SEVERAL LOOKS AT EUROPEAN BMD CONTRIBUTIONS

Thanks to RUSI for extending invitation to NATO International Staff.

European BMD contributions are a topic relevant for Summit in Wales, but I intend to look further ahead.

As concrete contributions are subject to decision of respective NATO members, I would like to share some general observations related to the topic.

My briefing represents my personal views, not any agreed NATO policy necessarily.

I will look at European contributions from four different angles:

1. What can be contributed (parameters for contributions); 2. Potential for multilateral cooperation; 3. Potential for contributions by NATO Partners; 4. BMD contributions in a broader context of the IAMD.

Though some of it may sound a bit technical, I intend to apply rather a politico-military optics.

1. What can be contributed (parameters for contributions)

Is there any single list of conditions to be met by national contributions? Not necessarily.

There are some traditional NATO procedures to facilitate national contributions to various Allied defence capabilities, such as defence planning or for operations planning (force generation) but since these procedures are clearly not the exclusive channels for identification of Allies’ contributions to NATO BMD, we need to seek for generally applicable parameters elsewhere.

In my view, the main guidance is still to be found in the Lisbon or Chicago declarations, where aim of BMD is defined:

“The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.”

Therefore, any parameters are rather based on this end-state, including the key notions of full coverage and protection, level of threat, affordability or technical feasibility.

In addition, another major notion was set in Chicago, stating that the NATO BMD would be based on national voluntary contributions.

Some may see a little dissonance between the voluntariness and the comprehensiveness, but I would argue that these features are just two sides of one coin.

All the notions mentioned are part of a carefully crafted balance governing any BMD related work in NATO. These notions may be sometimes considered too generic, but I would argue that they will be primary drivers for any national consideration of a contribution. In simple words, what we get will always depend on what is actually needed, what is available and what is affordable.

Besides that, Chicago language offers also a valid indication of what can be offered, referring to “nationally funded interceptors and sensors” or “hosting arrangements”. This shows clearly that contributions are not limited to sensors or interceptors. The BMD capability needs not only the military hardware, but also well trained operators.

It is often underestimated but no capability is of use without manpower capable of using it. Training and education is essential at all levels, from the tactical ground to the political top.

In summary, the range of contributions could include BMD sensors, weapon systems or platforms, but also assets for protection of BMD assets, offering hosting arrangements or support for training and education.

2. Potential for multilateral cooperation

In Chicago, Allies were also encouraged to explore possible additional voluntary contributions through multinational cooperation.

Development or acquisition of BMD assets is certainly challenging in terms of funding. I have already mentioned that the affordability is one of the key notions. Therefore, it is only logical that BMD is with no doubt a strong candidate for multinational cooperation.

In the NATO context, we keep implementing the initiative of Smart Defence to support the Allies’ cooperation in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities. As BMD is among the most prioritised NATO capabilities, it is also an area addressed under the Smart Defence umbrella. Considerations of concrete projects under Smart Defence follow the logic of focusing both on the materiel aspect of the BMD, as well as on the BMD training.

It is too early to assess results of the Smart Defence initiative in the area of BMD, but I believe that for Europe, the multinational cooperation in general remains an important option to deliver tangible contributions to NATO BMD architecture.

3. Potential for contributions by third states

Until now, I have spoken of European contributions in the context of NATO. However, should contribution by NATO partners be excluded? It is certainly premature consideration in the short term, but it could be kept in mind for a longer term vision.

NATO has reiterated several times its preparedness to engage with third states on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.

BMD cooperation with any partner is a long run ambition which would even in the most optimistic scenario need to evolve incrementally through several stepping stones. In addition, such a cooperation would also need to be framed by respective decisions of Allies, taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances at the time.

One could also recall in this regard that the current mandate of NATO BMD is protection of NATO European territory. But this mandate also includes protection of forces deployed out of this area. NATO forces have deployed several times in crisis response operations and at some occasions they have done so even with Partners.

Therefore, why should not we foresee – at one day – a joint operation with Partners that would include deployment of some BMD assets, too? In fact, when it comes to the tactical, theatre missile defence (TMD), several Partners do possess or plan to acquire assets that may be primarily for extended air defence but with some limited missile defence capability, too.

Therefore, with due respect to all necessary political considerations and decisions it would require, I believe that in a longer term prospective, the option of partners’ contributions for TMD should not be excluded.

4. BMD contributions in a broader context of the IAMD

Sometimes, we tend to speak on BMD in isolation, as if it were a precious flower in a greenhouse. It is not. There are valid political reasons to grant the BMD a special treatment, but operationally or technically, it is just one of layers. It is just another step taken from the long range air defence.

Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture is not only militarily sound and necessary, but it also provides an opportunity for contributions. Many systems that are being provided or considered for BMD can be used for air defence, too, though not necessarily at the same moment.

The BMD capable systems that are currently being procured or considered by some Allies are no exception. While buying a BMD only system could be considered overly luxurious, the air defence assets with some BMD capability seem to be a viable option for many nations.

The NATO doctrinal framework follows this approach, too, as it is progressively becoming less BMD and more IAMD. There are legitimate top-level political guidelines related specifically to BMD, but I believe that a broader perspective needs to be maintained, too. Facilitating of potential contributions is just one of its benefits.

In Conclusion, let me summarise my key messages:

The European BMD contributions will be mainly driven by the essential parameters set in Lisbon and Chicago, including the requirement for full coverage and protection, threat assessment, affordability and technical feasibility.

Multinational cooperation, including under the NATO’s Smart Defence initiative, remains an important option to enable contributions to NATO BMD architecture.

Contributions from NATO partners should not be excluded in longer-term, if so decided by Allies on a case by case basis.

Lastly, the BMD should be also seen in the context of Integrated Air and Missile defence, be it at political, technical or military levels.

Thank you for your attention.