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Ballistic Missile Defense: Overview and Implications for

Naval Planners Naval War College

Non-Resident Seminar: Joint Maritime Operations 30-31 Jan 2012

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THIS PRESENTATION IS

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Please Keep the Discussion At That Level

All Material is drawn from public/open sources Program Information is Drawn From MDA’s Public Website (www.mda.mil)

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OVERVIEW •! Ballistic Missile Basics •! Essential Lexicon •! Threat

•! BMD Fundamentals •! History/Background •! Doctrine & “Three Pillars” •! BMD Phases of Intercept •! BMD Elements

•! BMD Planning and Execution •! BMDR •! Homeland Defense and PAA •! BMD Planning Lexicon •! BMD Ops in the Joint/Maritime

Environment Break •! Discussion

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Part I Ballistic Missile Basics

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Essential Ballistic Missile Lexicon

Ballistic Missile Class Max. Range (km)

Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM <1000

Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRBM 1,000 – 3,000

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 3,000 – 5,500

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM >5,500

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Varies

Relevant International Conventions

MTCR (Multi-lateral)

START Treaty (Bi-lateral; US-RU)

INF Treaty (Bi-lateral; US-RU)

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Ballistic Missile Composition

Warhead/RV

Tankage: Oxidizer & Propellant

Airframe

Guidance

SIMPLE DESIGN: SCUD variant

Motor

COMPLEX DESIGNS:

MIRV

PBV

MaRV

Multiple Stages with Separating Warhead

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Ballistic Missiles: Propellant Types

Solid Propellant Liquid Propellant •! Basically – combustion chamber tubes

packed with a propellant that contains both fuel and oxidizer blended together uniformly. For example Shuttle SRBs:

•! Oxidizer -- ammonium perchlorate (69.93%)

•! Fuel – Powdered aluminum (16%)

•! Catalyzer -- Iron oxidizer powder (0.07%)

•! Remainder is an epoxy binder that also burns

•! Shape of chamber controls burn via exposed propellant surface

•! Advantages: Stable, storable; simple – enables mobility;

•! Disadvantages: Low tolerance for error in manufacture, cannot shut down & restart

Propellant = Fuel + Oxidizer which produces Thrust

•! Combines separately stored liquid chemicals, a fuel and an oxidizer, to produce thrust.

•! May be either cryogenic or hypergolic:

•! Cryogenic Propellant : very cold, liquefied gases as fuel and oxidizer; Typical uses: SLV

•! Hypergolic Propellant: fuel and oxidizer ignite on contact with each other. No spark is needed.

•! SCUD B/Shahab/No Dong: Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) (oxidizer) + Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)(fuel)

•! Advantages: highest energy per unit of fuel mass, variable thrust, and a restart capability

•! Disadvantages: Complex storage/plumbing; Precise injection metering; High capacity pumps; Limited mobility and long term storage; HIGHLY TOXIC (hypergolics)

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Ballistic Missiles: Basing Mode - Fixed

Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile bases

•!Silo: Hardened, underground shelter for security and protection from elements

•!Not immune to attack, difficult for liquid propellant missiles for long term storage

•!Elevate to Launch: Semi-buried, better access to service missile, useful when terrain does not permit deeply buried facilities

•!More vulnerable to attack

•!Roll-out to Launch: Missiles stored in hard/deeply buried facility, rolled out to pre-surveyed launch pad for launch

•!Missiles vulnerable until launch or returned to facility; gives away intentions (aids opponent I&W) and may lead to preemptive strike.

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Ballistic Missiles: Basing Mode - Mobile

Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile bases

•! Rail: Permits dispersal across broad area; organic support; deployment of “heavy” missiles

•! Unique identifiers of train set, maintenance shelters a weak point, costly infrastructure to build/maintain

•! TEL/MEL: Most mobile of land-based modes, self-sufficient for solid propellant missiles; easier for CCDD

•! Limitations on size/weight of missile and supporting road infrastructure/terrain

•! SHIP-BASED: Asymmetric threat concept but on the margins

•! Vessel size/stability vs. sea state directly impacts ability to successfully elevate, service, launch missile

•! SLBM: Most survivable, assured 2nd strike. Employed by US, Russia, with China and India in development

•! Very expensive to develop, build and operate

•! ALBM: Allows launch closer to threat territory decreasing flight and warning times

