KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, KUMASI

COLLEGE OF ART AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA‘S 4TH

REPUBLIC

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POLITICAL STUDIES SECTION,

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE BACHELOR OF ARTS

(HONS) DEGREE IN POLITICAL STUDIES

BY

ANTWI EMELDA

NYARKO ABBAM JOHN

NTI BUABENG DENNIS

WOANYAH EYRAM KELVIN

YEWETU OTU ALFRED

APRIL 2014

DECLARATION

We hereby declare that we have wholly undertaken the study herein submitted.

Name Signature Date

ANTWI EMELDA ………………. ……...............

NYARKO ABBAM JOHN ……………… …………….

NTI BUABENG DENNIS …………… ……………..

WOANYAH EYRAM KELVIN ……………. ………………

YEWETU OTU ALFRED …………….. ……………

I have fully supervised the students undertaking the study submitted herein and I confirm

that the students have my permission to present it for assessment.

Supervisor Signature Date

Dr. Edward Brenyah (PhD) …………………. ………………….

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ABSTRACT

Politics and ethnicity are two things that influence each other especially in Africa and

Ghana is no exception. Ethnicity has shaped the political structure and history of our

country since the struggle for independence from our former colonial masters. Ethnicity as

a tool for the acquisition of political and social power has been used vehemently by political

entrepreneurs who seek to capitalize on it in order to clinch unto political power or for the

attainment of that power. In this research, the study investigated the role ethnicity plays in

the politicking of modern day Ghana especially in the 4th

Republic. The study sought to find

out the magnitude of power which our politics as a country is being influenced by our

ethnicity and looked at governance and leadership as an aspect of politics since most

researches have looked at it from electioneering perspectives.

The study shows that there is a synergy between politics and ethnicity in Ghana especially

in its 4th

Republic since we returned to constitutional rule.

KEY WORDS: ETHNICITY, POLITICS, SOCIAL CLEAVAGE, GOVERNANCE AND

LEADERS

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to our Almighty father, the father of all children on the surface

of the earth and all lecturers in the Department of History and Political Studies especially

Dr. Brenyah Edward and Dr. Bobmilliar M. George for their enormous guidance and

contribution in making this dissertation a success.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost, we wish to express our utmost gratitude to the Maker and Holder of the

universe for seeing us through this far. Indeed, if we speak with joy of this work we do so

not with our ability but just by grace He has bestowed on us. Whatever the merits of this

study might be, they are largely attributed to all those who took time to advise and assist us.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Edward Brenyah, lecturer of Political Studies,

Department of History and Political Studies for not only his willingness to undertake the

supervisory role of this work but the compassionate and humane manner with which he

supervised this study and particularly for his suggestions, criticisms and assistance.

We are also grateful to our families especially our parents whom we dedicate this work to

for their immense support in our education and their patience. We would therefore want to

use this opportunity to say a big thank you for all you have suffered and achieved for our

sake.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ................................................................................................................... II

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... III

DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENT........................................................................................................V

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... VI

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. VII

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... VIII

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................... 6

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ....................................................................................... 6

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS OR (NULL) HYPOTHESES ......................................... 6

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 7

1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS ........................................................................................... 7

1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY .......................................................................... 9

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CRITIQUES .................................. 11

2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 11

2.2 THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AS A SOCIAL CLEAVAGE.................................... 12

2.3 THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP ................................................................................. 14

2.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE ............................................................................. 16

2.5 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT OF ETHNCITY ............................................. 18

CHAPTER 3 METHOD SECTION .................................................................................. 42

CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 45

4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 45

CHAPTER 5 ........................................................................................................................... 65

5.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................... 65

5.2 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTIONS ............... 65

5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 65

5.4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................... 66

5.5 DISCUSSIONS .......................................................................................................... 67

5.6 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 68

5.7 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 70

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 71

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................ 83

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 4-1 ................................................................................................................................. 47

Table 4-2 ................................................................................................................................. 50

Table 4-3 ................................................................................................................................. 51

Table 4-4 ................................................................................................................................. 52

Table 4-5 ................................................................................................................................. 60

Table 4-6 ................................................................................................................................. 61

Table 4-7 ................................................................................................................................. 62

Table 4-8 ................................................................................................................................. 63

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4-1 ................................................................................................................................ 46

Figure 4-2 ................................................................................................................................ 49

Figure 4-3 ................................................................................................................................ 53

Figure 4-4 ................................................................................................................................ 54

Figure 4-5 ................................................................................................................................ 55

Figure 4-6 ................................................................................................................................ 56

Figure 4-7 ................................................................................................................................ 58

Figure 4-8 ................................................................................................................................ 61

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity and politics are two interweaving fabrics which cannot be separated especially

within the contextual analyses of the African political systems and its structures, which

Ghana; a country within its western part is no exception. Politics and ethnic sentiments or

identification (ethnicity) dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial times. For example, the

Fantes helped the British to fight against the Ashanti perceived hegemony during the

colonial time. The word “ethnicity” has divergent definitions as some people perceive it as

realistic; while others see it as psychological and emotional feelings of belonging to one

group as an entity with a common history, language, customs, traditions, norms and

practices. It is then a feeling of us as an ―in-group‖ and them as ―out-group‖.

Bulmer (1996) defines the word ethnic group as:― a collectivity within a larger population

having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus

upon one or more symbolic elements which define the group‘s identity, such as kinship,

religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an

ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group.‖

According toEriksen 1993, ―ethnicity is often said to be an irreducibly dual phenomenon in

that, by definition, it comprises aspects of both symbolic meaning and instrumental utility.

Ethnic identity offers the individual a sense of belonging and contributes to group cohesion,

while ethnic organization serves the mundane interests of its members (or at least its

leadership). Ethnicity appears whenever there is an ongoing, conventionalized relationship

between individuals who conceive of themselves as belonging to culturally distinctive

groups with different origins‖.

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Ethnicity is about collective identification based on perceived cultural differentiation.

Ethnicity is concerned with culture (shared meanings) but it is rooted in-and a product of

social interactions, especially across boundaries. Ethnicity is neither fixed nor static, any

more than the culture of which it is an aspect. Ethnicity is collective and individual

externalized in institutions and patterns of social interactions and internalized in personal

self-identification. It is important to know that a sense of shared similarity is no less

significant than the construction of a sense of difference from external others. Ethnicity may

be emotionally authentic or tactically and strategically manipulable, or indeed both

simultaneously. These all suggest that, ethnic identifications do not mean anything in

themselves. They are not ‗things‘ sui generis (in a class or group of its own).

Politics is very broad but its usage in this study narrows ―politics‖ to governance and

leadership. Politics on the other hand, involves processes by which a group of people

(perhaps with divergent opinions or interests) reach collective decision-making generally

regarded as binding on the group, and enforced as a common policy.

Governance can be thought of as: ―the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the

overall direction, effectiveness, supervision and accountability of an organization‖.

Governance can be defined as the administrative and process-oriented elements of

governing. Most often than not, the word ―governance‖ is interchanged with the word

―government‖. Government refers to the machinery that steer the affairs of the state and it is

made up of mainly three distinct arms: executive, legislature and the judiciary.

According to the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF), governance can be defined in

the broader terms. It refers to the ―process of interactions and decision-making among the

actors involved in a collective problem, that lead to the creation, reinforcement or

reproduction of social norms and institutions‖. Also, according to the United Nations

Development Programme‘s Regional Project on Local Governance for Latin America

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(UNDP-RPLGALA): “Governance has been defined as the rules of the political system

to solve conflicts between actors and adopt decisions (legality).It has been used to

describe “the proper functioning of institutions and their acceptance by the public”

(legitimacy). And it has been used to invoke the efficacy of government and the

achievement of consensus by democratic means (participation)”.

Leadership can also be described as the process of social influence in which one person can

enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task. Leadership in

this sense is the ability to have people buying into one‘s idea or vision in order to

materialize that idea or vision. Haunschild, et al. 2009 describe leadership as “an exercise

in language that results in the realization of a future that wasn’t going to happen

anyway which future fulfills or (contributes to fulfilling) the concerns of the relevant

parties”. This definition espouses the notion that, leadership focuses on the future including

a focus on fundamental concerns of the relevant parties. Interesting, the definition of

leadership by Sun Tzu is very intriguing because he defined leadership as ―a matter of

intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage and discipline‖. He further argues that

reliance on intelligence alone results in rebelliousness: exercise of humaneness alone results

in weakness: fixation on trust results in folly: dependence on the strength of courage results

in violence and excessive discipline and sternness in command results in cruelty. When one

has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its function, and then one can be leader‖.

The issue of politics in Ghana is a very interesting one since there are so many factors

which go into our daily politicking as a country. Some of the factors which influence our

politics include religion, culture and ethnicity which have a very powerful impact on

political activities in the country.

Additionally, balance of power and distrust among different ethnic groupings has always

been a key to understanding Ghanaian politics. There are about 49 major ethnic groupings

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in Ghana comprising the Akans, Mole-Dagbani, Ewes, Gas, Guans, Grusi, among others.

But interestingly in Ghana, our politics is divided on the lines of the Akans versus the Non-

Akans.

Ethnicity, it must be emphasized thrives on half-truths and perceptions as much as historical

facts and is sustained by stereotypes and prejudice which help to explain why ethnicity

remains a crucial weapon for political mobilization (Frempong 2004).

Furthermore, ethnicity may exhibit a number of paradoxes: firstly, while ethnicity rests on

culturally specified practice and given sets of beliefs, in reality an entire ‗pure‘ group is

extremely rare. Secondly, ethnic groups can generate forces of moderation, constitute a

form of social capital and advance the private fortunes of their members; but they may also

occasionally engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the formation

as a single group (Rothberg 2000;Ayoob 2001). Thirdly, contrary to the conventional

wisdom that is the political elites who manipulate ethnicity for their own interests. Ethnicity

acts as a pole around which groups members can mobilize and compete for control of state

power, economic resources, positions, contract awards and constitutional protection (just

like any other interest group)(Rothschild 1997:4).

It is essential in any analysis of ethnicity to consider the crucial role of the State.

The State is the turf on which ethnic group politics is played. It is the arena for

interaction, encounter, corporation, conflict and struggle over the exercise of power

and the distribution of societal resources.

The State‘s political institutions and capabilities structure ethno political groups‘

choices about policies to be pursued and the means to do so; whether to participate,

protest or rebel.

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When the State is viewed as a prize in the hands of a particular ethnic group, it

creates distrust and insecurity and makes it difficult for the State to be perceived as

an impartial arbiter by the other ethnic groups.

The study is interested in why the labeling of a particular government or administration or

political party as favoring a particular ethnicity group. Sometimes the word ―tribe‖ is be

used to replace ethnicity since there is virtually no sharp difference in the usage of the two

concepts in Ghanaian politics. Specifically, the study is interested in knowing why the

Mahama-Amissah-Arthur administration as a government full of the Northern tribes, why

President Dramani Mahama used$60 million of a World Bank loan of $100 million

loan on projects in the northern sector of the country which are mostly made up of the

ethnic inclinations of the three(3) Northern regions for which he is a member; why the

erstwhile administration of the NPP under former president, J.A. Kuffour was tagged as an

administration of Asante-Akyem (Akans); and why was the Ashanti Region the first to

benefit from the 10 billion Cedis for the Youth Fund disbursed as loans to skilled youth

under the NPP administration. In this regard, this study is interested in finding out what

really influence leaders to pursue certain policies which favors a particular ethnicity group.

For example, why the Kuffour administration had26 sector ministers out of which 18

were Akans (a third of which were Ashantis) and 8 Non-Akans (3 Mole-Dagbanis, 2

Ewes and 3 Gas).

