EXTINCTION OF

CRIMINAL

LIABILITYSource: Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book One,

Articles 1-113. 2012. Eighteenth Edition. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, inc., pp.861-890

Extinction in General

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and

as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is

extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs

before final judgment;

Note: Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment.

Death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability

of the offender, because the offense is committed against the State.

Before final judgment After final judgment

Criminal Liability extinguished extinguished

Civil Liability extinguished not extinguished

2. By service of the sentence;Crime is a debt incurred by the offender as a

consequence of his wrongful act and the penalty is but the amount of his debt. When payment is made, the debt is extinguished. Service of sentence does not extinguish the civil liability.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

Amnesty is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted. (Brown v. Walker, 161 US 602)

Note: Civil liability is not extinguished by amnesty.

4. By absolute pardon;

Kinds of pardon:

Absolute pardon is an act of grace proceeding

from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws

which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed

from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has

committed.

Conditional pardon is a contract between the

executive and the convict that the former will release the

latter upon compliance with the condition. One usual

condition is “not again violate any of the penal laws of

the country.”

.

Amnesty Pardon

Blanket pardon to classes of persons, guilty of political offenses

Includes any crime and is exercised individually

May still be exercised before trial or investigation

The person is already convicted

Looks backward – it is as if he has committed no crime

Looks forward – he is relieved from the consequences of the offense, but

rights not restored unless explicitly provided by the terms of the pardon

Public act which the court shall take judicial notice of

Private act of the President and must be pleaded and proved by the person

pardonedValid only when there is final

judgmentValid if given either before or after

final judgment

.

Both do not extinguish civil liability

5. By prescription of the crime;Prescription of the crime is the forfeiture or loss of the right of

the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.

6. By prescription of the penalty;Prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture of the right

of the Government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time.

7. By marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

Marriage of the offender with the offended woman after the commission of any of the crimes of rape, seduction, abduction or acts of lasciviousness, as provided in Article 344, must be contracted by the offender in good faith. Hence marriage contracted only to void criminal liability is devoid of legal effects.

Article 90. Prescription of crimes. – Crimes punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty

years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in

fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor,

which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one

year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe

in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest

penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules

contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this Article.

In computing the period of prescription, the first day is to be excluded and the last day included. A month is computed as the regular 30-day month.

But as regards to a leap year, February 28 and 29 should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription.

Where the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or a legal holiday, the information can no longer be filed on the next days as the crime has already prescribed.

Act No. 3326 is not applicable where the special law provides for its own prescriptive period.

Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.

– The period of prescription shall commence to

run from the day on which the crime is discovered

by the offended party, the authorities, or their

agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the

complaint or information, and shall commence to

run again when such proceedings terminate

without the accused being convicted or acquitted,

or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not

imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the

offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Outline of the provisions:

1. The period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.

2. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.

3. It commences to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

Note: termination must be final as to amount to a jeopardy that would bar a subsequent prosecution.

4. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines.

For continuing crimes, prescriptive period cannot begin to run because the crime does not end.

The period of prescription commences to run from the date of commission of crime if it is known at the time of its commission. (The offended part had constructive notice of the forgery after the deed of sale, where his signature had been falsified, was registered.)

Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. –

The penalties imposed by final sentence

prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty

years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years, with the

exception of the penalty of arresto mayor,

which prescribes in five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year.

In prescription of crimes, it is the penalty

prescribed by law that should be considered;

in prescription of penalties, it is the penalty

imposed that should be considered.

Example: A commenced to serve the sentence and

after a month, he escaped and remained at large for

twelve years, in case he is captured thereafter, can he

be required to serve the remaining period of his

sentence? No. The penalty of prision correccional

already prescribed. Article 92 uses the words “the

penalties imposed by final sentence.”

Article 93. Computation of the prescription of

penalties. – The period of prescription of

penalties shall commence to run from the date

when the culprit should evade the service of

his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the

defendant should give himself up, be captured,

should go to some foreign country with which

this Government has no extradition treaty, or

should commit another crime before the

expiration of the period of prescription.

