IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50415

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

VICTOR TAVAREZ-LEVARIO,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

This case presents a question of first impression for this court and our

sister circuits: whether “use” of an immigration document, “knowing it to be

forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made” or “procured by fraud or

unlawfully obtained,” constitutes a “continuing offense” for statute of

limitations purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). We conclude that it is not. As a

result, the indictment in this case was filed outside the applicable five-year

limitations period. We therefore REVERSE the conviction of defendant Victor

Tavarez-Levario and REMAND for dismissal of the indictment.

I. Background

On March 26, 2013, Victor Tavarez-Levario (“Tavarez”), a citizen of the

Republic of Mexico, was indicted by a federal grand jury for having knowingly

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED June 5, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

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No. 14-50415

used, possessed, obtained, accepted, and received a counterfeit I-551 (“green

card”) and counterfeit Social Security card in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).

At rearraignment, the Government presented the following factual basis. On

March 20, 2014, officers pulled over a commercial vehicle driven by Tavarez.

Tavarez presented a Mexican driver’s license and, upon questioning, admitted

that he did not have any documents authorizing him to be in the United States

legally. Immigration authorities contacted the owner of the vehicle, Garland

Pumping and Roustabout, which revealed that Tavarez had presented a

counterfeit green card and counterfeit social security card to obtain

employment on February 2, 2009.

The Government conceded that, given the factual basis, the offense was

one for “use” of counterfeit documents under § 1546(a). The Government also

alerted the court to a statute of limitations issue. If the offense was understood

to have been committed on February 2, 2009, the indictment was not timely

filed within the five-year limitations period. However, the Government posited

that “use” of a counterfeit document was a continuing offense such that the

statute of limitations did not begin to run until Tavarez was no longer

employed based on the documents.1 Tavarez admitted to the Government’s

factual basis; however, he argued that the indictment was not timely because

he did not commit a continuing offense. With the consent of the Government,

Tavarez entered a conditional plea of guilty in which he reserved the right to

appeal the statute-of-limitations issue. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (allowing

a defendant to enter a conditional plea of guilty with the consent of the court

and government).

1 The Government conceded that it did not have any proof that Tavarez was in possession of the counterfeit documents when he was stopped in March 2014 or that he possessed the documents at any time within the prior five years.

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The district court overruled Tavarez’s limitations argument and

accepted his conditional guilty plea. The district court sentenced Tavarez to a

two-year term of probation. Tavarez timely appealed.

II. Discussion

The only issue before us is whether or not “use” of a counterfeit

immigration document under § 1546(a) is a continuing offense. As this is a

purely legal question, we review it de novo. See United States v. Gunera, 479

F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2007).

The offense for which Tavarez was convicted does not include a specific

statutory limitations period. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546. It is thus subject to the

general five-year limitations period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The factual basis

for Tavarez’s plea demonstrates that, at the time he presented a counterfeit

green card and counterfeit Social Security card to obtain employment with

Garland Pumping and Roustabout on February 2, 2009, he committed an

offense proscribed by § 1546(a), as all elements of the offense were satisfied.

See § 1546(a) (“Whoever . . . uses . . . any . . . visa, permit, border crossing card,

alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or

regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in

the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely

made . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .”).2 However, the

indictment against Tavarez was not returned within five years of February 2,

2009. The Government argues, and the district court agreed, that the

indictment was nonetheless timely because use of a counterfeit immigration

document is a continuing offense: when an individual obtains employment

based on the presentation of a counterfeit immigration document, the

2 For the sake of brevity, we refer generally to the documents described in § 1546(a) as “counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration documents,” although we realize that the description in the statute is more nuanced. We specifically note that we are not faced with, nor do we address, the issue of what documents implicate § 1546(a).

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Government contends that commission of the crime continues during the

tenure of the individual’s resulting employment.