It is as a result of these, that the study is interested in finding what causes the labeling of our

politics especially in the 4th

Republic on these lines. The study is very interested in fishing

out why the influence of ethnicity plays a key role in our daily politics. In this case, the

study intends to find out the magnitude of influence which ethnicity has on the governance

and leadership of a particular administration in Ghana. Specifically the study seeks to

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examine why people feel that, a particular government belongs to a particular ethnic

grouping and not the entire nation as a whole?

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The study examines why there exist strong relationships between ethnicity and politics (that

is, governance and leadership) in understanding Ghanaian politics. It further investigates

how leadership and governance are being influenced by ethnic identifications and

sentiments.

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to explore ways in which Ghana as a country can use its ethnic

differences in shaping its politics to bring about visible socio-economic transformations that

will raise the living standards of its citizenry.

Specifically, the study examines how ethnicity influences on our politics. In addition, the

study also investigates how ethnicity is manifested. Lastly, it examines how ethnicity can

serve as a political tool without causing conflicts, tensions, dissatisfactions and instability in

Ghana.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS OR (NULL) HYPOTHESES

It is hypothesized that, ethnicity has an influence on national and local

governmental politics.

Why does the invocation of ethnic identity impact governance and leadership?

How does ethnicity influence the actions and thoughts of political leaders in

authority in the political system?

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To what extent can one say that, the actions of political actors especially leaders are

informed by their ethnic inclinations?

Does the use of ethnicity as a political tool cause harmony in the political system?

How can Ghana ensure that, the use of ethnicity as a political cleavage does not

cause dissatisfaction, instability, violence and conflict?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study shows that, indeed ethnicity and politics are two variables that cannot be

separated if Ghanaian politics is to be understood. It further shows that, the use of ethnicity

as a political tool of social cleavage can be possible in the politics of Ghana without causing

dissatisfaction, instability and violence.

1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS

ETHNICITY: The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a

common national or cultural tradition. It is the measure of cultural affiliation. It

is the state of belonging to a human group having racial, religious, and linguistic

and certain other traits in common.

POLITICAL SYSTEM: It is defined as the set of formal legal institutions that

constitute a government or a state. It is a set of processes of interaction or as a

subsystem of the social system interacting with other nonpolitical subsystems,

such as the economic system. A political system consists of the formal and

informal structures which manifest the State's sovereignty over a territory and

people. Political system is a particular definition role and law norms and an

allocation of rights and duties historically determined through conflict, a

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balancing of powers. Those who fill these roles, who have the right to command

others, are the political elite.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE: It is defined as the division of voters into voting blocs.

The preliminary assumption is that voters don‘t come in predefined groups of

pros and cons for or against a certain subject. Ballot analysis assumes that voters

opt for a certain party, or decide for the solution or option that comes closest to

their own position. Cleavage separates the voters into advocates and adversaries

on a certain issue, or voting for a certain party. Cleavage is the line that divides

political parties into supporters and opponents. It is operationally explained as

the division of individuals into distinct classes or groups.

POLITICS: The part of ethics which has to do with the regulation and

government of a nation or state, the preservation of its safety, peace and

prosperity, the defense of its existence and rights against foreign control or

conquest, the argumentative of its strength and resources, and the protection of

its citizens in their rights, with the preservation and improvement of their

morals. It is operationally defined as the art of government or governing

especially of a political entity such as a nation, and the administration and

control of its external and internal affairs.

REPUBLIC: A government in which supreme power resides in a body of

citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by elected officers and representatives

responsible to them and governing according to law. It is operationally defined

as a state where the people are politically independent and sovereign by

themselves and have a president.

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GOVERNANCE: The use of institutions, structures of authority and even

collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society

or economy. It operationally refers to the processes of running a government.

LEADERSHIP: The action of leading a group of people or a society or

organization. Leadership involves establishing a clear vision, sharing that vision

with others so that they will follow willingly, providing the information,

knowledge and methods to realize that vision, and coordinating and balancing

the conflicting interests of all members and stakeholders.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGE: The division of people into different classes in the

political system. ―Political cleavage is the national, ethnic, linguistic and

religious divisions that affect political allegiances and policies‖

(Conservapedia).

1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter 1 presents the introduction, statement of the problem, purpose of the study,

research questions or null hypotheses, significance of the study, definition of terminologies.

Chapter 2 contains the review of related literature and research related to the problem being

investigated. The methodology and procedures used in gathering the data for the study are

presented in Chapter 3. The results of analyses and findings to emerge from the study will

be in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the study and findings, conclusions

drawn from the findings, a discussion and recommendations for future study.

10

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Chapter 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CRITIQUES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Most of the researches conducted in pursuance to ethnicity and politics in Ghana especially

in the Fourth Republic have bordered on the negatives( La Porte et al. 1999: Wa Wamwere

2003) that would emanate if Ghana allows the usage of ethnicity as a political

cleavage(Mahama, 2013: Kimenyi 2003, Wa Wamwere 2003). Some of the writings on

ethnicity and politics have sort to demonize the use of our differentials as a people in our

everyday politicking especially during the 4th

Republic and have largely been centered on

voting patterns during elections. Majority of the scholars argue that, ethnicity is what

mostly influence our voting patterns as a people but they fail to admit that, it is not ethnicity

that has been the major factor for our voting patterns in electing leaders in government but

different issues especially the issue of bringing rapid socioeconomic developments into the

life of the citizenry influence voting patterns. Concomitant to that, most literatures have not

been able to overwhelm convince readers why ethnicity as a political cleavage shouldn‘t be

allowed when it comes to politics.

Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and compete effectively

for state control of power, economic resources, positions, contracts awards and

constitutional protection (Rothschild 1997:4;Adam 1984).

Some people think democracy leads to more ethnic conflicts. Such school of thought argues

that , as more people participate in the political process and differences between ethnic

groups are articulated openly, political leaders in multiethnic societies may be tempted to

use ethnicity as a measure to obtain electoral support (Buzz: 2002:1). In a climate of

uncertainty, a policy of uniting an ethnic group against real or imagined political threat of

12

whipping up ethnic animosity against another ethnic group becomes expedient or

convenient. Whether use effectively to dash out the ambitions of others or offensively to

achieve their own end, ethnicity is primary as a label that is used for political advantage

(Psalides-Parlmetter 2000:238).

Unfortunately, there is little to be found when it comes to relating ethnicity to governance

in the Ghanaian political system especially in its relations to government policies,

programs, styles and regimes of the 4th

Republic. However, a better assessment of the

impact of ethnicity on politics in the 4th

Republican government of Ghana can be obtained

by examining the theories of ethnicity, leadership and governance.

2.2 THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AS A SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

There are essentially three main theories but out of which two are very dominant in

analyzing the meaning and nature of ethnicity.

The first school of thought of ethnicity is that of the “PRIMORDIALISM or

PERENNIALISM‖. This theory argues that, nations are ancient, natural phenomenon.

This school of thought holds that, members of the same ethnic group have a common bond

that determines their personal identity and ―turns the group into a natural community that is

older than the modern (state)‘ (Van de Goor 1994:18; Ake 2003:93). They emphasize the

idea of ethnic identification as a result of inherent long standing and usually unchanging

sets of alliances which often defy rationality and logic explanation (Smith 2000:36). With

this school of thought, ethnicity is an ascribed identity or assigned status, something

inherited from one‘s ancestors or right at birth which can never be changed (Geertz

1963:109-110).To primordialists, it is the primordial bonds or factors such as lineage and

cultural ties that give rise to sustain ethnicity (Geertz 1973; Isaac1975; Van den Berghe

1981).

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The second school of thought is the INSTRUMENTALISTS, which became popular or

prominent in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States of America in the debate about

ethnic persistence. This school of thought sees ethnicity as an instrument or strategic tool

for gaining resources. According to this theoretical framework, people become ethnic and

remain ethnic when their ethnicity yields significant returns to them. In other words,

ethnicity exists and persists because it is useful. The Instrumentalists again see ethnicity

essentially as a means for people, especially leaders to pursue their own purposes such as

‗forming, mobilizing and manipulating groups of people for political ends‘ (Van de Goor

1994:18, Ake 2003:94). They explain ethnicity in terms of a variety of political, economic

and institutional structures which mobilizes, alter and even create an ethnic identity in the

service of political goals (Smith 2000:36; Conteh-Morgan 1997:79 and Moynihan 1975).

The functional advantages of ethnicity range from ‗the moral and material support provided

by ethnic networks to political gains made through ethnic voting bloc‘ (Portes and Bech

1985, 24).

For example, Orlando Patterson (1975, 348) asserted that ―The strength, scope, viability

and bases of ethnic identification are determined by, and used to serve the economic and

general class interest of individuals‖. Hence, interests are the sole determinants of ethnic

identity, and ethnic affiliation tends to be transient or short in duration and situational as the

benefits of ethnicity shifts.

The last school of thought or theoretical framework on ethnicity is the

CONSTRUCTIVISM. This theoretical framework was crafted by Jean Piaget (1967), who

articulated mechanisms by which knowledge is internalized by learners. Starting in the

1970s, the school of the Constructivists began to ascend. The Constructivists views are in

sharp contrast to that of the Primordialism. This school of thought has advanced three

strong arguments. First, ethnicity is a socially constructed identity that is something which

14

was socially created. It is upon this first view that, the name constructionists come to bear.

Secondly, as an extension of a constructed identity, ethnic boundaries are flexible and

changeable. Ethnicity is dynamic. Lastly, ethnic identification is constructed by society.

Ethnicity is a reaction to changes in social environment. Jonathan Sarna, a historian

developed the so-called “theory of ethnicization‖. Saran maintained that, ethnicity is

created by two conditions: ascription and adversity. In here, ascription refers to the

assignment of an individual to a particular ethnic group by outsiders such as government,

churches, schools, media, natives, and other immigrants. Adversity includes hardship,

prejudices, discrimination and hostility. Saran contends that, adversity forces members of

the same group to unite and help create group identity and solidarity.

2.3 THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

Attribute pattern approach: This theoretical framework argues that, the influence of

individual characteristics on outcomes is best understood by considering the person as an

integrated totality rather than a summation of individual variables. In other words, the

leader attribute pattern approach argues that, integrated constellation or combination of

individual differences may explain substantial variance in both leader emergence and leader

effectiveness.

Behavioral and style theories: This school argues that, leadership takes a strong

personality with a well-developed positive ego (David McClelland, 1967). It argues

leadership as a set of behaviors, evaluate the behavior of successful leaders, and identify

broad leadership styles. The failure of tracing ‗‗gold‘‘ in the trait ‗‗mines‘‘ urged

researchers to examine the behaviors that specific leaders exhibited. Behavioral studies of

leadership aim to identify behaviors that differentiate leaders from non-leaders (Robbins,

1998). Behavioral theories of leadership support that a set of particular behaviors that can

be named as a style of leadership. Leadership style refers to a distinctive behavior adopted

15

by persons in formal positions of leadership (Campell, et al., 1966) and several studies were

conducted to identify those.

Contingency theory: The contingency view of leadership emerged from systems theory

and its impact on organizational and administrative theory. According to this model,

specific leader behaviors relate to group performance and satisfaction. In order to achieve

this, certain variables interact with each other such as the leader himself, the position he

holds, group members, internal, and external environment of the organization. A successful

match between the leader and the group‘s performance and satisfaction is ‗‗contingent‘‘

upon these variables. Three situational variables intervene between the leader‘s style and

effectiveness which are leader-member relations, task structure, and power position. Groups

are classified as either favorable or unfavorable based on these criteria (Monahan &Hengst,

1982).

