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biosecurity built on science
Better plant biosecurity risk management through collaborative planning and shared decision making
Suzy Perry and Rebecca LawsPrincipal Scientist and Research ScientistPlant Biosecurity, Biosecurity Queensland
Plant Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre
PBCRC 4115
biosecurity built on science
For more information, please email [email protected] or [email protected]
Suzy Perry (DAF)^ Rebecca Laws (DAF)@
Mike Ashton (DAF)*
Kim Ritman (DAWR)*
Rodney Turner (PHA)*
Craig Jennings (DAF)Jim Pekin (ABGC)*
Michelle McKinlay (ABGC)*
Andrew Bishop (DPIPWE)*
PBCRC4115 Project teamDarren Phillips (DPIPWE)Lois Ransom (DAWR)*
Rebecca Sapuppo (DAF)Ceri Pearce(DAF) John McDonald (NGIA)*
Fiona Macbeth*
(Blackwoodkemp) David Teulon (PFRNZ)*
Garry Hill (PFRNZ)
Ken Pegg (DAF)Lindy Coates (DAF) Cathy Robinson (CSIRO)Wendy Coombs (DEDJTR)Gabrielle Vivian-Smith (DEDJTR) *# ^Project leader@Postdoctoral research scientist*Project mentor network#Project end-user advocate
biosecurity built on science
Biosecurity planning and decision making:- Is inherently complex- Is often contentious- Is affected by competing priorities- Involves unknowns and uncertainty - Involves consideration of a large amount of diverse information- Needs to be adaptable to rapidly changing situations- Is subject to considerable time pressure
Required by international standards to be 'science-based’ and informed by risk analysis
Inevitably also influenced by other factors such as political or social pressures; or operational or legal constraints
Biosecurity decision making is complex
biosecurity built on science
A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager
Dr Kim Ritman (ACPPO) and Mike Ashton (CPHM, Qld) at the Panama disease TR4 emergency response Local Control Centre (LCC) (April 2015)
biosecurity built on science
A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager
Prevention Preparedness
Diagnostics
Ongoing management
Market access
Surveillance
Response
Control & containment
biosecurity built on science
A day in the life of a Chief Plant Health Manager
Prevention Preparedness
Diagnostics
Ongoing management
Market access
Surveillance
Response
Control & containment
Planning and decision makingPlanning and decision making
biosecurity built on science
analyse large amounts of diverse scientific, technical and practical information and account for information gaps and unknowns
deal with high levels of uncertainty, competing priorities, and potentially conflicting interests amongst stakeholders
take an iterative approach to adapt and respond to a dynamic and often rapidly changing situation
ensure that plans and decisions can be implemented from a policy, operational, logistical, legal and social perspective
ensure plans align with relevant legal requirements, national and international obligations, policies, standards etc.
develop and implement the plans and decisions under considerable time pressure and within significant resource constraints
ensure that plans are comprehensively, recorded, documented and reviewed
Plant biosecurity decision makers must be able to:
biosecurity built on science
analyse large amounts of diverse scientific, technical and practical information and account for information gaps and unknowns
deal with high levels of uncertainty, competing priorities, and potentially conflicting interests amongst stakeholders
take an iterative approach to adapt and respond to a dynamic and often rapidly changing situation
ensure that plans and decisions can be implemented from a policy, operational, logistical, legal and social perspective
ensure plans align with relevant legal requirements, national and international obligations, policies, standards etc.
develop and implement the plans and decisions under considerable time pressure and within significant resource constraints
ensure that plans are comprehensively, recorded, documented and reviewed
Plant biosecurity decision makers must be able to:
There is rarely an ‘ideal’ plan or decision option, so decision
makers must be able to analyse and evaluate all of the risk
management options; and often have to then make trade-offs in
determining the most appropriate course of action.