Elements:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence;

2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence;

3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not givenhimself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime;

4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict

The following interrupts the prescriptive period:

1. In cases where our government has extradition treaty with another country but the crime is not included in the treaty.

2. The acceptance of a conditional pardon interrupts the prescriptive period.

Article 36. Pardon; its effects. – A pardon shall

not work the restoration of the right to hold

public office, or the right of suffrage, unless

such rights be expressly restored by the terms

of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the

culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity

imposed upon him by the sentence.

Effects of pardon by the President:

1. A pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage. Exception: When any or both such rights is or are expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

2. It shall not exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity. The pardon cannot make an exception to this rule.

Limitations:

1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction;

2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

Recebido v. People, 346 SCRA

881Facts: On September 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of

Aniceto Recebido to redeem her property which Dorolmortgaged to petitioner sometime in April 1985. Recebidoand Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage butDorol gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.

Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of Assessor that thereexists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979allegedly executed by Dorol in favor of Recebido and that theproperty was registered in the latter’s name. Aftercomparison, NBI Document Examiner found that thesignature was falsified.

Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribedat the time the information was filed.

Held: The crime had not prescribed at the time of the filing of the

information. The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the

offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed

would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is

“prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not

more than 5,000.00 pesos.” Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty

is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is

categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being

correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the

petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the

prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year

prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was

committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,

the period of prescription shall “commence to run from the day on

which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or

their agents, x x x.” In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that

registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record

is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and

equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of

what it contains.

People v. Desierto, 363 SCRA

585Facts: This resolves the motion for reconsideration and second motion

for reconsideration filed by Cojuangco Jr., as well as the motion for

reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. On

September 23, 2002, the resolution of the Ombudsman in OMG-0-

90-2811 dismissing the Republic’s complaint was set aside and the

Ombudsman was ordered to proceed with the preliminary

investigation in said case and to exclude Teodoro Regala and Jose

Concepcion as defendants. Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr and

petitioner Republic of the Philippines then filed their respective

motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.

Cojuangco argues that: There is no evidentiary basis exists for

the Court’s finding that the offense had not prescribed; it was,

consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense

charged had not prescribed and that the Court overlooked

respondent’s right to speedy disposition. On the other hand, the

Republic questions the Court’s ruling ordering the exclusion of

Regala and Concepcion as defendants.

Held: (Cojuanco) It is not true that the Court has no evidentiary basis for

its finding that the offense had not prescribed. Since the ten-year

prescriptive period in violation of RA 3019 is governed by Section 2

of Act 3326, the complaint in this case was filed on March 2, 1990,

was well within the prescriptive period. The counting of the

applicable ten-year prescriptive period in this case commenced

from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have

been between February 1986 and the filing of the complaint on

March 2, 1990. Between these dates, at the most, only four years

had lapsed. Hence, the complaint was timely filed. The Court

likewise finds respondent’s contention in his motions that the seven-

year delay in the disposition of the preliminary investigation by the

Ombudsman warrants the dismissal of the case against him, without

merit.

In the case of Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, the petitioners

raised the issue of the delay of the conduct of the preliminary

investigation. Aside from the motion for extension of time to file

counter-affidavits, petitioners did not file nor send any letter-queries

They slept on their right – a situation amounting to laches. The matter could

have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they

showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their

cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early

resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence

may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

In Cojuangco’s case, records shows that the last pleading filed prior to

the resolution dated June 2, 1997 was respondent’s motion to

suspend filing of counter-affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991.

Between 1991 and 1997, respondent did nothing to assert his right

to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, his silence during such

period amounts to a waiver of such right.

(Republic) In the Regala and Castillo cases, the Court ordered the

exclusion of petitioners therein from the acts complained of in

connection with the legal services they rendered to the other

respondents. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged

ill-gotten wealth.

