Better Infrastructure Institutions

A discussion paper

September 2013

by

Dr Chris Hale

with

Associate Professor Colin Duffield

Mr Bernardus Djonoputro

Mr Leith Doody

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This paper reviews leading international practice and trends in the institutions and institutional arrangements that support effective policy, planning and

delivery for contemporary infrastructure. We adopt an internationalist perspective, but centre findings and exemplars around applicability to the

Indonesian context.

In this paper, ‘infrastructure’ covers both urban and regional contexts. It covers core economic and social infrastructure - with an assumption of

contemporary standards in sustainability and energy efficiency. We assume that high quality outcomes in infrastructure require robust capabilities across

fields such as: urban and regional planning; civil engineering (including environmental engineering and water); urban design and architecture; housing

and social infrastructure; ports and shipping; intermodal freight; airports; mass transit networks; project finance; governance and policy. It is suggested

that middle-income status for a country like Indonesia implies and demands new standards in performance across these fields and comprehensive

working inter-relationships among them.

The paper hopefully acts to stimulate thinking and discussion around the potential to establish a new multi-partner Indonesian Institute of Infrastructure.

The writing of this paper has been supported with a project grant from INDII (Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative) but the views contained herein reflect

only the current thinking of the authors - and are not related to official INDII positions.

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Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary Pg 3

2. Background – infrastructure and the 21st century society Pg 4

3. Excellence in Planning and Delivery – international exemplar cities and regions Pg 5

4. Research Hubs and Units Pg 7

5. Professional Institutes Pg 9

6. Industry Associations & Lobby Groups Pg 10

7. NGOs & Not-for-profits Pg 12

8. Infrastructure in Government Pg 13

9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm of policy and projects Pg 15

10. Key Themes in Indonesian Infrastructure Pg 16

11. Workable Options Pg 18

12. Recommendations – a new institute that suits Indonesian circumstances Pg 23

13. Bibliography Pg 25

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1. Executive Summary

This document puts forward a hypothesis – that a new multi-partner

infrastructure institute would be valuable and beneficial to Indonesia’s

infrastructure sector and hence to overall economic and social

development objectives and outcomes.

To arrive at this contention, the authors have initially reviewed

international trends in infrastructure thinking, policy and investment –

and suggest that infrastructure is now much more than a self-referential

sector based on hard-edged engineering and construction outcomes. The

authors contend that the ‘soft’ elements of policy, pricing, skills,

planning, design, assessment and finance are evolving rapidly, and new

support is needed to allow the infrastructure sector in any given country

to keep up with the pace of international change.

We then review the state of play among various institutional exemplars

internationally. We break this analysis down according to the ownership

or membership of such institutes – running across professional

institutes, research units, business associations, NGOs and government

units. The activities of the government units are offered for contextual

purposes, to demonstrate the manner in which government postures

toward infrastructure policy and delivery are changing rapidly. The

other organisations are listed with a view to identifying salient attributes

and activities that are either worthy of strong consideration for a

potential new Indonesian infrastructure institute, or worth avoiding in

some instances. The sense arises from the civil society exemplars that an

institute focused on infrastructure-specific research, knowledge-

exchange, intra-sector dialogue and trust-building is worthy of pursuit.

Some of the advanced institutional exemplars distinguish themselves by

focusing their infrastructure discussions under a ‘public interest’ rubric.

We then summarises an emerging concept of ‘seamless infrastructure

delivery’, which draws on best practice approaches from policy

development, through initiation of project concept planning, into

assessment, detailed design, technical refinement, and then delivery.

This open and transparent ‘process-based’ approach to infrastructure

projects is currently seen as a key factor in better projects and more

effective delivery. But the demands of a more advanced process

presumably frame the knowledge needs of the infrastructure sector in

developing countries – hence these demands frame the potential role and

activities of a new infrastructure institute.

In part 10, we review and group various technical themes and topics in

infrastructure and policy. We suggest that the creation of topic-coherent

‘special interest groups’ may form an effective way to structure a new

infrastructure institute in a manner that improves the relevance and

personalised experience for institute members. The special interest

groups could function as key units for proposing and initiating research

and knowledge-exchange activities of a future institute. We then sketch-

out a potential institute structure, alongside a presumed resource base to

deliver a critical threshold of industry-relevant activity. As with each

part of the discussion paper, this sketch of resourcing and potential

structure is mobilised as a hypothesis - and we hope that industry

stakeholders will respond to suggestions with their own ideas, either

confirming or disagreeing with the sketched concept as they see fit.

In concluding, the paper touches on some advanced intellectual

parameters for a potential institute, including the need to focus firstly on

supporting broad-based economic development progress. We suggest an

‘independent but close’ relationship to government for the institute, and

canvas various issues in resourcing, membership, focus, and policy

direction with an encouragement for stakeholders to submit their own

views in response.

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2. Infrastructure and the Contemporary

Society

Great diversity is evident among contemporary societies the world over,

but also much commonality in themes and influences. We can talk at a

philosophical level of the elements that make up any given society.

These include; inherited but evolving non-material culture such as

language, ritual, and social norms; material culture and consumerism;

the arts; systems of government; science and education; human

settlements and dwellings – both traditional and contemporary; and

trade, business and production. But increasingly, across all these

elements of human society and many more – we recognise the role of

infrastructure in sustaining, supporting, connecting and improving the

social and material condition.

Infrastructure can be taken in a narrow sense, to mean hard

infrastructure such as ports, roads, buildings, electricity supply and

water treatment systems. But these ‘hard’ elements and systems exist

within a complex economic and social context. Therefore, more up-to-

date thinking recognises the role of ‘soft infrastructure’ such as policy,

pricing, project assessment methods, governance, and capabilities for

delivery. These soft infrastructures can exist in an ad-hoc and

opportunist state at one end of a spectrum – or alternatively they can be

‘institutionalised’ in some fashion or other. We should recognise

excessively inflexible institutionalisation of infrastructure outcomes and

mechanisms as a problem in its own right. So - infrastructure

institutions, settings and ‘soft’ or policy-related elements ultimately

need to be positioned at some workable and practical space between

excessive informality and opportunism on the one hand, versus

excessive rigidity and stasis at the other end of our spectrum. Changed

and changing economic, social and technological circumstances require

institutions and arrangements that are flexible, responsive, socially and

environmentally responsible, and economically progressive.

Infrastructure work is, by definition, group work. Even the smallest

infrastructure project requires a cast of hundreds from conception,

through design and planning, into approval and endorsement, and then

delivery. Risks are many, but so are rewards when well-conceived

economic or social infrastructure is delivered effectively. Trust is a key

element in successful infrastructure projects, while hard-edged elements

of governance are required to guard against and manage the most

difficult of project risks. Differing individual perspectives,

organisational needs and professional capabilities demand opportunities

for open discussion and trust-building. Research and evidence-based

analysis plays an increasingly important role in informing policy

choices and actual practice. Structured skills-development lies at the

core of enhanced personal, institutional and sectoral capacity.

A quality infrastructure program is inherently based on effective inter-

relationships between demographic and social need and chosen

infrastructure solutions. This implies that transport infrastructure should

be integrated with housing, recreational, work and shopping

opportunities. Industrial land must be connected with freight-movement

mechanisms. Metropolitan-scale growth needs to be balanced by

regional-scale provision and protection of parkland, open space,

agricultural, and forestry lands. Water resources are finite and crucial.

