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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 1 Cybersecurity 2 Making our systems more secure Prof. Ian Sommerville

CS5032 L20 cybersecurity 2

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Page 1: CS5032 L20 cybersecurity 2

Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 1

Cybersecurity 2Making our systems more

secure

Prof. Ian Sommerville

Page 2: CS5032 L20 cybersecurity 2

Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 2

Technological approaches

• Computer security/Security engineering focuses on the technical aspects of the problem

• By reducing vulnerabilities in code and by adding more checks to code, many security incidents can be avoided

– However, this can significantly increase costs and time required for development

• Necessary but not enough for cybersecurity achievement

• Cybersecurity is a socio-technical rather than a technical problem

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 3

• “If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology.”

• "Security is a chain; it's only as secure as the weakest link."

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 4

Why technology is not enough

• Technology reliability cannot be guaranteed

• Insider attacks

• Technical security compromises made for usability reasons

• Failure of organisational procedures or poorly designed procedures

• Human carelessness

• Social engineering

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 5

Unreliable technology

• In the same way that it is practically impossible to guarantee that a complex system is free from bugs, it is also impossible to guarantee that a system is free from security vulnerabilities

• Even if a system A is ‘secure’, it may rely on other systems that are potentially insecure. If these are owned by different people, ‘system wide’ security validation is impossible

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 6

Insider attacks

• Insiders have legitimate credentials that allows them access to the system

– Therefore, strong access control technology is not a barrier

• Insiders in an organisation are aware of the technical safeguards built into the system and may know how to circumvent these – especially if they have privileged system access

• Insiders have local knowledge that may be used for social engineering and so may be able to discover privileged information.

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 7

Usability vs security

• There is always a trade-off to be made between usability and security

• Security procedures slow down system operation and may alienate users

• Companies may therefore make a deliberate decision to use weaker security procedures so that users don’t decide to go elsewhere

– Login/password authentication instead of biometrics

– Unencrypted information as encryption slows down the system

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 8

Procedural failures

• Procedures that are intended to maintain security may be badly designed or implemented

• This may introduce vulnerabilities into the system or may mean that users have to circumvent procedures – thus introducing new vulnerabilities

– Example

• Companies request strong passwords but do not provide any help to users how to construct strong easy to remember passwords such as “My_hamster.spot”

• Requirements for regular password change. Thought to improve security but actually means that users can’t remember passwords so they write them down

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 9

Human carelessness

• People will inevitably be careless

– Leave systems unattended whilst they are logged on

– Use authentication in public places where they can be observed

– Lose keys

– Etc.

• Some technical controls against carelessness but impossible to completely control this vulnerability without incurring very high costs

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 10

Social engineering• Attacker Alex calls system

admin Bob pretending to be the manager of a company and asks for his password to be reset and for Bob to tell him the new password

• Bob wants to please his boss so does as he is asked – Alex then can gain access to the system (and lock out the legitimate manager)

• Many examples that show users are willing to provide confidential information to a plausible requestor

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 11

Multiple points of failure

• These ‘social’ vulnerabilities may be exploited in connection with each other or with technical vulnerabilities to gain access to system

• For example, a successful password attack may require:

– Social engineering to convince system administators to reset a user’s password

– A poor password change procedure, which does not include a check to ensure that the requestor is legitimate

• Require text confirmation of password change request or text password change details to users mobile

• Requests made by phone should require callback to registered number

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 12

Improving cybersecurity

• Deterrence– Increase the costs of making an attack on your

systems

• Awareness– Improve awareness of all system users of security

risks and types of attack

• Procedures – Design realistic security procedures that can be

followed by everyone in an organisation (including the boss)

• Monitoring and logging– Monitor and log all system operations

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 13

Deterrence

• It is impossible to develop a completely secure personal, business and government system. If an attacker has unlimited resources and motivation, it will always be possible to invoke some attacks on a given system.