“[S]tatutes of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is

complete.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (quoting

Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943)) (internal quotation

marks omitted), superseded by statute, Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-

129, § 101(a)(31), 85 Stat. 348, 352–53 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 462(d)). However, the “doctrine of continuing offenses” presents a

qualification to the general operation of this principle. Toussie, 397 U.S. at

115. “The Supreme Court has defined ‘continuing offense’ to include ‘a

continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and

operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.’”

United States v. Brazell, 489 F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United

States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)). “The hallmark

of the continuing offense is that it perdures beyond the initial illegal act, and

that each day brings a renewed threat of the evil Congress sought to prevent

even after the elements necessary to establish the crime have occurred.”

United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, for a continuing offense, the

statute of limitations does not begin to run when all elements of the crime are

first satisfied, but rather when the ongoing commission of the crime comes to

an end. E.g., United States v. Edelkind, 525 F.3d 388, 393–98 (5th Cir. 2008).

When deciding whether a crime is a continuing offense for limitations

purposes, it is useful to first consider the role of a statute of limitations:

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of

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time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.

Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114–15.

In light of the important role played by statutes of limitations, the

Supreme Court has stated that “the doctrine of continuing offenses should be

applied in only limited circumstances since . . . the tension between the purpose

of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine is apparent; the

latter, for all practical purposes, extends the statute beyond its stated term.”

Id. at 115 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).3

The Court has thus held that a crime is not to be construed as a continuing

offense unless (1) “the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute

compels such a conclusion,” or (2) “the nature of the crime involved is such that

Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.”

Id.4 Because we conclude that the statutory offense at issue in the present

case meets neither requirement as delineated by the Supreme Court, we hold

that it is not a continuing offense.

A. The Explicit Language of the Statute

The explicit statutory language does not compel a conclusion that use of

a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document is a continuing

offense. In other instances, Congress has explicitly stated that a crime is a

continuing offense. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (“The concealment of assets of a

debtor in a case under title 11 shall be deemed to be a continuing offense . . . .”);

3 Indeed, the statute of limitations applicable in this case provides that it applies “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.” § 3282(a); see Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting § 3282(a)).

4 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06(4) (“An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated.”).

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22 U.S.C. § 618(e) (“Failure to file any such registration statement or

supplements thereto . . . shall be considered a continuing offense for as long as

such failure exists . . . .”); 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(d) (superseding Toussie, 397

U.S. 112, by effectively providing that the start of the five-year limitations

period on the offense of failing to register for the draft does not begin until the

day an individual turns twenty-six or registers for the draft). If Congress

intended for use of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration

document under § 1546(a) to constitute a continuing offense, it easily could

have stated so. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120 (noting that congressional silence

on whether a crime is a continuing offense supports the conclusion that it is

not). In addition, unlike other statutes that have been held to proscribe a

continuing offense, § 1546(a) does not include language which would indicate

that the offense involves ongoing conduct. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120

(“Unlike other instances in which this Court has held that a particular statute

describes a continuing offense, there is no language in this Act that clearly

contemplates a prolonged course of conduct.”); see, e.g., United States v. Cores,

356 U.S. 405, 408–09 (1958) (holding that punishment of “any alien crewman

who willfully remains in the United States in excess of the number of days

allowed” is a continuing offense).

Citing the principle that each term in a statute should be given effect,

see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001), the Government argues that

the term “use” must be construed as involving an ongoing employment of the

counterfeit or fraudulently obtained document so that the term “utter” in

§ 1546 does not render it superfluous. We disagree. In other contexts, “the

word ‘use’ [has posed] some interpretational difficulties because of the different

meanings attributable to it.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995),

superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112

Stat. 3469 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). Accordingly, the word “draws

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meaning from its context” and it is important to consider the statutory scheme

in which it is found. Id. (interpreting “uses or carries a firearm”). We think it

clear that the verb “use,” in the context of § 1546’s prohibitions relating to

counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration documents, means “[t]o

employ for the accomplishment of a purpose.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1776

(10th ed. 2014); see MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1301 (10th

ed. 1994) (“use implies availing oneself of something as a means or instrument

to an end”); Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (noting that the “ordinary or natural

meaning” of the word “use” includes “to convert to one’s service, to employ, to

avail oneself of, and to carry out a purpose or action by means of” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Use implies “action and implementation,”

Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145, especially in the context of § 1546(a), which separately

proscribes “possessing” a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration

document, see id. at 143.