This theory assumes that different situations call for different characteristics and that no

single optimal psychological profile of a leader exists. According to this theory, ―what an

individual actually does when acting as a leader is in large dependent upon characteristics

of the situation in which he functions‖ (Hemphill 1949).

Trait theory: This theoretical framework argues that, leadership is based an individual

attributes. The study of special traits of leaders emerged from the belief that leadership and

abilities such as intelligence were inherited. In addition to intelligence other factors such as

birth order, status and liberal parents highly correlate with leadership abilities (Carlson,

1996).

Visionary Leadership: Visionary leadership is the ability to create and express a realistic,

attainable, and attractive vision of the future for organizations which grow continuously.

Visionary leaders should create inspiring and innovative visions for their organizations

rendering them credible in the eyes of the people in the organization at the same time.

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Visionary leaders have three qualities, which are related to their effectiveness. First, is the

ability to explain and articulate the vision to the others? Second, is to express the vision not

just verbally but through the leader‘s behavior. Third, is to communicate the vision to

different leadership contexts.

2.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE

Governance is a new phenomenon that is now gaining ascendancy in the academia and so

little theories are known about it. In this study, we will be looking at three categories of

governance theories or school of thoughts and they are: Policy Network theory, Rational

Choice theory, and ―Interpretive‖ theory.

Rational Choice theory: This school of thought draws on microeconomic analysis, with its

attempt to unpack social life in terms of individual actions and to explain individual actions

in terms of rationality, and especially utility maximization. The rational choice theorists are

often more interested in exploring cases where institutions or norms are honored even in the

absence of a higher authority to enforce them. Rational choice theory attempts to explain all

social phenomena by reference to the micro level of rational individual activity. It unpacks

social facts, institutions and patterns of rule entirely by analyses of individual action. It

models individuals acting on the assumption that they adopt the course of action most in

accord with their preferences. Rational choice theorists furthermore, argue that the absence

of any effective higher authority means that such institutions have to be conceived as self-

enforcing. Again, they argue institutions structure people‘s strategic interactions with one

another; stable institutions influence individuals‘ actions by giving them reasonable

expectations about the outcome of the varied courses of action from which they might

choose.

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Interpretive theories: Interpretive approaches to governance often emphasize contingency.

They reject the idea that patterns of rule can be properly understood in terms of a historical

or social logic attached to capitalist development, functional differentiation or even

institutional settings. Instead, they emphasize the meaningful character of human actions

and practices. It simply means that, because individuals act on beliefs, ideas, or meanings-

whether conscious or not- their actions can be understood properly only if the significant

meanings are grasped. Some of the interpretive approaches suggest that beliefs, ideas or

meanings are more or less uniform across a culture or society. Hence, they inspire studies

of distinct patterns of governance associated with diverse cultures. Other interpretive

approaches also place greater emphasis on the contests and struggles over meanings that

they take to constitute so much political activity. Hence, they inspire studies of the different

traditions or discourses of governance that are found within any given society.

Policy network theory: This theory argues that, governance is simply self-organizing,

inter-organizational networks that are charged with policy-making (Rhodes 1996, 660;

Stoker 1998a, 18). Any setting with a plurality of actors and no formal control system that

can dictate the relationships between the actors is a governance network (Chhotray& Stoker

2009, 3). Policy-making involves multiple organizations, from the government as well as

from the outside. The policy issues are complex, and even defining the policy problem is

demanding (Stoker 2000, 92). Setting policy goals, defining solutions, and implementation

all require resources that are not held by any single organization, resulting in

interdependence of the organizations. The interdependence in turn provides the

organizations in the network considerable autonomy from central control.

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2.5 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT OF ETHNCITY

Ethnicity has proven to be a very difficult concept to define with much precision. Indeed,

those who have approached the task have not been able to achieve a consensus. Most

usages are both vague and ambiguous in their application to empirical research. What most

scholars consider to be examples of ethnicity, others would consider being cases of such

other variables are regionalism, religious-sectarianism, class conflict and even sheer

―opportunism‖ (Ross 1979:3).

Franck and Rainer (2009) provide an assessment of ethnic favoritism in Sub-Saharan

Africa. They looked at eighteen (18) countries and focused on primary education and infant

mortality of various ethnic groupings under different ethnic leadership in a period of fifty

(50) years. They argued that, ethnic favoritism effects are large and widespread and that,

this causes underdevelopment in these African countries. They went on to say that, ethnic

favoritism are common in states whose governments have control greatly over fiscal

resources but interestingly, they argued that, states of ethnic groups speaking structurally

unrelated languages or live in more segregated locations don‘t display higher levels of

ethnic favoritism.

Moreover, ethnic diversity according to Franck and Rainer (2009) is related to bad

economic policies, slow economic growth and low levels of per capita income. States of

diverse ethnics were found to have poor quality governance, inadequate provision of public

goods and civil wars. (Le Porte et al.1999; Alesina et al. 2003; Montaloo and Reeynal-

Querol, 2003). Ethnic diversity leads to costly rent-seeking by different ethnic groupings

(Easterly and Levine, 1997) and generate conflict over the provision of public goods

(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). In other words, politically domineering ethnic groups

will use their powers to provide economic benefits to their own members. In ethnically

heterogeneous societies, it is common for the group that ascends the throne of power to

19

fashion government policies and expropriate the production of goods to their members and

prevent outsiders from benefiting.

Ethnicity is used as an exclusion tool and the dominant ethnic groups redistribute resources

towards their own members (Fearon, 1991; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).

In addition, they argued that whereas theoretical arguments link bad economic

performances of African states to ethnic favoritism, there is no systematic empirical

evidence that members of the ethnic groups actually benefits from having their leaders in

power. In their work, they estimated that on average primary school attendance, completion

and literacy of the leaders ethnic groups grew by 2.5 percent and reduced their infant

mortality by about 0.5 percent. They argued that, leaders‘ ethnicity have strong effects on

education, infant mortality or both in their ethnic groups.

In conclusion, ethnic favoritism is more alarming in states whose governments collect more

revenues and have greater resources to spend on the provision of public goods; that, the

ordinary members of ethnic groups get benefits from their leaders when in power and that,

leaders may deliver even larger favors to narrow subgroups of other ethnic groupings.

Kimenyi (2003) argued ethnicity is an important institution and one which impacts on the

quality of governance. He argues further that, ethnic heterogeneity results in under-

provision of non-excludable public goods and such societies are associated with the

provision of patronage goods. In addition, Kimenyi argued governments provide public

goods because left to private individuals, such goods need not be provided. Governments

step in to correct the inefficiencies of the markets with the intention of maximizing social

welfare and do so efficiently; but surprisingly governments‘ provision in itself is marred by

numerous inefficiencies and short-comings called government failure (Buchanan and

Tullock, 1962; Olson 1965).

20

He explained the failure of government by the use of interest group theory of government.

This theory argues that, public policy makers are not benevolent maximizers of social

welfare as assumed by the market failure model but rather, they are motivated by self-

interests. In addition, the provision for the public is subjected to rent-seeking which

associates with waste of resources and other inefficiencies (Krueger, 1975; Tallock, 1967).

He went further to say other factors explain the inefficiencies of government provision and

focuses on the ―principal agent problems‖ inherent in public provision. The ―principal agent

problems‖ arise from the fact that voters are not motivated to invest resources to monitor

the behavior of public officials.

Moreover, he argued public provision lacks well-defined property rights because voters are

numerous and dispersed. No single person has sufficient wealth at stake to make it

worthwhile to monitor government officials on a day-to-day basis. Interestingly, he goes

beyond to say that the degree of ethnic fractionalization influence the quality of governance

in terms of provision of public goods. One way ethnicity could increase the probability of

government failure is by increasing the transactions costs of achieving cooperation and thus

weakening institutions of governance. The failure to incorporate heterogeneity in the design

of institution leads to the failure of states governments of diverse presence of ethnic groups.

Thus by ignoring the importance of ethnicity in institutional design, many ethnically

fractionalized states are not suited to harmonize ethnic claims (Kimenyi, 1998).

Ethnic groups lower the transaction costs of solving ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ and therefore are

suited to provide local public goods but they complicate collective action translating into

outcomes that make all members of the society worse off. Ethnically diverse societies are

prone to corruption and poor governance and slow economic growth (Kimenyi, 1987;

Easterly and Levine, 1997; Mauro, 1995; Mbaku, Ogbese and Kimenyi, 2001). Identifying

21

with one‘s ethnic group is highly valued and resources are devoted to make certain that

members of the group continue to identify with that group.

Moreover, Kimenyi argued good governance in the provision of public goods requires an

institutional framework that reduces the cost of cooperation. Such institutional framework

could be supplied by experience built up through repeated interactions, a high level of

social cohesion, trust or a constitutional and legal regime characterized by effectiveness and

legitimacy (Meagler, 2003). Ethnic groups that control government adopt strategies that

make it difficult for other groups to capture the instruments of wealth transfers. The

competition to control the instruments of wealth transfers have been intense carrying ethnic

conflicts and this explains the continued state of conflict and political instability in Africa.

In conclusion, Kimenyi argued that, ethnic fractionalization causes corruption, low public

goods provision and participation, exclusion and instability and that ethnic identification in

politics is revealed by voting patterns because the state fails to insure nonexcludability

which make people turn to their ethnic communities because these ethnic societies serve as

a sort of alternative statehood for the provision of public goods and this process can initiate

a vicious cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy which in turn

reduce the effectiveness of the state thus, intensifying the attitude of illegitimacy.

Thomas Bossuroy (2011) looked at 2004 presidential elections of Ghana in his analyses of

his work. To him, heterogeneity of the populace deter institutions capacity suitable for

economic growth and poverty reduction and brings possible rivalry and non-cooperative

relationships between groups leading to a lower access of development because of the

difficulty they have to work together. The rivalry between groups also impacts the

aggregate social choice generated by democratic processes.

Compromise, balance of power and distrust between ethnic groups have always been

critical in the understanding of the Ghanaian politics. Ghana is a multi-party system which

22

has two parties dominating the system and they are the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and

National Democratic Congress (NDC). He went on further to argue that, economic

opposition between the two (2) leading parties may be one of the motives for voters

choosing between them as well as ethnic opposition. The NPP represent the Akan tradition

and is mostly supported by the heart of the Ashanti Region whilst the NDC gathers support

from the Northern Regions and from the Volta Region where non-Akan people are

majority.

The level of urbanity may also play a key role in structuring the political field in Ghana as

he argues on. In his analyses, the NPP-NDC gained about 97percent in the 2004

Presidential Elections. He found out that, the geographical patterns of votes clearly reveal it

in the votes garnered by the NPP among Akan areas and NDC in the non-Akan areas.

Ethnicity had a very strong effect on the patterns of votes. The NPP had almost 70 percent

of the variance of shared votes when Akan alone is looked at regressively; socioeconomic

variables accounted 55percent of the NPP vote pattern.

In conclusion, Bossuroy argued that political participation is determined by the

socioeconomic conditions of voters, level of education and the remoteness of the residence

areas are determinants of participation. Ethnicity appeared to poorly explain the evolution

of votes when analyzing elections though it plays an important role in the structural patterns

of voting distribution.

Alabi (2007) also argued ethnicity play a major role in the acceptability of political

marketing approaches of partisan politics in Ghana. He argues that, when looking at the

activities and functions of political marketing, the political product (the political party)

should be designed to fit into both the social and economic contexts of the target audience

whose votes that particular political party is seeking. The characteristics of the political

product include which personalities, philosophy or ideology, manifesto, past performance,

23

dependability, reliability and brand name or image can be said to determine the

acceptability of that product within the defined environment.

