Lebanon--2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Report

2011 FDA Electoral Fairness Audit of Lebanon’s Republic Electoral System

Electoral Fairness Audit Completed June 9, 2011. Updated July 10, 2011.

Executive Summary: Lebanon received a failing overall score of 37.5 percent for electoral fairness. The score means that there is more unfairness than fairness in the legal basis for Lebanon's republic electoral system. Lebanon's electoral finance laws favor significantly wealthy candidates and parties, and the legal structure of the electoral system favors Christians and Muslims over all other religious and non-religious followings. Also, Lebanon has poor enforcement mechanisms of its media laws. Despite these elements of unfairness, Lebanese people have freedom of political expression and their media laws, which encourage impartiality, are on a progressive and democratic trajectory.

About the Foundation for Democratic Advancement:

The Foundation for Democratic Advancement ("FDA")'s mission is to advance fair and transparent democratic processes wherever elections occur. The FDA believes that fairer electoral systems and a more informed public will help ensure the election of candidates who truly represent the will of the people. The FDA fulfills its mission by performing detailed electoral audits on political candidates and parties to inform the public, objectively and impartially, about their electoral choices. Also, the FDA audits electoral legislation in terms of fairness and equity, and conducts ground level assessments of democratic processes. (For more information on the FDA visit: www.democracychange.com)

Purpose of Electoral Fairness Audit:

The purpose of the FDA's electoral fairness audit (the “Audit”) is to determine a grade and ranking for electoral fairness in Lebanon at the republic level of government. (This Audit is part of the FDA’s global audit of electoral fairness involving all countries which hold political elections.)

This non-partisan, independent determination aims to give the citizens of Lebanon an informed, objective perspective of the fairness of the Lebanese republic electoral system.

The views in this electoral fairness audit are the views of the FDA only.

The FDA’s members and volunteers are in no way affiliated with the Lebanese Supervisory Committee or any of the Lebanese registered/non-registered political parties.

The Audit represents an independent assessment based on objectivity, transparency and non-partisanship. The FDA assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors in the calculation of its audit results or inaccuracies in its research of relevant Lebanese legislation.

Methodology for the Electoral Fairness Audit:

The FDA focuses on four key areas of electoral fairness:

1) Laws and regulations on the political content of media including newspapers, broadcasters and online media before, during, and after elections;

2) Laws and regulations on the equality of candidates’ and parties’ influence before, during and after elections, such as national televised debates, restrictions on candidate nominations, party registration requirements, etc.;

3) Laws and regulations on electoral finance, such as party and campaign donation limits, third party spending limits etc.; and

4) Laws and regulations on the equality of voter say before, during, and after an election. The

Foundation for Democratic Advancement

http://www.democracychange.com/

FDA looked at how Lebanese laws and regulations promote equality of voter say in the media, at the polling booth, through electoral finance and constitutional laws etc.

The FDA decided to evaluate these four areas of electoral fairness because, in our opinion, they are often ignored or overlooked by the international community in determining electoral fairness.

Moreover, these four areas cover broad aspects of the electoral process in which fairness could be compromised significantly.

The FDA acknowledges that electoral laws and regulations may not necessarily correspond to the implementation of those laws and regulations or the public’s response to them. The implementation and response could be positive or negative, in terms of electoral fairness.

Nevertheless, laws and regulations provide the framework for the electoral system and an indication of electoral fairness.

A further study which tracks the actions of mainstream media and the enforcement or non-enforcement of electoral laws and regulation, for example, would provide a more reliable overall determination of electoral fairness.

The FDA researched current Lebanese legislation, in relation to the four areas of electoral fairness being examined. Following which, the FDA audited the research results via the FDA electoral audit team and established FDA scoring scales for the four areas of electoral fairness.

Weighting and Scoring:

Overall, the FDA scoring is guided by an inherent valuation of the concepts of soundness and relevancy.

Each area of electoral fairness has a score range between 0 and 10, and each area is counted equally.