Systems of movement should enhance and nurture city environments

and streets rather than overwhelming them. And the very dynamism of

cities means that opportunities abound for innovative financing of

much-needed urban transport, electricity, water and other infrastructure.

The society that grasps these elements and works with them effectively

creates its own, much better future.

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3. Excellence in Planning & Delivery –

international exemplar cities & regions

Jakarta, as the Indonesian mega-city and powerhouse of the Indonesian

economy, faces a difficult choice in terms of infrastructure and planning

reference-points. Likewise, medium-scale cities such as Surabaya are

presented with two essentially very different pathways and reference

cases for economic development. The two ‘options’ in question involve

a choice between an agenda for a high-quality medium to higher-income

urban growth trajectory, versus a planning and infrastructure approach

that entrenches low-to-medium income status into the future.

The ‘high quality’ reference points for Jakarta include locations like;

Tokyo, Osaka, Hong Kong, Seoul, London and perhaps the San

Francisco Bay Area. Chinese mega-cities such as Shanghai and

Guangzhou have also set an interesting direction, by aspiring to and

developing first-world standard infrastructure, during a growth phase

from low to middle income status (and ultimately beyond).

Additionally, we recognise the important role that a location like

Singapore has played, albeit at a lower population benchmark, in setting

an agenda for long-term transition out of developing world status,

through middle-income, and ultimately into higher-income living

standards, infrastructure, and city conditions.

Conversely, medium-scale Indonesian cities can orient themselves

around recognised planning and infrastructure reference exemplars like

Washington DC, Melbourne, Munich, or any number of advanced

European cities. Neighbouring Kuala Lumpur is another interesting

reference case, in which the ambition seems to be about matching-up

against the standards delivered in Singapore (for example), rather than a

benchmarking of infrastructure and planning approach against that

achieved or targeted in other developing countries.

Picture: Yamanote Line, Tokyo. Tokyo is acknowledged as a world leader in mega-city

infrastructure and economic power. But few pause to reflect on Tokyo’s past as a poor city, or

the investment and development pathway that sustained its economic transition over time.

By contrast, some cities in the developing world are captive to a

dynamic of lower expectations and benchmarks. This is very

understandable, given resource and delivery constraints – but carries its

own specific implications, parameters and risks. Certain Latin American

cities have charted a path toward rapid expansion of BRT infrastructure

(for example). And a mega-city like Bogota now grapples with the

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reality that ‘quick and reasonably low-cost’ roll-out of BRT systems has

been achieved, but next phases of mass transit infrastructure

development demand higher capacity and quality-of-service. South

American cities clearly don’t have the same resources as many cities in

the developed world. But those same South American locations

increasingly recognise that a ‘limitation on expectations and standards’

across urban design, planning and infrastructure makes them a captive

in future to those same lower standards.

India presents another intriguing paradigm. In locations like Delhi, rapid

expansion of Metro transit is being achieved - but a choice to make

marginal cost savings by limiting design and infrastructure quality of

stations (particularly) seemingly entrenches another generation of

developing-world status. This at the very time that economic growth

would suggest emergence into middle-income standard urban

environments is possible.

We recommend deep consideration of the high-standard infrastructure,

planning, and city design approaches that have successfully supported

the transition to middle and higher income status among cities like

Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Nagoya, Tokyo, Osaka and more

recently Shanghai or other large Chinese cities.

While Indonesian cities and infrastructure developers should be mindful

of the needs of lower-income citizens – those citizens are seemingly

best served by a rapid and sustained transition to middle and higher

income status through a high-quality approach to urban infrastructure.

This implies an emphasis on productive institutions, high professional

standards and reference points, as well as effective planning processes,

inter-organisational communication and co-operation, and independent

assessment of competing projects and investment priorities. It also

involves innovative and flexible approaches to project financing and

implementation.

Picture: BRT - Bogota, Colombia. Bogota achieved transformation of urban people-movement

with bus rapid transit, but the system appears to be at-capacity just a handful of years after

opening. The balance between cost and capacity is a common debate for developing cities.

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4. Research Hubs and Units

Internationally, a number of infrastructure-related research ‘hubs’,

‘units’ or ‘institutes’ have emerged whose progress and agenda is worth

tracking and discussing. Broadly, it is observed that these units can

either follow ‘organic’ growth and development trajectories, or they can

adopt a ‘big-bang’ approach based around heavy publicity and

aspiration.

A research and learning facility such as UC Berkeley’s ‘City and

Regional Planning’ unit has attained pre-eminent status within its areas

of operation - through lengthy track record, a large faculty, and depth of

resourcing. Berkeley CRP offers quality interaction between

knowledge-creation (through research), and teaching/learning or

publication activities (‘knowledge transfer’). Although there is

anecdotally a significant and meaningful interaction between Berkeley

CRP and industry or government – those links are not always overtly or

clearly formalised, and tend perhaps toward the activities of individual

academics. Berkeley’s main mechanism for overcoming the

planning/engineering divide is through the activities of key staff

members who have formal credentials in both of these inter-dependent

fields. Berkeley CRP does not currently offer a high profile in

infrastructure finance - which could render a perception of limitation

into ‘traditional’ concepts and approaches of planning.

Melbourne University’s architecture, building and planning department

founded the GAMUT unit several years ago (‘Governance and

Management of Urban Transport’). While GAMUT is thematically

coherent, it has only a small permanent staff and has struggled

somewhat to attain high levels of published output in recent times,

especially after the departure of a particularly prominent individual lead

researcher. GAMUT’s relationships with government and industry could

be perceived as somewhat limited.

The University of Wollongong founded the SMART infrastructure unit

relatively recently. SMART’s launch was attended with high levels of

publicity and the overt promise of something ‘new and comprehensive’

in infrastructure research. SMART has attained some level of

relationships to industry and government – although these appear to be

at the level of individuals more than formal institution-to-institution

arrangements. SMART could be perceived to have a low research

output (or impact) relative to its resource base – and it is not clear that

the staffing of SMART is entirely in-line with ambitions to be a

specialist infrastructure research organisation (rather than a group of

diverse researchers turning their attention to infrastructure). SMART’s

regional location could be perceived as something of a hindrance in the

realm of urban infrastructure – but the unit does not seem to orient itself

explicitly around the regional infrastructure context in which it could

conceivably gain a clear competitive advantage.

ARRB Group (originally the ‘Australian Roads Research Board’) has a

50 year history as a major not-for-profit research unit, after starting with

a variety of Australian state and national government departments as

foundation funding members. ARRB explains that the rationale for its

creation was to collectively carry out road transport research exercises

that could otherwise not be justified or resourced individually. ARRB’s

core membership and funding currently comprises federal, state and

local transport organisations – but has diversified significantly to

encompass a wide variety of strategic, opportunistic, and purely

commercial funding sources. ARRB’s activities have also now

significantly diversified – and include; knowledge exchange and

‘information services’, road infrastructure and design expertise,

transport strategy, road safety, and advanced technical equipment

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(including design thereof). ARRB offers a useful exemplar because of

its rich history, diverse but coherent activities, up-to-date attitudes to

funding and resourcing, leading-edge technical expertise, public interest

agenda, and a universally high regard and standing in the national and

international transport research community.