•! Limited by carrier aircraft size

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Ballistic Missiles Defined

•! Guided only during boost phase of flight

•! Once powered flight is complete, only gravity affects remainder of trajectory •! Plus a little drag on reentry

•! “Guided” has historically implied a relatively gentle means of controlling the state vector at thrust termination (Vbo) •! To a static target

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Ballistic Missiles Defined: Reality

In reality, ballistic missiles are not “ballistic” . . . there are many ways to change trajectory during and after boost

•! Endo-atmospheric maneuvers

•! Maneuvers in the atmosphere using aerodynamic surfaces on the booster or RV

•! Used during boost, after boost or both

•! Exo-atmospheric maneuvers

•! Maneuvers outside the atmosphere using small liquid propellant thrusters or solid propellant motors

•! Used after boost

•! Generalized energy management system maneuvers

•! Used on boosters that allow all stages to burn to depletion (i.e., solid fuel); missile pitches and yaws during boost phase to waste energy to control range

•! Can result in a much less “gentle” guidance during boost phase

Complicates Missile Warning And BMD Missions

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Endo-Atmospheric Maneuvers

Booster Mounted •!Uses aerodynamic surfaces for lift •! Takes advantage of atmosphere and missile’s velocity to

“fly” further down range •!Can increase range by 100s of km over “basic” ballistic

missile

RV Mounted (MaRV) •! Ballistic missile performance and accuracy decrease as

ranges >500 km if payload remains attached to booster •!Booster needs to be strengthened for re-entry •!Easier to separate payload after boost •! To make a MaRV, add moveable fins to separating

payload •!Then maneuver in atmosphere during re-entry to: Avoid

defenses; aero range extensions; add terminal guidance maneuvers

•! All at large ranges

MaRV

Booster

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Boost-Phase Maneuvering Generalized Energy Management Steering (GEMS) •! Many solid propellant missiles don’t shut down

to control range, instead their motors burn to depletion

•! Since thrust is constant, boosters pitch/yaw during powered flight to “waste” energy as required to make planned range. •! Examples: Trident I C4 SLBM and THAAD

•! May be as simple as corkscrews or more complex maneuvers

This is an example of GEMS (THAAD launch)

…and this is not (failed BULAVA SLBM launch)

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Exo-Atmospheric Maneuvers

Post-Boost Vehicles (PBVs)

•!Use a small (typically restartable liquid propellant) upper stage motor

•!Deploy MIRVs from a single booster

•!Targets may be 100s of kms apart

•!Deploy BMD countermeasures

•!Correct boost phase errors during mid-course flight

Inflatable decoy for Minuteman III

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Ballistic Missile Threat •! Ballistic missile threat will continue to

proliferate and grow in capacity and capability

•! Increasingly seen as both an asymmetric threat and economical log-range/deep strike alternative to manned aircraft

•! Threat countries are pursuing WMD warheads despite international sanctions and counter-proliferation efforts

•! Future systems will incorporate active and passive countermeasures and a reduced logistical footprint

•! Mobility and underground facilities will protect deployed missiles

•! Growing mobile force using deception and denial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures which complicate I&W and counter-targeting

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Worldwide Ballistic Missile Proliferation: 1990

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Worldwide Ballistic Missile Proliferation: 2009

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Ballistic Missile Threat: North Korea

•!Nation “of the greatest concern” according to 2010 BMDR

•!Nuclear ambitions + long-range missiles

•!Nuclear tests Oct 2006 and May 2009

•!Three attempted space launches, none successful

•!1998, 2006, 2009

•!2006: Simultaneous with 6 x SRBM & MRBM launches

•!2009: Closest to success; demonstrated potential ICBM capabilities in 3-stage variant to reach CONUS

•! Mobile IRBM under development and may be operational

•!Extensive hardened/deeply buried supporting infrastructure and garrisons complicate I&W

•!“Serial proliferator” of nuclear and ballistic missile technology and whole systems Toksa SCUD

B/C No Dong Musudan Musudan

ER Taepo Dong 2

120- 140 km

300- 500 km

1300 km 3000 – 4000 km (est) 15000 km (3-stage)

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Ballistic Missile Threat: Iran

•!Active indigenous program 2nd only to China in size/scope; nuclear program strongly condemned in 2011 IAEA report

