Upload
guest3bd2a12
View
789
Download
2
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Democracy, Media and Corruption
Democracy corruption? Olson 1993 Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson 1996 Keefer 2007
Free press corruption? Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003
Olson 1993
Modern classic in theoretical politics
Echoes of The Logic of Collective Action 1965 Individuals free ride…
Developed further in Power and Prosperity 2000: Anarchy (“roving bandit”) < Tyranny (“stationary bandit”) <
Democracy (majority government)
Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson 1996
Pioneering and most quoted empirical articles on the impact of political institutions
Controversial points…
Structure: Simple but powerful Olson’s theory World Bank economists’ empirical methods
Keefer 2007
• Most recent contributions to the debate
• Encompassing empirical analysis of differences within democracies
• Several dimensions of ”Quality of Government”:– Corruption
– Provision of Private Goods
– Provision of Public Goods
Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003
• Important contribution to the debate on Causes of Good Government:
– Theory with mechanisms linking Democracy, Free Press and Corruption
– Original empirical analysis: cross-country and within-country variation
Olson 1993
• Are all polities built by means of force and coercion?
• “no one has ever found a large society that obtained a peaceful order or other public goods through an agreement among the individuals in the society.”
Stationary bandits > Roving bandits ?
• “Why should warlords, who were stationary bandits continuously stealing from a given group of victims, be preferred, by those victims, to roving bandits who soon departed?”
monopoly of theft > uncoordinated competitive theft
• "the first blessing of the invisible hand: the rational, self-interested leader of a band of roving bandits is led, as though by an invisible hand, to settle down, wear a crown, and replace anarchy with government. The gigantic increase in output that normally arises from the provision of a peaceful order and other public goods gives the stationary bandit a far larger take than he could obtain without providing government.”
Democratic rulers > Dictators
Not because democrat incumbents are more benevolent
Assumption: taxes distort incentives reduces income so much that tax collections fall Dictators establish a revenue-maximizing tax Democrat rulers tax less: the majority always has a higher
stake at the growth of the national economy
Underlying idea: the broadest the interests represented in government (majority > oligarchy > dictator), the more the government will take into account the social costs of redistributions
But, if you are unlucky, and have a dictator…
Dynastic Monarchies > Standard Dictators
Why?
Any other critical comment to Olson’s theory?
Why do democracies emerge?
If autocrat rulers obtain more revenue than democratic ones…
…why do not those rebel leaders who overthrow a ruler always establish another autocracy instead of a democracy?
Great works, great last sentences… • “The moral appeal of democracy is now almost
universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood.”
Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson1996
Simple but powerful Olson’s theory + World Bank economists’ empirical quantitative methods
• What matters for protection of PPRR is not Democracy vs. Dictatorship, but Short vs. Long Time Horizons
• But, at the same time, WHY and HOW property rights are protected in democracy # dictatorship
Different reasons for protection of PPRR
If Dictators do not expropriate (too much) and protect rise in national income more taxes
If the democracy is to last, incumbents need to delegate the protection of PPRR to disinterested parties (e.g. independent courts)
Theoretical Hypotheses
• In dictatorships: + time horizon of the individual dictator + protection of contract and PPRR
• In democracies: + duration of the democratic system + protection of contract and PPRR
• So, time heals all wounds….
Empirical analysis
• Proxies for the expected remaining life (of the system/of the dictator)– for democracies: current age of the democratic system
– for dictatorships: years of the dictator in power (?)
• What’s wrong in tables 3-5?
Results
• 1) confirm the hypotheses: the longer (dictator/democratic system) + protection of contract and PPRR
• 2) point out an intriguing U- or J-shaped relationship between democratization and protection of contract and PPRR
The mysterious case of the U- or J-shaped relationship…
Increasingly, empirical studies tend to show that: Consolidated/Old Democracies > Dictatorships >
Transitional/Young Democracies (Keefer 2007)
(focus on “time”)
Full/Totally Free Democracies > Dictatorships > Semi-/Partially Free Democracies <
(focus on “degree” of democracy)
Keefer 2007
• Tackles the most intriguing puzzle: in theory, Democracy > Dictatorship, but, in practice, many democracies fall short of many autocracies in many indicators of good government (e.g. corruption)
• Offers:– 1) theoretical explanation
– 2) empirically someone proves for the first time the systematic performance differences between Young and Old Democracies
Theory
• In relation to Old Democracies, the Young ones…– underprovide non-targeted goods (e.g.
education, PPRR)– overprovide targeted goods (e.g. patronage)– and are more corrupt
• Reason: Young democracies = candidates are not credible
How to win credibility?
Two options for new incumbents:– Be Good: Invest resources to show they can provide
public goods (costly)– Be Bad: Rely on local “patrons” and deliver targeted
goods to them and their “clients” (cheaper)
Problems with these options? Or with a theory based on something vague such as “credibility”?
Alternative factors?
• Young democracies also have more political violence than Old ones
– Reason: “more freedoms”
• Short-time-horizon incumbents in Young D vs. Long-term-horizon incumbents in Old D
Empirical analysis
His proxies for good government:– Nontargeted policies benefiting all citizens: secondary
school enrollment, bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, and government ownership of newspapers
– Targeted policies, benefiting discrete and identifiable groups of voters: public investment (where pork barrel projects reside) and the central government wage bill (which finances patronage jobs).
– Corruption: standard measure of corruption
Do you agree with the proxies? Do you think the analysis supports his predictions?
Expected effects of control variables
Nontargeted Goods Targeted Goods Rent Seeking More presidential Less Less Less
More majoritarian Less More Less
Greater social cleavages Less Less More
More affected by conflict Less Less More
Less citizen information Less Less More
Problems with this analysis
Any omitted variables you would introduce?
Does his variable (“age”) remain strong after the control variables are included?
Any other flaw?
Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003
• Important contributions to the debate What Causes Good Government:– Democracy: necessary, but not sufficient condition for good
government. We also need Free Press
– Unlike most of the previous literature, the theory here fleshes out the micro-mechanisms through which rulers comply or are made to behave in a benevolent fashion
– Original test: cross-country and within-country (US)
Mechanisms of the theory
• 1.Democracy > Dictatorships– Mechanism: Electoral accountability
• 2.Better informed citizens > Poorly informed citizens– Mechanism: No room to divert resources when people know
it!
• 3.Capital mobility > non-mobile assets (e.g. oil)– Mechanism: People can “exit”
Empirical analysis Encompassing account of alternative explanatory
variables (p.451-457)
Main result: as long as they introduce controls, Democracy seems to exert less significant influence on good government, but Free Press remains strong
Fine, but sure you also found some problems…
World Bank Governance Indicators I "Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be
counted"
Albert Einstein
• 212 countries and territories • Period: 1996–2006• Six dimensions of governance:
– Voice and Accountability – Political Stability and Absence of Violence – Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality – Rule of Law – Control of Corruption
World Bank Governance Indicators II
• Reflect the views of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries
• They are aggregate indicators made with lots of individual indicators by survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations
World Bank Governance Indicators
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/worldmap_start.asp?allcountries=1
Intrinsic problem with these data: statistically significant differences at opposite ends of the distribution of governance Very difficult to discriminate among the majority
of countries with any degree of confidence
Analysis of corruption in US States
• Which is the advantage of testing a theory in one single country? Is there any added value?
• Nice result : more circulation of papers less corruption
• Other variables that matter: electoral turnout (a lot), social capital (a little)
• Any omitted variable?