The total averaged score will provide an indication of the level of electoral fairness in Lebanon.The FDA electoral audit team deliberated on the research for each area of electoral fairness, and then attempted to reach consensus on the final score. Where no consensus could be reached, the individual scores of the team were averaged.

The final score for each section must be supported by the more sound reasons and correspond to the established FDA scoring scale.

FDA Researchers for the Lebanese republic electoral system:

Mrs. Linda Dassin, bachelor of Law (Université Paul Cézanne), lawyer, FDA researcher, and Lebanese citizen.


FDA Electoral Fairness Audit Team:

Chief Electoral Auditor:

Mr. Stephen Garvey, FDA founder and executive director, bachelors degree in Political Science (University of British Columbia), and masters degree in Environment and Development (University of Cambridge).

Electoral Auditors:

Mrs. Linda Dassin, bachelor of Law (Université Paul Cézanne), lawyer, FDA researcher, and Lebanese citizen.Mr. Aurangzeb Qureshi, FDA director of marketing, researcher, bachelor degree in Political Science (University of Alberta), and bachelor degree in Journalism (University of King's College). Mrs. Liza Valentine, FDA design consultant, masters degree in Architecture (University of Calgary) and researcher.Ms. Larisa Vortman, teaching diploma (University of Foreign Languages in Irkutsk, Russia FDA), specialization French and English, FDA volunteer and researcher, and Russian citizen.

Information Sources:

The following information was consulted and utilized in this audit report:

The Lebanese Constitution

The Lebanese Parliamentary Election Law n°25

Official Website of Parliamentary Elections 2009:www.elections.gov.lb

The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections Website:www.lade.org.lb

The international foundation for electoral systems http://www.ifes.org/

The Lebanese Transparency Association http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/index.php?lang=en

The National Democratic Institute Report on Lebanon http://www.ndi.org/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf


http://www.ndi.org/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf

http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/index.php?lang=en

http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/index.php?lang=en

http://www.ifes.org/

http://www.lade.org.lb/

http://www.elections.gov.lb/

© 2011, Foundation for Democratic AdvancementAll rights reserved.Foundation for Democratic Advancement728 Northmount Drive NWPO Box 94Calgary, AlbertaCanada, T2K [email protected]


Table of Contents:Background information on the Lebanese Electoral System 8

Chapter 1: Political Content of Media 11

Executive Summary 11

Research Excerpt 11

Score 12

Rational 12

Chapter 2 Equality of Political Candidate and Party Influence 13


Research Excerpt 13

Score 15

Rational 15

Chapter 3: Equality of Electoral Finance 16


Research Excerpt 16

Score 17

Rational 17

Chapter 4: Equality of Voter Say 18


Research Excerpt 18

Score 20

Rational 20

Chapter 5: Overall Audit Results 21

Chapter 6: Analysis 22

Chapter 7: Conclusion 23

Chapter 8: Recommendations 24

Appendix: FDA Global Audit Results 25

Background information on the Lebanese Electoral SystemLebanon is a parliamentary Republic. Since its first Constitution of 1926 – when still under French Mandate – the political system has been characterized by the logic of confessional power sharing in the state institutions and the public administration.The ‘National Pact’ reserves the presidency to a Maronite Christian, the position of Prime Minister to a Sunni Muslim and the post of speaker of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shi’ite. The Chamber of Deputies indirectly elects the President1 for a six-year non-renewable term.

The Lebanese Parliament: confessional seats.

The Lebanese Parliament is a unicameral body consisting of 128 directly elected deputies. In accordance with the Constitution, all parliamentary seats are divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The seats are further sub-divided into eleven confessional branches. The distribution of the 128 seats among the eleven confessions is formalized under the 2008 Election Law. 2 The single seat for Christian Minorities is intended to provide parliamentary representation for six recognized confessional groups. Lebanese citizens of any other religion, including two that are formally recognized by the State, are unable to be elected to Parliament.

The Electoral system :

The 2008 Election Law allocates 128 parliamentary seats among the 26 election districts shown on the map.