Stuttgart University’s Centre for Transportation Research is

noteworthy because it combines the transport-related research interests

of a diverse variety of units and individual university researchers under

one umbrella. In this manner, a range of competencies such as rail

engineering, transport planning, geomatics, IT, and business (to mention

but a few) are integrated around common or inter-related transport

topics. Under the Centre, specific stand-alone units such as the Institute

of Railway and Transportation Planning and Engineering offer

important exemplars, through their longstanding profile and

acknowledged competency across both technical, engineering-driven

concerns alongside the broader social and economic contexts of rail

transport infrastructure.

The Australian “CRC” (co-operative research centre) concept was

inaugurated around1990 – with the intention of integrating industry

interests with the research competencies of universities, under a hybrid

multi-partner funding model. CRCs have been widely successful in

delivering meaningful industry-university connections, and are

recognised to have delivered valuable research and knowledge advances

across a range of scientific and industry fields. On the other hand, CRCs

are often criticised (by academics particularly) for having a top-heavy,

highly managerial approach that is disproportionate to research budgets,

and which can marginalise individual researchers of high standing into

‘research staff’ roles (while simultaneously being entirely dependent on

their output for credibility). CRCs also receive criticism for their

‘equity’ stance across universities – and it is sometimes contended that

lower-status regional universities are effectively learning from the larger

or more established universities in the CRC, rather than contributing

original research outputs in their own right. The strength of the CRC

model lies in its flexibility – with different CRCs being variously

housed in a particular university, existing as a stand-alone office (with

input from a range of university researchers), or even existing in the

‘virtual’ sphere in some instances (rather than having a bricks-and-

mortar home). They span a long list of partner universities and have

involvement from a wide variety of Australian jurisdictions, companies,

and government departments. CRCs have become one of the key

mechanisms for industry-university research connections in the

Australian context. The CRC for Water Sensitive Cities is a

recognised leading exemplar – whose activities seemingly hold

resonance for the concept of an Indonesian institute of infrastructure.

We would suggest that a new multi-partner Indonesian institute of

infrastructure needs a multi-university research capability at its core. It

could conceivably become a high-profile research unit in its own right

by commissioning research output from a handful of pre-committed

Indonesian and international member university research teams.

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5. Professional Institutes

Professional institutes offer a fulcrum for networking and exchange

within a particular profession, alongside representation of that

profession to key external stakeholders. The point-of-difference between

professional institutes and the other organisations discussed in this

document lies in their accreditation role, and hence they often also

feature greater depth of membership (within a particular profession).

The role of professional institutes is evolving – but a coherent critique

of these institutes could revolve around their focus on minimum

standards and entry into professional status. It could be suggested that

these institutes don’t sufficiently distinguish between the credentials and

standards applicable for early-career, entry-level professionals, versus

those operating at higher levels of seniority, technical complexity,

project scale, or social impact. There is seemingly no professional

institute in the world that focuses explicitly on ‘major infrastructure’ or

its planning, finance and delivery, But there is nothing to suggest at this

stage that such an institute would not be useful in Indonesia – possibly

even featuring some form of accreditation role in future.

Engineers Australia offers ‘registered practicing engineer’ status to

professionals across the civil and other engineering disciplines in

Australia. Engineers Australia is to all intents and purposes a monopoly

institute in this role – a phenomenon mirrored by similar institutes

stemming culturally from the UK’s Institution of Civil Engineers.

These institutes straddle mundane activities such as intra-industry

networking with the quite different demands of a quasi-regulatory role.

As an example – engineering programs at even the most prestigious of

Australia’s universities require regular accreditation from Engineers

Australia for those programs and degrees to be acceptable as a

credential for establishing ‘practicing engineer’ status for the holder.

Clearly this is a somewhat self-referential and circular dynamic -

although at this stage the role of Engineers Australia faces no serious

challenge in the regulatory sphere. The greatest question for such

institutes perhaps lies in their relevance and applicability for advanced

practitioners and experts – whose own individual credentials may lend

them unassailable in roles outside the narrow confines of ‘signing off’

for plans or on-paper technical designs. Advanced practitioners may no

longer see value in membership of an institute focused on lower-level

credentials for specific technical roles and activities.

Similarly, the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA) provides

‘registered practicing planner’ status to holders of three year

undergraduate degrees with threshold levels of workplace experience

(tellingly, this experience must be completed under the supervision of

another PIA member). A registered planner is, in the final analysis,

credentialed mainly for the processing of development applications or

various project approvals under pre-existing planning schemes (ie -

preparation, submission, or assessment). This role definition is very

similar to that played in the United States by the American Planning

Association (APA). Although we recognise the important current role

of organisations like PIA or APA, there are broader questions as to

whether their accreditation or ‘continuing professional development’

thresholds are appropriate for the demands faced in creating

metropolitan-scale strategic plans, or in project development and

implementation work for major infrastructure projects. Indeed, these

organisations themselves face regular internal discussion around the

standards expected of higher-level practitioners and experts – although

no definitive solution has yet been tabled. As with organisations like

Engineers Australia – many advanced practitioners or experts may

transition into a career trajectory for which APA or PIA membership

becomes less relevant or crucial over time.

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6. Industry Associations

Industry bodies are a particularly pervasive phenomenon in a market

like Australia – where small but well-resourced groups can be

physically and philosophically prominent-enough to be relevant and

active sounding-boards for both industry and government actors. It is

not clear whether this dynamic of a very large number of small and

diverse industry representative groups could be relevant in a market like

Indonesia - where population is an order of magnitude greater. In any

case, the role of these industry bodies is worth reviewing and

canvassing. While they could be perceived as relatively weak on

research and knowledge-transfer, their achievement in setting an agenda

for public discourse and policy decisions is successful out of all

proportion (and hence an interesting phenomenon in its own right). As a

first point of contrast, it is clear that industry bodies are substantially

less prominent in a larger, more diverse marketplace like the United

States (the reputation for industry lobbying in Washington DC

notwithstanding).

In summary it is mainly this ‘agenda-setting’ dynamic which renders the

industry bodies worthy of review and consideration. While an

Indonesian institute of infrastructure would need to be prominent, and

have a clear role in public discussion or agenda-setting, we might hope

it would be continuously mindful of public and taxpayer interests, and

evidence-based in its approach to agendas and policy issues.

Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) is a group with diverse

membership but focused almost exclusively on the issue of PPPs. IPA is

actually very small by staff numbers, and tends to operate mainly in the

space of public and media debate, and through consistent involvement

in government-sponsored ‘studies’ and ‘working groups’. Without being

overly critical, it seems at times remarkable that IPA has been

successful in retaining government membership - as an organisation

devoted mainly to furthering the interests of its private sector ‘big

corporate’ stakeholders. IPA could be perceived as largely not relevant

to harder-edged issues and developments in evidence-based

infrastructure policy, governance, and financing. IPA tends to focus on

re-iterating a set of clear and consistent messages around the desirability

of private involvement in public infrastructure delivery where

government resources are limited – and accordingly is invariably

prominent in any corporate or private sector-led discussion around these

topics.