The beliefs, economic and social dispositions of the people are fundamental to ethnicity.

The satisfaction of the needs and aspiration of the voters and the people themselves are the

major determinants of accepting a political party. The acceptance of a political party to a

larger extent is tied to how the people, their beliefs, economic and social disposition

identify with a particular political party based on the party‘s characteristics in terms of party

leadership, party structure, ideology, party‘s image and past performance. Alabi identifies

the political market as a conglomeration of voters, challenges and incumbents. The political

market refers to anywhere political parties and electorates meet or communicate to sell and

buy political products. The electorates are the buyers while the political parties are the

sellers within that surrounding; and there are also competitors of their own strengths and

weaknesses except in one party state.

He went on to say that, the important things to consider in political marketing are what

product, how the product is presented, where is the communication taking place. In political

marketing, the battle field is the mindset of the voter whereas in a society, where ethnicity

and communality plays a vital role, the political market is said to be the mindset of the

floating voter given that the party already has a strong base. This is where the role of ethnic

identification falls in political marketing. Ethnicity pervades all societies and as a result is

essential for every political marketing approach although to a lesser degree in a more

diverse environment.

Political parties learn much about people‘s identities and culture in order to pitch candidates

to win the acceptability of such people. Likewise the performance and acceptability of

political parties among a specific ethnic grouping is fixed to perception, appreciation and

24

how the ethnic group identifies with the party. Ethnic sentiments are one of the important

tools affecting democratization and nation-building.

Complexity of ethnicity in Ghanaian grass root politics is due to the fact that, ethnic groups

are not bond not only by kinship but also principles (NyuotYoh, 2004). Alabi further

described Ghanaian political experience as a chameleonic experience because it has been

full of regime changes both democratic and authoritarian. Yalae (2006) indicates the

entrenchment of ethnicity in Ghana‘s politics is due to the fear of perpetual ethnic

domination-the fear of ethnic subjugation by another ethnic group. Alabi went further to say

the decision of leadership of parties especially the selection of flag bearer and vice

presidential candidate is made in consideration of which ethnic card to play and cites the

NPP as an example. No part of Ghana is ethnically homogenous and the urban areas are the

most ethnically mixed due to migration of people in search of employment.

His analyses of voting pattern indicates that, aside Ashanti, Volta and Western Regions, no

political party can consider any of the urban districts or constituencies as a stronghold due

to the ethnically diverse nature of these constituencies. This implies that, the effect of

ethnicity is more common in rural areas.

In conclusion, Alabi argued that for any party to win any presidential election it needs an

ethnic base as a springboard and the parties with very strong ethnic support bases are those

that have stood the test of time no matter the marketing tools used. Strongholds are

considered pre-requisites for multi-party systems imperative for the sustenance of political

parties.

Oelbaum (2010) in his paper consider the linkage between the spatial dimension of poverty

and war in the conflict-prone Northern areas of Ghana. The research centers on one specific

conflict, the ―Guinea Fowl War‖ of 1994 which he describes as the most violent episode in

Ghana. He specifically looked at the relationship between changes in poverty, interethnic

25

inequality and warfare in that region. He blamed government mixed signals about its

intention for the region to have played a critical role as a driver for the conflict; for

inflaming the aspirations and expectations of non-centralized groups, while generating

resistance and anger from chiefs to whom government was ultimately beholden.

He went on further to say that, the widening of economic inequalities between distinct

reference groups caused the war. Conflict emerges as a result of development and poverty

reduction, and says institutional arrangements could be used to prevent and contain

violence. According to Oelbaum, the war affected 8 administrative districts, and led to the

burning and destruction of four hundred and forty-two (442) separate villages, which

resulted in the displacement of about two hundred thousand (200,000) people.

Again, he argued there is a substantial relationship between warfare and poverty reduction.

According to World Bank(2004),after a typical civil war of seven(7)years duration,

incomes are approximately fifteen(15) percent lower than they would have been if the war

had not happened, which implies a thirty(30)percent increase in the incidence of absolute of

poverty. The most proximate cause of the ―Guinea Fowl War‖ was the petition launched by

the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) and a Konkomba sub-chief to the National

House of Chiefs which sought to cause the elevation of the chief of Saboba (a Konkomba)

to paramount status. The petition was rejected by the Dagomba paramouncy. The

environment surrounding the petition was exacerbated by the actions of the central

government in particular President Rawlings, who had indicated in 1991 that ―minority

groups would be justified in taking up arms to defend their autonomy‖.

A combination of signals of official permissiveness, rumors of war, the intractability of the

issues and the seemingly inability to find alternatives to violence, gave rise to a form of

security dilemma that manifested in a deadly ethnic war (Pul, 2003).

26

Collier (2001) argues people mostly identify with their kin groups, ethnic groups or

religious groups, than with the nation and does this by using two terminologies- ethnic

dominance and ethnic fragmentation. The power of such sub-national identities is

commonly regarded as a course. Societies divided by ethnicity are seen as less likely to

reach cooperative solutions, and more likely to victimize minorities. Civil wars can be

viewed as the extreme manifestation of the more general phenomenon of dysfunctional

politics and have social repercussions far beyond the boundaries of the affected state. This

implies ethnic divisions make cooperation more difficult and victimization more likely.

Collier argues that to solve sub-national ethnic identifications, governments could engage in

the sort of virulent nationalism which Europe used in its own building of national identities.

Alternatively, governments could accede to the demand for ethnic self-determination

creating many new states.

Ethnic diversity neither increases the risk of civil war nor reduces economic growth. Multi-

ethnic societies can usually be socially and economically fully viable. Ethnicity as a basis

for identity is a social rather than psychological phenomenon. It is seen as cultural and

political phenomenon. As a cultural phenomenon, ethnicity is highly persistent i.e. people

choose transmit their culture by marrying within their own group (Bisin and Verdier, 2000).

As a political phenomenon, ethnic diversity is considerably more fluid. It is indeed implied

by ‗national building‘.

Moreover, he argued basing group membership upon kinship provides clear rules of

lifetime membership thereby overcoming the standard problems of adverse selection.

Kinship also provides high observability of behavior that means it ensures groups are well-

informed about anti-social behaviors and discourage moral hazards. A society composed of

multiple kin groups is more efficient than a homogeneous, but atomized society. Kin groups

do not divide a pre-existing whole, but rather aggregate an atomized society into groups

27

large enough to reap the gains from collective actions. Effective political groupings are too

large to be based upon social interaction and so must be based upon an imagined share

identity (Anderson, 1983).

Modern ethnic political loyalties start from reciprocal economic obligations within a kin

group, extend to an imagined community of shared interest within a tribe, and often extend

to allowances with other tribes to form a political party. The fear of ethnic politics in

societies with ethnic minorities will lead to the permanent exclusion of other groups and

discrimination against them. Together with Ashish Garg, they analyzed the effects of ethnic

diversity in the Ghanaian labor market (Collier and Garg, 1999). They found ethnic

diversity had consequences which are highly problematic. Controlling for other

characteristics, they argue that workers from tribes that are locally the largest usually

command a substantial wage premium. This they explained in terms of the power of kin

group patronage in promotions, with larger groups having disproportionate power. The

problem from this scenario is poor national economic policy. Ethnic diversity makes

political cooperation more difficult (Easterly and Levine, 1997).

Collier and Garg (1999) found that in the public sector, the patronage-induced wage

premiums for the locally largest tribe was twenty-five (25) percent whereas in the private

sector, it was zero. They analyzed this by arguing that, in the private sector, competition

force firms to curb the patronage power of kinship. More so, Collier argues ethnic diversity

is damaging if it takes the form of dominance. Political protest is more common in

ethnically diverse societies and political violence is less common. Diversity not

homogeneity lowers the risk of conflict (Bates 1999, p.31). Dominance (one ethnic group

in permanent) may produce victimization and so increase the risk of rebellion.

―Fragmentalization‖ however is predicted to make rebellion more difficult because to be

militarily viable, a rebel organization must maintain cohesion. In Collier‘s work with Anke

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Hoeffler (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000), they found ethnic dominance indeed doubles

the risk of civil war and fragmentation significantly reduces the risk.

Collier (2001) further went on to look at ethnicity in democratic regimes. To him, if

democratic politics is dysfunctional in ethnically diverse societies, then such societies need

a strong leader ‗above‘ politics to avoid these pressures; the introduction of party loyalties

based on ethnic affiliation does not substantially change outcomes, but rather it is likely to

have significant negative effects in either single-issue politics or multi-issue politics.

Single-issue politics assumes government is constrained and all citizens must benefit

equally from the provision of a public good or service. With this kind of politics, ethnic

politics makes no difference to political decisions regardless of whether diversity takes the

form of fragmentation or dominance. Even when ethnic identification is strongly correlated

with an interest, ethnic politicking makes surprisingly little difference. When diversity takes

the form of fragmentation, ethnic politicking will normally have only a negligible effect;

but when it takes the form of ethnic identification dominance, it will have a significant

effect if the dominant group has a small plurality and if at the same time, there is a large

difference between that group and others.

Multi-issue politics, in this system, the absence of identification makes political parties (if

they exist at all) to be weak. In here, political parties‘ survivals depend on their ability to

deliver ―expenditure‖ to the people, rather than on party loyalties. In multi-issue politics,

there is no ‗core‘, i.e. there is no equilibrium and the likely outcome is therefore instability

(Imman and Rubenstein, 1997). The political system continues to try to build minimum

winning coalitions which capture all the benefits of public expenditure for its own

members. Hence, majorities keep forming and breaking up. The effects of exogenous party

loyalties i.e. no ethnic group constitute majority are mutual gains from cooperation if only a

bargain can be negotiated and enforced. The more ethnically fractionalized a society is, the

29

greater the number of political parties, the more difficult it might arrive at a cooperative

solution.

In conclusion, Collier argues any system in which electoral allegiance is based on identity

will have cooperation problems as well as instability. Ethnic dominance confers durable

power on a winning ethnic group which sacrifices growth and redistribution of resources

and to solve the problems of ethnic dominance, there is the need for better protection of

minority rights in societies with ethnic majorities. Rights of equal treatment, individual or

group need to be incorporate into the popular conception of democracy as well as ethnic

employment patronage in the public sector could be countered by greater transparency in

hiring and promotions perhaps reinforced by targets and quota protection for minorities plus

the boundary between public and private activity should be drawn somewhat different.

Cheeseman and Ford (2007) examine the significance of ethnicity as a political cleavage

across African nations. They look at ‗ethnic voting‘ of all significant parties and ethnic

groups. They divide ethnic voting by dividing it into two- ―ethnic polarization and ethnic

diversity‖. The former captures the importance of ethnic identification in determining party

support levels while the latter captures variations in the ethnic diversity of the support base

of different parties. Ethnicity has long been understood as playing a crucial role in

structuring party politics in Africa (Horowitz, 1985; Palmberg, 1999; Posner, 1999). Norris

and Maltes (2003) find that ethnicity does play an important role in determining support for

ruling parties but ethnicity is not always the primary cleavage in African politics. Scarrit

and Mazaffar (2005) demonstrate that both ethno-political fragmentation and geographical

concentration of ethnic groups are important factors in explaining the number of political

parties.

They argue again that, the vast majority of political parties in Africa are not ‗ethnic parties‘.