•! Majority of inventory – liquid propellant SRBMs

•!Mobile force supported by growing hardened/deeply buried infrastructure

•!Aggressive solid propellant effort

•!Fateh-110 SRBM and Ashura MRBM

•! Two ASBM development programs

•!Recently demonstrated as part of naval exercise

•! Safir SLV – 2 successful on-orbit deliveries in three attempts

•!Knowledge and technology developed would aid IR/ICBM program

•!“Serial proliferator” – to other state and non-state actors

Fateh-110 SCUD A/B/C

Shahab-3 Shahab-3

ER BM-25

Ashura/ Sejil

Safir (SLV)

200 km 300-

600 km 1300 km 2000 km 2500 km 2000 km

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Ballistic Missile Threat: China

•!Largest, most active and diverse ballistic missile program in the world

•!Ballistic missile force developed and deployed for range of missions from nuclear deterrence to conventional precision strike

•!Key part of A2/AD capabilities ICW large ASCM/LACM force

•!2010 BMDR notes an imbalance of forces across Taiwan Straits primarily because of numbers of SRBM/MRBM deployed

•!Est. 1,000 – 1200

•!ASBM in development or early deployment specifically to counter US CVBGs

•!Non-signatory to MTCR but verbal pledge to some provisions

Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM Coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of land and sea based missile systems, including advanced SAMs that China would likely employ in a Taiwan conflict.

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Ballistic Missile Threat: Other Notables

•! India: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons

•! Active, indigenous program to build/deploy a range of ballistic missiles

•! Ranges cover all of Pakistan and eventually all of China

•! Pakistan: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons

•! Not nearly as extensive as India – requires significant outside help

•! Focused primarily on India

•! Israel: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons (undeclared)

•! SRBM to IRBM (Jericho II/III)

•! Focused on Iran but able to range other regional threats

•! Syria: Ballistic missiles & WMD program

•! Primarily SRBM from Russia, North Korea and/or Iran

•! Reports of sharing weapons and training with Hezbollah

•! Russia: Treaty limited (INF) to weapons of 500km or less; party to MTCR which limits transfer of technology, materials, systems and knowledge

•! Broad hints and statements since 2002 over possibly breaking with INF Treaty

•! Extensive use of SRBMs in Georgian conflict (2008)

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Part II BMD Fundamentals

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BMD Timeline

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BMD Doctrine Guiding Pub: “Countering Air and Missile Threats” (JP 3-01, 5 Feb 2007)

BMD included under Counterair Mission: !! “The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, to counter the air and

missile threat by attaining and maintaining air superiority” (Chp 1)

!! Counterair mission consists of Offensive Counterair (OCA) and Defensive Counterair (DCA) missions.

!! Offensive Counterair: “The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”

!! As applied to BMD – Attack Operations to include “attacks on missile sites,…,command and control (and) infrastructure”

!! Defensive Counterair: “(A)ll defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace” Includes active and passive measures

!! As applied to BMD:

!! Active Defense: “…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW), sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.”

!! Passive Defense: “…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.”

Sometimes Referred To As “The Three Pillars of Missile Defense

UUNNDDEERR RREE--WWRRIITTEE

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BMD: Attack Operations

In Theory: Preferred method of countering missile threats by reducing level of threat defensive forces face; AO range throughout enemy territory, are conducted at initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority.

In Practice: Not very successful where ballistic missile forces are concerned:

•! Operation CROSSBOW (Dec 43 – Jun 44): Allied bombing campaign against V-1 and V-2

•! >25,000 sorties with > 36,000 tons of bombs dropped against production and support facilities including fixed launch pads

•! Net result – V-1 strikes continued and V-2 strikes began against London summer ’44

•! Operation DESERT STORM (1992): Dedicated A-10 & SOF assigned to seek/destroy SCUD MEL/TEL

•! 1/3 of the 2,000 daily sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting

•! Net result – SOF team captured, 0 MEL/TEL struck, launches continued against Israel and single largest US casualty event of DS was via SCUD strike

Major challenges to AO: ROE and real-time, actionable intelligence.

“…to prevent the launch of enemy . . . missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”

Peenemunde V-2 test site

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BMD: Passive Defense

•!Passive BMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection and targeting of friendly assets and thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack.

•!Passive measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.

•!Treaties and export control regimes may also be considered a form of passive defense

“…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly forces and assets.”