Urban Taskforce is another small (3 staff) Australian group which has

arisen out of the perceived need for the real estate development industry

(particularly) to intensify its communication on infrastructure-related

issues. Urban Taskforce is, again, focused on media impact and profile

(and internal member discussion to some degree) – rather than having a

robust and coherent research, knowledge-development, policy

formulation, or capability-building role. Its focus on themes of ‘private

development profits supported by public funding for infrastructure’

could be perceived as counter-productive for any larger, broader and

more co-operative sectoral discussion around better infrastructure

outcomes (or collaborations). Urban Taskforce was part of a successful

lobbying effort to overturn a widely-accepted ‘user pays’ infrastructure

funding regime across Australia in recent years, in favour of a return to

state and local government infrastructure subsidies for privately-

developed housing estates.

Property Council of Australia self-describes mainly as a ‘champion of

the interests of members’ and a ‘business ally’ of members, rather than

specifically being an organisation based on professional standards,

knowledge development, or knowledge transfer (although it lays

contestable claims to such activities). Certainly, the Property Council

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holds no professional accreditation role. Overall, the Property Council is

quite successful at walking a perceptual line between being an ‘industry

group’ and being an outright lobbyist for industry interests – a role that

it does indeed carry-out reasonably robustly. Property Council’s

relevance to the Indonesian institutional context probably lies in its

sustained success at attracting membership and resources, and its broad

involvement in the property industry across all major cities of Australia.

Property Council seems to have a lively and active membership, a

regular agenda of events, and a high public profile – but articulates a

reasonably narrow view on complex issues such as planning, urban

design, infrastructure, infrastructure finance, or the appropriate role of

public interests (broadly defined) when industry engages with

government on policy questions.

Urban Land Institute (ULI) is a prominent US organisation that seems

to effectively balance a ‘big corporate’ membership base with a

publically-spirited and responsible role in policy advocacy and policy

development, plus the dissemination of progressive planning and real

estate ideas. Urban Land Institute has around 80 years track record –

and currently focuses on concepts of ‘smart growth’, and important

contemporary housing and infrastructure issues with a social and

environmental dimension, while retaining a mainstream membership

base in the real estate and development sectors. ULI’s apparently

substantive resource base seems to allow it the opportunity to engage

highly-credentialed researchers to deliver its policy papers or analysis.

ULI also offers a ‘panel’ formation role (essentially a clearing-house for

technical input) and ‘technical assistance’ more broadly. As with many

US-based NGOs, these roles tend to straddle into consulting – and there

would clearly be a debate as to whether such roles are suitable in the

context of a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. We might

comment that overall, ULI represents a similar sectoral membership

base to an equivalent Australian organisation in the Property Council,

but the tenor of its core ideas on planning and infrastructure are

recognisably more up-to-date, progressive, evidence-based, and socially

responsible. One can only assume that being up-to-date is a benefit to

members, rather than a hindrance.

In summary, the networking, events-management, and public advocacy

roles of all these industry associations are worth noting. It is suggested

that the US-based ULI exemplar provides better overall guidance, due to

their inherent acknowledgement of the public interest in policy

discussion. Correspondingly, ULI also appears to have a strong and

proactive research capability at its core – which presumably forms an

important component for any emergent Indonesian infrastructure

institute.

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7. NGOs & not-for-profits

Beyond government and the commercial sector, the ‘institutional’

landscape of infrastructure sees strong representation from NGOs and

not-for profit organisations. NGOs and not-for-profits are increasingly

focused and professional in their approach -hence their impacts are

growing. Undoubtedly, a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure will

take on some of the roles, outlooks or activities represented among the

organisations here below.

Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a US not-for-profit that focuses

primarily on research, public and industry communication and policy

advocacy. To carry out these functions, Lincoln relies on an endowment

funded model – which in the classic American tradition renders it

largely independent of industry or sectoral fashions. As with ULI,

Lincoln provides a progressive, up-to-date, evidence-based view on

metropolitan planning, sustainable infrastructure (such as mass transit)

and land or housing policy. Lincoln has distinguished itself particularly

through the popularising role of some of its staff – as noted writers and

communicators for mainstream audiences. Lincoln also offers

scholarships at PhD level for research into key policy or technical

questions. These latter two roles may not be immediately obvious – but

are worthy of initial consideration for a new Indonesian institute.

Embarq is a not-for-profit focused on bus rapid transit (BRT) in

developing cities. Embarq’s activities are oriented mainly to pro-BRT

public relations and promotion, but also span research (loosely defined)

and provision of technical support and expertise on a project basis.

Embarq appears to be extremely well-resourced - with a large

professional and technical staff base. Embarq’s exclusive emphasis on

BRT can be seen as curious, in a world where public transport

traditionally spans a diverse range of modes and options, and where

‘mode neutrality’ is valued. A review of Embarq’s membership and

sponsors suggests a strong emphasis on heavy industry, bus and road-

related interests, and representation from several of the world’s largest

petroleum suppliers. Without being overly critical about Embarq’s well-

intentioned work, there could be concerns around the promotion of

particular options and technologies in-line with donor interests.

This dynamic perhaps alerts us of the need for institutions that are

broad-based, diverse, multi-party, independent, and which effectively

balance specific technical options against a sense of policy choices.

Enabling institutions need to prioritise ‘what is best for the taxpayer’

and demonstrate a strong orientation to the public interest.

Presumably a new, multi-partner Indonesian institute of infrastructure

fits into the ‘NGO’ mould in some manner or other. With relatively few

infrastructure-focused NGOs around to provide a template, it falls to

potential members and major stakeholders to proactively chart a course

forward that is largely original, unique, and responsive to circumstance.

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8. Infrastructure in Government

Government itself seeks to innovate and adapt its approach to

infrastructure through its organisational units and structures. While it is

difficult to position any given example as genuinely ‘best practice’,

there are some roles, functions and trends worth considering in the

context of a potential new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. A new

multi-partner Indonesian institute would not replicate or deliver the

same mainstream public sector activities represented below, but it might

have a significant role in supporting progressive change and adoption of

new approaches. It would lay the research, analytical, skills-

development, and informational foundations to assist and explain

substantive changes and innovations as required.

Infrastructure Australia (IA), when formed around 2008, had a

defined role as an assessor and funder of nationally significant

infrastructure projects, drawing on a ‘pool of funds’ as its resource base.

More recently, the ‘pool’ has diminished and IA increasingly focuses on

project assessment, and on working with government partners on a case-

by-case basis to fund agreed projects. IA is interesting particularly

because of this assessment and appraisal role. While IA is notionally

‘independent and expert‘, it has struggled to consistently maintain both

of those challenging attributes. But the role and concept of “independent

assessment” is worthy of consideration for any new Indonesian institute.

Presumably a new institute might assist and support a move toward

open, independent assessment. But it may also conceivably have a role

in executing such assessments itself (if that capability were of interest to

stakeholders). IA also maintains a ‘list’ of major projects – although is

running into problems around transparency and the level of information

provided to justify and clarify that list of projects. At present, IA merely

suggests that various projects are more or less ‘preferred’ than others,

without providing substantive justification behind that ranking (although

claiming to perform such analysis out of the public eye). The idea of an

infrastructure ‘list’ and a ranking of projects according to merit is

probably also worthy of consideration among the potential roles of an

Indonesian institute – with the institute supporting and sustaining a

move in that direction at the very least, if asked to do so.