On average, opposition parties are less ethnically diverse than ruling parties and both ruling

30

and opposition parties are diverging. While ruling parties are becoming increasing

ethnically diverse and less ethnically polarized, the opposite is generally true of opposition

parties, making the evolution of ethnicity as a political cleavage complex. The need for

incumbent parties to build large coalitions in order to retain power appears to have

encouraged the development of multi-ethnic political alliances which are becoming

increasingly representative of the national population. This scenario is likely to continue as

aspirant leaders recognize the electoral need to prevent themselves as national, rather than

sectional or regional leaders.

They argue that, if this continue, it is more likely to undermine the salience of ethnic

identifications as cleavages. Interestingly, many opposition parties have responded to

electoral defeat by mobilizing increasingly ethnically homogenous communities. The

underlying tension between the ‗included‘ and the ‗excluded‘ if not dealt with could prove

divisive in the future. The level of ethnic representation is significant as it is likely to have a

strong impact in question of legitimacy of regimes, trust and ultimately political stability.

The majority of ruling parties between 2001 and 2006 have been ethnically

‗unrepresentative‘ of the population they serve. This is as a result, of incumbent parties

becoming more ethnically diverse and less ethnically polarized. This could reduce the

significance of ethnicity as a political dividing line and suggests that multi-party elections

may promote ,rather than hinder the emergence of a ‗non ethnic‘ politics.

In addition, they argue that there is a synergy between ethnic identity and party affiliation.

In Ghana after 2001, using a kappa score, Ghana scored 0.508(2001), 0.340(2003) and

0.352(2006). Countries scoring below 0.250 suggest that ethnicity is not the predominant

political factor in those countries and they included Botswana - 0.168(2001), 0.088(2003)

and0.136 (2006) and Mali after 2001 – 0.216(2003) and 0.244(2006). In 2001 and 2006,out

of ten(10) countries, eight(8) showed that ethnic polarization of support of ruling parties fell

31

between these periods suggesting that incumbent were recruiting support from across the

societies they ruled. Surprisingly, ethnic polarization of opposing parties supports rose in

six(6) out of the ten(10) countries surveyed of which Ghana recorded

0.452(2001),0.312(2003) and 0.364(2006).

Based on knowing whether parties are ethnic parties, they classified ethnic parties in five

categories as follows:-

(I) Parties which receive 85 percent and 100 percent of their support from one

ethnic group as ‗ethnic parties‘.

(II) Parties receiving less than 85 percent but more than 66.6 percent of their support

from on ethnic group as ‗potentially ethnic‘ parties. Such parties are neither so

dominated by one group that they will be encouraged to tailor policies solely to

that community nor independent enough of the support of the group that the

party leadership can risk alienating this support base.

(III) Parties which receive between 33.3 percent and 66.6 percent of their votes from

one ethnic group as ‗multi-ethnic‘ parties. These are genuinely broad based

alliance in which the party is reliant on support from a number of different

ethnic groups. The importance of cross-ethnic support to these parties must offer

policies which are attractive to a range of communities.

(IV) Multi-ethnic parties-majority ethnic group receive between 50 percent and 66.6

percent and mottle-ethnic party-no majority ethnic group (33.3 percent and 50

percent).

(V) Finally, where the largest ethnic group constitute less than a third of the parties

total support. The party is ‗non ethnic‘.

Mahama (2013) examines the potential dangers of ethnic manipulation as capital tool on

one hand and ethnic conflict on the other and how they affect the consolidation of Ghana‘s

32

effort of democracy. He argues that continued spread of ethnic conflict and deepening of

existing ones coupled with the dangers of ethnic identity by political entrepreneurs is not

only threat but harmful to the country‘s democracy. He affirms that strengthening

democratic institutions and civil society among others is the way forward for the

consolidation of our fragile democracy. Ethnic groups possess their culture, customs,

norms, beliefs and traditions. There is usually a common language and boundary

maintenance between members and non-members.

He goes on to argue ethnic rivalries of the pre-colonial era, variance in the impact of

colonialism upon different regions of the country, and the uneven distribution of social and

economic amenities in post-independence Ghana have all contributed to the present-day

tensions among ethnics. Ethnic and regional considerations have played significant roles in

the fortunes of political parties in Ghana. Ethnic mobilization and exploitation have

characterized Ghanaian politics for very long and the deepening of this trend is a hindrance

to our efforts of consolidating our democracy. The effort of consolidating our democracy is

not a choice but a necessity if we are to continue priding ourselves as the beacon of African

democracy. The deepening of ethnic division mostly aligned to the political division and the

upsurge and/or renewal of ethnic conflict due to apparent political manipulation for

electoral gain is a worry as far as our future of democracy is concerned.

In addition to these, conflict situations are caused by several factors including chieftaincy

issues though the bottom line is often ethnic and examples are the Bawku conflict between

the Kusasis and Mamprusis, the Dagombas and Nanumbas and more recently between the

Fantes and Ewes in Ekumfi. Ethnic diversity is not just beautiful due partly to the exquisite

blend of culture, but when characterized by unity; togetherness and tolerance could yield

many dividends in our country‘s national life. Ethnic discrimination and stereotyping by

33

some ethnic groups against others easily draw people closer to where they feel accepted and

identified with and that could account for this significant alignment.

Finally, injustice is a breeding grounding for anarchy and self-defense. Ghana‘s democracy

is characterized by weak institutions, lack luster civil society and corruption which render

the country‘s democracy more vulnerable and susceptible to the dangers of ethnic

politicking and manipulative ethnic conflicts for political gains. Political leadership should

also work towards strengthening the capacity of government and democratic institutions to

allow for their effective and efficient functioning to help provide the needed services to

Ghanaians.

Ansell and Gash (2007) look at what is termed ‗collaborative governance‘ both in theory

and practice. Collaborative governance brings public and private stakeholders together in

collective forum with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making.

They examine the conditions under which collaborative governance will be more or less

effective as an approach to policy making and public management. Collaborative

governance emerged as a response to the failures of downstream implementation and to the

high cost and politicization of regulation. It also arose from the growth of knowledge and

institutional capacity. They define collaborative governance as ‗a governing arrangement

where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective

decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims

to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets‘. Lynn, Heinrich

and Hill (2007) construe governance broadly as ―regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions,

and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly

supported goods and services.

They define collaborative governance as a type of governance in which public and private

actors work collectively in distinctive ways, using particular processes, to establish laws

34

and rules for the provision of public goods. Their definition stipulates a specific role for

public agencies and look specifically at the executive branch. Public agencies initiate

collaborative forums either to fulfill their own purposes or to comply with a mandate

including court orders, legislation or rules governing the allocation of central government

funds. Stakeholder is defined by them as the participation of citizens as individuals and to

the participation of organized groups. Collaborative governance is never consultative. It

implies two-way communication and influence between agencies and stakeholders and also

opportunities for stakeholders to talk with each other. The institutionalization of a collective

decision-making process is paramount in understanding collaborative governance.

In addition to these arguments, resources/liabilities of collaboration include a level of trust,

conflict and social capital. Power imbalances between stakeholders are a commonly noted

problem in collaborative governance and they produce distrust or weak commitment. If

some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status or resources to participate

or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance

process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors. The power imbalances are

particularly problematic where important stakeholders do not have the organizational

infrastructure to be represented in the governance process. Another problem is that, some

stakeholders may not have the skills and expertise to engage in discussions about highly

technical problems(Gunton and Day,2003;Lasker and Weiss,2003;Merkhofer et

al.,1997;Murdock et al.,2005;Warner,2006).

A third is that, some stakeholders do not have the time, energy or liberty to engage in time-

intensive collaborative processes (Yaffee and Wondoleak, 2003). Power and resource

imbalances affect the incentives of groups to participate in collaborative process (Gunton

and Day, 2003; Imperial, 2005). Power differences among players influence their

willingness to come to the table (Gray, 1989). Incentives to participate depend in part upon

35

stakeholders‘ expectations about where the collaborative processes will yield meaningful

results especially against the balance of time and energy (Bradford, 1998; Geoghegan and

Renard, 2002; Rogers et al. 1993; Schneider et al. 2003; Warner 2006).

In conclusion, they argue that venue shopping can easily undercut collaborative processes.

Incentives to participate in collaborative governance will also increase if stakeholders

perceive achievements of their goals to be dependent on cooperation from other

stakeholders(Logsdon,1991);where incentives to participate are weak, power and resources

are asymmetrically distributed and prior antagonisms are high, leadership becomes all the

more important. The more stakeholders fundamentally distrust each other, the more

leadership must assume the role of honest broker.

Tong (2009) looks at the causes of ethnic peace and that of ethnic violence. She examines

how ‗master narratives‘, scarce resources and democratic institutions have influenced the

occurrence of ethnic violence. She uses four (4) countries- Ghana, Cote d‘Ivoire, Kenya and

Tanzania in analysis ethnic peace and ethnic violence. She pairs a peaceful one with a

violent one and so pairs as specific ―Ghana and Cote d‘Ivoire‖ and ―Kenya and Tanzania‖.

In order to ensure peace, nations ought to learn how to cultivate societies of civic trust

across ethnic lines. Colonialism has influenced how African nations have attempted to

develop and the way in which democracy has been pursued. Political institutions best

explain the occurrence of ethnic peace. Free press, independent legislatures and viable

opposition parties provide peaceful ways to resolve competitions between ethnic groups.

She further argues cultural identity, scarce resources and political manipulations by elites

are not sufficient variables for understanding all facets of ethnic violence. Without

politically viable ethnic cleavages, there is nothing for elites to exploit, nor is there any sort

of ethnic bases for such conflicts. Ethnic groups are used by political elites or the people to

make the rational choice to compete with other ethnic groups over scarce resources or

36

access to political power such as executive office. While economic scarcity empirically

explains some cases of violence, it fails to explain how it is that so many poor countries are

peaceful. The same can be said for political manipulation which is present in many cases of

violence.

In conclusion, Tong argues strong institutions create civic trust which means citizens

believe that the ballot is more powerful than the bullet and therefore, institutions prevent

ethnic violence and contribute to the existence of ethnic peace in various countries.

Jedwab (2001) argues that the strength of communal expressions of identity very often

depend upon the extent to which a group is able to mobilize persons around shared interests

and objectives. Understanding the processes by which leaders emerge can provide valuable

insights into institutional life and the manner in which a community sets its agenda and

establishes priorities. The ability to retain and recruit effective leaders could be an

important source of group persistence. He examines the relationship between leadership,

governance and politics of identity. Social identity presumes that ‗part of a person‘s self-

definition is the knowledge of membership in a social group (or groups) together with the

value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1982). The feelings

for differentials among people are a panacea for ethnic identification (Barth, 1969).

He defines an ethnic group as comprising of persons who view themselves as belonging to

a special group and sharing particular attributes. Identity formation and the resulting

communal leadership are undoubtedly influenced by historic and demographic

considerations as well as the broader socioeconomic contexts within which the group

evolves. Aside the degree of openness or hostility of the surrounding environment to the

promotion of varying expression of identity such as rootedness of the society, pattern of

immigration of a group, its unity and diversity are important to identity formation

(Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). Notion of leadership is very much linked to the issue of

37

power and influence. Power cannot be separated from the control of resources because

many of the key decisions in political systems deal with such matters.

Moreover, the economic conditions and social status of a society may have a significant

bearing on the nature of governance and leadership as identity needs are addressed by

institutions and the individuals who run them. Finally, knowledge of the evolution of the

ethno cultural communities in not only critical to understanding their modes of governance,

as well as leadership development and identity formation, but effective leadership networks

are formed where opportunities are maximized for the pooling of resources and the

combination of action.

Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004) look at ethnic structures, inequality and governance in

the public sector in Ghana. They argue that, no part of Ghana is ethnically homogenous, an

overriding feature of the country‘s ethnic polarization of north-south divide. The problem

of inequality has been partially addressed through representation and the symbolism of

appointments of individuals from a variety of ethno-territorial and religious backgrounds to

prominent positions in government, the public and quasi state services. It appears

institutional structures as well as distribution of symbolic and bureaucratic resources which

foster inclusion, cohesion and participation have helped the checking of ethnic polarization

in the Ghanaian society.

They analyze the effectiveness of the governance institutions or arrangements and public

policies to regulate political competition and conflicts in the public sector in order to build a

peace, stable and inclusive society; how successive governments have perceived and

managed the main cleavages and inequalities and most crucially, what types of institutions

and public sectors have been adopted by governments successively in the management of

these cleavages and inequalities. They argued that inequality in Ghana has been determined

by factors such as geography, gender, disability and class. Inequality of opportunities

38

among the peoples of Ghana is often the result of the combined effect of objective factors

such as differentials of resource endowment, history and public policy, as well as subjective

factors such as prejudices and attitudes (Ghana Human Development Report, 1997).

In addition, they argue that ethnic politics in Ghana emerged after the overthrow of

Nkrumah‘s Convention People CPP in 1966 by what they described as ‗the comrades in

crime‘, Ashanti (Major Afrifa) and Ewe (Colonel Kotoka).

They further say Ashanti-Ewe rivalry has persisted into the 4th

Republic with Ashanti-Ewe

exceptionalism in voting patterns. While other regions distribute their votes, Ashanti and

Volta Regions concentrate their votes on their home-based parties in all the elections held

since the commencement of the 4th

Republic. The NDC sweeping votes of Volta region by

94.5percent,93.2percent and 88.47percent respectively in the 1992.1996 and 2000

presidential elections, while the NPP won approximately 66percent,61percent and

80percent respectively in Ashanti region. The regional impact on electoral outcome in

Ghana is very difficult to gauge mainly because some regions are largely coterminous with

ethnic groups or sub-groups of ethnic groups while others are not. Akan voters often

support and vote for individuals and candidates who are not Akans and similarly, non-Akan

voters support and vote also for parties and individuals who are Akans.

Moreover, they argue that, although regional patterns of voting could contain hidden ethnic

dimensions, the trajectory of electoral politics in Ghana depict that, even though ethnic

cleavage is significant, it is nevertheless the sole variable which determines the outcomes of

elections. The conscious efforts on the part of political parties to present ethnically mixed

presidential slates in elections have contributed largely to the diffusion of ethnic imbalance

in the voting pattern in presidential elections.

Again, they cite the 2000 Elections as example and were quick to say ethno-regional factors

alone would not significantly explain the patterns of voting in the three (3) Northern

39

Regions as NDC retained its dominance by winning the majority of the votes cast in both

presidential ballots but the NPP managed to increase its share of votes from about

30percent in the first round to about 49percent in the run-off due partly because the

People‘s National Convention (PNC) gave its support to the NPP. In the Public Service,

they focused on the position of Chief Directors for the various ministries and other

establishments. The first appointments were made in September, 1993. Out of the

seventeen(17) people appointed, eleven(11) were Akans, three(3) Ewes, two(2) Gas and a

Northern under NDC but when the NPP came to power, out of the seventeen(17) Chief

Directors appointed in 2003, nine(9) were Akans, two(2) Ewes, four(4) Gas and two(2)

Northerners.

Also, they argue that, there is a strong belief that party affiliation, ethnic identification and

region of origin are highly influential and possibly the most influential factors in public

service appointments aside based on merits. The 1992 Constitution contains notable

proclamation and extensive provisions on good governance and participation. It does this

through the entrenchment of certain rights and innovations such as recognition of

economic, educational and cultural rights, along with the traditional constitutional concern

with civil, political and private property rights. They argue these are to promote policies

and programs that override sectional, ethnic and other loyalties in recruitment and

appointments to public office. They also seek to foster the inclusion of groups and regions

who do not support or vote for the government of the day to be represented in government.

Finally, they point to the provision in the 1992 Constitution which require a person to attain

a vote of more than 50percent to be president encourage politicians and political parties to

forge alliances and to broaden their support by seeking votes outside their traditional ethnic

strongholds. The overall dominance of the Akan group in economic and social life and in

the public sector represent the main features of ethnic and regional polarization in Ghana

40

and fragmentation among the various ethnic groups encourage cross-ethnic coalitions and

help to foster crude but stable inter-ethnic conflicts.

Ofosu (2008) looks at connections between ethnicity and political choices during elections

and applies institutional analyses. She uses Fanteakwa electoral politics to explain

democratization and ethnic identity and uses three institutions of local powers to explain

when ethnicity becomes a significant factor as a political tool. She argues that, although

people determine their political allegiance on the basis of political familiarity, they also do

so because of economic well-being as a basis. To her, the institutional relationship and

features of a political party locally, local government administration and chieftaincy define

how resources are apportioned, who gets what and when and because of this, electorates are

sometimes made to rely on ethnic cleavages. Locality is also a more salient factor than

ethnicity in determining how people reason about their political choices in a multi-ethnic

setting. Again, formal institutions determine the kinds of social cleavages that matter in

politics. Institutions delineate the strategic context of social, economic and political

interactions in which ethnicity would or could not be salient but critical in the processes of

democratization which introduce political parties and decentralized local government into

local setting already structured politically in part by differentials in ethnicity.

Moreover, Ofosu argues chieftaincy gives ethnicity its potential verve in its relation to local

political parties and the district assembly. Ethnicity is a sociocultural and historical variable

shaped by the character of the institutions operating at the local levels as well as an

instrument in the context of those institutions. Other sociopolitical organizations such as

villages, clans, administrative areas and political parties are influential in the political

process. Ultimately, political interests are defined by one‘s village of origin and immediate

chiefly authority.

41

Finally, she argues ethnicity is the major challenge to an equitable distribution of the

benefits of national citizenship. In fact, it is the positioning of local interests within an

institutional framework of chieftaincy, district assembly and political parties that determine

who can fully exercise the rights of national citizenship at the local level.

In conclusion, ethnic identity occurs when there is ethnocentrism, competition for resources

and inequalities in power. Ethnocentrism makes groups disparaged depending on the extent

of their differences from the majority; competitions among groups occurs when they vie for

the same resources but it need not lead to the feel of being ethnically identified if values

concerning freedoms and equality are held and enforced; and the inequality in power

enables one group to impose its will upon the others. Power permits the dominant group to

render the subordinate groups ineffectual as competitors and to institutionalize the

distribution of rewards and opportunities to consolidate their positions. Ethnicity is a factor

when it comes to the analyses of Ghanaian politics and it is a way of understanding why

certain policies and programs are made by different governments under different leadership

era but there are other significant factors which underpin the reasons for various styles of

governance and leadership in their running of their administrations.

42

Chapter 3

METHOD SECTION

The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools but it is rooted

in much of a quantitative epistemological position that recognizes the significance of

locating the research within a particular socio-cultural perspectives. It took essentially

the identities participants construct within them. The study looked at Ghana‘s politics in

relation to how ethnic identification influences it especially in the 4th

Republic. In

addition, the study involved the use of documentaries, case studies and field works, and

employment of both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses.

Documentary research involves the use of texts and documents as source materials. We

employed those obtained from newspapers, census publications and pictorial sources in

both the paper and electronic media in Ghana.

With the case studies, it is a descriptive, exploratory or explanatory analysis of issues.

In the case studies analyses, we will employ the retrospective analyses, where criteria

are established for selecting our case studies from historical resources such as the votes

obtained by both presidential candidates in the 2012 elections in relation to their home

regions.

The field work entailed intensive internet and documentary researches to help us with

the theoretical foundations of the study. Again, it entails the usage of face-to-face

interviewing and issuance of questionnaires to various people from all works of life in

order to sample their views and opinions about ―ethnicity and politics in the Ghanaian

4th

Republic‖. With the issuance of the questionnaires, people were sent a short epitome

of the study‘s aim and possible questions and the interviews entails the asking of

participants through personal contacts by using well coded questions.

43

At the onset of the personal interviews, people were informed of the relevance of

conducting such research and clarifications and distortions were made and expelled

from participants‘ minds.

We used a sample size of 375 in all because we want it to really be representative of the

population, in this case the people of Ghana. We employed the use of random

probability sampling by using that of the multi-cluster sampling techniques, where we

take regions such as Greater Accra, Eastern and Ashanti, and we scale them down to

district, municipal and metropolitan areas such as the Ga-West Municipal, Akim-Oda

District, Kumasi Metropolitan and Asokore-Mampong Municipality. After finding the

areas, we chose households randomly and from each household at least two people

were selected and at most four.

The issuances of questionnaires to participants were 200 and interviewed 175 people.

Out of the 375, we used a purposive sampling of 70% as men and 30% as women

because a pilot test with about 100 people was carried out and we realized that, women

are reluctant when it comes to the issue of politics and men are more active players of

politics in Ghana.

Qualitative methods are used because; they have the ability to obtain more realistic

views of participants which cannot be experienced in ‗8numerical data and statistical

analyses. Also, they yield results that can be helpful in pioneering new ways of

understanding and providing holistic views of the phenomena under investigation but

they are limited by drafting away from the marginal objectives of the research in

response to the changing nature of the context, arriving at different conclusions based

on the same information depending on the personal characteristics of the research.

Again, we employed quantitative methods such as the student t-test due to the

employment of the inferential statistics, chi-square- for comparing the categorical

44

responses between two variables, Cohen Kappa, for measuring the agreement between

the two raters, i.e. ethnicity and politics in terms of looking at the Akans and non-

Akans, the confidence level for the reliability of such data to be obtained, and

correlation coefficient by using the Pearson‘s product-moment correlation. The

Pearson‘s correlation is used to check the relationships that exist between two or more

variables by looking at their dependencies or independence of one another.

Finally, we employed the use of computational method through the usage of SPSS

(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software.

45

Chapter 4

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we looked at the influence of ethnicity in the Ghanaian politics

especially in the 4th

Republic. Looking at the factor of ethnicity in the Ghanaian

politics, we issued 200 questionnaires to people who are 18years and above and of

sound mind that are deemed eligible to exercise their franchise to elect leaders in any

general election.

Out of the 200 interviewees, majority of the people were Akans (i.e. 99 people

representing 49.5 percent), and about 5.5 percent said they do not consider themselves

as belonging to an ethnic group. Out the 200 respondents, 136 voted in the at least the

last General Election representing 68 percent; and out of the 136 people about 46

percent did vote for the New Patriotic Party (NPP), about 40 percent for the National

Democratic Congress (NDC), and about 7 percent each voted for the Progressive

People‘s Party (PPP) and the others.

46

Figure 4-1

Source: Field study 2014

Interestingly, out of 136 respondents who voted in the last elections, 96 representing

close to 71 percent are party supporters or sympathizers of the various parties.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

votes percentages

46

40

7 7

NPP

NDC

PPP

OTHERS

47

Table 4-1

Source: Field Study 2014

In reference to the choices of influence in terms of choosing candidates, only 134

people answered that portion of it. Out of these respondents, 14.2 percent went for

personality; 5.2 percent said manifesto (party platform) influenced them; 23.1 percent

were influenced by past achievements of the various parties particularly the New

Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC); ideology (i.e. what the

political party stands for) was the major influence which represents 32.1 percent and

finally 25.4 percent being influenced by ethnic affiliations.

Majority of the Akan ethnic group said they voted for the New Patriotic Party (NPP)

representing 69.5 percent of those who voted and about 20.3 percent voted for the

National Democratic Congress (NDC). With the non- Akans, especially the Ewes,

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

14.20%

5.20%

23.10%

32.10%

25.40%

Choice of Influence

choice of influence

48

majority voted for the NDC (i.e. 69.6 percent voted for the NDC) followed by the Gas

representing 48 percent of the valid votes cast among the respondents.

