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Submitted by: Amanpreet Kaur
Historically, the concept of determining whether an
expert’s testimony is admissible or not dates back to
the Frye case. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App.
D.C. Dec. 3, 1923)
This 1923 case stemmed from a Defendant’s appeal
who was convicted based on a precursor to the lie
detector.
The machine would measure changes in blood pressure
and the operator of the machine would correlate these
changes with the Defendant’s truthfulness.
The Defendant argued that this was an unfounded
technique which was not recognized by scientists in the
field.
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled that this test was not “generally
accepted” by the scientific community so the polygraph
results were not allowed into evidence.
In 1923, the scientific community would not have been
as broad as we would define the term “scientific
community” today.
Fields like psychiatry and forensics were not as popular
as they are now since they were just developing.
The “general acceptance test” establishes that the expert’s testimony must have acceptance of his/her peers in that particular field of expertise.
An example of this could be related to a medical malpractice case against a surgeon for negligent performance of a surgical procedure.
The Plaintiff would have to have an expert that was well versed in surgery, and, specifically, knowledge of the specific surgery that is at issue.
If the Plaintiff decided to use a pharmacist as an expert witness, the judge would exclude the testimony because the pharmacist does not have the experience and training of a surgeon.
If the Plaintiff uses a surgeon as an expert witness who wants to testify that the Defendant should have used a surgical procedure that no one, but the Plaintiff’s expert uses, the judge would exclude the testimony because the procedure is not generally accepted.
Essentially, for the results of a scientific technique
to be admissible, the technique must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in
its particular field.
This is referred to as the "general acceptance" test
by the scientific community.
• In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) were passed.
Rule 702 outlines the basic principles of the Frye test and
introduces the concept of the judge having discretion to decide
what the jury hears in term of expert opinions.
• “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.” Federal Rule of Evidence
702 (passed in 1975)
The Daubert case involves children and their parents who
were plaintiffs in a case involving alleged birth defects
which were caused by the mother’s ingestion of an anti-
nausea drug (Bendectin) which was manufactured and
marketed by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
The defense expert concluded that, based on his review of
multiple published studies, using Bendectin in the first
trimester of pregnancy was not a risk for birth defects.
The plaintiffs did not disagree with the defense expert but
rather countered with eight experts of their own who
concluded that Bendectin could cause birth defects with a
myriad of different types of testing and re-analysis of
previously published studies.
The trial court ruled that the Plaintiff’s experts’
evidence did not meet the general acceptance test for
admission.
As stated previously, the general acceptance test refers
to people in the specific field/career at issue who would
handle/view the situation similarly.
The Appeals court agreed, citing the Frye ruling in
their decision.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, stating that
the Federal Rule of Evidence supersede the Frye test.
• The Supreme Court’s ruling on Daubert (Daubert v
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 293 U.S. 579 (1993)) is
crucial to the admissibility of expert testimony in that it
provides a detailed framework to help the judge when
determining the relevance and reliability upon hearing
evidence.
The Daubert standard (the detailed framework
previously referenced) is as follows:
Can the scientific theory/technique be tested or has it
been?
Have the test results been the subject of publication
and/or peer review?
Is there a known/potential rate of error?
What are the standards that control the operation of the
technique and how are they maintained?
Is it generally accepted within the scientific
community?
Once the Supreme Court ruled on the Daubert motion
in 1993, it caused mass confusion amongst the lower
courts who were inconsistently applying the ruling.
Some jurisdictions went so far as to say that Daubert
only applied to scientists and not engineers.
This was the first case regarding admissibility of
handwriting after the daubret rule were passed.
In this case the Jury charged the defendant’s with
conspiring to steal paintings, sculpture, silver and
gold jewellery from Ethel Brownstone,
Defendant’s aunt.
In this case two documents having signatures of
Ethel Brownstone was presented in court as
evidence.
When these signatures were compared by forensic
document examiners with the standard signatures
of Ethel, they were found to be forged.
But the judges decided that forensic examination
was practical rather than scientific so the Daubert
did not apply.
The expertise was admissible under rule 702 but
only as “ TECHNICAL SKILL”.
But the results of starzecypyzel indicated that an
expertise in forensic handwriting examination did
exist.
The case of Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v Carmichael (526
U.S. 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999) expands the rules of expert
testimony to:
include the testimony of those who have “technical”
knowledge, such as a doctor, architect, or engineer.
include the testimony of those who have “other
specialized” knowledge, such as the tire expert
testifying on behalf of the Plaintiffs in the Kumho case.
FRE 702 was amended in 2000 to reflect both the
Daubert and Kumho rulings
U.S court of appeals; Frye vs. U.S., 54 App. DC. 46,47,293F,1013,1014;1923
U.S Supreme court ruling; Daubert vs. MerellDow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S, 579;1993
U.S Supreme court ruling; U.S. vs. Starzecpyzel, 880F. Suppl 1027 (S.D.N.Y);1995
Howard Zonana: Daubert Vs. Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals: A new standard for scientific evidence in courts. ; Bull Am Academy Pschiatry law; 22(309-325);1994
Michael J. Saks and David L. Faigman: Expert
evidence after Daubert; Annual review Law
Soc. Sci.; 1(105-130)2005
Jan Seaman Kelly and Brian S. Lindblom:
Scientific examination of Questioned
Documents; 2nd edition; CRC press; (37-42);
2006