The trend toward Government-Owned Corporations (GOCs) and

quasi-private provision of infrastructure is worth tracking as an

influential phenomenon in its own right. This trend seems to be

occurring in Indonesia as quickly as anywhere else in the world. Hence

the trend toward GOCs becomes a framing reality around which a new

Infrastructure institute presumably arranges itself in Indonesia. GOCs,

new and old, would also presumably become core members of a new

institute. Some better practice among GOCs is identifiable in a leading

exemplar like:

Hong Kong MTR Corporation successfully straddles the worlds of

government and commercial activity, and shapes Hong Kong as a city

through real estate development, and the infrastructure needed to move

large numbers of people daily. MTR is a profitable, stock market listed

company with HK Government still retaining a large shareholding. In

many respects, MTR is similar to the diversified business model of

private and public railway companies present throughout Asia,

including in Japan. The sheer success of MTR and similar firms in

transport and commercial terms provides a pointer to the level of

sophistication and policy nuance required to deliver world-beating

infrastructure in a developing mega-city like Jakarta over time. The key

finding here is that any new infrastructure institute would need to be

capable of supporting and explaining far-reaching transitions in the role

and capabilities of key infrastructure organisations (and indeed GOCs)

toward advanced practice standards.

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The Transbay Joint Powers Authority (TJPA) is a special purpose

vehicle for a massive downtown renewal and station redevelopment

project in San Francisco. A diverse array of state and local government

arms and organisations combine themselves into the TJPA to create a

commercially-focused delivery organisation built on equity

contributions. The key issue here, again, is the rapid evolution and

sophistication of new-era best practice infrastructure delivery

arrangements. An Indonesian institute would presumably need to play a

key role in researching and explaining these new and emerging delivery

models to government, industry and even the general public.

Within the specific sub-topic of PPPs, there are a number of different

government-owned or managed ‘centres of excellence’ around the

world. The centres typically fall into two categories: a) government

units that encourage and define best practice and provide guidance

material, and b) specialist delivery units with high-end project

management and finance skills. Examples of these groups include:

Public-Private Partnership Center in the Philippines was established

in its current form in 2010 with a charter to support the implementation

of PPPs by facilitating, co-ordinating and monitoring PPP programs and

projects. This is done via the provision of technical assistance and

advisory services, capacity development, and policy formulation and

evaluation. By itself this ‘professional service’ approach initially proved

insufficient to stimulate the hoped-for level of in-country PPP activity.

The Centre was then boosted and complemented by a multi-agency

program to develop, package, competitively tender, and implement new

PPP projects. This additional support facilitated new enabling

capabilities, policy platforms, legal and regulatory reforms and supports,

and institutional frameworks for PPP. Through these measures, the

Centre is seen now to have effectively supported the creation of a

workable pipeline of PPP projects.

The Partnerships Victoria policy created a specialist PPP unit within

the Department of Treasury and Finance, of the State Government of

Victoria. The unit provides policy leadership and practice guidance in

support of various agencies involved in project delivery. This team

develops policy and project guidelines, provides advisory support to

project teams, convenes training, and assists project teams in their

interface with Victorian State Government. The model is generally

considered to have been successful in raising the standard of projects -

and has provided the basis for similar arrangements in British Columbia

(Canada), and at the national PPP unit in South Africa.

Infrastructure Ontario (Canada) is a specialist delivery agency that

implements PPP policy across Provincial Government. IO manages a

diverse range of interests such as: integrating between the value of

public infrastructure and real estate; managing government facilities;

and financing the renewal of the province’s public infrastructure. The

focus of the unit has primarily been around lending, project delivery and

real estate management. The strength of this model is consistency, but

questions remain around the depth of understanding provided for

specific sector businesses, projects and activities. It has been suggested

that lack of sectoral specialisation could hinder opportunities for project

optimization.

Infrastructure UK is a specialist unit that concentrates on policy

process and arranging finance for projects, but does not deliver projects

directly. Prior to the GFC, this approach had generated a solid pipeline

of projects. The Infrastructure Investments Unit within Scotland

government is somewhat similar.

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9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm

of policy and projects

Rapid changes in technology, society and economy in the early 21st

century place ever-greater demands on government and industry to

deliver an infrastructure outcome and city environment that is

acceptable to residents, and which actively fosters better living and

business conditions. At the same time, the profound economic impacts

of decent, well-planned infrastructure mean that opportunities abound

for projects that are either partially ‘self-sustaining’ at the very least, or

fully ‘self-funding’ at best. But this effortless provision of quality

infrastructure through a practical delivery and financing package

depends absolutely on the support and efforts of a broad team of well-

rehearsed infrastructure specialists. These specialists will invariably be

working in concert across institutions and jurisdictions.

Some may go so far as to say that great cities, with the best

infrastructure, have become that way through application of high levels

of skill and co-operation in infrastructure conception and delivery

(more than though accident, happenstance, the actions of a single

leadership figure - or through any other specific factor). Great societies

and better cities demand exemplary infrastructure capabilities.

In the 21st century the process of effective delivery begins with

advanced analysis and interpretation of existing conditions, the drivers

and sources of change, and the current and future needs of the populace

and businesses. Good planning demands brilliant analysis. Through

good planning, we can identify agreeable policy parameters, and a short-

list of potential infrastructure initiatives and projects. These should then

be assessed at arms-length, and the most compelling prioritised because

of the social, economic, environmental and functional benefits they

offer. The best projects will invariably match-up well against pre-agreed

policy guidelines and directions.

If we presume that we are selecting and working with the best project

proposals, offering the greatest array of economic benefits – then project

implementation and financing become radically more straight-forward

and attainable. Conversely, selecting projects for reasons other than a

clear and positive economic contribution implies great difficulty in

financing and even in attaining multi-stakeholder agreement and

commitment. With a compelling financial package and clear triple

bottom-line rationale, the range of beneficiaries is invariably greater.

This smooths the way for an array of institutions, levels-of-government

and industry players to get involved, support, contribute and deliver

from within their respective areas of influence and competency.

But each and every element of this delivery process is entirely reliant

on; individual technical skills, organisational capabilities, trust, open

discussion, and the sharing of advanced knowledge. For these reasons,

infrastructure specialists have often looked at the question of overall

‘institutional and sectoral capabilities’ and identified these as a pre-

existing requirement that precedes, but ultimately supports the creation

of better infrastructure and better cities.

We believe that for these reasons, the time has come to create the

settings for sustained advancement of skills and capabilities in the

infrastructure sector in Indonesia. Whatever is ventured into an

initiative for developing the analytical, policy, finance and project

capabilities of sectoral stakeholders is likely to be repaid many times

over in the form of more effective, efficient project planning and

delivery. Indonesia’s competitiveness and social dynamism depends on

a major step-forward in the infrastructure sector.