Of the 55 people who voted for the NDC, about 78.2 percent of them belong to the non-

Akan ethnic groups whilst about 30.5 percent did vote for the NPP.

With the issue of trust of government among these multi-polar ethnic groups we have in

Ghana, only about 33.7 percent said they trust the governments meaning about 66.3

percent have no trust in the government. With the question of parties campaigning on

ethnic lines, 96 people said either the NPP or NDC campaigned mutually exclusively or

both representing 48 percent of all the respondents which calls for serious analyses.

The question on whether only leaders from their ethnic groups could really advocate for

the needs of their people, 43.6 percent said they agree and another 39.6 percent saying

that they disagree with that perception and about 19. 7 percent are not sure whether they

agree or disagree with such analyses.

49

Figure 4-2

Source: Field Study 2014

0

14

0

12

4

1

22

Ethnic Groups

CPP

NDC

NONE

NPP

PNC

PPP

50

Table 4-2

Ethnic Groups Total

Akan Mole Dagbani Ewe Ga Others

second choice

Missing

(unticked)

45 1 7 7 1 61

CPP 14 0 1 3 4 22

NDC 0 3 1 2 1 7

None 12 3 11 13 6 45

NPP 4 0 5 2 1 12

PNC 1 3 1 1 2 8

PPP 22 1 5 4 1 33

Total 98 11 31 32 16 188

Source: Field Study 2014

Interestingly, when the question of if people were made to cast a second vote for

another party, only 127 answered that portion and out of the answered, 45

representing an approximation of 35% answered none of the parties, meaning that about

56% of them are entrenched supporters or sympathizers of all political parties (i.e.

missing and none together) and about 26% of the respondents answered that, they

would have casted a second ballot for the Progressive People‘s Party (PPP).

When the issue of ethnicity was asked as being dangerous to governance in Ghana,176

respondents believe it is strongly dangerous representing 84.3 percent of the sample

population which means that, whenever one picks 100 Ghanaians to sample their views

on ethnicity, it is estimated that about 84 people are likely to kick against campaigning

or politicking on ethnic lines.

51

We further looked what the major factors which influence ethnic groups when voting

for a person and this was how the respondents answered them:

Table 4-3

Case Processing Summary

Cases

Valid Missing Total

N Percent N Percent N Percent

ethnic group * choice of

influence

130 65.0% 70 35.0% 200 100.0%

Source: Field Study

In the table above, it looks at the relationship between various ethnic groups and their

choice of influence. In here, only 130 people answered representing a percentage of

65% of all respondents during the interview session.

52

Table 4-4

Choice of Influence

Total

personality party platform

past

achievements ideology Ethnicity

Ethnic

Group

Akan 5 5 17 21 5 53

Mole Dagbani 3 0 4 2 2 11

Ewe 3 1 5 11 6 26

Ga 8 0 2 3 13 26

Others 0 1 3 2 8 14

Total 19 7 31 39 34 130

Source: Field Study 2014

The table shows the choices of influences when it comes to the selections of leaders as

well as what influences various ethnic groups in their voting choices in the political

despension.

53

Figure 4-3

Source: Field Study 2014

From the graph above, ethnicity had 9% of the influence in terms of how Akans voted

with about 40% and 32% representing ideology (i.e. what they party stands for) and

achievements of the party respectively.

personality 10%

manifesto 9%

achievements 32%

ideology 40%

ethnicity 9%

Akans

personality

manifesto

achievements

ideology

ethnicity

54

Figure 4-4

Source: Field Study 2014

With that of Mole-Dagbani, 18.1% were influenced by their ethnicity and 63.7% being

influenced by either personality or achievement of the person or party.

27.30%

0

36.40%

18.10%

18.10%

Mole-Dagbani

personality

achievements

ideology

ethnicity

55

Figure 4-5

Source: Field Study 2014

Among the Ewe respondents, 23.1% said they were influenced by ethnicity, 11.5%

influenced by personality, 19.2% influenced by achievements of the person or party

with manifesto taking 3.8% as a factor of influence.

11.50% 3.80%

19.20%

42.30%

23.10%

Ewe

personality

manifesto

achievements

ideology

ethnicity

56

Figure 4-6

Source: Field Study 2014

Among the respondents who were Gas, 50% said ethnicity influenced their pattern of

voting, 7.7% said they were influenced by party or personality achievements, 30.8%

being influenced by personality and 11.50% were influenced by ideology of the parties

they casted their votes for.

Finally, we looked at the trust of state institutions in Ghana and the following were the

revelations unrevealed after the survey was conducted.

In sampling the views of people in terms of their trust of state institutions, we decided

to take about eight (8) and here is the breakdown of people‘s ratings of the state

institutions. From 0 to 4 shows the lowest rating of state institutions (i.e. not trusting at

all) and from 8-10 shows the highest rating (trust very well) in terms of trusting the

institution

With Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA), about 29.5% of the participants say they

really don‘t know whether they trust the institutions or they don‘t. Out of the 200

30.80%

7.70%

11.50%

50%

Ga

personality

achievements

ideology

ethnicity

57

participants representing 26 percent say they trust the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly

as an institution and about 88 people representing 44% not trusting.

Political parties in terms of trust had 29% of the participants, 12% of the participants

didn‘t know whether they trusted the institution or not, 118 people representing 59% of

the participants not trusting the political parties as a singular institution. With reference

to the cabinet as an institution, about 6 people represent 3% trust the institution, 113

people representing 56.5% not trusting the Cabinet as an institution, 12.5% of the

participants not knowing their levels of trust, and finally 28% lying in between trusting

and not trusting.

With Parliament, 12 people representing 6% trust the institution of Parliament, 109

people representing 54.5% not trusting the Parliament as an institution, 19 people

representing 9.5% not knowing their levels of trust and finally, 60 people representing

30% lying in between trusting and distrusting. About 83 people representing 41.5% do

not trust the Courts,30 people representing 15% highly trusting them,66 people

representing 33% lying in between not trusting and trusting very well of the Courts as

an institution, and finally about 21 people representing 10.5% not knowing their level of

personal trust for the institution.

With the issue of people trusting the Civil Service, about 36.5% don‘t trust the civil

service at all, 11.5% really trust the civil service, 12% in a dilemma of trusting or not

trusting and the ambivalence level of trust is about 40%.With the police as a key

institution of the state, about 7% representing 14 people really cannot ascertain their

level of trust in the institution, 11% representing 22 people really do have trust in the

police as an institution, 30% representing about 60 people lying in between not trusting

at all and really trusting the police as an institution and ultimately, 52% of the

respondents answered that, they do not trust the police as an institution of the state at

58

all. Amazingly, with the issue of trusting politicians, out of the 200 respondents, only 2

people representing 1.0% claim to trust them very well, about 8% not knowing their

level of trust of politicians, 27 people representing 14% lying in between trusting and

not trusting at all and a whopping number of 154 participants representing 77% not

trusting the politicians at all.

Figure 4-7

Source: Field Study, 2014.

COHEN KAPPA CO-EFFICIENT

( ) ( )

( )

During another interview, 100 people indicated that indeed ethnicity did influence them

in their choice of party affiliations when it came to voting but did say it was not the

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

average of trust of institutions

28.42%

13.58% 14.09%

11.86% 13.25%

14.62%

9.94% 9.36%

kma

political parties

cabinet

parliament

courts

civil service

police

politicians

59

main reason for their choice of candidate or party and the breakdown of their influences

and non-influences of the various groups are as follows.

AKANS

YES NO

NON AKANS

YES 20 25

NO 20 35

The ―Yes‖ and ―No‖ refers to whether they were influenced or not by ethnicity.

Pr (a) is the relative observed agreement among the raters; that is the agreement

between both Akans and Non-Akans that ethnicity influence them or not when it comes

to politics are 15 and 35 which are in the yes and nay places respectively. So to find Pr

(a), we add

. To calculate the Pr (e), that is the hypothetical

probability of chance agreements, using the observed data to calculate the probability of

each observer randomly. In order to find Pr (e), we note that:

*The Non-Akans said yes to a tune of 45 and says no to a tune of 55. Thus, Non-Akans

say yes to ethnicity as an influence 45.0%.

*The Akans said yes to a tune of 40 and nay to a tune of 60. Thus, the Akan

respondents said yes to ethnicity as a social cleavage as an influence in choosing their

leading 40.0%.

Therefore, the probability that both respondents are influenced by ethnicity is

0.40•0.45=0.18 and the probability that, both respondent replied in affirmative not as a

factor of influencing their choices in politics is 0.60•0.55=0.33. Thus, the overall

probability of random agreement is Pr (e) =0.18+0.33=0.51

So, therefore applying the formulae for Cohen's Kappa, we get:

60

K=Pr(a) Pr(e)

Pr( )

The Kappa co-efficient shows that there is a slight agreement among Akans and Non-

Akans that, indeed ethnicity as a social cleavage does influence their choice of voting.

Finally, with another 75 respondents answering to their level of closeness to the

state(Ghana), region and ethnic groupings in term of hierarchy, the statistics below

shows the number of persons who consider the state first or region first or ethnic group

first.

Table 4-5

STATE ETHNIC REGION

FIRST 40 23 12

SECOND 11 24 40

THIRD 24 28 23

Source: Field Study 2014

61

Figure 4-8

Source: Field Study 2014

Making an inference from the above data, it means that about 53.3% of the respondents

firstly consider themselves as Ghanaians, about 30.7% then see themselves coming

from an ethnic background and just a percentage of 16% see themselves as belonging to

their respective regions of residence. Secondly, in terms of second priority, the same

number of 40 people representing a percentage of about 53.3% consider region as very

important, then the ethnic group with a percentage of 32% followed by the state

(Ghana) with a percentage of 14.7%.

In another breadth, we looked at the 2004 General Election using archival research to

find out if ethnicity played a key role in the election that saw the second term of John

Agyekum Kuffour, a man perceived to have promoted the hegemony of Ashanti‘s, a

group of Akans

Table 4-6

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

first second third

state

ethnic

region

62

Western 1774037 1388738 78.28

Central 1476584 1208608 81.96

Greater Accra 2679991 1065509 39.7

Eastern 1980719 1031498 52.08

Ashanti 3154862 2458088 77.91

Brong Ahafo 1705612 1069744 62.71

Volta 1525744 129384 8.48

Northern Region 1740700 174469 10.02

Upper East 851537 19186 2.25

Upper West 5480807 17524 3.19

SOURCE: GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE, 2000 POPULATION CENSUS.

The first section refers to the regions in Ghana, second shows total population per

region, and next is Akan population per region and lastly the percentage of Akans in

each region.

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF 2004 GENERAL ELECTION

Table 4-7

REGION POLITICAL PARTIES

NPP NDC PNC CPP IND.

Greater Accra 17 10 0 0 0

Ashanti Region 36 2 0 0 0

Eastern 22 6 0 0 0

Central 16 2 0 1 0

Western 12 8 0 2 0

Volta 1 20 0 0 0

Brong Ahafo 14 10 0 0 0

Northern 8 17 0 0 1

SOURCE: PEACEFMONLINE.COM.

From this data, it shows empirically that, ethnicity played a major role in determining

the outcome of the 2004 General Election since the NPP which is dominated by Akans

had majority of their parliamentary seats from there especially in Ashanti Region

63

where, the leader of the party, J.A. Kuffour had more seats there and that region alone

contributed almost about 28% of their parliamentary seats.