1Art. 49 (2) of the Constitution states that: the President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by two third majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be sufficient.

2Article 1 of the Parliamentary Elections Law n°25Foundation for Democratic Advancement Page 8

Lebanon’s electoral system has five basic elements : The right to stand is confessional : Seats can only be contested by candidates who are

from the confession it is allocated to. The right to vote is non-confessional : Voters can vote for all available confessional seats,

regardless of the voter’s own confessional group. Voters have more than one vote : Lebanon uses multi-member electoral districts. Voters

are able to vote for as many candidates as there are seats available ( the black vote system).

Voters vote with e single ballot paper : On a single ballot paper, a voter chooses the names of candidates they wish to vote for. A voter may choose to use only some of the votes they are entitled to.

It is a plurality/ majority system : Where there is only one seat for a confession, the seat is won by whichever candidate

Foundation for Democratic Advancement Page 9


Chapter One: Political Content of MediaChapter one will focus on the research and audit results of Lebanese laws and regulations with respect to the political content of media, including newspapers, broadcasters and on-line media, before, during and after elections.

Executive Summary:

Lebanon received a satisfactory score of 60 percent for equality of political content. The score means that Lebanese political content laws are more fair than unfair. Lebanese legislation requires that the political content of public and private media and broadcasters to be impartial. However, there are weak provisions to monitor and enforce impartiality.

Research Excerpts:

The following excerpts were identified by the FDA researchers as relevant. The FDA researchers made some excerpts bold to emphasize high relevance:

The Lebanese media landscape is as characterised by confessionalism as are the political institutions.By convention the head of the Journalists’ Union is a Christian while the head of the Publishers’ Union is a Muslim. Confessionalism and the power of political families also determined the licensing of private TV stations under the 1994 audio-visual media law.These stations included55 :- Future TV, owned by the Hariri family- The National Broadcasting Network, owned by the family of Parliamentary speaker Berri - Al Manar TV, controlled by Hezbollah- LBCI Tv formed originally by the Lebanese Forces .A major shareholder is formerDeputy Prime Minister Issam Fares (Greek Orthodox). It is now considered to be more neutral - New TV (NTV), originally formed by the Lebanese Communist Party, but later controlled by Tahsin Khayat, who supported the ‘People’s Movement’ (Arab nationalist, Greek orthodox) - Orange TV owned by the Aoun family- In January 2009 Murr TV will be re-launched. It is co-owned by FL and former MP Gabriel Murr

The public TV station Télé-Liban does not enjoy a large audience.

The New Law introduces regulation for paid media advertising by obliging all media companies intending to sell electoral advertising to report to the Supervisory Commission, including specifics of the advertising space or time they will sell and their price list. These submissions must be made ‘ten days before the beginning of the electoral campaign’ (Article 66).

The media is also now required to sell political advertising space to all candidates and at the same price.


Electoral ads must be marked as such and indicate the advertising party.

Requests for advertising and the relevant material (videotape, or print ad) should be submitted not only to the media company but also to the Supervisory Commission at least three days before the desired publication.

No candidate should spend more than 50% of their advertising budget with any single media company.

The New Law also regulates election coverage (in addition to advertising), requiring the public media to remain impartial. They may not: “carry out any activity that might be considered to favour any candidate or list at the expense of another candidate or list” (Article 67).

All audio-visual media, including private media, are required to respect the freedom of expression, so that: “fairness, balance and impartiality among candidates and lists would be guaranteed” (Article 68).

Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Media and Broadcasters:

Score:

The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 6/10

Rational for Score:

Media and broadcasters required to be impartial.

The impartiality of the media is weakly enforced, though there is some adherence to the impartiality in the form of no blatant examples of partiality.

Media controlled and owned by political figures and families.

Public media though impartial has an insignificant viewing audience compared to private media.

International observers provide some monitoring of the media impartiality.

