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Motivating Contribution: 5 Theories and 35 Design Claims
Paul Resnick
Professor
University of Michigan
School of Information
Online communities face challenges typical of off-line groups
• Community start-up• Recruit, select and socialize members• Encourage commitment• Elicit contribution• Regulate behavior• Coordinate activity
But anonymity, weak ties, high turnover, & lack of institutionalization make challenges more daunting online
Evidence-based Social Design
• Mine the rich empirical and theoretical literatures in psychology and economics
• Develop design claims – Hypotheses about the effects of social design decisions
• Sometimes directly tested in the online context and sometimes only extensions of empirically tested theories developed in offline settings
Inspiration
Kurt Lewin
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory”
“If you want to understand something, try to change it”
Some Theories
• Latane’s Social Impact Theory• Social Proof• Goal Setting• Intrinsic Motivators• Collective Effort Model
The Roles of Theory and Evidence
• Identify Challenges• Generate Solution Ideas• Predict Consequences
Roles For Theory
• Identifying Challenges
Identifying Challenges
• Economics: Public Goods – Private provision underprovision
• Psychology: Social Loafing– In group contribution setting less individual effort
• Implications for online communities– Some valuable tasks won’t be done
• Support forums: Questions, answers, empathy• Recommender systems: Votes, opinions, comments• Facebook: Invites, accepts, wall posts, pictures • WoW guild: Time, skill development• OSS: Patches, code, translations, documentation• Wikipedia: New articles, facts, copy-editing, cash
– …unless you design for it
Wikipedia Stubs & Unassessed Articles• Many Wikipedia articles haven’t been assessed for
quality or importance• 58% of important ones are of low quality
Roles For Theory
• Identifying Challenges• Guide to Where to Look for Solution Opportunities
Collective Effort Model: Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
Adapted from Karau and Williams, 1993
Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
uniqueness
Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
uniqueness
commitment
Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
uniquenesscommitment
Performance-contingent rewards
Task-contingent rewards
Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
uniquenesscommitment
Performance-contingent rewards
Task-contingent rewards
Intrinsic Motivators
Guide to Opportunities
individual effort
individual performance
individual motivation
group performance
individual utility
uniquenesscommitment
Performance-contingent rewards
Task-contingent rewards
Intrinsic Motivators
Persuasive Messages
Collective Effort Model++
Roles For Theory
• Identifying Challenges• Guide to Where to Look for Solution Opportunities• Predicting Effects: Design Claims
Design Alternative X…
…Leads to Outcome Y…
…Under Conditions Z– E.g.,
• Coupling goals with specific deadlines leads to increases in contributions as the deadlines approach
• Group goals elicit contribution most among people who identify with the group
Design Levers
• Community structure• Content, tasks & activities• Selection, sorting & highlighting• External communication• Feedback & rewards• Roles, rules, policies and procedures• Access controls• Presentation and framing
Design Claims and Pattern Languages
• Design pattern: a formal way of documenting a solution to a design problem in a particular field of expertise.
• May or may not document the reasons why a problem exists and why the solution is a good one
• Captures the common solutions, but not necessarily the effective ones
Encouraging Contributions
ASK AND YE SHALL RECEIVE
Requests Focus Attention on Needed Contributions
• Make the list of needed contributions easily visible to increase the likelihood that the community will provide them
Email Request to Contribute to Movielens Quadruples Ratings
• In week after email reminder, contributions quadrupled, to ~ 20 ratings/person from ~5.4
SOME ASKS WORK BETTER THAN OTHERS
Ask When They Can Act• News site with a “Leave a
comment” form at the end of each article
• Fewer than 0.1% leave comments
• Experiment to estimate the value of explicit requests– No ask: “Leave a comment”
form at end of article– Immediate: Pop-up “Leave
a comment” when user opens article
– Delayed: Pop-up “Leave a comment” on closing article
Delayed
Immediate
No ask
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Comments by Type of Request
Number of comments
(Wash & Lampe, 2012)
Ask For Something Doable: Intelligent Task Routing (Cosley, 2007)
SuggestBotSuggestions
Suggestions Quadruple Editing Rates
Effective Requests
• DC1: Visible list of tasks• DC2: Tools for finding and tracking tasks• DC3: Matching to tasks that interest them
Latane's Social Impact Theory
• Power of persuasive attempt– increases with number (immediacy, importance) of people
asking• declining marginal rate
– decreases with number of people being asked• declining marginal rate
Chat Room Experiment
• “Can you tell me how to see someone’s profile”– 400 Chat rooms– DV=Time to response
• People are slower to respond when others are present
• Diffusion of responsibility is reduced when people are called by name
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Others present
Tim
e to
res
po
nd
(se
con
ds)
No name
0
10
20
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40
50
60
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Others present
Tim
e to
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con
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No name Name
Markey(2000)
Systematic vs. Heuristic Processing
• Systematic: decisions people care about– Gather evidence– Weigh pros and cons
• Heuristic: routine decisions– Superficial cues– Heuristics
Social Proof
• Others doing something signals that it's good/valuable
Effective Requests
• DC1: Visible list of tasks• DC2: Tools for finding and tracking tasks• DC3: Matching to tasks that interest them• DC4: specific people vs. broadcast• DC5: Simple requests for routine decisions• DC6: Explain benefits for important decisions• DC7 and 8: Fear campaigns higher importance,
systematic processing• DC9: requests from high status people• DC10 and 11: requests from people you like (similar,
attractive, familiar)• DC12: seeing that others complied
Goal Setting Theory• Goals motivate effort, perseverance & performance
– Trigger for both self-reward (e.g., self-efficacy) & external reward (e.g., money, reputation, promotion)
• Goals are more effective if– Specific & challenging rather than easy goals or vague ‘do your
best’– Immediate, with feedback– People commit selves to the goals – because of importance,
incentives, self-esteem, …– People envision the specific circumstance & method they will
use to achieve them
• Design claim: Providing members with specific and highly challenging goals, whether self-set or system-suggested, increases contribution.