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BMD: Active Defense

•!Active BMD includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.

•! Missile defense is defined as “defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.”

•! Integration of systems enables defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success.

•!AMD assets normally provide overlapping coverage, however, not all anti-air DCA assets have organic capability against BM; likewise, not all anti-BM DCA have anti-air and CM defense capabilities.

•!Offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations use many of the same sensors, weapons, and command and control systems.

“…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly forces and assets.”

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BMD: Intercept Phases

Boost Phase

Mid-Course Phase

Terminal Phase

Vbo

Apogee

((ttiimmeess ffoorr IICCBBMM fflliigghhtt (( >>1100,,000000 kkmm ffrroomm llaauunncchh ssiittee))

Launch to Vbo (180-320 sec) Launch to Apogee (< 1,000 sec) Launch to Impact (~2,000 sec)

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BMD By Flight Phase: Boost

•!In theory – most vulnerable part of flight

•!Missile thrusting to gain acceleration

•!Highly visible exhaust plume aids detection/tracking

•!3-5 minutes travel in Earth’s Atmosphere

•! Damage to aerodynamic surfaces or airframe breach may induce fatal aerodynamic loads

•! Challenges

•!Compressed launch notification to intercept timeline/sensor challenges

•!BMOA may be geographically too far to successfully complete endo-atmospheric intercept

•!Countermeasures (hardening, counter-intercept platform defenses, GSM, TTP)

All Active Boost Phase Intercept Programs are Proof of Concept Only

Note: As of Dec 2011, ALTB to be mothballed

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BMD By Flight Phase: Ascent

Boost Phase + Ascent Phase = “Early Intercept”

ASCENT PHASE: begins right after the missile’s powered flight and ends just prior to apogee. Benefits include: •! Earlier intercept in the battle space •!Optimizes a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic to defeat threat

before countermeasure deployment •! Enables debris mitigation •! Reduces number of interceptors required to defeat a raid

of threat missiles •! Reduces loading on remainder of BMDS architecture by

not eliminating need to track and kill a threat reentry vehicle and associated objects, •! Reduces costs of maintaining significant number of

expensive interceptors to destroy advanced countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missile’s flight

•! Places a premium on early launch detection and tracking, emphasis on launch/engage on remote and need for longer-range interceptors •! Mostly PPT and paper CONOPS – if funded, capability

won’t be fielded until late this decade/early 2020’s •! Significant technical, engineering, C2 and fiscal challenges

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BMD By Flight Phase: Midcourse

•!Offers longest decision space over course of flight – up to 20 to 30 min for ICBMs

•!Missile coasting to apogee

•!Exoatmospheric intercept

•!Debris mitigation for WMD

•!Challenges

•!Detection/tracking:

•!Non-thrusting cold body presents IR detection/tracking challenges;

•!Radar affected by horizon and position relative to flight path

•!Discrimination: warhead(s) obscured by debris cloud and/or deployed PENAIDS

•!PBV maneuvering, MiRV

•!Salvage fusing effects

•!Nuclear weapons effects from an offensive warhead fuzed to detonate when attacked

Majority Of Current BMD Effort Focused In This Area

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BMD By Flight Phase: Terminal

•!Missile re-enters atmosphere

•!Atmosphere acts as a screen to strip away debris cloud/PENAIDS

•!Challenges:

•!RV free-falling at extremely high speeds (+22,500 KPH for ICBM RVs)

•!High-g maneuvering by MaRVs

•!Limited engagement space owing to speeds, fuzing and warhead altitude detonation or dispersion of submunitions

•!Lower tier engagements must deal with debris mitigation from upper tier intercepts

Most Demanding Environment On BMD Systems And Supporting C2 And C4I Infrastructures

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BMDS: System of Sensors and Shooters

The Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, “layered” architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. The system’s architecture includes: •! Networked sensors and ground-

and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking;

•! Ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct collision, called “hit-to-kill” technology, or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead;

•! A Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications Network providing the warfighter with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles.

The BMDS Is Designed To Counter Ballistic Missiles Of All Ranges

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Ground-Based: Midcourse Defense

•! GMD: “Engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in the midcourse battle space to protect the United States”

•! Elements:

•! Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): Three-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle)

•! Ground Systems: Includes redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a complex communications network for planning, directing and controlling GMD element

•! Current Configuration:

•! GBIs: emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A total of 30 interceptors were deployed at the end of 2010.

•! Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking and threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-in-control interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska (49th MD Battalion) and Colorado Springs, Colorado (100th MDBE)

•! GND C2 via GMD communications network, a secure data and voice communications system using both SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul communications.

Cue & track

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Ground-Based: Terminal Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a globally transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight.

•! Land-based, capable of shooting down a ballistic missile inside and just outside the atmosphere w/hit-to-kill technology.

•! Procurement: First two Batteries fielded at Fort Bliss, TX. Total hardware for Battery #1 & #2 include:

•! 6 Launchers, 2 Fire Control & Communications components, 2 AN/TPY-2 Radars, and 48 Interceptors. Delivery of first production interceptors began in March 2011. Batteries 3 and 4 on contract March 2011 with delivery and fielding to start in 2013.

•! Dec 2011: Agreement to sell battery to UAE

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): Operational and fielded by the U.S. Army.

•! Procurement: The Army is responsible for production and further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains responsible for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and PAC-3 interoperability and integration efforts.

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Sea-Based BMD: Aegis BMD

•! Aegis BMD: Describes the entire program of sea-based BMD but primarily focused on the mid-course intercept of SRBMs, MRBMs some IRBMs and in latter versions, a limited capability against certain ICBMs

•! Modifications and upgrades to the Aegis Weapons System (sensors, hardware and software – currently ver. 3.6.1) and the SM-3 BLK 1A interceptor.

•! 24 Deployed/forward-based CG/DDGs currently configured (includes one developmental ship, USS LAKE ERIE)

•! Missions:

•! Aegis LRS&T: Forward deployed Long Range Surveillance & Tracking support to GMD for Homeland Defense

•! Aegis BMD: Exo-atmospheric, mid-course intercept and endo-atmospheric, terminal intercept

•! First Aegis BMD Patrol (EUCOM AOR): 2011

•! Aegis Ashore: Shore-based program to support PAA derived from the Aegis BMD ship-based program, using the SM-3 BLK IIA and a land-based only version for long-range intercept of ICBMs.

FY 11

FY 12

FY 13

FY 14

FY 15

FY 16

FY 17

FY 18

FY 19

FY 20

BMD-cap. Ships 23 28 32 36 38 41 42 43 43 43

SM-3 Inventory 111 129 155 201 263

+TBD 341

+TBD 428

+TBD 500

+TBD 513 515

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Sea-Based BMD: Ship Mods

NFIC-CA has critical role in IAMD (cruise- and TBM) mission

The caveat: These plans all depend on outcome of major program cuts and revisions DoD-wide

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Sea-Based BMD: SBT Sea-based Terminal: Provides a sea-based, endo-atmospheric intercept capability for a limited threat set. •!Initially comprised of 72 modified SM-2 Blk IV deployed on BMD configured ships with the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 system.

•!Blast frag warhead, not HTK

•!Increasingly capable versions of SBT will be fielded beginning with Increment I SBT (IOC 2014) which uses the SM-6 with BMD 5.0 and Increment II SBT (IOC 2018) which will debut with BMD 5.1

SBT: Sea-Based Terminal Kill vs. SRBMs

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Part III BMD Planning and

Execution

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Navy BMD Pedigree

October 2007: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

National guidance and policy:

DOD/JCS guidance:

Navy guidance:

22 July 1999: National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38)

16 Dec 2002: NSPD-23 - National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense

March 2006: NSS – “Field BMD to protect US from rogue states”

17 Sept 2009: “Field more of most capable theater MD systems to protect our forces and those of allies.”

June 2008: NDS – “Missile defenses can defend against attack should deterrence fail”

MDA CHARTER

January 2002 – MDA Charter

15 March 2007 – Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) Established

15 Dec 2008 – NAVY BOD Membership Memo

Navy

Strategic Guidance

PR-11

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Naval Operating Concept

(NOC)

Guide/Influence

Sept 2009: CNO Guidance 2010 – “Issue NOC that links CS21 to operations and force structure with guidance from QDR 10 and BMDR 10”

Fleet TACPRO

TACMEMOs

“…preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”

•! Deterrence •! Sea Control •! Power Projection •! Forward Presence •! HA/DR •! Maritime Security

CS-21 Core

Capabilities

Guide/Influence

•! Limit Regional Conflict •! Deter major Power War •! Win our nation’s Wars •! Homeland defense •! Cooperative Relationships •! Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions

CS-21

Strategic Imperatives

DIRECTS

2010 2012

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The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR)

The BMDR - Congressionally mandated and guided by Presidential directive, released in Feb 2010 for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive review of US BMD policies, strategies, plans and programs.