They have made their position clear from the verybeginning that they are not willing to testify and theycannot be compelled to testify in view of theirconstitutional right against self-incrimination and of theirfundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilegeof attorney-client confidentiality.

During the pendency of this petition, respondentLobregat died on January 2, 2004. The death of anaccused prior to final judgment terminates his criminalliability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.The motions for reconsideration filed by Cojuangco andthe Republic are denied with finality.

Presidential Ad hoc Fact-finding Committee on

Behest Loans v. Desierto, 363 SCRA 489

Facts: On March 24, 1997, Atty. Orlando Salvador (PCGGConsultant) filed with the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills inc., alleging thatthe presence of two or more of the eighth criteriamentioned under Memorandum No. 61 will classify theaccount as Behest Loan.

On May 29, 1997, the Ombudsman dismissed thecomplaint on the ground of prescription. “The entireseries of transactions was by public instruments, dulyrecorded, the crime of estafa committed in connectionwith said transactions was known to the offended partywhen it was committed and the period of prescriptioncommenced to run from the date of its commission.” OnOctober 28, 1999, the Ombudsman manifested to theCourt his willingness to have the case remanded to hisOffice for preliminary investigation.

Held: Looking closely at the provisions of R. A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act), the law provides for its own prescriptive period. However,since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in thecomputation of the prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, Section 2as amended. This implies that if the commission of the crime wereknown, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day thecrime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law wasnot known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to runonly from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature ofthe constitutive act or acts. In cases involving violations of R. A. No.3019committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that oustedPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as theaggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time thequestioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would havedared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting ofthe prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of theoffense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential AdHoc Committee on Behest Loans. As to when the period of prescription wasinterrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended,provides that prescription is interrupted "when proceedings areinstituted against the guilty person." In this case, the prescriptive periodwas interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsmanon March 24, 1997, five (5) years from the time of discovery in 1992.Thusly, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period.

Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, 394

SCRA 221

Facts: On May 17, 1982 (Barangay Election Day), the accusedconducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking theelectric bulb and two kerosene petromax lamps lighting theroom where voting center no 24 is located, during thecounting of the votes in said voting center plunging the roomin complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting theproceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. On January 14,1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declaredpetitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. During theexecution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear whichprompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest ofpetitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitionerwas never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten yearslater, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial courta motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on theground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed has prescribed.

Held: From the four elements of Article 93, it is clear thatthe penalty imposed has not prescribed because thecircumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy thesecond element, to wit – “That the convict evaded theservice of the sentence by escaping during theservice of his sentence.” Article 93 provides when theprescription of penalties shall commence to run. Undersaid provision, it shall commence to run from the datethe felon evades the service of his sentence.Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion ofservice of sentence can be committed only by those whohave been convicted by final judgment by escapingduring the term of his sentence. The assailed decision ofthe Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudenceand applicable laws. It did not engage in judiciallegislation but correctly interpreted the pertinentlaws. Because petitioner was never placed inconfinement, prescription never started to run in hisfavor.

Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil

34Facts: Teofilo Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He

was given pardon by the president but even prior to hispardon he was already holding the position as themunicipality president of Malabon, notwithstanding hisconviction. Miguel Cristobal, on the other hand, averred thatSantos should be excluded from the list of electors inMalabon because he was already convicted of final judgment“for any crime against property”. This is pursuant to CA 357 ofthe New Election Code. The lower court presided by AlejoLabrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision ofthe law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his“full civil and political rights, except that with respect to theright to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible forappointment only to positions which are clerical or manual innature and involving no money or property responsibility.”

Issue: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as anelector.

Held: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon

the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief

Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after

conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of

impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the

Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or

controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the

sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the

highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not

only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities

resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability

is the result of conviction without which there would be no

basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the

only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate

its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,

and the pardoning power likewise extends to such

disabilities.

When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequencesof conviction. In the present case, while the pardonextended to respondent Santos is conditional in thesense that "he will be eligible for appointment only topositions which are clerical or manual in nature involvingno money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofaras it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualificationimposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth ActNo. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoningpower of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment ofthe pardoning power of the Chief Executive, notcontemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermoreto the result that there would be no way of restoring thepolitical privilege in a case of this nature except throughlegislative action.

Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil 441

Facts: Gregorio Palatino was the mayor elect ofTorrijos, Province of Marinduque. FlorencioPelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding allegingthat Palatino is no longer qualified to hold officebecause he was already convicted before andwas even imprisoned. Because of such convictionand imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatinois already barred from voting and being votedupon. Palatino also invoked paragraph (a) section94 of the Election Code which supports hiscontention.

Issue: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for publicoffice.

Held: In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondentmayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago;that he had already merited conditional pardon from theGovernor-General in 1915; that thereafter he hadexercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor ofTorrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; waselected municipal president of that municipality three times insuccession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of themunicipality in the election for local officials in December,1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that thepurpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enablehim to assume the position in deference to the popularwill; and the pardon was thus extended on the datementioned hereinabove and before the date fixed insection 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. Wesee no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by arestrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant tothe Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy toexecutive action and disregard what at bottom is atechnical objection.

People v. Nery, 10 SCRA 244

Facts: On 15 November 1954, in a market stall in Bacolod City, the

accused, Soledad Nery, received from Federico Matillano two

diamond rings to be sold by her on commission. The agreement

was for the accused to deliver on the following day, the sum of

P230.00 to her principal, to whom the accused had represented

having a ready buyer, and whatever overprice could be obtained

in the sale would be retained by the accused as her

commission. Soledad Nery failed to show up on the following

day; after several days, in a casual encounter with Federico

Matillano, she claimed that her prospective buyer withdrew from

the transaction and that she was looking for another buyer. His

patience exhausted, Federico brought the matter to the attention

of the police authorities of Bacolod on 5 January 1955. Soledad

was found and brought to the police station; she promised, in

writing, to deliver the price of the rings or the rings on 25

January 1955. The accused failed to comply with her promise.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused is extinguishedby novation.

Held: The accused in the present case insists that there is no prohibitionin our law to prevent the parties to a contract to novate it so that anyincipient criminal liability under the first is thereby avoided. It may beobserved in this regard that novation is not one of the meansrecognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can beextinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to eitherprevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the truenature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was suchthat its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as whenmoney loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguiseis resorted to. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected bycompromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense whichmust be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its ownmotion though complete reparation should have been made of thedamage suffered by the offended party. The fact, therefore, that theaccused herein had, with the consent of the offended party, assumedthe obligation of paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his ownsalary after he had committed the misappropriation, does not obliteratethe criminal liability already incurred.

Llamado v. CA, 270 SCRA 423

Facts: Accused Ricardo Llamado and his co-accusedJacinto Pascual were the Treasurer and President,respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation. LeonGaw, delivered to accused the amount of P180,000.00,with the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of theaccused in the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4November 1983, plus interests thereon at 12% plus ashare in the profits of the corporation, if any. On the saiddate, Leon Gaw deposited the check in his currentaccount but it was dishonored by the drawee bank.Informing Llamado of the dishonor of the check.Accused offered in writing to pay Gaw of the amountequivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November 1983,and the balance to be rolled over for a period of ninetydays. Llamado failed to do so. Gaw filed a complaintagainst Llamado and Pascual for violation of BP 22.Pascual remained at large. Llamado contends he signedblank checks and leave them with Pascual.

Held: The "novation theory" does not apply in the case atbar. While private complainant agreed to petitioner's offer topay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or15, 1983 and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, thisturned out to be only an empty promise which effectivelydelayed private complainant's filing of a case forViolation of BP 22 against petitioner and his co-accused.As admitted by petitioner in his Memorandum, privatecomplainant was never paid as agreed upon. Petitioner'sargument that he should not be held personally liable for theamount of the check because it was a check of the Pan AsiaFinance Corporation and he signed the same in his capacityas Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The thirdparagraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: “Where thecheck is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, theperson or persons who actually signed the check inbehalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.”