biosecurity built on science
An integrated planning and decision making system for plant biosecurity risk management
biosecurity built on science
Panama disease is one of the most destructive plant diseases ever recorded
In Australia, Panama disease TR4 was first detected in the NT in 1997, and then in north Qld in 2015
No effective disease control measures No immediate replacements for Cavendish Affects all commercial cultivars of banana
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
biosecurity built on science
Decision criteria and management options identified Decision tools developed (argument tree and decision
tree) and evaluated by decision makers through scenario workshops
Multiple meetings with policy, scientific, technical and operational staff, to gather input
Decision criteria refined and updated Tool helped decision makers identify true decision
criteria
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
biosecurity built on science
Factors influencing the spread of Panama TR4 from an infested site Number of diseased plants detected at the infested site Density of plants at the infested site Location of diseased plants in the landscape Position of infected plants within block Direction of rows across block Rainfall events Irrigation
Factors influencing the spread from an infested block to the wider farm Number of diseased plants previously found on the property Quarantine and disinfection procedures in place between blocks within the farm Irrigation
Factors influencing the likelihood that the disease will spread to other farms Distance from boundary of adjoining banana farm Slope gradient and direction in relation to adjoining farms or shared irrigation
channels Distance from public or shared private road
Factors influencing the impact of the protocol on the grower Size of the block and the farm Continuing impact of biosecurity activities on farm
Factors influencing the ability for Biosecurity Queensland to implement and enforce the strategy
Legal and regulatory ability to enforce the destruction protocol
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
biosecurity built on science
Factors influencing the spread of Panama TR4 from an infested site Number of diseased plants detected at the infested site Density of plants at the infested site Location of diseased plants in the landscape Position of infected plants within block Direction of rows across block Rainfall events Irrigation
Factors influencing the spread from an infested block to the wider farm Number of diseased plants previously found on the property Quarantine and disinfection procedures in place between blocks within the farm Irrigation
Factors influencing the likelihood that the disease will spread to other farms Distance from boundary of adjoining banana farm Slope gradient and direction in relation to adjoining farms or shared irrigation
channels Distance from public or shared private road
Factors influencing the impact of the protocol on the grower Size of the block and the farm Continuing impact of biosecurity activities on farm
Factors influencing implementation and enforcement the strategy Legal and regulatory ability to enforce the destruction protocol
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
Only 3 Key FactorsNumber of diseased plants on the blockSize of the blockAbility of BQ to implement and enforce destruction area
biosecurity built on science
Five possible disease management options were evaluated:
1. Destruction of the entire farm 2. Destruction of the whole block 3. Destruction of part of a block4. Destruction of banana plants within a 10 m radius 5. No destruction of banana plants
Only two disease management options were considered:• Destruction of the whole block• Destruction of banana plants within a 10 m radius
2. Considered the importance of allowing the grower to maintain a livelihood, when more extensive destruction was unlikely to impact on the build up of disease inoculum
3. Strategies were based on known disease epidemiology
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
biosecurity built on science
Arguments Sub-arguments Evidence Source of Evidence
The low inoculum load on the block doesn’t require destruction of the whole block to prevent high inoculum loads on the whole farm
Sub argument – The are insufficient clusters of infected plants (six or more plants all of which are within 20 m of at least one other plant in the group) to indicate that the level of inoculum on the block is high
In a block smaller than 10 hectares there is no more than one cluster
Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4
In a block 10-20 hectares there are no more than two clusters
In a block larger than 20 hectares there are no more than three clusters
Sub argument – There are insufficient individual infected plants in the block to indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high
In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are fewer than 15 infected plants
Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4In a block 10-20 hectares there are fewer than 30 infected plants
In a block larger than 20 hectares there are fewer than 60 infected plants
High inoculum load in the block means that the whole block should be destroyed to prevent the inoculum from spreading and infecting more plants.
Sub-argument - The number of clusters of infected plants (six or more plants all of which are within 20 m of at least one other plant in the group) indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high.
In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are two or more clustersInfected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4In a block 10-20 hectares there are three or more clusters
In a block 20 or more hectares there are four or more clusters
Sub-argument – The number of individual infected plants in the block indicate that the level of inoculum in the block is high
Evidence - In a block smaller than 10 hectares there are 15 or more infected plants
Infected plants and their locations identified and diagnostic testing confirms the presence of Foc TR4In a block 10-20 hectares there are 30 or more infected plants
In a block larger than 20 hectares there are 60 or more infected plants
BQ has the ability to enforce the destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants
Evidence - BQ has the legal and regulatory authority to enforce destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants
Evaluation of the situation against the provisions of the current legislation
Evidence - BQ has the resourcing to enforce and oversee the destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant
Evaluation of the logistical requirements of the destruction
BQ doesn’t have the ability to enforce the destruction of a 10 m radius around infected plants
Evidence - BQ doesn’t have the legal and regulatory authority to enforce destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant
Evaluation of the situation against the provisions of the current legislation
Evidence - BQ doesn’t have the resourcing to enforce and oversee the destruction of a 10 m radius around the infected plant
Evaluation of the logistical requirements of the destruction
Panama disease TR4 Emergency Response
biosecurity built on science
PBCRC4115 project outcomes More informed decision making that integrates scientific,
technical and practical knowledge Better decision making that factors in political, social and
economic values More likely acceptance of the decision making outcomes Adaptation towards shared responsibility in plant biosecurity
risk management Improved risk management practices and strategies
biosecurity built on science
End-users and beneficiaries National and state plant health managers Government agricultural and environmental agencies Plant industry leaders and managers, and growers
End-users will be able to better manage plant biosecurity risks, with a logical and analytical planning and decision mass.
biosecurity built on science
“In our multi-disciplinary team, the development of the argument trees (and the associated discussion during their development) provided a valuable interface between science, policy and regulatory views. In a fast-paced regulatory environment, it is not only important to arrive at a decision point, but to ensure that you consider each question in a way that is flexible, relevant, documented and defensible.”
End-user’s perspective
Rebecca Sapuppo (Program leader, Panama TR4 Program)