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Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks Tal Be’ery, Web Research TL, Imperva

Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

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Page 1: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

Tal Be’ery, Web Research TL, Imperva

Page 2: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction to Imperva’s Hacker Intelligence Initiative Denial of Service (DoS):

+ Definition and background + Attackers

– Hacktivists – Business related

+ Tools – JS LOIC – Slow HTTP

+ Mitigation – Non-mitigations – True mitigation

Summary of recommendations

Agenda

Page 3: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Web Security Research Team Leader at Imperva

Holds MSc & BSc degree in CS/EE from TAU 10+ years of experience in IS domain Facebook “white hat” Speaker at RSA, BlackHat, AusCERT Columnist for securityweek.com

Presenter: Tal Be’ery, CISSP

Page 4: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Imperva’s Hacker Intelligence Initiative

Page 5: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Hacker Intelligence Initiative is focused on understanding how attackers operate in practice

+ A different approach from vulnerability research

Data set composition + ~50 real world applications + Anonymous Proxies

More than 18 months of data Powerful analysis system

+ Combines analytic tools with drill down capabilities

Hacker Intelligence Initiative (HII)

Page 6: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

HII - Motivation

Focus on actual threats + Focus on what hackers want, helping good guys prioritize + Technical insight into hacker activity + Business trends of hacker activity + Future directions of hacker activity

Eliminate uncertainties + Active attack sources + Explicit attack vectors + Spam content

Devise new defenses based on real data + Reduce guess work

Page 7: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

HII Reports

Monthly reports based on data collection and analysis Drill down into specific incidents or attack types 2011 / 2012 reports

+ Remote File Inclusion + Search Engine Poisoning + The Convergence of Google and Bots + Anatomy of a SQLi Attack + Hacker Forums Statistics + Automated Hacking + Password Worst Practices + Dissecting Hacktivist Attacks + CAPTCHA Analysis

Page 8: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

WAAR – Web Application Attack Report

Semi annual Based on aggregated analysis of 6 / 12 months of data Motivation

+ Pick-up trends + High level take outs + Create comparative measurements over time

Page 9: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Denial of Service: Definition and Background

Page 10: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Denial of Service attack Wikipedia - “make a machine or network resource

unavailable to its intended users” Attacks data availability

Denial of Service: Definition

Page 11: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Customers details Inventory Trade secrets Intellectual property Financial analysis

Data Drives Business

Page 12: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Availability

Confidentiality Integrity

Data must remain: + Protected against unauthorized changes + Available + Confidential

Protecting Data

Page 13: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidentiality

Attacking confidentiality – leaking secret data + SQL injection + Careless employees

Hackers Are After Your Data

Page 14: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Integrity

Attacking integrity – changing sensitive data + SQL injection + Malicious insider

Hackers Are After Your Data

Page 15: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Availability

Attacking data availability + DoS attacks

Hackers Are After Your Data

Page 16: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hacker Forum Discussion Topics

DoS is Another Tool in the Hacker Toolbox

16%

22%

19%

10%

12%

12% 9%

spam dos/ddos SQL Injection zero-day shell code brute-force HTML Injection

Source: Imperva. Covers July 2010 -July 2011 across 600,000 discussions

Page 17: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Denial of Service: Attackers

Page 18: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Who wants to put you out of business? Protesters

+ Hacktivists

Business related + Competitors + Racketeering

Attackers – Who Are They?

Page 19: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

“Hacktivism (a portmanteau of hack and activism).”

Hacktivism: Definition

Page 20: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

What/Who is Anonymous?

“…the first Internet-based superconsciousness.” —Chris Landers. Baltimore City Paper, April 2, 2008

Page 21: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

What/Who is Anonymous?

“…the first Internet-based superconsciousness.” —Chris Landers. Baltimore City Paper, April 2, 2008

“Anonymous is an umbrella for anyone to hack anything for any reason.”

—New York Times, 27 Feb 2012

Page 22: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

One thing is for sure - they are hackers!

What/Who is Anonymous?

