Introduction

1) What isJapan’s Basic Security Policy?

2) How has Japan’s political decision-making impacted its security policysince the Gulf War?

3) How have Japan’s military capabilities changed since theGulf War?

4) What are the implications of the evolution of Japan’s political decision-making and military capabilities for Japanese security policy in the next 10 years?

Conclusion

Japan’s basic security policy will fundamentally be unchanged in the next 10 years. Its defense posturewill remaindefensive and restrained.

The future directionof Japanese security policy:1 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture on

national security to the international security environment within the framework of its basic security policy.

2 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.

3 Japan may adopt alimited offensive strategy consistent with its basic security policy.

Article 9

1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forceas means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Basic Policy for National Defense

1) To support UN activitiesand promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

2) To promote publicwelfare and enhance the people’s love for their country, thereby establishing asound basis essential forJapan’s security.

3) To incrementally developeffective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense in accordance with the nation’s resources and prevailing domestic situation.

4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending the effective capacity of the UN in the future to deter and repel such aggression.

Other basic security policies

1) Exclusively defense-oriented policy

2) Not becoming a military power

3) Adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles

4) Ensuring civilian control of the military

The constitution (article 9) Basic Policy for National Defense

Other basic security policies

“ Japan’sBasic Security Policy”

The Evolution of Political Decision-making 1/4

PersianGulf War of 1991

• Japan started to change its posturetoward international security issues.

– Dispatch of the MSDF minesweepers

Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)

• Japan tried to realistically enhance its role inPKOs within the limits ofJapanese public understanding.

– International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992.

• Restrictions

Response to international terrorism• Japanese public opinion came to understandto the use of the

SDF which was within legal limits.– Protect U.S. bases and sensitive Japanese facilities– SDF in the Indian Ocean– Restraint

North Korea • Japanese public are very concerned about the various

ongoing difficulties and imminent threats posed by North Korea:– Teapodong-1 -Japan's MD system– Nuclear program -a threat to Japan– Suspicious boats -a big impact– North Korean abductions -an act of terrorism in Japan

The Evolution of Political Decision-making 2/4

Iraq Dispatch• Japan clearly stated its support for theU.S. rather than a

UN-authorizedmandate.– Created abill to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq

• Help U.S. and other foreign forces • Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance • Restrictions

• Permanent legal framework to allow the dispatch of SDF troops overseas.– 12 years?

The Evolution of Political Decision-making 3/4

Japan-US Political Relationship

• Steadily continued to evolve their political relations.

– “Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region” in 1995

– The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996

• The three bills on ensuring the effectiveness of the Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1999

– Restrictions

The Evolution of Political Decision-making 4/4

• The SDF gradually oriented their capabilities to the Japan’s national security circumstance.– New defense strategy aimed to address the

increase of new types of threats.– Japanese politicians discuss how to utilize Japan’s

military capabilities to address these new threats.

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 1/7

GSDF capabilities

• GSDF has triedto orient their capabilities to the national security circumstances.

– Operations to counter landing of invading forces

• Long range strike capability

• Transportation capability

– Prepare new assets oriented to the Japan’scurrent national security circumstance.

• Western Infantry Regiment

• New organization for ???

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 2/7

MSDF capabilities• MSDF reinforced overseas and air defense capabilities

according to Japan’snational security circumstances– Decreased ships– Increased standard displacement (Explain)– Limited but practicaloverseas capabilities in 2003– Suspicious boats

• New missile boats • Special boarding units

– Two additionalAegis destroyers with improved air defense capabilities.

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 3/7

ASDF capabilities• Reinforced traditional capabilities and acquired new

capabilities according to Japan’snational security circumstances.– The reinforcement of equipmentquality

• Ability to use AWACS for air operations.– Reinforced air strike capabilities for F-2 and F-4EJK

• Why F-4EJK?– KC-767

• Air refueling capability

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 4/7

Other military capabilities (MD system and Satellite)

• Japan still should depend on U.S. military power for itsnational security

• MD system

– 4 basic phases in MD

– No capabilities in Japan

– The Missile Defense Joint Task Force

– The exertion of collective security

• Intelligence-gathering satellites

– Monitor North Korea

– Still depend on U.S. satellites?

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 5/7

General Experience of the SDF• The SDF has acquired much experience in international

security since 1991.– 11 operations 5,313 personnel since 1992 to today

• No SDF personnel causality by military actions– The participation in UN PKOs has beenone of the

major pillars in the SDF.

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 6/7

The U.S.-Japan military relationship• The bilateral security relationship has strengthened

graduallysince 1991– The contents of bilateral training are more practical

• GSDF– Combat training for a guerrilla-commando or

special operation unit assault • MSDF

– RIMPAC since 1980– MSDF’s interoperability

• ASDF– Cope North Exercise at Guam since 1999– Cope Thunder Exercise at Alaska in June 2003

The Evolution of Military Capabilities 7/7

• Japan’s basic security policy will fundamentally be unchanged in thenext 10 years. Its posturewill remain defensive and restrained.

– Japan has not ever changed its basic security policy.

– All of Japan’s pastsecurity activities have been based on its basic security policy.

Conclusion 1/4

1 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture onnational security to the international security environment within the framework of its basic security policy.

