1. ComparativeCollapsonomics European Electoral Politics and the Financial Crisis Justin Pickard Futurist, Gonzo Ethnographer @justinpickard

2. Welcome toBlack Swan Country Photo by xlibber 3. 'Since New Year's Day [2011], we've seen the unraveling of a pan-regional power structure akin to the collapse of the old Soviet Bloc, and now a sequence of epic disasters culminating in the triple whammy of once-in-a-millennium earthquake, giant tsunami, and the possibility of multiple nuclear meltdowns in northern Japan.' Scott Smith , ' The Future is Here Today, and it's Superdense ' Photo by ecstaticist 4. 'the study of economic and state systems at theedge of their normal social and economic function, including preventative measures to avoid destructive feedback loops and vicious cycles.' The Institute for Collapsonomics Collapsonomics? Photo by Sean Wallis 5. Copyright World Economic Forum 6. Iceland and Ireland Small, Windswept Island Nations with Big Fragile Banks 7. 8. 9. 'These corporate spaces are still pockmarked by industry, which in the context resembles a series of scattered ornaments, accidental or otherwise, creating a landscape which gets ever stranger the closer you get to the centre of it ...' Owen Hatherley (on the Dublin Docklands) 10. 11. Photo by briansuda 12. Iceland, 2007/2009 Significant seatgains for theLeft-GreenAlliance Emergence of a loose, grassroots alliance of reformist MPs underthe banner of theCitizen's Movement Elimination of the libertarian, eurosceptic Liberal Party Major losses for the conservativeIndependence Party leading partyin the previous government 13. 14. Ireland, 2007/2011 Substantial boost in the number of Sinn Fein, New Vision, ULA and non-party TDs Near-total obliteration of Fianna Fil; Ireland's dominant party, and leader of the previous government widely perceived as having exacerbated the banking crisis 15. 'What Ireland has rejected is () much clearer than what Ireland wants. The big winners were Enda Kenny's Fine Gael, which scooped more seats than ever before, although they received only 36% of the vote, rather less than their strongest past showings. Despite a good campaign, the lack of universal enthusiasm for Fine Gael is not hard to understand. Economic questions are the only questions that count in a country where a fifth of national income has just disappeared in a baffling burst of smoke from the blazing banks () Fianna Fil has been deservedly eaten after the savage turn of the Celtic tiger that it rode for so long, but power has now passed to another party forged in the struggle for national sovereignty, which also has precious few plans for rescuing economic sovereignty today. The people who have said what they do not want have not been offered a clear alternative. It may not be long before they are once again scratching their heads, and asking who elected the bankers? Guardian Editorial , ' Irish elections: a vote cast in anger ', 28/02/2011 16. Post-Crisis Elections First Attempts at a General Taxonomy 17. Anti-incumbency sentiments

Hypothesis: in the first election after a crisis event, the vote fleesawayfrom the parties previously in government

18. The vote flees equally in all directions, both left and right 19. Iceland 2009 saw an aggregate swing of9.9%away from the ruling parties (Independence -12.9% / SDA +3%) 20. In Ireland 2011, the equivalent shift was27.1%(FF -24.1% / Greens -2.9%) 21. Greece 2009:8.38%swing away from the governing NDP 22. High churn

Hypothesis: as a corollary of anti-incumbency sentiment, post-crisis politics also produces a substantial level ofchurn

23. Both at the level of party leadership ... and partyexistence... 24. Iceland 2009 sees new leaders for3/4returned parties; eliminates the Liberal Party; and sees the birth of a grassroots political force (the Citizen's Movement) 25. Ireland 2011 3/5new party leaders since 2007; demise of the Progressive Democrats and the Greens; birth of the ULA, and a substantial boost in the number of Independent TDs (from 5 to 13) 26. Turnout holds steady

It may seem logical to presume that the dissatisfaction of post-crisis politics would have resulted in a disengaged electorate and, as such, a much-reduced election turnout

27. In practice, however, dissatisfaction with politicians doesn't manifest as dissatisfaction with thepolitical process instead, the desire to 'punish' those responsible took precedence, resulting in a relatively consistent turnout 28. Ireland 2011:70.1%(up from 67%) 29. Iceland 2009:85.1%(up from 83.6%) 30. Greece 2009:70.9%(down from 74.1%) 31. Diagram by Nate Silver New political axes: a model 32. Trending left; independently-minded

Borrowing from Nate Silver's ideological/institutional axes for front-runners in the US GOP primaries, the trend in Ireland and Iceland was not a simple swing to the left, but a swing left-&-down, toward the bottom of the chart

33. Iceland 2009

• Left-Green Alliance (secular, eco-socialist, eurosceptic 21.7%,+7.4% )

34. Citizen's Movement (grassroots, reformist, anti-establishment 7.2%,+7.2% )

35. Progressive Party (liberal, agrarian 14.8%,+3.1% ) 36. Social Democratic Alliance (social democracy, pro-european 29.8%,+3% ) Ireland 2011

• Labour Party (social democracy 19.4%,+9.3% )

37. Sinn Fein (left-wing nationalism, republicanism 9.9%,+3% )

38. United Left Alliance (anti-capitalism, trade unionism 2.6%,+2.6% ) 39. New Vision (grassroots, reformist, anti-establishment 1.1%,+1.1% ) Greece 2009

• Ecologist Greens (social progressivism, green 2.5%,+1.5% )

40.

In post-crisis politics, outsiders > insiders

Luke 'Ming' Flanagan, TD 41.

In post-crisis politics, outsiders > insiders

BirgittaJnsdttir, MP 42.

In post-crisis politics, outsiders > insiders

Jn Gnarr 43. Apparent retrograde motion

'Apparent retrograde motion is the motion of a planetary body in a direction opposite to that of other bodies within its system as observed from a particular vantage point.' (Wikipedia)

44. In both nations, the governments returned by post-crisis elections belie the true scale of the ideological shift 45. Iceland's electorate turfed the conservatives out of government, replacing their Independent/SDA coalition with a leftist government of social democrats and eco-socialists 46. Ireland roundly rejected both parties of their FF/Green government, returning a 'grand coalition' of Labour (centre-left) and Fine Gail (centre-right) 47. Hypothesis: the 'outsider' candidates the Gnarrs, Flanagans, andJnsdttirs are closer to the actual preferences of a post-crisis electorate 48. What Now? Conclusions; Questions; How to Move Forward 49. Concluding Questions

What does a resilient electoral system look like?

50. If a diversity of voices aids systemic resilience, how can we undercut or circumvent the professionalization of European politics? 51. How durable are these left-outsider realignments? How specific to the context of small states in Northern Europe? 52. Assuming Brown's bail-outs and stimulus packages saved us from the rawest of collapse scenarios, but failed to fix any of the underlying weaknesses of the system, what happens when the second 'dip' discredits the next set of governing parties? Oncethey'recast into the wasteland, following the footprints of their predecessors, who do we have left? 53. What can the emergence of 'celebrity economists' in Ireland tell us about the role of the expert in a post-collapse environment?