Page 23: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Recruiting Over Social Media - 1

Page 24: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Recruiting Over Social Media - 2

Page 25: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Setting Up an Early Warning System

Page 26: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example

Page 27: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Business Attackers - 1

DoS as a Service

Page 28: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Business Attackers - 2

Where there is a demand, there will be supply…

Page 29: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Business Attackers - 2

Where there is a demand, there will be supply…

Page 30: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Denial of Service: Popular Tools

Page 31: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hackers protect their identity By using…

+ TOR + Other anonymity services

– Anonymous proxies – Private VPN services – Hacked servers

Protecting True Identity

TOR 15%

Anonymity Services

57%

Other IPs 28%

Source: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

Page 32: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Low-Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC) Purpose - DDoS Windows desktop application, coded in C# UDP/TCP/HTTP flooding

Hacking Tools

Page 33: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

LOIC downloads + 2011: 380K + 2012 (through October 14): 616K + Jan 2012 (megaupload takedown): 182K

LOIC Facts

For more: http://blog.imperva.com/2012/05/loicversary.html

Page 34: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Decreasing costs + Application layer attacks are far more efficient + Less attackers to take down a site

The DoS security gap + Traditionally, the defense against DDoS was based

on dedicated devices operating at lower layers (TCP/IP). Inherent shortcomings:

– Don't decrypt SSL, – Don’t understand the HTTP protocol – Unaware of the web application.

DDoS is Moving Up the Stack

For more: http://blog.imperva.com/2011/12/top-cyber-security-trends-for-2012-7.html

Page 35: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

DaaS – DoS as a Service Application layer attacks Easy to participate – no download

+ Just point your browser to the JS-Loic page

Effective + Iterates up to 200 requests per second

Cross platform + Mobile device + Linux/Mac/PC

Javascript/Mobile/VM/JS LOIC

Page 36: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

HTTP Referer header – indicates attack code source Fixed target URL

+ Carefully selected to create load on target server

A Parameter with some arbitrary changing value + To avoid caches along the way

A Parameter value "msg" with some hacktivist’s slogan www.target.com/search.php?q=a&id=61278641278&msg=

we+are+legion!

JS LOIC - Attack Characteristics

Page 37: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hacktivists’ DoS in the Wild

Page 38: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hacktivists’ DoS in the Wild

Page 39: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hacktivists’ DoS in the Wild

Page 40: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Some More JS LOIC

Page 41: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Some More JS LOIC

Page 42: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

“Dripping” HTTP POST parameter value byte by byte Generating a never ending request Exhausting the attacked server’s concurrent requests

pool Tools

+ RAILgun + SlowHTTPtest

Slow HTTP tools

Page 43: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

DDoS: Mitigation

Page 44: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Anti-Virus is Irrelevant: Malware is NOT the MO

McAfee mea culpa

“The security industry may need to reconsider some of its fundamental assumptions, including

'Are we really protecting users and companies?’”

--McAfee, September 2011

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011/08/23/23readwriteweb-mcafee-to-security-industry-are-we-really-p-70470.html?partner=rss&emc=rss

Page 45: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

SDLC is Irrelevant: No Vulnerability

Traditionally, an attack is comprised of two elements + Vulnerability + Exploit

To mitigate, either (or even better both) + Repair the vulnerability – with SDLC + Stop the exploit – with a security device

In DoS – there’s no vulnerability!

Page 46: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

IPS/NGFW is Irrelevant

Statefulness + Inspecting each request by itself is futile as each request is

benign per se + Only when accumulated within the right context (IP/ Application

Session / Application user) the attack’s true colors are exposed

True application awareness + Detecting unexpected parameters on request

Page 47: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Mitigation

WAF: Stateful, Decrypts SSL, understand HTTP, understand the application business logic to analyze the traffic, sifting out the

DoS traffic.

Page 48: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Mitigation: Stateful Rules

Customer was attacked with “large files” downloads from unauthenticated users

A specific rule was created:

Page 49: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Mitigation: Picking the Low Hanging Fruits

Some tools have small deviations from normal browsers + User agent + Missing headers + Headers order + Misspelled headers + Fixed value

Page 50: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Mitigation: Reputation Services

Sources intelligence + Malicious IPs + Anonymity services IPs

– TOR – Anonymous proxies

Page 51: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

51

Blocking Traffic Based on Reputation

Real-time alerts and ability to block based on IP Reputation.

Page 52: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

52

Blocking Traffic Based on Reputation

Real-time alerts and ability to block based on IP Reputation.

Page 53: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

53

Blocking Traffic Based on Reputation

Real-time alerts and ability to block based on IP Reputation.

Page 54: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Summary and Recommendations

Page 55: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Summary

DoS is another tool in the hackers toolbox

DoS is going up the application stack

Mitigate application layer DoS attacks with WAF

Use community based anti-automation reputation services

Page 56: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Usage Audit

Access Control

Rights Management

Attack Protection

Reputation Controls

Virtual Patching

Imperva in 60 Seconds

Page 57: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Webinar Materials

57

Page 58: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Webinar Materials

Post-Webinar Discussions

Answers to Attendee Questions

Webinar Recording Link Join Group

Join Imperva LinkedIn Group, Imperva Data Security Direct, for…

Page 59: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

© 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Questions?

59

Page 60: Deconstructing Application DoS Attacks

www.imperva.com

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