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Independent Team presents findings from nuclear safety and quality culture assessment at Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Dec. 1, 2011, Washington, D.C. - The Independent Safety and Quality Culture Assessment (ISQCA) team that recently assessed the nuclear safety and quality culture at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) today released its findings and a series of recommendations. The team's report summarizes key themes and trends gathered during a nearly four-month assessment of safety culture at WTP, including both DOE and its contractor, Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI). In its assessment, the ISQCA team identified four findings: No widespread evidence of a chilled atmosphere adverse to safety, and no widespread evidence that DOE and contractor management suppress technical dissent. o The team found, in general, no reluctance by DOE, URS or BNI personnel to raising safety and technical issues that could impact the overall safety of the project, even though there were isolated expressions to the contrary. Lack of effective and timely disposition of technical and safety issues o The team found that this was and is a major contributor to real and perceived problems with the projects execution, and strongly affects its safety culture. Safety construct implementation does not support project schedule o The team found that the projects overall safety construct (which includes the assumptions, guidance, criteria, and processes used to evaluate and document the safety basis for design, construction, and operation) has not been consistently defined or timely implemented, to enable completion of the project focused on safety, quality, cost and schedule. Communications not fully supportive of safety culture. o The team found that communications with employees, stakeholders, and the public need improvement to establish and sustain trust. The team supplied supporting statements and recommendations for each finding. The findings and recommendations are exclusively directed at issues and actions that affect the nuclear safety culture for people involved in the design, authorization, and oversight of the facility. The team's analysis of the status of industrial safety at the construction site and other project facilities identified no significant current concerns regarding the safety culture in those areas. The ISQCA team was engaged to fulfill a commitment made by Secretary of Energy Steven Chu in response to a letter written by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in June. The team is composed of six industry experts with decades of experience working in nuclear safety and quality, including work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and

Independent Team presents findings from nuclear safety and quality culture assessment at Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

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Page 1: Independent Team presents findings from nuclear safety and quality culture assessment at Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

Independent Team presents findings from nuclear

safety and quality culture assessment at Hanford

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

Dec. 1, 2011, Washington, D.C. - The Independent Safety and Quality Culture Assessment

(ISQCA) team that recently assessed the nuclear safety and quality culture at the Department of

Energy (DOE) Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) today released its

findings and a series of recommendations.

The team's report summarizes key themes and trends gathered during a nearly four-month

assessment of safety culture at WTP, including both DOE and its contractor, Bechtel National,

Inc. (BNI). In its assessment, the ISQCA team identified four findings:

No widespread evidence of a chilled atmosphere adverse to safety, and no

widespread evidence that DOE and contractor management suppress technical

dissent.

o The team found, in general, no reluctance by DOE, URS or BNI personnel to

raising safety and technical issues that could impact the overall safety of the

project, even though there were isolated expressions to the contrary.

Lack of effective and timely disposition of technical and safety issues

o The team found that this was and is a major contributor to real and perceived

problems with the project’s execution, and strongly affects its safety culture.

Safety construct implementation does not support project schedule

o The team found that the project’s overall safety construct (which includes the

assumptions, guidance, criteria, and processes used to evaluate and document the

safety basis for design, construction, and operation) has not been consistently

defined or timely implemented, to enable completion of the project focused on

safety, quality, cost and schedule.

Communications not fully supportive of safety culture.

o The team found that communications with employees, stakeholders, and the

public need improvement to establish and sustain trust.

The team supplied supporting statements and recommendations for each finding. The findings

and recommendations are exclusively directed at issues and actions that affect the nuclear safety

culture for people involved in the design, authorization, and oversight of the facility. The team's

analysis of the status of industrial safety at the construction site and other project facilities

identified no significant current concerns regarding the safety culture in those areas.

The ISQCA team was engaged to fulfill a commitment made by Secretary of Energy Steven Chu

in response to a letter written by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in June.

The team is composed of six industry experts with decades of experience working in nuclear

safety and quality, including work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and

Page 2: Independent Team presents findings from nuclear safety and quality culture assessment at Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and interactions with the DNFSB.

The ISQCA team was charged with conducting an in-depth assessment of WTP's nuclear safety

and quality culture.

Beginning in August, the team conducted interviews and meetings with both DOE and contractor

employees. The team also developed an anonymous and confidential all-employee survey that

was administered by an independent vendor. The team concluded that the majority of results

from the survey compared favorably to the traits in the NRC's Safety Culture Policy Statement,

although the team's assessment was less favorable in some respects, due to its deliberate focus on

problem areas.

The history of the WTP safety and quality culture has been the subject of continuing reviews,

investigations, publicity, and associated impacts on project execution. The ISQCA team notes

significant efforts by DOE and BNI, particularly over the last two years, to establish a sound

safety and quality culture at WTP; however, these efforts have not been widely disseminated

outside of the project or considered to have been sufficient to overcome the continuing external

concerns over the safety culture of the project.

"It is apparent that both DOE and Bechtel National are committed to the overall safety mission

of WTP," says Nils Diaz, vice chairman of the ISQCA and past chairman of the NRC.

"Improvements to the project's safety and quality culture, however, are required so that nuclear

safety permeates the project structure. This will ensure the safety of the design, construction,

and operation of the facilities, and is the only manner by which to secure cost and schedule

performance."

A report of the team's assessment and findings is available on its website at www.ISQCAT.com.