Due to the weak enforcement of the media impartiality, the score was reduced from 8 to 6. If a law is being weakly monitored and enforced, then the law is ineffective. However, there is some adherence to impartiality by the lack of extreme examples of partiality in the private media. Public media has an insignificant viewing audience and therefore does not offset the partiality of private media.


Chapter Two: Candidates’ and Parties’ InfluenceChapter two will focus on the research and audit results of Lebanese laws and regulations with respect to the equality of candidates and parties’ influence before, during and after elections.

Executive Summary:

Lebanon received a failing score of 30 percent for equality of candidate and party influence. The score means that there is significantly more unfairness of candidate and party influence than fairness. The 50 percent sharing of Assembly seats for Muslims and Christians is unfair to other non-Muslim and non-Christian candidates and parties. Also, the 50 percent sharing of seats does not reflect that the Muslims in terms of population are 20 percent more than Christians. Further, the weakness of the Supervisory Committee in enforcing impartiality of the media favors those parties who own private media or are supported by private media. Although, the public media has to be impartial, it has an insignificant viewing audience as compared to private media.

Research Excerpts:


Local authorities must assign locations for campaign posters and other printed advertising material. Candidates are only permitted to advertise on these designated spaces. Given that in Lebanon election campaigning tends to be intense, involving widespread poster advertising, it remains to be seen if this provision is realistic. While the law is not explicit (Article 70), presumably each candidate has the right to equal advertising space.

Public buildings, private universities, schools and houses of worship may not be used for campaigning.

The law also prohibits the distribution of ballot papers or flyers in or near polling stations on election day. Traditionally candidates’ agents beleaguer Lebanese voters at polling station entrances and it would mark progress if this practice were now prevented.

The composition of the Chamber, as provided by Article 24 of the Constitution, is based on the following principles:a) Equal representation between Christians and Muslims b) Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious community c) Proportional representation among geographic regions.

The third criterion is not respected. Regions are not proportionally represented: areas with concentrations of Muslim voters are underrepresented (in particular in the south of the country). It is possible to respect all three criteria of Article 24, but not if Christian political players insist that most ‘Christian seats’ are elected by majority Christian electorates. Such a demand, accepted by the New Law, violates Article 24 of 2008 of the Constitution by creating


inequalities in the value of vote: a seat in a redrawn Christian district is elected by fewer voters than in a Muslim area, making a Muslim vote worth less than a Christian vote.

The electoral system now worked in favor of well-organized parties or groups of candidates, enabling them to win all seats in a constituency, excluding other groups from any seats at all and blocking minorities in a constituency from electing any of the representatives they desired.

During elections :

Right to Stand: Registration of Candidates and Lists

All seats are reserved for specific confessions. In the past this meant that a candidate could not stand for election in a district if their confession had no seats there. A problem with confessional representation has been that candidates who are not affiliated to any of the 11 confessions represented in Parliament (because they follow another religion or have no religious belief) are unable to stand for elections.

Registered voters who are at least 25 years old, literate and in possession of full civil and political rights are allowed to run for elections.

Naturalised Lebanese are eligible only 10 years after they gain citizenship.

A candidate can only run for election in one electoral district.

The law restricts military personnel, public personnel of the first and second rank, judges, chairmen or board members of public institutions as well as directors of these institutions and presidents and vice-presidents of municipal councils from standing as candidates. In some of these cases, a period must elapse after retirement or resignation from these posts before the right to stand is recovered. (Article 10)

Candidates have to pay a fee of two million Lebanese Pounds (around €1,000) and a deposit of six million Lebanese Pounds. These are significant amounts, which bar poorer candidates from standing in elections.

Equality of Votes and Confessional Representation

This equality requirement is problematic in Lebanon, because it can conflict with the idea of confessional representation. Already the requirement that 50% of the seats should be filled by Christian candidates is a challenge to equality, given that Christian voters represent only 40% of the electorate. However, this is not in itself a violation of the equality of votes as long as each seat represents a similar number of registered voters (or population).

