The top documents tagged [truthful mechanisms]

On Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Online Scheduling V. Auletta, R. De Prisco, P.P. and G. Persiano Università di Salerno
Documents On Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Online Scheduling V. Auletta, R. De Prisco, P.P. and G. Persiano Università di Salerno

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Private capacities in mechanism design Vincenzo Auletta Paolo Penna Giuseppe Persiano Università di Salerno, Italy
Documents Private capacities in mechanism design Vincenzo Auletta Paolo Penna Giuseppe Persiano Università di Salerno, Italy

215 views

Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Based on joint works with Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira
Documents Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Based on joint works with Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira

216 views

Multiagent Systems1 Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions Daniel Lehman, Liadan Ita OCallaghan and Yoav Shoham @ Journal of
Documents Multiagent Systems1 Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions Daniel Lehman, Liadan Ita OCallaghan and Yoav Shoham @ Journal of

213 views

Real-Time Competitive Environments: Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks Anwar Mohammadi, Nathan Fisher, and Daniel
Documents Real-Time Competitive Environments: Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks Anwar Mohammadi, Nathan Fisher, and Daniel

214 views

Eric Shou Stat/CSE 598B. What is Game Theory? Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is often used in the context of economics. Studies strategic
Documents Eric Shou Stat/CSE 598B. What is Game Theory? Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is often used in the context of economics. Studies strategic

217 views

Mechanisms with Verification Carmine Ventre Teesside University
Documents Mechanisms with Verification Carmine Ventre Teesside University

220 views

Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot Paolo Penna 1, Guido Proietti 2, Peter Widmayer 3 1 Università di Salerno 2 Università de l’Aquila
Documents Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot Paolo Penna 1, Guido Proietti 2, Peter Widmayer 3 1 Università di Salerno 2 Università de l’Aquila

216 views

Online Mechanism Design (Randomized Rounding on the Fly) Piotr Krysta, University of Liverpool, UK Berthold Vöcking, RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Documents Online Mechanism Design (Randomized Rounding on the Fly) Piotr Krysta, University of Liverpool, UK Berthold Vöcking, RWTH Aachen University, Germany

221 views

Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Joint work with Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira
Documents Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Joint work with Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira

217 views

A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling Jon Feldman S. Muthukrishnan Eddie Nikolova Martin P á l
Documents A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling Jon Feldman S. Muthukrishnan Eddie Nikolova Martin P á l

214 views

CRESCCO Project IST-2001-33135
Documents CRESCCO Project IST-2001-33135

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