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10. Key Themes in Indonesian

Infrastructure

In this section, we canvas the idea that a new Infrastructure Institute

could find strength in diversity – by providing a number of ‘special

interest groups’ that link with key themes, fields of business activity,

and the topical interests of organisations, government units, and

professionals. Special Interest Groups (SIGs) may allow members to

arrange their input into the institute in a more practical and meaningful

manner, and allow a more personalised experience of membership. The

SIGs may stand coherently as largely self-managing and self-actualising

units within the overall institute, drawing on the leadership of

champions and discipline experts. They could become the key interface

for project-level research funding decisions. The following discussion is

representative, but not exhaustive of the themes and topics that might

form themselves into special interest groups. We envisage the institute

will initially comprise those SIGs with greatest up-front support and

momentum, but the inauguration of new or pre-nominated SIGs should

be pursued as circumstances allow over time.

SIG – Policy & Investment

This SIG connects with Government of Indonesia objectives to

accelerate delivery of needed infrastructure. A full variety of policy and

financing innovations should be engaged and discussed, including but

not limited to PPPs. Assume that accelerated, more effective project

delivery demands increasingly effective governance and sectoral

performance. This SIG then becomes a key hub for discussion, debate

and research of policy change and investment innovation.

SIG – Integrated Metropolitan Infrastructure

This SIG covers distinct but inter-related fields such as metropolitan

planning policy, housing and social infrastructure decisions, urban

design, transport strategy, and mass transit networks. This SIG engages

across the infrastructure required to support; quality of life, housing

options that meet contemporary needs, livable attractive cities and

neighbourhoods, and convenient 21st century urban people-movement.

Picture: Transport and urban planning conference in Colombia, 2013. Special interest groups

could frame and initiate topic-specific discussions and events.

SIG – Commercial Transport Infrastructure

This SIG covers the movement of freight and commercial traffic at a

regional scale. This SIG should be positioned at the interface between

international, intra-national (and island-to-island), and localised

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movement of commercial vehicles and goods. It comprises a concern for

ports, rail freight corridors, trunk roads, and distribution networks.

SIG – Infrastructure Challenges in Informal Settlements

This SIG addresses the unique and special challenges of providing better

infrastructure and living conditions to informal settlements, and indeed

the future planning and evolution of such locations.

SIG – Airports

This SIG addresses policy, planning, supportive infrastructure and

business models for major and regional airports.

SIG – Water & Sanitation

This SIG clusters around water supply and sanitation infrastructure - and

its planning, engineering, financing, pricing, governance and delivery.

SIG – Energy Supply

This SIG clusters around electricity and gas supply infrastructure - its

planning, engineering, financing, governance and delivery.

SIG – Rural Infrastructure and Agriculture

This SIG connects with the substantial population base in rural and

regional Indonesia, and their infrastructure-related needs. It should

cover agriculture, irrigation, social needs, rural supply chains, and

settlement-based planning and infrastructure delivery solutions.

SIG – Better Infrastructure for Women

This SIG could provide a forum for driving research and exchanging

information around infrastructure initiatives that enable better outcomes

in women’s health and economic progress. It could also comprise a key

form for women working in the infrastructure sector to meet and

exchange knowledge and support.

SIG – Infrastructure for Major Regional Cities

This SIG could cluster around urban infrastructure initiatives outside of

Jakarta, particularly in the larger Indonesian cities. It recognises that

medium and larger non-capital cities face their own demands and

conditions. It is also conceivable that this SIG could see much of its

member and group activity taking place outside of Jakarta.

SIG – Communications

This SIG addresses an interest in 21st century telecommunications

infrastructure and uptake of advanced ICT services.

Picture: Jakarta’s varied pattern of urban development suggests a broad range of infrastructure-

related interests and topics need to be covered.

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11. Workable Options

Parikesit et al (2012, p6) summarised a potential ‘mission’ for an

Indonesian infrastructure institute or centre thus:

“To become known nationally and internationally for its high quality

and independent evidence-based policy advice on infrastructure and the

PPP approach to Indonesian governments at the national, provincial

and local levels, and to Indonesian and international investors and

businesses, and for its capacity building in the public and

private infrastructure sector of Indonesia.”

This mission statement could be rephrased to suggest the institute

should be:

a) independent, but collaborative and multi-themed – with a broad and

diverse membership and support base

b) marshalling highest-level expertise in technical and policy-based

aspects of infrastructure – and in a position to regularly exercise this

expertise through evidence-based research and advice

c) a sustained driver of enhanced capabilities for infrastructure policy,

planning, evaluation, finance, and delivery

On the governance and direction of a new institution

The University of Melbourne accepts most of the governance and

organisational advice offered by Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) regarding

the establishment of a new institute. Especially the scope of activities

(pp 7-8) seems appropriate and comprehensive.

These activities would include (in summary, and in-brief): research and

development exercises on agreed topics; skills development and

training; direct policy advice; stimulation of open, broad-based policy

discussion (especially through regular events and publications); and a

certain degree of self-responsibility for sourcing and growing the

institute’s own diversified funding base into the future.

On the other hand, there are a small number of recommendations in

Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) where a contrasting view may prove

valuable at this stage. Particularly the recommendation that the ‘board

of management’ would be separate from the ‘board of researchers’

seems worthy of challenge. This separation and distinction appears

arbitrary and counter-productive - and we recommend, by contrast, the

creation of a single board which incorporates and intertwines high-level

infrastructure research leaders with key partners, sponsors, and

recognised leaders from government and business. We feel a better

outcome is achievable where research, capability-development, and

evidence-based analysis becomes the core focus of discussion for

business and government leaders in board-level interactions with the

institute - in direct consultation and partnership with research leaders.

Neither should the institution’s organisational, governance and strategic

decision-making be kept at a distance from skilled research practitioners

– the best of whom bring track records in organisational governance and

program management to the table, in addition to their technical or

academic skills-base.

The University of Melbourne team also recommends strongly that

‘specific research topics’ (see pp 9-11) should be kept at a thematic

level at this stage, to be decided by the actual board, researchers, and

government or private sector institute members on a case-by-case basis -

using a system of ‘matching funds and resources’ for specific proposals.

While we accept many or most of the suggested ‘specific topics’ as

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worthy and useful, it appears more important at this stage to work

toward those specifics subsequent to the framing influence provided by

the formation of topical special interest groups (SIGs). As such, a

potential institute structure reflecting this thinking is put forward

hereafter for initial consideration (broadly speaking, and subject to

further input and refinement). Other themes, topics, and potential SIGs

not listed above in part 11 might include: social infrastructure; legal

practice and legal reform for infrastructure; land titling and acquisition;

and tracking and publication of overall industry or sectoral performance

analytics – including perhaps the regular publication of a presumed,

projected or acknowledged ‘infrastructure pipeline’.

A ‘matched’ funding mechanism for operations and research At this stage, we put forward the suggestion that specific research

projects would be initiated through the SIG mechanism, on the basis of

demonstrated support from institute partners and members. This holds

implications for the nature of membership and financial contributions.