Experiment in MovieLens
• Send email to ~900 MovieLens subscribers– Gave non-specific, do your best goal or specific, numerical
contribution goals
Goal Experiment Results
• Results– Specific, challenging goals increased contribution– Group assignment increased contributions
In-game Goals in WoW
• In WoW players receive extra powers each 10-levels implicit goal setting
• Ducheneaut, N., et al.(2007). The life and death of online gaming communities: A look at guilds in world of warcraft. in SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems. San Jose, California, USA.
Weekly minutes playing World of Warcraft, by level
Featured Status in Wikipedia as a Challenge
Wikipedia edits before and after reaching featured status
WikiProjects Use Collaborations of the Week (COTW) as Time-Delimited Goals
43
A COTW announcement in a project page
An example template identifying an article as a COTW
Get designated to good status in a defined period (e.g., a week or a month)
Goal doubles contribution
44
Pre-Collaboration Collaboration Post-Collaboration
Edits per person on the collaboration articles
Non self-identified members
Self-identified group members
Goal has much larger effect on group members
45
Pre-Collaboration Collaboration Post-Collaboration
Edits per person on the collaboration articles
Non self-identified members
Self-identified group members
Goal Setting Design Claims
• DC13: specific and highly challenging goals• DC14: deadlines• DC15: frequent feedback
Theories of Intrinsic Motivation
• Social contact• Challenge• Mastery• Competition• Autonomy• ...
Enhancing Intrinsic Motivation
• DC16: combine contribution with social contact• DC17: immersive experiences• DC18: performance feedback• DC19: systematic quant feedback verbal feedback
as well• DC20: performance feedback only works if perceived
as sincere• DC21: comparative performance feedback
– DC22: but may create game-like atmosphere
Extrinsic Rewards
• Reinforcements are rewards given after a behavior• Incentives are promises given before the behavior to
cause people to produce it– Reinforcement can lead to incentive if it’s predictable– But persistence of behavior is greatest if not predictable
• Form of rewards: – $– Points– Praise– Reputation– Privileges
Reinforcement: Barnstars
Enhancing Extrinsic Motivation
• DC23: rewards• DC24: task-contingent rewards for small-discrete tasks
motivate taking on the task, but not effort on them• DC25: rewards "gaming the system"/manipulation• DC26: non-performance-contingent rewards
manipulation• DC27: performance-contingent can prevent
manipulation• DC28: status and privileges less gaming than material
rewards• DC29: non-transparency less manipulation
Interfering with Intrinsic Motivation: Cameron et al 2001 • + external
reward enhances intrinsic motivation
• - external reward decreases intrinsic motivation
• Effect on feelings of control is key explanatory variable
Tradeoffs
• DC30: Task-contingent rewards, especially money, reduce intrinsic motivation
• DC31: Pay a lot or don't pay at all
Collective Effort Model++
Uniqueness & Benefits Experiment
• Email invitations to join a movie rating campaign• Uniqueness
– Unique: We are contacting you because as someone with fairly unusual tastes, …, your contributions are especially valuable
– Non-unique: "We are contacting you because as someone with fairly typical tastes, ……, your contributions are especially valuable
• Which will lead to more contributions?
Emphasizing Uniqueness Increased Number of Ratings
• H1: Unique condition rated 18% more movies than non-unique condition (means = 20.92 vs. 17.65, p<.05).
• Unique condition rated 40% more rarely-rated movies than those in non-unique condition (means = 1.82 vs. 1.30,
p<.05). 16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Non-unique
Unique
#Rat
ings
Expectancy-Value of Group Outcomes
• DC32: Commitment to the group• DC33: Small rather than large group• DC34: Unique contributions to make• DC35: See others' complementary contributions
REVIEW
The Roles of Theory and Evidence
• Identify Challenges• Generate Solution Ideas• Predict Consequences
Theories
• Latane’s Social Impact Theory• Social Proof• Goal Setting• Intrinsic Motivators• Collective Effort Model
Design Levers
• Community structure• Content, tasks & activities• Selection, sorting & highlighting• External communication• Feedback & rewards• Roles, rules, policies and procedures• Access controls• Presentation and framing
Other Challenges
• Newcomer Recruitment and Socialization• Enhancing Commitment• Regulating Behavior• Community Startup