation Review past releases and publically available data Check
for changes in the law Require a use agreement 22Managing
Confidential Data
23. Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
Little Data, Big Data, & Privacy
24. Little Data Big World The Favorite Ice Cream problem --
public information that is not risky can help us learn information
that is risky The Doesnt Stay in Vegas problem -- information
shared locally can be found anywhere The Data Exhaust problem --
wherever you go, there you are, and your data too! Capturing
Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
25. New Data New Challenges v. 24 (January IAP Session 1) How
to deidentify without completely destroying the data? The Netflix
Problem: large, sparse datasets that overlap can be
probabilistically linked [Narayan and Shmatikov 2008] The GIS: fine
geo-spatial-temporal data impossible mask, when correlated with
external data [Zimmerman 2008; ] The Facebook Problem: Possible to
identify masked network data, if only a few nodes controlled.
[Backstrom, et. al 2007] The Blog problem : Pseudononymous
communication can be linked through textual analysis [Novak wet. al
2004] [For more examples see Vadhan, et al 2010] Source: [Calberese
2008; Real Time Rome Project 2007] 25Managing Confidential
Data
26. Algorithmic Discrimination Capturing Contributor Roles in
Scholarly Publications Help! Ive been mugged by a mugshot
database!
27. Legal Differences Across the Pond Capturing Contributor
Roles in Scholarly Publications
28. Some Open Questions for Research Data Do individuals still
expect a degree of privacy in the information they publicly share
on the internet, despite how US law defines information privacy?
Should this expectation be reasonable? Some individuals employ
techniques to limit public exposure of data, such as sending photos
directly to individuals through SMS or e-mail, using Facebook
privacy controls to limit sharing to a specified group of friends,
deleting information previously made public, or sharing only
through services that provide terms of service that restrict data
uses by others, and follow techno-social norms around information
sharing that may not be recognized in non-internet contexts. How,
if at all, should such conventions and behaviors shape legal
expectations and ethical notions of privacy? Government agencies
often exercise discretion with respect to the scope of information
they release publicly. What best practices should government actors
follow in redacting information prior to release? And when
researchers are aware that best practices have not been adopted,
and/or that stated anonymization policies have followed, do they
have any obligations with respect to this data? Services and
participants in them often span multiple states, countries, and
supranational regions, which may have different legal regulations
and restrictions to use of data. When data is studied
transnationally, are researchers obligated to honor data these laws
and regulations that may apply in the country the user is located,
where the services are hosted, and where the data in publicly
accessed? To what extent are outcomes affected by stages in the
data lifecycle, or to research that will be published in outlets
with international reach? Many web services, including social
networks, have detailed terms of use that potentially restrict or
prohibit secondary uses of data. When are researchers required to
comply with these terms of use? Should IRBs oversee human subjects
that uses only mined data? Should researchers have an ethical duty
to safeguard such information in their studies? How does the
sensitivity of information factor into a determination whether
information is public or private for research purposes? Should
individuals on the internet have the ability to opt-out their
information from studies? Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly
Publications
29. Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
Elements of A Modern Framework for Managing Confidential
Information
30. Principles The risks of informational harm are generally
not a simple function of the presence or absence of specific
fields, attributes, or keywords in the released set of data.
Instead, much of the potential for harm stems from what one can
learn or infer about individuals from the data release as a whole
or when linked with available information. Redaction,
pseudonymization, coarsening and hashing, are often neither an
adequate nor appropriate practice, and releasing less information
is not always a better approach to privacy. As noted above, simple
redaction of information that has been identified as sensitive is
often not a guarantee of privacy protection. Thoughtful analysis
with expert consultation is necessary in order to evaluate the
sensitivity of the data collected, to quantify the associated
re-identification risks, and to design useful and safe release
mechanisms. Nave use of any data sharing model, including those we
describe above, is unlikely to provide adequate protection.
Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly Publications
31. Analysis Framework Any analysis of information privacy
should address the scope of information covered, the sensitivity of
that information (its potential to cause individual, group, or
social harm), the risk that sensitive information will be disclosed
(by re-identification or other means), the availability of control
and accountability mechanisms (including review, auditing, and
enforcement), and the suitability of existing data sharing models,
as applied across the entire lifecycle of information use, from
collection through dissemination and reuse. Capturing Contributor
Roles in Scholarly Publications
32. New Tools Personal Data Stores Information Accountability
Framework Interactive private computation Multiparty computation
Synthetic information Capturing Contributor Roles in Scholarly
Publications
33. Integrated Lifecycle Policy Management Aligning Legal and
Computational Concepts Regulatory language Legal requirements
across lifecycle stages Metadata Schemas Implied requirements
Questionnaires and elicitation instruments Legal instruments --
capturing scientific privacy concepts in legal instruments
consistently across lifecycle service level agreements consent
terms deposit agreement data usage agreements Policy Research
Update
34. Additional References v. 24 (January IAP Session 1) A
Aquesti, L John, G Lowestein, 2009, "What is Privacy Worth", 21rst
Rowkshop in Information Systems and Economics. A. Blum, K. Ligett,
A Roth, 2008. A Learning Theory Approach to Non-Interactive
Database Privacy, STOC08 L. Backstrom, C. Dwork, J. Kleinberg.