• However, attackers NEVER have unlimited resources and motivation so, aim of security is to increase the costs of making a successful attack to such an extent that attackers will (a) be deterred from attacking and (b) will abandon attempted attacks before they are successful

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 14

Deterrence mechanisms

• Diverse authentication systems

– Use strong passwords and multiple forms of authentication

• Firewalls– Limit access to your

systems through ‘safe’ ports

• Encryption– Use https protocols for

internet traffic

– Encrypt confidential information to increase the costs of access

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 15

Password security

• Password strength measurement

– https://passfault.appspot.com/password_strength.html#menu

• Password is ‘hamster’

– 27,000 possibilities. Cracked in < 1 hour

• Password is ‘My_hamster’

– 9 billion possibilities. Cracked in < 1 day

• Password is ‘My_hamster.spot’

– 152 trillion possibilities. Cracked in >15 years

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 16

Encryption

• Encryption is the process of encoding information in such a way that it is not directly readable. A key is required to decrypt the information and understand it

• Used sensibly, encryption can contribute to cybersecurity improvement but is not an answer in itself

– Security of encryption keys

– Inconvenience of encryption leads to patchy utilisation and user frustration

– Risk of key loss or corruption – information is completely lost (and backups don’t help)

– Can make recovery more difficult

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 17

Awareness

• Educate users into the importance of cyber security and provide information that supports their secure use of computer systems

• Be open about incidents that may have occurred

• Take into account how people really are rather than how you might like them to be

• Bad information

– Use a different password for every website you visit

• Good information

– If you use the same password for everything, an attacker can get access to your accounts if they find that out

– Use a different passwords for all online bank accounts and only reuse passwords when you don’t really care about the accounts

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 18

Procedures

• Design appropriate procedures based around the value of the assets that are being protected

• If information is not confidential, make it public as this reduces the need for users to authenticate to access the information

• Cybersecurity awareness procedures for all staff

• Recognise reality – people will use phones and tablets and derive procedures for their safe use

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 19

Monitoring and logging

• Monitoring and logging means that you keep track of all access to the system

• Use tools to scan log frequently looking for anomalies

• Can be an important deterrent to insider attacks if attackers know that they have a chance of being discovered through the logging system

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 20

Protection levels

• Personal protection– What should individuals do?

• Organisational protection– What should organisations

do?

• National protection– What should government do?

• International legal frameworks and agreements

– What should governments do?

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 21

Personal protection

• Protection of information and devices belonging to individuals

• Security awareness and attention

– This can happen to you

– Don’t make security mistakes e.g. clicking on unknown email links

• Secure defaults

– Require password to log in to PC/ PIN for phone

• Regular checks

– Scans for malware

– Information integrity

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 22

Organisational protection

• Senior management commitment to cyber security

• Audits of existing systems and procedures for security weaknesses

– Actions to strengthen systems where vulnerabilities are discovered

• Creation of ‘sensible’ security procedures that do not stop people doing their job

– Support use of personal phones/tablets but raise awareness of the dangers to confidentiality

– Backup and recovery strategies

• Creation of a ‘cybersecurity response team’ to handle security incidents

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 23

National protection

• National protection should be concerned with protecting the critical physical, digital and organisational infrastructure

– Infrastructure is managed and delivered by a wide range of private and public ‘owners’

– Role of government is to ensure cooperation between them

• Provision of information and advice to business and public sector

– Backed up by resources for public sector bodies

• Legislation and regulation to ensure that organisations involved in CNI have appropriate security in place

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 24

International agreements

• Cybersecurity is an international rather than simply a national problem

• Attackers may be based anywhere in the world

• Danger of reciprocal attacks and escalation if attackers are government sponsored

• Need for consistent international laws (and penalities) so that attackers cannot hide behind national boundaries

• International reporting and response systems

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Cybersecurity 2, 2013 Slide 25

Key points

• Technology is important but it cannot, on its own, solve the cybersecurity problem

• Deterrence is a critically important strategy. Make it too expensive for attackers to breach your security

• Organisations cannot fall back on unrealistic security procedures then blame individuals when they go wrong

• Regulation and legislation is required to ensure cybersecurity in CNI providers

• Cybersecurity is an international problem – so international action is required.