Election Observation : Each candidate or list can delegate representatives to each polling station in their electoral district to witness polling and the counting of votes (Article 83)


Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Equality of Candidates and Parties:

Score:

The FDA electoral fairness audit team reached consensus on a score of 3/10.

Rational for Score:

There is an equal 50% split in political representation for Muslims and Christians. (Political seats are reserved only for Muslims and Christians.) However, the 50% split is based on a 1923 survey, which does not reflect the current 60%/40% split in population favoring Muslims over Christians. Muslims are unfairly represented.

The electoral system favors Muslims and Christians over non-Muslims and Christians.

Electoral finance favors dominant, wealthy parties, because candidate registration fees are expensive ($1,400.00 USD per candidate) and candidate spending limits are high ($100,000.00 USD per candidate).

Lebanese living abroad can make contributions to candidates and parties, and therefore, depending where they live, have an unfair advantage over Lebanese in the homeland whose incomes may be a fraction of those living abroad.

The media is partial.

Placement of poster advertisement is equal among parties and candidates, and prices of electoral advertisements have to be equal for all candidates and parties. Also, not more than 50% of a party’s advertising budget can be spent at one source.

The score of 3 derives from the fairness of poster advertisement and freedom to make a contribution to a party. However, there is significant unfairness in the electoral system favoring of Muslims and Christians. Also, the equal electoral representation for Muslims and Christians ignores that the Muslims are 20% greater in population. Further, the electoral finance laws favor dominant, wealthy parties and candidates. In the backdrop, the private media’s political content, through poor monitoring and enforcement, is allowed to be partial without extremes.


Chapter Three: Electoral FinanceChapter three will focus on the research and audit results of Lebanese laws and regulations with respect to the equality of Lebanese laws and regulations with respect to electoral finance.

Executive Summary:

Lebanon received a failing score of 20 percent for equality of electoral finance. The score means that there is significantly more unfairness than fairness in Lebanon's electoral finance laws. The electoral finance laws favor significantly wealthy candidates and parties through, for example, high expenditure limits and expensive registration fees for candidates. Also, Lebanese living abroad (in developed countries) have an unfair advantage over Lebanese living in the homeland, in terms of the amount of gifts and contributions donated to political candidates and parties.

Research Excerpts:


It is unclear when the campaign period starts. This should be clarified through sub-legal acts (government decrees).The New Law fails to specify when the national electoral campaign begins, although it starts for potential candidates when they submit their applications (Article 54). Given that persons can register for candidature once elections are called (at least 90 days before elections), there remains a significant period (at least 30 days) until the registration deadline (60 days before the election), giving an unfair advantage to those who register first and creating confusion for other stakeholders. For example, the media need to know when campaign coverage rules come into force.

In the past money has played a major role in election campaigning and observers have criticized a lack of regulation. The New Law contains detailed provisions on campaign financing (chapter five of the law).

Candidates now have to open a single bank account for all donations and campaign expenditure, and each candidate may now spend no more than 150 million Lebanese Pounds (approximately €80,000) per election, plus an additional sum based on the number of voters in their electoral district and fixed by the Council of Ministers acting on the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior.

A candidate may spend their ‘own money’ (including family resources) and may receive donations from Lebanese citizens (natural or legal persons).

Gifts in kind, cash or ‘subscriptions’ (party dues) are considered campaign contributions, with the exception of the work of volunteers.


Candidates may not give donations to voters or organizations during the election campaign period. The Supervisory Commission can form a committee to supervise candidates’ adherence to campaign financing regulations and can check candidates’ campaign accounts at any time.

Within one month of the elections candidates must submit detailed campaign accounts to be audited by the Supervisory Commission (Article19 no.4). Intentional breaches of the campaign financing provisions incur a fine or a prison sentence of up to six months. However, it will be difficult to prove intentional breach of these provisions. The New Law fails to specify how the Supervisory Commission can enforce accountability of candidates for their accounting. The Law includes no sanctions for false accounting, if no intent can be proven. Furthermore there are no deadlines by which the Commission should review accounts and no requirement to publish accounts of candidates. The new regulations risk irrelevance unless the Supervisory Commission resolves these failings in its internal regulations.

Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Lebanese Election Finance:

Score:


Rational for Score:

Electoral finance due to high spending limits and high registration fees favor dominant, wealthy parties and candidates. Also, Lebanese living abroad have an unfair advantage over Lebanese living in the homeland, in terms gifts and contributions to political parties. Lebanese diaspora outnumber homeland Lebanese 12 million to 4 million.

Candidates are required to pay $1,400.00 USD for electoral registration. This fee is significant when there are 300 candidates, for example, to be registered.

The score of 20 percent reflects the significant unfairness of the Lebanese electoral finance laws. The score is supported by the fact that there is equal freedom to contribute to political parties and candidates for Lebanese from the homeland and abroad.


Chapter Four: Voter SayChapter four will focus on the research and audit results of Lebanese laws and regulations with respect to the equality of voter say laws and regulations before, during and after an election.

Executive Summary:

Lebanon received a failing score of 40 percent for equality of voter say. The score means that Lebanon's laws for equality of voter say are more unfair than fair. Though Lebanese people have freedom of expression and freedom to decide who they vote for and donate to, electoral finance laws favor wealthy voters, and wealthy candidates and parties. Also, the FDA could find no Lebanese processes for voter electoral complaints, and some voters are subject to inconvenience and irrelevance by all voters having to vote in the electoral district of their family origin. Added to these points, there are weak mechanisms to monitor and enforce the impartiality of the private media.

Research Excerpts:


List of exclusions for persons with convictions for specified felonies or misdemeanors (Article 4). Non-retired military personnel are not allowed to vote. This includes among others the army, public security forces and the customs police (Article 6).

Naturalised persons are only allowed to vote ten years after naturalisation (Article 5). This conflicts with the UN HRC’s interpretation of the obligations under Article 25 ICCPR.

There are no provisions for housebound, hospitalised or detained citizens to vote. Arrangements should be made to enable such citizens to vote, although this would need careful handling given the history of vote buying and lack of secrecy in Lebanese elections.

Voters can complain about mistakes and omissions to a Registration Committee in their area and complaints against decisions of these committees may be made to the election district’s Higher Registration Committee.

The law contains no procedures on how the Higher Registration Committees should deal with these complaints (for example, concerning the time frame in which a ruling should be made and the notification of concerned voters).

Voter registration is based on the peculiar concept of registration at the place of family origin. This ignores that many people do not live at the place of family origin. The law does not provide for any exceptional revision of the voters’ lists prior to elections occurring between the updating periods. Individuals becoming eligible for registration between 30 March and election day are simply not added to the list and are effectively disenfranchised until the next update


period. Similarly, individuals who lose their eligibility remain recorded until their names are removed during the next annual registration.

The New Law introduces out-of-country voting. This is significant, because Lebanon has a sizable diaspora. Each voter who is registered in Lebanon will be able to register with embassies and consulates abroad, which will pass this information on to the Ministry of the Interior.

The law sets out objective criteria for the establishment of polling stations: • A village with 100 – 400 registered voters should have a polling station •Generally polling stations should not represent more than 400 voters, but if necessary for a smoothrunning of the elections the limit can be increased to a maximum of 800 voters • There shall be a maximum of 20 polling stations in one polling centreThe list of polling sites has to be published at least 30 days before election day.

The practice of registering voters with their families in their ‘district of origin’ is a longstanding administrative practice and is not enshrined in the election law. Voters are further allocated to polling stations by confessions, family and gender (This is unpractical, necessitating significant amounts of travel on election day and not following the real population distribution).

Under the New Law polling is to take place on one Sunday, from 7am until 7pm.

Voters are entitled to vote with their ID or their passport, which are checked against data in the voters’ list in each polling station.

The New Law increases the security and integrity of the polling process by introducing transparent ballot boxes and indelible ink to mark the fingers of those who have voted.