People v. Maneja, G.R. No. L-

47684

Facts: The sole question raised in this appeal iswhether the period of prescription for theoffense of false testimony which, in the instantcase, is five years (Art. 180, No. 4, in relationto art. 90, Revised Penal Code), shouldcommence from the time the appellee,Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposedfalse testimony in criminal case No. 1872 onDecember 16, 1933, as the lower courtheld, or, from the time the decision of theCourt of Appeals in the aforesaid basic casebecame final in December, 1938, as theprosecution contends.

Held: The period of prescription shall commence to runfrom the day on which the crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91,Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of falsetestimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor inarticle 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case,made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of thedefendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falselydoes not therefore constitute an actionable offense untilthe principal case is finally decided. And before an actbecomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly bediscovered as such by the offended party, the authoritiesor their agents. The penalty for the offense of falsetestimony is the same, whether the defendant in criminalcase No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment,it being a matter of pure coincidence. The four casesenumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — andthe instant case falls on one of them — uniformly presupposea final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case asa prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false

Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, 122 SCRA

713

Facts: On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of QuezonCity filed before the City Court an information for slightphysical injuries allegedly committed by RafaelYapdiangco on December 2, 1964 against Mr. AngCho Ching. On September 10, 1965, the petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution onthe ground that the information having been filed onthe sixty first day following the commission of theoffense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed.On September 14, 1965, the City Court of QuezonCity denied the motion to quash stating that the 60thday fell on a Sunday and considering the rule thatwhen the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on aSunday, the same may be filed on the nextsucceeding business day, the action had notprescribed.

Held: The law requires or permits the filing of the information within two

months or sixty days from the date the crime was discovered by the

offended party. The 60th day or last day for the filing of the information

in this case fell on a holiday. If we follow the ordinary rule of time

computation based on the common law, which, in construing

statutes of limitations excludes the first day and includes the last

day unless the last day is dies non in which event the following

day is included, the stand of the respondents-appellees would be

correct. The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised

Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court

do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute

those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right

to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law.

Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a

Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended

up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in.

The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the

last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606

Facts: On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the

Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with

respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of

Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,

1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel

of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the

Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge. After

hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, granted the motion to

quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription.

The order of dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that

the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were

supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not present

during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8,

1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by

petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the

criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same

accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments

contained in the criminal Information.

Held: The Solicitor General recommends giving due course to the petition and

the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor General, the

Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of

prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification,

including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said

Resolution had already become final and executory inasmuch as the

Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the

reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on

March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21,

1975, or about two months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal,

the same had already long been final. We agree with the Solicitor

General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a

motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution

for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides

that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total

extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of

falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised

Penal Code. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the

alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of

Deeds on August 26, 1948.

People v. Carino, 56 Phil 109

Facts: On or about June 5, 1928, in the municipality of Goa, CamarinesSur, the aforenamed accused, Victorino Cariño and Daniel Obias,being election inspectors duly appointed in precinct No. 4 of saidmunicipality for the general election held on that date, with the solepurpose of favoring one Vicente Oliquino, falsify the copies of theelection returns in said precinct sent to the provincial and municipaltreasurers, sign them and with the full knowledge of falsifying theresults of the election the accused made it appear therein that the saidVicente Oliquino had obtained 110 lawful votes for the office ofcouncilor, when as a matter of fact, and which the defendants positivelyknew, as indeed they stated in the other copy of the election returnwhich was placed in the valid ballot box, that said Vicente Oliquinoobtained only 67 lawful votes in said precinct. That these frauds werediscovered in connection with the election protest filed against saidVicente Oliquino in civil case No. 4562, in which, by order of the court,the ballot boxes for said precinct No. 4 were opened on October 10,1928. The trial court convicted Victoriano Cariño and Daniel Obias ofthe crime charged and sentenced them to six months' imprisonment, afine of P200 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,to pay the costs, and to be deprived of the right of suffrage, besidesbeing disqualified to hold a public office for a period of seven years.Victoriano Cariño and Daniel Obias filed an appeal.