Within the context of § 1546, the word “utter” carries a different

meaning: “[t]o put or send (a document) into circulation.” BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 1781 (10th ed. 2014). This meaning is specifically employed in

reference to the circulation of forged or counterfeit documents as if they were

genuine, id.—the precise context contemplated by § 1546(a), which prohibits

both the production of counterfeit documents and subsequent acts involving

counterfeit documents. See also id. at 1781 (defining “uttering” as “[t]he crime

of presenting a false or worthless instrument with the intent to harm or

defraud.—Also termed uttering a forged instrument”); MERRIAM WEBSTER’S

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1302 (10th ed. 1994) (“to circulate (as a counterfeit

note) as if legal or genuine”).5

5 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 479 (“Whoever, within the United States, knowingly and with intent to defraud, utters, passes, or puts off, in payment or negotiation, any false, forged, or counterfeited bond, certificate, obligation, security, treasury note, bill, or promise to pay . . . [commits an offense].” (emphasis added)).

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Given this understanding of the terms “use” and “utter,” it becomes

evident that an individual can utter, or put into circulation, a counterfeit or

fraudulently obtained immigration document without himself using or

employing the document. This would occur if a person tendered a counterfeit

immigration document intended for use by another. Likewise, an individual

can use a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document without

himself uttering, or putting into circulation, the document. The two terms thus

have distinct meanings within § 1546 without any need to construe the term

“use” as involving ongoing action as the Government suggests. Accordingly,

we hold that the “explicit language” of § 1546 does not compel the conclusion

that using a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document is a

continuing offense. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.

B. The Nature of the Crime Involved

The defining characteristic of a continuing offense is that it involves

ongoing perpetration, which produces an ongoing threat of harm. See Brazell,

489 F.3d at 668; Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875. The prototypical continuing offense

is conspiracy, which “continues as long as the conspirators engage in overt acts

in furtherance of their plot,” and “each day’s acts bring a renewed threat of the

substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.” Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122.

Likewise, other offenses that prohibit an individual from remaining in an

unlawful condition or status have been construed to continue so long as the

offender maintains the unlawful condition or status; the perpetration of the

offense naturally continues so long as the unlawful condition is maintained.

See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (holding that escape

is a continuing offense because the escapee can be held liable for failure to

return to custody and “[g]iven the continuing threat to society posed by an

escaped prisoner, ‘the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must

assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one’” (quoting

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Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115)); Cores, 356 U.S. at 408–09 (holding that punishment

of “any alien crewman who willfully remains in the United States in excess of

the number of days allowed” is a continuing offense because the crewman

continues to violate the statute “until he physically leaves the United States”);

United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Where

a deported alien enters the United States and remains here with the

knowledge that his entry is illegal, his remaining here until he is ‘found’ is a

continuing offense . . . .”); United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir.

1989) (holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense

because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and

presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long

as he has not appeared); United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343–44 (9th

Cir. 1988) (holding that kidnapping is a continuing offense because the crime,

by its nature, involves unlawful seizure and detention and the perpetration of

the offense and harm to the victim continues throughout the duration of the

detention).

Unlike other crimes that have been construed as continuing offenses, use

of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document does not by its

nature involve ongoing perpetration that produces an ongoing threat of harm.