Established Policy Priorities:

1.!U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

2.! U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to US forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.

3.!Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.

4.!The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.

5.! US BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.

6.!US will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.

“This review. . . will result in an enhanced defense of the United States and its forces, allies, and partners from the danger of ballistic missiles wherever and whenever they threaten us.”

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Defense of the Homeland “The United States will…”

•!Maintain readiness…develop capabilities at Fort Greely, AK (FGA) and Vandenberg AFB, CA (VAFB)

•!Complete the 2nd field of 14 silos at FGA as a hedge

•!Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the US from Iran or elsewhere in Middle East

•! Invest in further development of the SM-3 for future land-based use as ICBM threat matures

•! Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept kill systems to defeat countermeasures

•!Pursue new enhancements…and other hedging strategies including continued development of a two-staged ground-based interceptor

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Phased Adaptive Approach

“A key objective (for regional defense) is to leverage recent successes in regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low risk.”

•!Near-term capabilities •! Increase procurement of proven systems (SM-3,

THAAD, An/TPY-2) •! Improve already developed technology

•! “Aegis Ashore” – 2015 epoch: land-based Aegis BMD weapons system including land-based SM-3 variant •! SM-3 BLK IB, BLK IIA, BLK IIB/NGAM

•!Develop/deploy enhanced C2BMC •! Long-term Capabilities

•!Develop SM-3 BLK IIA/IIB with higher Vbo and divert, providing greater regional coverage

•! BLK IIB will have some early-intercept capability against long-range missiles

•! “Engage on remote” – enables interceptor engageability at greater ranges using off-board sensors •! Develop persistent overhead sensors to detect/ track

large raid sizes over entire trajectories from space

“Ballistic missile defenses help support U.S. security commitments to allies and partners. They provide reassurance that the United States will stand by those commitments despite the growth in the

military potential of regional adversaries.”

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PAA Implemented: Europe

Sep 2009 decision followed SECDEF/JCS recommendation to revise Sept 2007 deployment plan

•! Phase 1 (2011): Existing missile defense systems deployed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

•! Protection of portions of southern Europe with sea-based BMD supported by new TPY-2 site in Turkey

•! Phase 2 (2015): Fielding enhanced capabilities -- SM-3 Block IB and additional sensors.

•! Phase 2 will include land-based SM-3s in southern Europe expanding coverage to additional NATO allies.

•! Phase 3 (2018): Coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats improved with 2nd land-based SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, and deployment of SM-3 BLK IIA

•! Extends coverage to all NATO allies in Europe.

•! Phase 4 (2020): adds capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United States.

•! Deploys SM-3 BLK IIB/NGAM will be available.

2009 CONCEPT

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BMD: International Participation

Per the BMDR, international cooperation is focused on: •!Development and deployment of joint and/or

complementary capabilities •!Technological and industrial cooperation Current Initiatives: •! Europe: implement PAA in a NATO context •! East Asia and Middle East: strengthen

cooperative relationships in bilateral frameworks •! Arrow development program w/Israel •! THAAD sale to UAE

•! Renew cooperation with Russia •! Conduct a substantive and sustained

dialogue with China

“The U.S. is committed to working intensively with allies and partners…”

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BMD Planning Lexicon •!Defended Area (DA): Defended area is the portion of the territory protected against long-range missile

attacks;

•!Critical Asset List (CAL): A list compiled by the JFC w/input from components of assets requiring theater level protection

•!Organized by phase of operations and prioritized

•!Defended Asset List (DAL): a list of those assets on the CAL that receive theater level asset protection.

•!Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active air defense or appropriate passive measures if that is all that is available.

•!Launch Area Denied (LAD): Refers to the collection of threat countries from which the DA is protected;

•!Probability of Engagement Success (Pes): The probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed, derived from the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill;

•!Raid size breakpoint: The maximum number of warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single engagement. This metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.

