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Slide 3
Core Volatility developer Co-Author “Art of Memory Forensics” Lead-investigator on large-scale investigations Performed many RE efforts, pentests, and source
code audits Previously presented at Black Hat, RSA, Source,
DFRWS, BSides, and others
Who Am I?
Slide 4
(Brief) overview of traditional incident response settings
Challenges faced when traditional approaches are applied to cloud environments
Overcoming the challenges Leveraging unique features of the cloud for
scalable and effective incident response
Agenda
Slide 5
Focused on mostly static networks IT has full control over system start, stop, reset,
refresh, etc. Collection usually performed directly on affected
systems or at least on the same internal network
Traditional IR
Slide 6
Analysts have the ability to gather files, volatile data, physical memory, and (full) disk images as needed
Analysts have full control over both the host and guest virtual machines of servers
Logs are locally and easily accessible
Traditional IR Cont.
Slide 7
The cloud is not static Systems may start and stop automatically in
response to processing load Including systems that were or still are
compromised Volatile data is gone forever…
IT staff generally has little control over the architecture and resource allocation
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR – Environment
Slide 8
Collection is done outside of the local environment, over the Internet
Collect to storage within the cloud? Secure credentials? Cost?
Collect to the local environment? Speed? Capture in real-time vs in-cloud copies? Cost?
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR - Collection
Slide 9
Acquiring traditional data sets is often difficult Full disk images are usually impossible Full memory captures possible, but chances of a
smeared image greatly increase with high system activity
Number of systems that may be comprised can be enormous
Live analysis tools trivially lied to by malware Particularly on Linux
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR - Collection
Slide 10
Gathering logs faces many of the same issues as disk and volatile data collection
In-cloud SIEM may prevent reasonable local download of logs
Periodic transfer of logs from cloud to the local network may leave gaps in real-time view
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR - Collection
Slide 11
You (or your client) generally have little to no control over the VM host when using the cloud
This prevents acquisition of data from guests through the host
This necessitates the use of software within the guest to acquire data
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR – VM Control
Slide 12
During an incident is a bad time to move acquisition tools to system(s)
Many fully automated deployments don’t enable SSH
Administrators may have no remote access to the system
What then? Agents? “Backdoor” to enable remote administration?
Traditional IR vs Cloud IR – Acquisition Tools
Slide 13
Incident response needs must be considered at all stages of development, deployment, and ongoing operations
The goal of these efforts is to enable effective and immediate response as well as ongoing detection of threats
Richard Mogull has done great work in this space related to application and network security
https://securosis.com/blog
Making Cloud IR Seamless
Slide 14
Applications should be verified that all relevant logging features are enabled
In-house applications should be built with detailed logging built-in and enabled
This includes every action that you as an investigator might want to later know about
Malicious insiders and remote attackers should never be able to use your own app against you and you not be able to later track down exactly what they did
Making Cloud IR Seamless – App Dev
Slide 15
As systems are built, automated forensics tools should be used to base line the system’s “normal” state
Both on-disk and in-memory artifacts Prevent guessing during incidents Immediately pinpoint suspicious artifacts
Systems should be checked to ensure that all relevant logging is enabled
Making Cloud IR Seamless – Pre-Deployment
Slide 16
Tools required for collection of forensics artifacts need to be installed with the base system
How to collect if entirety of disk is not acquirable?
“Select” files What to do with memory?
Acquisition of artifacts through APIs is vulnerable to malware interference
“Live” memory forensics isn’t A good compromise when you can’t get a full
sample of RAM
Making Cloud IR Seamless – Enabling Collection
Slide 17
If the system can be automatically spun down, ensure the logging is remote
Scalable, remote logging is preferred in most cases even if the system is stable
Have automated methods to gather data of interest
Be proactive about finding threats – don’t wait for signatures (AV, HIPs, IDS) to fire!
Making Cloud IR Seamless – Post-Deployment
Slide 18
Required in both traditional and cloud environments
Over 60% of breaches were “discovered” after 3rd party notification
Existing technology will only catch skilled adversaries if they make a mistake
Proactive Incident Response - Motivation
Slide 19
Constantly gather and evaluate system state Processes Network connections AutoRun locations … many more data points
Compare current state to baselines Use IOCs, threat intel data, etc. to find known
badness
Proactive Incident Response – Howto
Slide 20
Leverage IR-only credentials Leverage IR-only instances Stop any auto termination of (potentially)
affected hosts Use automated scripts to gather as much data
as possible Leverage features of the cloud to enhance
response and minimize disruption
Making Cloud IR Seamless – Active Incident
Slide 21
While IR in the cloud has many challenges, it also has unique features that can be very beneficial
When used correctly, large-scale, automated detection and collection becomes possible
Leveraging the Cloud for Better IR
Slide 22
Pre-built instances that have the tools (software) and storage needed to support IR
No need to configure and install tools during an incident
Removes bottlenecks related to people power as well as processing power
Can use credentials separate from the rest of the environment
IR-Only Instances
Slide 23
Production instances are often under medium to heavy load
This pollutes forensics data and makes live analysis challenging
Fix: Isolate (potentially) affected instances Spin up new production instances to replace
compute power Benefits:
More time to gather data in a stable manner No adverse effects on customers or
performance
Virtual Guest Isolation
Slide 24
Can inspect the state of VM guests without direct interaction
Avoids the issue of malware interference or notifying attackers of forensics activity
Much simpler to automate and scale Collected data can be safely stored on the VM
host until needed A huge security boost to private clouds and
managed security from public providers
Virtual Machine Introspection
Slide 25
Snapshots include both volatile memory (RAM) and the file system (disk)
The guest cannot detect itself being snapshotted*
Again - no chance for malware interference or attacker notification
Can periodically snapshot and keep for days or weeks after
Determine exact time of infection and state changes since then
Virtual Machine Guest Snapshots
Slide 26
Coming from traditional IR settings, the cloud can be quite challenging
Pre-planning is required to effective Agreed upon processes to capture and
analyze data Pre-allocation of resources Full-scale exercises to test all points of
response Automated as much as possible Continuous threat hunting
The cloud also provides unique features that, if leveraged properly, can make IR much more effective
Summary