Held: The difference between the Election Law and the Penal Code inthe matter of prescription consists in this, that according to the Code,if the commission of the crime is unknown, prescription beginsupon its discovery and the commencement of judicialinvestigation looking to its punishment; whereas according to theElection Law, if the discovery of the offense is incidental tojudicial proceeding in any election contest, prescription beginswhen such proceedings terminates. The discovery in questionwas not incidental to judicial proceeding in said election contest, but,that, even before the filing of the motion of protest, the contestantsand their election watchers, with knowledge of the falsificationcommitted by the inspectors, in connection with the count of thevotes and the preparation of the election returns on June 6,1928, had sufficient reason to denounce such falsification to thefiscal. Therefore, the general rule established that the year for theprescription of the crime charged in the information began torun when the offense was committed. And inasmuch as thefalsification of the election returns took place on June 6, 1928, it isevident that the information filed on July 22, 1929, is outside ofthe year provided by law. Wherefore, the judgment appealed fromis reversed, and the appellants Daniel Obias and Victorino Cariñoabsolved from the information.

People v. Joson, 46 Phil 380

Facts: On the 6th day of June 1922, on the occasion of thegeneral elections which were being held on said day inthe municipalities of Virac and Bato, Province of Albay,the above-named accused, conspiring and intentionallywrite, prepare and cause to be written, distributed,published, divulged and posted in different public placeswithin the municipalities of Virac and Bato severalposters and bills reading as follows: “Voters, bear in mindour sufferings, hemp is cheap, due to Vera, and rice isdear, due to Martinez” and is calculated to belittle anddefeat Jose O. Vera and Pedro Martinez. In accordancewith the foregoing order on April 28, 1923, an "order ofarrest" was issued, signed by said judge. On the samedate and without having been actually arrested undersaid order of arrest, all of the defendants appeared incourt and gave "bail bonds" for their liberty. Nothingfurther seems to have occurred in the prosecution of saidaction until the 22d day of January, 1924.

Held: In accordance therefore with that section, the filing of thecomplaint in the present action on the 28th day of April, 1923, hadthe effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive periodmentioned in section 71 of Act No. 3030, and that the actual arrestof the defendants was not necessary to interrupt the runningof the period of prescription or limitation. Moreover, it may beadded that when the defendants voluntarily appeared after thecomplaint was presented against them and gave bonds for theirappearance at any time they may be called, no arrest is necessary.Voluntary appearance relieves the necessity of an actualarrest. The record contains no explanation why the prosecution ofthe present case was delayed from the 28th of April, 1923, to the20th of March, 1924. Such delay should not be permitted. In viewof all of the foregoing, the presentation of the complaint withinthe year of prescription interrupted the running of theprescriptive period and the action was not barred byprescription; that the lower court committed the errors complainedof by the Attorney-General; that the cause was improperlydismissed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the recordshould be returned to the court whence it came, with direction thatthe prosecution proceeds as speedily as possible.

People v. Puntilos, June 15,

1938

“Acceptance of a conditional pardon interrupts

the prescriptive period because it is similar to

a case of one fleeing from this jurisdiction.”

Tanega v. Masakayan, February 28,

1967

Facts: Adelaida Tanega was convicted of slander by the CityCourt of Quezon City. Found guilty once again by the Court ofFirst Instance, she was sentenced to 20 days of arrestomenor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in thesum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiaryimprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appealsaffirmed. Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentencebe set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, executionwas deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At theappointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. Thisprompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, toissue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 analias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested. Then,on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved toquash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed. OnDecember 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "thepenalty imposed upon the accused has to be served",rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead,

Held: For prescription of penalty of imprisonment

imposed by final sentence to commence to

run, the culprit should escape during the

term of such imprisonment. Adverting to the

facts, we have here the case of a convict who

— sentenced to imprisonment by final

judgment — was thereafter never placed in

confinement. Prescription of penalty, then,

does not run in her favor.