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BMD Planning Lexicon Point Defense (PAC 3)

Area Defense (Aegis BMD/THAAD)

Launch Area Denied

Critical Asset List

DEFENDED AREA

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BMD & Joint Doctrine for C2 Architecture

•!The JFACC / Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is the supported commander for Counter-Air operations to include BMD – The JFMCC has a supporting role (JP 3-01)

•!In mature theaters, the JFC will normally designate the JFACC as the AADC and Airspace Control Authority (JP 3-01)

•!Decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the CDR. (JP 1)

•!BMD engagement timelines may dictate that engagement authority be held by the ship’s CO for optimal employment of BMD-capable ships

•!Strategic considerations may drive engagement authority to be held at the highest level in some situations (JP 1)

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Navy C2 Architecture Planning Factors

Multi-mission Ships Are Most Effectively Controlled By Maritime Commander

•! JFMCC is the persistent maritime IAMD planning and execution command echelon

•! IAMD ships are multi-mission platforms that are most effectively controlled by a Maritime Commander

•!A Maritime Commander will retain OPCON / TACON of multi-mission ships

•! Provides most effective asset management for AADC

•! Maximizes warfighting capacity and capability across all component commanders

•! Optimizes logistics support

•! Ensures asset protection and safety of navigation

•!When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC for optimum employment of multi-mission ships

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Integrated Air & Missile Defense C2

JFC / JTF

JFACC AADC

CTF IAMD

DAADC

AAMDC

Land-based Sensors and Shooters

CRC RADC

Airborne Sensors and Shooters

Maritime Sensors and Shooters

RADC RADC ADAFCO

JFLCC TAAMDCOORD

JFMCC

Supporting

OPCON / TACON

Lines of Coordination

Engagement Authority

•! JFMCC is a supporting commander to JFACC/AADC for IAMD •!Navy retains OPCON and TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships •!When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC for

optimum employment of multi-mission ships

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IAMD C2 Vision: The Reality

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TF Integrated Air & Missile Defense

CTF IAMD is JFMCC’s Tactical Execution Agent for IAMD

•!JFMCC conducts operations at the Operational level from the Maritime Operations Center (MOC)

•!Commander, Task Force Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TF IAMD) is the JFMCC’s tactical execution agent for the air and missile defense mission

•!CTF IAMD may serve as the RADC for the maritime BMD fight

•!In most cases, CTF IAMD would reside at the MOC where the supporting integrated planning and C2 resides

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What This Means For The Joint Community

•!Joint Force Commanders have a consistent path to maritime IAMD capability in every theater

•!Optimized maritime contribution to theater-level plans and operations

•!Supports JP 3-01 for IAMD C2

•!Identifies maritime node to support JFACC / AADC development and execution of the Area Air Defense Plan

•!CTF IAMD plans for maritime IAMD

•!CTF IAMD, when designated as RADC plan, coordinate, and execute engagements

The Path to Maritime IAMD Capability is Through the JFMCC

Joint Force Commander

Theater IAMD C2 Elements

ACC MCC LCC

NORTHCOM 1st AF USFF

263rd

AAMDC

SOUTHCOM 12th AF C4F N/A

EUCOM 3rd AF C6F 357th

AMDD

CENTCOM 9th AF C5F 32nd AAMDC

PACOM 13th AF C7F 94th AAMDC

USFK 7th AF C7F 94th AAMDC

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BMD Challenges Countermeasures •!PENAIDS: Chaff, decoys •!Terminal maneuvers •!Multiple warheads/HGV •!Salvage fuzing

Debris •!Upper stages, separation debris,

“chuffing,” other intercepts Adversary TTP •!Attack BMD system •!Trajectory shaping/depressed trajectories •!Raids •!Mass launches/Timed arrival Positional •!Location of sensors/shooters relative to

BMOA Geo-political •!Host-nation concerns/issues

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BREAK

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Discussion

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Backups

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BMD: Tracking and Cueing

(Earth center)

Full Covariance: Space track report transmitted by a BMD platform:

Vx

Vy

Vz

Position: X-Y-Z Cartesian coordinate system w/origin @ Earth center

Velocity: Along X, Y & Z axes. Predicts future BM position.

Area Of Uncertainty (AOU)

Aegis Track Covariance

Full covariance provides a more reliable AOU around the current and future positions of the space track, enabling construction of a search pattern that efficiently utilizes sensor resources by limiting the search only to the most probable area of the sky