2007, Wherefore Art Thou R3579X? Anonymized Social Networks, Hidden
Patterns, and Structural Steganography. Proc. 16th Intl. World Wide
Web Conference., KDD 008 J. Brickell, and V. Shmatikov, 2008. The
Cost of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining Utility in Annoymized
Data Publishing P. Buneman, A. Chapman an.d J. Cheney, 2006,
Provenance Management in Curated Databases, in Proceedings of the
2006 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management o f Data,
(Chicago, IL: 2006), 539550.
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1142473.1142534; Calabrese
F., Colonna M., Lovisolo P., Parata D., Ratti C., 2007, "Real-Time
Urban Monitoring Using Cellular Phones: a Case-Study in Rome",
Working paper # 1, SENSEable City Laboratory, MIT, Boston
http://senseable.mit.edu/papers/, [also see the Real Time Rome
Project [http://senseable.mit.edu/realtimerome/] Campbell,. D.
2009, reported in D, Goodin 2009, Amazon's EC2 brings new might to
password cracking, The Register, Nov 2, 2009,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/11/02/amazon_cloud_password_cracking/
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Dwork, M Naor, O Reingold, G Rothblum, S Vadhan, 2009. When and How
Can Data be Efficiently Released with Privacy, STOC 2009. C Dwork,
A. Smith, 2009. Differential Privacy for Statistics: What we know
and what we want to learn, Journal of Privacy and Confdentiality
1(2)135-54 C Dwork 2008, Differential Privacy, A Survey of Results.
TAMC 2008, LCNS 4978, Springer Verlag. 1-19 C. Dwork. Differential
privacy. Proc. ICALP, 2006. C. Dwork, F. McSherry, and K. Talwar.
The price of privacy and the limits of LP decoding. Proceedings of
the thirty-ninth annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
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Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis,
Proceedings of the 3rd IACR Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2006
A. Desrosieres. 1998. The Politics of Large Numbers, Harvard U.
Press. S.E. Fienberg, M.E. Martin, and M.L. Straf (eds.), 1985.
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Publishing: A Survey of Recent Developments, ACM CSUR42(4)
Greenwald, A. G. McGhee, D. E. Schwartz, J. L. K., 1998, "Measuring
Individual Differences In Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
74(6):1464-1480 C. Herley, 2009, So Long and No Thanks for the
Externalities: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users;
NSPW 09 A. F. Karr, 2009 Statistical Analysis of Distributed
Databases, journal of Privacy and Confidentiality (1)2: Vadhan, S.
, et al. 2010. Re: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Human
Subjects Research Protections. Available from:
http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/irb/Vadhan.pdf Popa, Raluca Ada,
et al. "CryptDB: protecting confidentiality with encrypted query
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Operating Systems Principles. ACM, 2011. 34Managing Confidential
Data
35. Additional References v. 24 (January IAP Session 1)
International Council For Science (ICSU) 2004. ICSU Report of the
CSPR Assessment Panel on Scientific Data and Information. Report.
J. Klump, et. al, 2006. Data publication in the open access
initiative, Data Science Journal Vol. 5 pp. 79-83. E.A. Kolek, D.
Saunders, 2008. Online Disclosure: An Empirical Examination of
Undergraduate Facebook Profiles, NASPA Journal 45 (1): 1-25 N. Li,
T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian. T-closeness: privacy beyond
k-anonymity and l-diversity. In Pro- ceedings of the IEEE ICDE
2007, 2007. A. MachanavaJJhala, D Kifer, J Gehrke, M.
Venkitasubramaniam, 2007,"l-Diversity: Privacy Beyond k-Anonymity"
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data, 1(1): 1-52 A.
Meyerson, R. Williams, 2004. On the complexity of Optimal
K-Anonymity, ACM Symposium on the Principles of Database Systems
Nature 461, 145 (10 September 2009) | doi:10.1038/461145a A.
Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, 2008, Robust De-anonymization of Large
Sparse Datasets , Proc. of 29th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (Forthcoming) I Neamatullah, et. al, 2008, Automated
de-identification of free-text medical records, BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 8:32 J. Novak, P. Raghavan, A.
Tomkins, 2004. Anti-aliasing on the Web, Proceedings of the 13th
international conference on World Wide Web National Science Board
(NSB), 2005, Long-Lived Digital Data Collections: Enabling Research
and Education in the 21rst Century, NSF. (NSB-05-40). A Qcquisti,
R. Gross 2009, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public Data,
PNAS 27(106): 1097510980 Sweeney, L., (2002) k-Anonymity: A Model
for Protecting Privacy, International Journal on Uncertainty,
Fuzziness, and Knowledge-based Systems, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 557
570. Truta T.M., Vinay B. (2006), Privacy Protection: p-Sensitive
k-Anonymity Property, International Workshop of Privacy Data
Management (PDM2006), In Conjunction with 22th International
Conference of Data Engineering (ICDE), Atlanta, Georgia. O. Uzuner,
et al, 2007, Evaluating the State-of-the-Art in Automatic
De-identification, Journal of the American Medical Informatics
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Science from Politics, Cambridge U. Press. Warner, S. 1965.
Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive
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60(309):639. D.L. Zimmerman, C. Pavlik , 2008. "Quantifying the
Effects of Mask Metadata, Disclosure and Multiple Releases on the
Confidentiality of Geographically Masked Health Data", Geographical
Analysis 40: 52-76 35Managing Confidential Data