There is nothing about the “use” of an immigration document that denotes

temporal longevity. As explained above, a person uses a counterfeit or

fraudulently obtained immigration document when he employs the document

for a purpose. This may take the form of employing the counterfeit or

fraudulently obtained document to obtain employment, gain entry into the

country, or obtain other rights and privileges that normally proceed from the

employment of a valid immigration document. Cf. Browder v. United States,

312 U.S. 335, 335 (1941) (holding that “use by an American citizen of a passport

obtained by false statements to facilitate reentry into the United States is a

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‘use’ within § 2 of the Passport Title of the Act of June 15, 1917, [40 Stat. 217,

227]”). Any of these uses of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration

document naturally occur in incidents of finite duration; they do not by nature

involve “a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts.” Brazell, 489 F.3d at 668

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Dunne,

324 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a statute which made it

illegal for a person to knowingly “use[] any false writing or document” did not

involve a continuing offense because it “contemplate[d] a single act” (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 1001)). For example, using a fraudulent document to obtain entry

into the country occurs as a discrete incident, as might the attainment of

employment or other benefits. This is in stark contrast to traditional

continuing offenses, such as conspiracy, that by their essence prohibit conduct

that perdures. Cf. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122 (contrasting the ongoing nature of

conspiracy and the instantaneous event of registering for the draft).

The Government argues, however, that Tavarez committed a continuing

offense because the facts demonstrate that he presented counterfeit documents

to his employer, which then set in motion a process by which the documents

continually allowed Tavarez to maintain his employment and provided

Tavarez with the ongoing benefits of employment. This argument suffers from

two flaws.

First, under Toussie, the analysis of whether a crime constitutes a

continuing offense involves examining the offense itself, not the defendant’s

particular conduct. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115. Second, the fact that a

particular defendant’s conduct provided long-term benefits to that defendant

does not mean that his offense is a continuing one. See Dunne, 324 F.3d at

1165 (an offense was not a continuing one simple because the defendant

“committed a crime which had continuing effects after its completion”); United

States v. Hare, 618 F.2d 1085, 1086–87 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the argument

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that improper receipt of anything of value for performance of an official act was

a continuing offense where the defendant received a loan that provided benefits

over a prolonged period). Instead, the nature of the offense itself must be such

that it inherently involves criminal activity of an ongoing or continuous

character. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 122. Even a crime that naturally

occurs in a single, finite incident can produce prolonged benefits to an offender;

this does not mean that the statute of limitations refrains from running until

all benefits of the criminal act dissipate. E.g., Dunne, 324 F.3d at 1165; United

States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 1992); Hare, 618 F.2d at

1086–87. Thus, we conclude that the “nature” of this offense is not “such that

Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.”

Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.6

As the indictment against Tavarez was not filed within five years of the

commission of the offense, the indictment should have been dismissed. See

§ 3282(a). Accordingly we REVERSE the conviction and REMAND with

instructions to dismiss the indictment.

6 We need not resort to considering the rule of lenity because we conclude that § 1546(a) is not ambiguous as to whether “use” of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document is a continuing offense. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998). However, assuming arguendo that § 1546(a) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity supports our holding. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122 (“[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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TITLE 18—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

This title was enacted by act June 25, 1948, ch. 645, §1, 62 Stat. 683

18 U.S.C. §1546. Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents (a) Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant or

nonimmigrant visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained; or

Whoever, except under direction of the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or other proper officer, knowingly possesses any blank permit, or engraves, sells, brings into the United States, or has in his control or possession any plate in the likeness of a plate designed for the printing of permits, or makes any print, photograph, or impression in the likeness of any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit or other document required for entry into the United States, or has in his possession a distinctive paper which has been adopted by the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the printing of such visas, permits, or documents; or

Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or for admission to the United States personates another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without disclosing his true identity, or sells or otherwise disposes of, or offers to sell or otherwise dispose of, or utters, such visa, permit, or other document, to any person not authorized by law to receive such document; or

Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or other document which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact-

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both.