Roughly similar to the arrangement in Australian CRCs (co-operative

research centres), we suggest that membership should involve two-

phases of commitment to research projects, and two types of resource

contribution. Member organisations should perhaps contribute in the

following manner:

an up-front annual cash commitment – the majority of which

will cover basic institute operating costs, with another portion

thereof ventured into a ‘base research funding pool’

matching cash commitment from members on a case-by-case

basis for specific research projects that meet the needs and

criteria of a quorum of members. This second-phase cash

commitment to specific research projects is only enacted on the

basis of an accepted, detailed research proposal, which initially

meets the approval of the SIG for which it is relevant. The

‘matching’ cash commitment can then be combined with pool

funds to finance the research endeavour. There should be an

annual minimum threshold for member’s cash commitment to

research initiatives. This threshold can be exceeded

a mixture of cash and ‘in-kind’ commitment overall (in both up-

front annual commitments, and for specific research exercises).

‘In-kind’ contributions include important resources such as; staff

time, use of facilities and equipment, sharing of data and

expertise

The membership base

The membership of the institute should be diverse and multi-faceted, but

the role of key patron organisations is paramount – especially during

early years of the institute’s operations. We suggest that a first-tier of 3-

5 ‘gold patron’ funding partners is required. These partners could be

committing in the order of $US 100,000 or more per annum in up-front

membership fees, depending on the institute’s ultimate financing and

ramp-up program. Beyond the top tier of funding partners, a larger

selection of between 5-10 ‘silver’ member organisations could

presumably contribute some $50,000 cash per year – as a mixture of up-

front fees and ‘matching funds’ for research projects.

And finally, a much larger pool again should be allowed for from

individual medium and small-scale organisations, presumably involving

an affordable annual subscription fee (providing basic access to events)

for individual members. These ‘broader’ membership categories would

presumably not have direct access to or involvement in research

exercises, and would have no role in decision-making and governance.

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A sustainable end position for institute staffing

After several years of operation, we would expect the institute to be

self-sustaining on the basis of an established and stable multi-tiered

membership and funding base. In this context, it is timely to estimate

the scale and resources required for sustained operation, and hence to

some degree the expectations for partner and member contributions at

that mature stage. Here below is a listing of basic institute activities, the

personnel required to deliver presumed outcomes, and an early-stage

estimate of cash resources required to deliver:

Expectations for ongoing research endeavour and activity

Identification and proposing of potential research projects should be

resourced from a base of in-kind contribution from both the partner

organisations and the university research providers. Beyond that, we

expect that each individual ‘standard’ one-year research exercise could

involve some $50,000 in cash payment for salaries and costs to research

providers. If we presume eight projects per year, the implied cash

demand is:

$US 400,000

Overall makeup, role and resourcing of the board

The board may presumably comprise a maximum of around 12 persons

– drawn from a mixture of government, NGOs, research organisations

(primarily universities), private sector companies, and perhaps major

international donor partners. It should also involve the director of

operations/CEO. We presume that the majority of this staffing would be

provided by partner organisations as an in-kind contribution, but it is

reasonable to expect that the ‘research’ board members might be paid an

honorarium, and there may be merit in appointing a professional chair

on a fee basis. While it is possible that the board might be covered

entirely from in-kind, we should countenance the idea of the above four

positions (three research directors and a chair) being staffed

professionally at a rate of around 0.2 FTE at $195,000 (including 30%

on-costs). This equates to an implied annual cash demand of:

$US 156,000

Makeup and role of operations and executive team

We presume that an ultimate mature institute would require one full

time director of operations and/or CEO, and one full time administrative

staff member. Staffing beyond this level would only be countenanced

and considered on need at a later stage. On the basis of 1.0 FTE for the

CEO at $195,000 ($150,000 salary plus on-costs) and 1.0 FTE for the

admin staff member at $65,000 ($50,000 salary plus on-costs), the

annual operational staffing costs of the institute would be:

$US 260,000

Office accommodation and general operations costs

We presume (unless indications emerge otherwise) that office space and

office-related overheads would be provided as part of the in-kind

contribution from one of the main partner organisations - presumably

either a government or a university wishing to ‘house’ a pre-eminent

institute within their facilities. But a cash resource base for events,

publicity and travel would presumably also be required. At this stage,

we estimate that in mature phases an annual ‘general operations’ budget

for the Institute would be in the order of 10% of operating costs, or:

$US 80,000

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Indicative Organisational Structure

Board & executive staff

*strategy & governance

*operations & budget

*membership & publicity

*management of events, training, knowledge exchange & dissemination

*research contracts

SIG

integrated metropolitan infrastructure

(example only)

SIG

policy & investment

(example only)

SIG

commercial transport

(example only)

other SIG

other SIG

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Preliminary annual total budget estimate during mature phases

The sum total of these assumed annual cost elements comes to some:

$US 896,000

This amount presumably defines the cash contributions required from

partner organisations and members, in both-up front and matched

research funds. It also partly defines the number of cornerstone partners,

and the scale of the membership base needed. The split of ‘operational

overheads’ to ‘direct research activity’ under the figures described in

previous pages is around 55/45 - and we suggest the desirability of this

balance should be vigorously debated by potential partners. There may

well be an expectation that overheads and staffing would remain largely

stable while direct research endeavour expands as the institute matures,

shifting the balance of ‘overhead’ to ‘core activity’ over time.

In rough and generic terms, a budget in the order of $900,000 would

imply a need for around four cornerstone ‘gold partners’ at $100,000

each, and some seven ‘silver’ partners at $50,000 each, plus the

remainder from fees contributed by the broader membership pool. This

seems, at face value, to be potentially workable and achievable.

Start-up process: first-steps during year one The ‘mature’ financing and resourcing arrangement outlined above

presumably occurs at around year 2-3 of operations, or perhaps for the

2016 calendar year or later – depending on circumstances. In initial

phases, and if working on the presumption there is an interest in seeing

the institute initiated at some stage during 2014, we might imagine that

many of the full-scale cost elements could be forgone in years one and

two. Under this scenario, the institute could be ‘virtual’ in not drawing

on specific office accommodation needs. We might also expect that

there would not be a full time CEO or admin staff – and that these roles

could be filled on a part-time basis initially and/or as a generous in-kind

foundation contribution from key stakeholders.

Equally, the scale of research activity and budget allocation to general

(non-salary) operating costs could and would presumably be

substantively lower during year one particularly. We might also expect

that provision for paid board members and a paid chair could be at least

partially foregone or limited during year one.

Development process for the institute business model

These parameters and figures are put forward at this stage only as a

starting point for discussion and debate among interested stakeholders.

We would expect the eventual arrangements to be somewhat different to

those outlined above, and determined through input and agreement from

industry and government throughout the feasibility study process and

beyond. Interested parties should make every effort to engage the

University of Melbourne study team directly, provide a formal

submission by the due date, and become involved in workshop

discussions with other potential stakeholders.

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12. Recommendations – a new institute

that suits Indonesian circumstances

During September and October, the authors of this document will seek

feedback from stakeholders regarding the, need for, benefits, scope and

nature of a potential new multi-partner Indonesian infrastructure

institute. This document serves as a platform for early-stage discussion

of important issues, with the hope that new ideas and further thinking

from industry and government is stimulated, and then articulated in both

the submissions, and the workshop series. Subject to these inputs, a final

concept will be refined and tabled in the form of a feasibility report. At

this stage though, the University of Melbourne team are willing to

provide some early recommendations to guide and stimulate further

discussion. These should not be read as final or conclusive, but are

representative of questions to be discussed and debated further.