2012 GENERALELECTIONS- PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS

Table 4-8

REGION NEW

PATRIOTIC

PARTY

SEATS

(%)

REGION NATIONAL

DEMOCRATIC

CONGRESS

SEATS

(%)

ASHANTI ASANTI

BRONG

AHAFO

BRONG

AHAFO

CENTRAL CENTRAL

EASTERN 26 EASTERN

GREATER

ACCRA

GREATER

ACCRA

NORTHERN NORTHERN

UPPER

EAST

UPPER

EAST

UPPER

WEST

UPPER

WEST

VOLTA VOLTA

WESTERN WESTERN

64

SOURCE: ELECTORAL COMMISSION, GHANA.

From the data above, it is evidently clear that ethnicity as a social cleavage in terms of

being a political tool for mobilization did not play a key instrument as the National

Democratic Congress(NDC) convincingly won most of the Akans dominated areas, that

is Central, Brong Ahafo and Western Regions as against a political party perceived as

an Akin dominated affiliate aside the Non-Akans but let me quickly add that, in fact

ethnicity played a role especially for the two parties leaders since they are won

convincingly in their native regions, that is Eastern and Northern Regions.

65

Chapter 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS, FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to explore ways in which Ghana as a country can use its

ethnic differences to shape its politics to bring about visible socioeconomic

transformations that will raise the living standards of its citizenry. Specifically, the

study examines how ethnicity influence our politics; investigates how ethnicity is

manifested in Ghanaian politicking and how ethnicity can serve as a political tool

without causing conflicts, tensions, dissatisfaction and instability in Ghana.

5.2 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTIONS

The research questions for this study are: (1) ethnicity has an influence on national and

local governmental politics in Ghana. (2) How does the invocation of ethnic identity

impact governance and leadership in Ghanaian politics? (3) How can Ghana ensure

that, the use of ethnic identification as a political cleavage does not cause

dissatisfaction, instability, tensions, conflicts and violence? (4) To what extent can one

say the actions of political actors especially leaders are influenced by their ethnic

inclinations?

5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research used descriptive research methodology, face-to- face interviews and

survey techniques to collect data from respondents who partook in helping us get the

66

information needed across the country by the using of a probability sampling technique

(i.e. multi-cluster probability sampling technique). Data collected from the survey and

face-to-face interview respondents represented their views, opinions and perceptions

regarding ethnicity in Ghanaian politics and performance of leaders.

A coded stratified random sample was selected from the population of Ghana. The

interviewees completed a survey questionnaire that addressed their views and

perceptions of ethnic influence in Ghanaian politics. The sample in the study is

disaggregated by regions to address the fact that there is wide variation in the number of

Ghanaians within each of the selected areas. The numbers in the sample are based on

studies by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). A coded stratified random sample of 375

respondents was utilized for this study.

5.4 RESULTS

Out of the total surveys and face-to- face interviews analyzed, 80 people representing

about 21% of all respondents were from the Ga-West Municipal Assembly in Greater

Accra Region. 95 people representing about 25% of all respondents from the Kwame

University of Science and Technology (KNUST), 20 people from the Eastern Region

and 180 people from the surroundings of both Asokore-Mampong Municipal Assembly

as well as Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

The majority of the participants indicated that they live in the cities (90%). Next, 8

percent reported suburban and only 2 % indicated they live in the rural communities.

The ethnic affiliations and identifications reported by those who responded to the

survey and interviews. The majority of the respondents are males (75%) and females

(25%) but mostly from the Akan ethnic group.

67

Section A of the survey contained four questions (1-4) which required selected

respondents to talk about their ethnic identification; Section B containing political

participation and party identification (5-11). Section C contained questions on

perception of leaders‘ performance (12-13), Section D with that of political trust (14-

16) and other issues in Section E (17-20). Results indicated that the majority of the

interviewees (95%) considered themselves as belonging to an ethnic group. More than

65% considered themselves as being attached to their ethnic groups with the breakdown

as follows: close (20%) or very close (45%).

5.5 DISCUSSIONS

Ethnic groups are ancient and natural phenomenon. Ethnicity is as a result of inherent

long standing ascribed identity which was inherited from one‘s ancestors and can never

be changed. Also, ethnicity is seen as an instrument for gaining resources especially that

of political and economic. The usage of ethnicity yields dividends to its users; and

ethnicity is a socially construed terminology.

From the study, people are much attached to their ethnic orientations and majority of

the respondents confirm that indeed they all belong to various ethnic groups since they

all come from families confirming the theory of the primordialists view. In addition to

that, most people argued that indeed they first consider themselves as Ghanaians but it

is just that when one is seen or spoken to, people immediately ask whether they are

from this particular ethnic affiliation or not, thus also confirming that, indeed ethnic

identity is also a constructed identity which affirms the view of the Constructionists.

Furthermore, the study shows that, ethnicity is a social construction especially for

socio-political goals since majority of Ghanaians first and foremost see themselves as

68

distinct ethnic groupings when it comes to lobbying of appointments and seeking the

mandates of the electorates during electoral voting but after that, these same people and

politicians try to draw the electorates‘ attention of being Ghanaians first before their

regions of residence or ethnic belonging.

With a multi-polar society like Ghana, the trust of political institutions are very low

ranging between 10 percent and 29 percent of the population and there is also lack of

social cohesion among citizens since majority of the populace of Ghana look at their

ethnic interests at the utmost expense of the state leading the retardation of socio-

economic and political development. Interestingly, majority of Ghanaians consider

ethnicity as dangerous to national cohesion and development.

Finally, most Ghanaians are torn in between whether only leaders from their various

ethnics could adequately represent them or not; about the same percentage argued for

that view and also against such phenomenon in the Ghanaian politics.

5.6 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reformation of social policies should include the protection of the vulnerable by

systematically reducing inequalities in the distributions of incomes and

resources.

2. Facilitation of conditions for full social, economic and political participation of

all people no matter their ethnic identification.

3. Politicized ethnicity has been detrimental to national unity and socioeconomic

well-being. Distribution of economic resources has often been skewed to favor a

particular group, pushing marginalized groups to use their ethnic inclination to

mobilize for equality.

69

4. Economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in

Ghana. Competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic

conflict conflicts and not all conflicts are violent but cause tension.

5. The fear and insecurity of ethnic groups during transition. It is opined that

extremists build upon these fears to polarize the society. Additionally, memories

of past traumas magnify these anxieties. These interactions produce a toxic brew

of distrust and suspicion that leads to ethnic violence.

6. Ethnic conflict is a sign of weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties.

Therefore in crucial or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of

governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs.

7. Stability of Ghana is threatened not by ethnic identification per se, but the

failure of national institutions to recognize and accommodate ethnic diversity

and interests. To solve this, governments should not discriminate against

groups.

8. The role of good political leadership is good to help solve the issues of conflict

managements. Importance of civil societies is also very crucial to helping

conflict managements.

9. Politics along ethnic lines could lead to instability. Whether democracies in

diverse societies become stable or unstable however depend to some extent on

the institutional designs of the country. The anxiety of ethnic politics is due to

the transformation of ethnic politics from the mono-ethnic nature of yester years

to an emerging poly-ethnic type today.

10. The recognition of multiple identities provides incentives for different political

actors to mobilize along different cleavages. It prevents privilege mobilization

along one identity and generating a multi-polar society.

70

11. The saliency of an ethnic identity is not stable but depends of situations and

contexts. Non existing identities (non-attitudes) can be induced by the questions

in a survey.

5.7 CONCLUSION

The findings in this study indicate that ethnicity plays a key role in Ghanaian politics

representing about 25.4 percent and that during the run-up to the 2012 General Election,

campaigning on ethnic lines were evident representing about 48 percent and that

another key tool for understanding why people vote for a particular party is look at the

ideological framework of the party and its past achievements as a government when

they were in power. Moreover, in a heterogeneous ethnic society, trust of institutions of

the state is very low.

71

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APPENDIX

KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES

TOPIC: ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA‘S 4TH

REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

We are a group of students from the Department of History and Political Studies

conducting a research on the topic “ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA’S

4TH

REPUBLIC”.

It is our firm believes that the findings of this study will help us to ascertain the

influence of ethnicity in Ghanaian politics especially in the fourth Republic.

The research is purely an academic activity, initiated and designed and executed by

students of the above department. It is neither intended to delve into people‘s private

lives, nor gather personal information for any organization or government.

We therefore hope we can count on your maximum co-operation.

Please note that the information gathered here will only be used for academic

purposes and information will be kept confidential.

QUESTIONNAIRE

ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

Please, kindly tick the right answers corresponding to the questions.

QE01. Do you consider yourself as belonging to an ethnic group?

1. Yes

2. No →QE 2

84

QE02. Which group?

Answer; …………………………………………..

QE03. If yes, which group?

1. Akan

2. Mole Dagbani

3. Ewe

4. Ga

5. Others (specify) ……………………

QE04. How would you describe your feelings towards this group?

1. Very close

2. Somehow close

3. Close

4. Not very close

5. Not close at all

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

QE05. Did you vote in the last General elections?

1. Yes

2. No

QE06. Which party did you voted for in the Presidential Elections?

1. NPP

2. NDC

3. PPP

4. Others (specify) ……………………………

85

QE07. Generally speaking, do you think yourself as supporting or belonging to any

party? If yes indicate.

Answer …………………………..

QE08. How would you describe your support for the party?

1. Very strong

2. strong

3. neither

4. Not strong

5. Not very strong

QE09. If the voting paper had required you to give two votes, in order of preference,

which party would you have put as your second choice?

Answer …

QE10. During the run−up to Election, did you think any political party campaigned

specifically to woo the vote of a particular ethnic group?

1. Yes

2. No

QE11. If yes, which party or parties?

Answer ……………………………………

PERCEPTION OF LEADERS’ PERFORMANCE

QE12. How would rate the performance of John D. Mahama in the last 12 months?

1. Excellent

2. Very satisfactory

3. Satisfactory

86

4. Neither satisfactory nor dissatisfied

5. Poor

QE13. How do you think the general economic situation in Ghana has changed over the

last 12 months? Has it….

1. Got a lot better

2. Got a little better

3. Stayed the same

4. Got a little worse

5. Or, got a lot worse?

POLITICAL TRUST

QE14. How well can you trust this government (NDC) to deliver to change the society?

1. Extremely confident

2. confident

3. neither confident nor unconfident

4. not confident

5. Not very confident

QE15. How satisfied are you with the government in doing its job?

1. Very satisfied

2. Satisfied

3. Not satisfied or dissatisfied

4. Dissatisfied.

87

5. Very dissatisfied

QE16. How strongly do you personally trust each of these institutions?

Not trust at all Very strong trust

Don’t know

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88

KUMASI

METROPOLITAN

Assembly

The Political Party

The Cabinet

The National

Parliament

The Courts

The civil Service

88

The Police

Politicians

ISSUES

QE17. On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Ghana?

1. Very satisfactory

2. Fairly satisfactory

3. Not satisfactory or dissatisfactory

4. dissatisfied

5. Not at all satisfactory

QE18. Do you agree that the use of ethnicity is dangerous for our governance?

1. Strongly agree

2. Agree

3. Neither agree nor disagree

4. Disagree

5. Strongly disagree

QE19. How much do you agree or disagree that only MPs or Presidents from their

ethnic groups can properly represent the real interests of their groups?

1. Strongly agree

2. Agree

89

3. Neither agree nor disagree

4. Disagree

5. Strongly disagree

QE20. When you voted in the last Election, what made you vote for that party?

1. Personality

2. Party platforms

3. Past achievements

4. Ideology

5. Ethnicity