• Reasonable interpretation of Japan’sbasic security policy– A permanent legal framework to dispatch SDF troops overseas

• Restrictions on “the use of arms.”– The 2003 defense white paper A landmark (Clarify)

• Japan does not need to hastily change itsbasic security policy.– Japan has kept its defensive and restrained attitude– Japan should exploit the right capabilities in the right places

(Clarify).

Conclusion 2/4

2 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.

• There are still some political and military problems– No critical problems

• To keep the currently close relationshipin thefuture– Need time and patience– Need to clarify each country’s role

Conclusion 3/4

3 Japan may adopt alimited offensive strategy consistent with its basic security policy.

• The right to adapt a limited offensive strategy• Overseas capabilities, and advanced strike capabilities• Limited offensive strategy will be restrained

Conclusion 4/4

Table 1. What do you think about the participation of SDF? (Question needs clarification)

Response Percent

1991 2003

Yes 45% 70%

No 39% 13%

Cannot Tell 11% 8%

Don't know 5% 9%

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. Public poll in 1991 and 2003.

Table 2. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery in GSDF

Type Modelapproximate Number

Owned Comparison Remarks1991 2003

Recoilless guns 3430 3190 -7%

Mortars 1500 1880 25%

Field artillery 830 750 -10%

Rocket launchers 110 1700 1545%

Anti-aircraft machineguns

130 110 -15%

Armored vehicles 690 980 42%

Total Tanks 1210 1022 -15%

Type90 40 242 600%

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.

Table 3. Number of Helicopter and others in GSDF

Use Type Modelapproximate Number Owned comparison Remarks

1991 2003

Anti-tank Helicopter AH-1S 55 89 60%

Observation Helicopter

OH-1 0 162%

OH-6D 174 162

Transport Helicopter CH-47J/JA 18 49

20%V-107A 39 1

Utility Helicopter UH-60JA 0 21

UH-1H/J 133 157

Anti-ship Missile Type88 SSM-1 0since

1991new

Surface to surface rocket

MLRS (M270) 0since

1992new

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.

Table 4. Number of Ships in MSDF

Classapproximate Number Owned

comparison1991 2003

Destroyer 61(169,000t) 54(203,000t) -12%(20%)

Submarine 14(31,000t) 16(40,000t) 14%(29%)

Mine warfare ship 41(19,000t) 31(27,000t) -25%(42%)

Patrol combatant craft 13(1,000t) 7(1,000t) -47%(0%)

Amphibious ship 9(12,000t) 8(30,000t) -12%(250%)

Auxiliary ship 32(87,000t) 26(97,000t) -19%(11%)

Total 170(319,000t) 142(398,000t) -16%(25%)

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.

Table 5. Number of Special Ships in MSDF

Use Type Name of ClassNumber Owned

Comparison Remarks1991 2003

Aegis type Destroyer

Kongo Class (7250t) 0 4 new

Destroyer Murasame Class (4550t) 0 11 new

Shirane Class (5200t) 4 4 0%

Minesweeper (Ocean)

Uraga Class (5650t) 0 2 new

Minesweeper (Coastal)

Hatsushima Class (440t) 23 11 -53%

Sugashima Class (510t) 0 17 new

Amphibious Ship Osumi Class (8900t) 0 3 new

Miura Class (2000t) 4 2 -50%

Supply Ship New type class (13500t) 0 0 (2004 Mar)

Towada Class (8100t) 1 3 300%

Missile boat Hayabusa Class (200t) 0 3 new

1-GO Class (50t) 0 3 new

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.

Table 6. Number of Aircraft in MSDF

Use Type Model

Number Owned comparison Remarks

1991 2003

Patrol (Fixed Wing) P-3C 65 9932%

P-2J 10 0

Patrol (Helicopter) SH-60J 0 9120%

HSS-2B 81 6

Minesweeping and transport

MH-53E 6 10 66%

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.

Table 7. Number of Aircraft and Missile in ASDF

Use Type ModelNumber Owned

comparison Remarks1991 2003

Combat Fighter F-15J/DJ 143 203 41% (AR)

F-4EJ/ (F-4EJK*) 124 (30) 92 (85) -26% (AR)

Fighter Bomber F-2A/B 0 40 new (AR)

F-1 74 26 -65%

Reconnaissance RF-4E/EJ 13 27 207% (AR)

Transport Aircraft C-1 27 26 -4%

C-130 15 16 6%

Transport Helicopter CH-47 10 17 70%

Early warning E-2C 8 13 63%

Early warning and control

E-767 0 4 new

Air Refueling Aircraft KC-767 0 0 none (4)

SAM

Patriot (PAC-3)new

Patriot (PAC-2) 24FU

Patriot (PAC-1) 12FU

NIKE 10FU

*F-4EJK: Modified F-4EJ has F-15's Central Computer and F-16A's AI Radar

The Range of Ballistic Missiles

Nodong

Teapodong-1

Teapodong-2

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 2003.

BMD Architecture

SPACE SENCER

Ballistic Missile

Intercept by SM-3

Intercept by PAC-3

ASDF Patriot

MSDF Aegis DDG

Central Operation Center

Ground Radar

Detect & Track

Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 2003.