A vehicle for sustaining broad-based economic development

Any institute would need to demonstrate its worth by acting as a key

mechanism for sustaining economic growth with responsible social and

environmental characteristics. We suggest that any specific or sectional

interest of a potential institute needs to be subsidiary to, contextualised

by, and supportive-of this over-arching economic development

rationale. Given the necessity of quality infrastructure for economic and

social development, and its profound impacts, we suggest that an

‘economic development’ rationale for a new institute is natural and

attainable, but this possibly represents an emerging nuance around

which further discussion is needed.

Relationship to government – separate but supportive

Much discussion among the project team so far has surrounded the

perceived needs and future directions of Government of Indonesia

ministries, organisations and stakeholders. It has taken a certain amount

of time to become absolutely apparent that the role of a new multi-

partner institute would be to support skills-development, policy

discussion, and research needs of GOI stakeholders, rather than

anticipating or being directly involved in GOI activities and decisions.

We believe the institute should have a strong working relationship and

robust membership from GOI partners - but its activities need to be

independent, and focused on sectoral capacity-building outcomes. The

institute should be supportive of the needs of GOI members, rather than

part of government.

Core focus – value-adding through enhanced skills and capabilities

We believe that a distinct and important role is available to a new

institute where it focuses on ‘value–adding’ and improved productivity

within the Indonesian infrastructure sector, and in specific infrastructure

fields. At face value, public and private sector stakeholders currently

agree a need for accelerated infrastructure delivery in Indonesia. This

then suggests that a new institute can play a framing role through

sustained support for skills and knowledge-development that enhances

sectoral working productivity. A focus on value-add, capabilities,

enhanced productivity, and new knowledge is aided by networking, but

these outcomes exist as a higher rationale than networking per se. The

institute can thus presumably distinguish itself by moving beyond

networking and into the realm of focused and sustained sectoral

performance enhancement.

Membership base – strength in diversity

There appears to be little value in a potential institute that does not

balance effectively between all the stakeholders and partners that

contribute to infrastructure thinking, policy and delivery in the

Indonesian context. While the idea of public-private interaction is

commonly advanced, the University of Melbourne team suggests that

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NGOs and researchers (primarily university academics) are very much

part of the mix in a diverse and robust infrastructure discussion.

Equally, we distinguish between the roles and natures of private sector

planners, technical consultants, financiers and project principals. The

knowledge-related needs and contributions of consultants tend to be

quite different from those of corporate construction professionals (for

example), or government officials. In order to optimise sectoral

knowledge exchange and policy discussion we suggest that an invitation

be provided for each distinct stakeholder or professional group.

Topics and themes – broad coverage across infrastructure

There appears at this early stage to be sufficient depth and breadth of

interest from government and industry to suggest that the institute can

sustain a reasonably comprehensive coverage of infrastructure-related

themes and topics over time. To counterbalance breadth, we suggest that

depth of understanding can be achieved with attention to particular

needs and issues among the specific ‘special interest groups’. By

developing shared knowledge and experience among professionals with

an interest in these specific topics, we suggest that ‘depth’ will be

delivered alongside a more tailored, personalised and relevant

experience of institute membership.

The role of commissioned research

Another point of difference presumably arises where the new institute

has research delivery capabilities at its core. Around agreed research

projects, the clustering of policy discussion, knowledge-exchange,

progressive new ideas and value-adding presumably falls into place. In

the absence of the creation of new knowledge through research

initiatives, an institute is presumably positioned further from the cutting-

edge, and networking becomes an activity undertaken for its own sake,

rather than a natural adjunct to learning, debate, and the introduction of

new policy ideas.

The ‘Public Interest’ as driver

The culture and activities of an institute will arise and define themselves

over time from the perspectives and needs of members. But basic

understanding of the nature of infrastructure-related activities seems to

suggest that a new institute could gain greatest traction if ‘the public

interest’ were adopted as a shared intellectual driver. Recognition of

public interest perspectives and issues would seem to be of primary

importance to GOI and academic stakeholders or NGOs particularly, but

it also seems to connect with a more enlightened audience and

discussion among private sector partners – who will presumably

recognise that infrastructure investment flows more predictably when

the public interest is addressed. It appears worth tabling this perspective

in any case at this stage – with the expectation that potential

stakeholders will frame their response through formal submissions and

participation in upcoming workshops.

On the inherent & demonstrable need for an infrastructure institute

The feasibility study represented in this document, at an early stage, is

fundamentally engaged with a question of whether a new infrastructure

institute is needed in Indonesia. Relatedly - if an institute is indeed

needed, then what are its presumed benefits...? Further input will be

taken from industry and government actors. But at this stage, we suggest

that a new institute is needed at face value for the following reasons: a

demand for acceleration of infrastructure delivery among GOI and other

stakeholders (see World Bank 2012); the need for a platform of

enhanced trust and policy awareness to sustain such an acceleration (see

Parakesit et al 2012); and the question of quality outcomes in

infrastructure design, specification, procurement and performance (see

Bakker 2007) – for which sustained sectoral skill-enhancement and

capability development appears to be the prime and logical answer.

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13. Short Bibliography

Documents

Bakker (2007) Trickle Down? Private sector participation and the pro-

poor water supply debate in Jakarta, Indonesia. Geoforum 38

Parikesit, Black, Lea and Strang (2012) Towards a Refocused

Indonesian National Delivery Process for Infrastructure: a concept for

a Centre of Evidence-based policy analysis of infrastructure and PPP.

GREAT initiative

World Bank, Indonesia Office (2012) FY 2013-2015 Country

Partnership Strategy for Indonesia. The World Bank, Indonesia Office

Websites

American Planning Association

www.planning.org

Centre for Transportation Research – University of Stuttgart

http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/fovus

Co-operative Research Centres home page (Australian Government)

www.crc.gov.au

CRC for Water Sensitive Cities

www.watersensitivecities.org.au

Embarq

www.embarq.org

Engineers Australia

www.engineersaustralia.org.au

GAMUT (University of Melbourne)

www.abp.unimelb.edu.au/gamut

Hong Kong MTR Corporation

www.mtr.com.hk

Infrastructure Australia

www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au

Infrastructure Investments Unit (Scotland)

www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Finance/18232

Infrastructure Partnerships Australia

www.infrastructure.org.au

Infrastructure UK

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/infrastructure-uk

Institution of Civil Engineers

www.ice.org.uk

Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

www.lincolninst.edu

Ontario Infrastructure

www.infrastructureontario.ca

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Planning Institute of Australia

www.planning.org.au

Property Council of Australia

www.propertyoz.com.au

Public-Private Partnership Center (Phillippines)

www.ppp.gov.ph

SMART (at University of Wollongong)

www.smart.uow.edu.au

Transbay Joint Powers Authority

www.transbaycenter.org/tjpa

University of California at Berkeley – City and Regional Planning

www.ced.berkeley.edu/academics/city-regional-planning

Urban Land Institute

www.uli.org

Urban Taskforce

www.urbantaskforce.com.au

Victorian Government – PPPs at Department of Treasury & Finance

www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Public-private-partnerships