The secrecy of the vote is not guaranteed because there is no uniform, exclusive official ballot; voters can write their choice on any piece of paper. In reality candidates and lists often prepare ballots that allow them to track ballots cast by certain voters or families. There is no requirement to use official ballot papers. When voters enter the polling station they are: “supposed to discretely hold a paper containing the names of candidates they wish to elect“ (Article 87).

In addition to the staff appointed by the governor ahead of election day, four assistants are added on election day morning: two are chosen by the head of the polling station and two by the voters present at the opening of the polling station from among themselves.

System for Complaints and Appeals`

The New Electoral Law provides for only two specific instances where complaints or appeals may be made: complaints against decisions on voter registration by registration committees can be lodged with the higher election committees - but only until March 30 each year (Article 39). Secondly, refusals by the Ministry of the Interior to register a candidate can be appealed to the Council of State (Article 49).


However, according to the administrative code (Article 63), all decisions by the public administration can be appealed to an administrative court.

A number of sensitive aspects of the counting of votes and the aggregation process are not regulated in the law, including: there is no requirement for detailed results to be announced at all levels of the process of aggregating results;

there is no requirement that detailed results down to polling station level be published at the end of the process; there are no provisions on how valid ballots should be transferred to the Central Bank for storage.

Electoral Fairness Audit Results for Equality of Voter Say:

Score:


Rational for Score:

Naturalized Lebanese have to wait 10 years before they can vote.

Lebanese have freedom to express their political views.

Lebanese in the homeland have to vote where their family originates which discourages voting, due to possible travel inconvenience and no interest or connection to a particular electoral district. Also, not all parties are represented in all districts. It depends on the outdated 1923 survey.

There is no mechanism to deal with voter complaints about the electoral system.

Electoral finance favors wealthy voters over less wealthy. Also, the Lebanese diaspora from wealthy countries likely have an advantage over Lebanese from the homeland in terms of the amount of gifts contributions to political parties.

The score of 40 percent is supported on grounds of equal freedom of expression of political views, and yet unfair electoral finance, no mechanisms for voter electoral complaints, partisan private media, no suffrage for naturalized citizens for 10 years, and the possible inconvenience and irrelevance of voting in the electoral district of family origin.


Chapter Five: Audit ResultsChapter five will set out the FDA’s scores for each of the areas of the Lebanese electoral system as set out above.

1. Research and audit results for Lebanese laws and regulations on the political content of media including newspapers, broadcasters, online media, before, during, and after elections.

6/10

2. Research and audit results for Lebanese Laws and regulations on the equality of candidates and parties influence before, during and after elections.

3/10

3. Research and audit results for Lebanese laws and regulations on electoral finance.

2/10

4. Research and audit results for laws and regulations on the equality of voter say before, during, and after an election.

4/10

Total score: 15/40

37.5 percent


Chapter Six: AnalysisChapter six will provide a brief analysis of the FDA’s findings.

Lebanon receives a failing overall score of 37.5 percent for electoral fairness. A failing score means that there are numerous major deficiencies in most if not all of the Lebanon’s electoral legislation and related legislation.

Lebanon’s only passing electoral fairness score is in equality of political content, in which Lebanon received 60 percent. This score means that there is more electoral fairness than unfairness in the Lebanese political content laws and regulations.

Lebanon and Venezuela both have electoral laws requiring the media and broadcasters to be impartial.

Lebanon has been a democracy since the year 2000.

Lebanon scored higher overall, for example, than the United States, Canada, Russia, Argentina, Denmark, Mexico, Egypt, Tunisia, Cameroon, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria for electoral fairness:

Lebanon 37.5% (F) Denmark 35% (F) Russia 35% (F)Argentina 32.5% (F) United States 30% (F) Canada 25.75% (F) Mexico 22.5% (F)Tunisia (under Ben Ali) 10% (F) Cameroon 2.5% (F) Yemen (under Saleh) 1.25% (F)Bahrain 0% (F)Egypt (under Mubarak) 0% (F) Syria (under Bashar al-Assad) 0% (F)

Lebanon’s confessional political system is a way to manage conflict between Christians and Muslims.