(b) Whoever uses- (1) an identification document, knowing (or having reason to know) that the document was

not issued lawfully for the use of the possessor, (2) an identification document knowing (or having reason to know) that the document is

false, or (3) a false attestation,

for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of section 274A(b) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(c) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States, or any activity authorized under title V of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. note prec. 3481).1 For purposes of this section, the term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 771; June 27, 1952, ch. 477, title IV, §402(a), 66 Stat. 275 ; Pub. L. 94–550, §5, Oct. 18, 1976, 90 Stat. 2535 ; Pub. L. 99–603, title I, §103(a), Nov. 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 3380 ; Pub. L. 100–525, §2(c), Oct. 24, 1988, 102 Stat. 2610 ; Pub. L. 101–647, title XXXV, §3550, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4926 ; Pub. L. 103–322, title XIII, §130009(a)(4), (5), title XXXIII, §330011(p), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2030 , 2145; Pub. L. 104–208, div. C, title II, §§211(a)(2), 214, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–569 , 3009-572; Pub. L. 104–294, title VI, §607(m), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3512 ; Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, §4002(a)(3), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1806 .)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

Based on section 220 of title 8, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Aliens and Nationality (May 26, 1924, ch. 190, §22, 43 Stat. 165).

Words "upon conviction thereof" were omitted as surplusage since punishment can be imposed only after a conviction.

Fine of $10,000 was reduced to $2,000 to conform with sections embracing offences of comparable gravity.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The immigration laws, referred to in subsec. (a), are classified generally to Title 8, Aliens and Nationality. See alsosection 1101(a)(17) of Title 8.

Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is classified to section 1324a(b) of Title 8.

Title V of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, referred to in subsec. (c), is title V of Pub. L. 91–452, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 933 , which was set out as a note preceding section 3481 of this title, and was repealed by Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §1209(b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2163 . See section 3521 et seq. of this title.

AMENDMENTS

2002-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 107–273 substituted "to facilitate" for "to facility" in concluding par.

1996-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–208 substituted "which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact" for "containing any such false statement" in fourth par. and "imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense)" for "imprisoned not more than 10 years" in concluding par.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–294 inserted at end "For purposes of this section, the term 'State' means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States."

1994-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–322, §330011(p), amended directory language of Pub. L. 101–647, §3550. See 1990 Amendment note below.

Pub. L. 103–322, §130009(a)(4), substituted "10 years" for "five years" in concluding par.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103–322, §130009(a)(5), in concluding provisions, substituted "under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years" for "in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than two years".

1990-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101–647, §3550, as amended by Pub. L. 103–322, §330011(p), substituted "Shall be fined under this title" for "Shall be fined in accordance with this title" in concluding par.

1988-Pub. L. 100–525 amended Pub. L. 99–603. See 1986 Amendment note below.

1986-Pub. L. 99–603, as amended by Pub. L. 100–525, substituted "other documents" for "other entry documents" in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituted "permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States" for "or other document required for entry into the United States" and for "or document" in first par., substituted "in accordance with this title" for "not more than $2,000" in concluding par., and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

1976-Pub. L. 94–550 inserted ", or as permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true," after "Whoever knowingly makes under oath" in fourth par.

1952-Act June 27, 1952, made section applicable to entry documents other than visas and permits.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT

Amendment by section 211(a)(2) of Pub. L. 104–208 applicable with respect to offenses occurring on or after Sept. 30, 1996, see section 211(c) of Pub. L. 104–208, set out as a note under section 1028 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT

Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330011(p), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2145 , provided that the amendment made by that section is effective as of the date on which section 3550 of Pub. L. 101–647 took effect.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–525 effective as if included in enactment of Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–603, see section 2(s) of Pub. L. 100–525, set out as a note under section 1101 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

Functions vested by law in Attorney General, Department of Justice, or any other officer or any agency of that Department, with respect to the inspection at regular inspection locations at ports of entry of persons, and documents of persons, entering or leaving the United States, were to have been transferred to Secretary of the Treasury by 1973 Reorg. Plan No. 2, §2, eff.

July 1, 1973, 38 F.R. 15932, 87 Stat. 1091, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. The transfer was negated by section 1(a)(1), (b) of Pub. L. 93–253, Mar. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 50 , which repealed section 2 of 1973 Reorg. Plan No. 2, eff. July 1, 1973.

ABOLITION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

For abolition of Immigration and Naturalization Service, transfer of functions, and treatment of related references, see note set out under section 1551 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

1 See References in Text note below.