Chapter Seven: ConclusionChapter seven will provide a summary of the FDA’s findings.

The Lebanese democracy is on the right track despite its overall failing grade of 37.5 per cent for electoral fairness.

Lebanon’s laws on the impartiality of the media and broadcasters are very advanced and central to the main tenants of democracy--political equality and electoral fairness.

Lebanon faces a challenge in dealing with religious strife. Presently, Lebanese democracy is being weakened to manage probable religious conflict. The FDA hopes overtime that the principles of democracy will trump gradually religion in terms of political expression.


Chapter Eight: RecommendationsChapter eight will set out the FDA’s recommendations on how Lebanon can improve its electoral fairness score and thereby its electoral fairness.

1) Lebanon’s Supervisory Committee needs to set up guidelines to monitor the impartiality of the media and broadcasters. Also, an independent, non-partisan Lebanese committee needs to create laws to enforce the impartiality of the private media and broadcasters.

2) Lebanon’s electoral finance laws need to be reformed so that candidate registration fees are replaced with member support equivalent to 5% of the total voting population of the district.

3) An independent, non-partisan Lebanese committee needs to create laws for an equal playing field in terms of candidate and party finances. Every registered candidate should have access to the same campaign funds.

4) Lebanese diaspora should not be allowed to give gifts and/or contributions to Lebanese political candidates and parties.

5) Lebanese voting locations should not be based on family origin. The voting locations should be based on place of residency during an election period.

6) The Lebanese political system needs to shift from a confessional system to a pluralistic system in which any party and candidate can participate regardless of belief.

7) The Lebanese government should commit resources to educating the Lebanese public in the principles of democracy, in order to encourage the shift from a confessional political system to a pluralistic system.

The FDA believes that electoral fairness is at the heart of pure democracy. The more fair electorally a country is, the more democratic the country will be.

Therefore, the FDA believes that by improving electoral fairness, pure democracy in Lebanon will be advanced which in turn will improve the status of Lebanese people as a whole.

The FDA hopes that this report will improve electoral fairness in Lebanon and thereby the well-being of the Lebanese people as a whole.


AppendixFDA Global Audit Results as of August 2, 2011:


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

RussiaVenezuela

France Lebanon

AzerbaijanDenmark

FinlandSweden

United StatesCanada

ArgentinaTunisiaYemen

BahrainCamerron

Egypt Iran

Libya Mexico

Syria

Laws and regulations on the equality of political content of the media and broadcasters before, during, and after an election

<-- failing range | passing range -->

FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Results


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

FranceVenezuela

FinlandLebanonSweden

United StatesAzerbaijanArgentinaDenmark

RussiaCanadaMexico

BahrianCameroon

EgyptIran

LibyaSyria

TunisiaYemen

Laws and regulations on the equality of candidate and political party influence before, during, and after an election<-- failing range | passing range -->



0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

FranceVenezuela

FinlandArgentinaDenmarkLebanonSwedenTunisia

AzerbaijanCameroon

CanadaMexico

United StatesBahrain

EgyptIran

LibyaRussia

SyriaYemen

Laws and regulations on the equality of electoral (campaign) finance<-- failing range | passing range -->



0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

FranceVenezuelaArgentina

MexicoCanada

DenmarkFinland

United StatesSweden

LebanonRussia

AzerbaijanBahrain

CameroonEgypt

IranLibyaSyria

TunisiaYemen

Laws and regulations on the equality of voter influence before, during, and after an election

<-- failing range | passing range -->



0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

FranceVenezuela

FinlandLebanonDenmark

RussiaSweden

ArgentinaUnited States

CanadaAzerbaijan

MexicoTunisia

CameroonYemen

BahrainEgypt

IranLibyaSyria

Overall Electoral Fairness Audit Scores<--failing range|passing range -->


News & Politics

Lebanon--2011 FDA Global Electoral Fairness Audit Report