1. By Brit Meredith

2. Government warnings for weather and natural disasters areoften ineffective. This is due to numerous factors, most ofwhich are not taken into consideration when formulating ordesigning the warning, and contribute to the overallineffectiveness of the warning. These factors include:successfully reaching the target audience (penetrating theirnormal activities so that the warning is received), credibilityof the source issuing the warning, the inherent conflictbetween experts and the general populace, differences in riskperception, and the complexities of the social process.Design formulations that address these issues and that couldproduce more effective warnings are outlined. If these designdeficiencies are addressed and if a more centralized approachto warnings is implemented, government warnings maybecome more effective and ultimately save more lives. 3. Reaching the Target Audience Perceived Credibility of the Source Conflicts between Experts and the TargetAudience Risk Perception and the Social Process 4. One of the most important factors in warning thetarget audience (all people within the definedgeographical risk zone) is that the warning isactually received by those individuals. The ability of the warning to penetrate a personsnormal activities is dependent on what thoseactivities are and the time of day (Barnes 1143). If the warning is never received, no action is takenand the people are left exposed. 5. Insuring that the warning is actually received by thetarget audience is further aggravated by a lack ofcentralization in issuing warnings. Currently, "public warning practices aredecentralized across different governments and theprivate sector. Uneven preparedness to issuewarnings exists across local communities; hence,people are unevenly protected(Sorenson 119). The result is that those who would normally receivea warning dont because of government failings. 6. Once the message is actually received by the intendedrecipients, people will automatically seek confirmationof the information. It is important that people do receive confirmation; ifthey do not, the chance they will disregard the messageis increased (McGinley 155). A centralized government body that issues a consistentmessage across all mediums of communication isparamount to effective warnings, as it extends the reach,and therefore the likelihood, of reaching the intendedrecipients, while also providing confirmationreinforcement. 7. Once the warning penetrates to the people, the peoplemust believe and trust the source of the warning beforethey will act. Research has shown that credibility of a messagesource is directly related to effectiveness and persuasionof the message (Lirtzman and Shuv-Ami 707). Weather warnings are overwhelmingly issued by localgovernment agencies. Unfortunately, governmentagencies do not achieve the highest credibility amongmany individuals (Lirtzman and Shuv-Ami 707). 8. This is especially true among ethnic minorities and poorpeople, who have been evidenced to have a delay inwarning responses due to a lack of perceived credibilityin local officials (Drabek 518). Poorer families are alsomore isolated socially, so the informal systems[confirmation reinforcement of the message via socialconnections] that are so much a part ofthe warning process are less robust (Drabek 518). Consequently, they are more likely to be left in areas ofhigh risk, as they are more likely to live in trailerparks or other types of housing that are more vulnerableeither because of location or structural integrity or both(Drabek 518). 9. Until more credence and trust is apportioned to thegovernment, many will fail to be persuaded intoaction and they will continue to suffer theconsequences. A more centralized approach by those issuingwarnings may help alleviate this problem, as itwould help solve the problem of unequal coverage,an inequality which is a likely culprit for much ofthe mistrust people place in the government and itswarnings. 10. Once you get the target audience to give credenceto the source of the warning, interpretation of thewarning may conflict with what the warning wasintended to convey. Often, what the experts assume will cause action isnot the case. There are differences in perception ofwhats at stake. Different weight is given to risksand outcomes. 11. Intuitive risk perception places higher concern for low-probability,high-consequence risks than for high-probability,low-consequence risks (Renn and Levine176). Therefore, risk communicators have to face the problemof the intrinsic conflict between the perspectives of thescientific community and the public in general (Rennand Levine 176). While the expert scientific community may be baffledby the publics preponderance for concern of theimprobable, they must nonetheless keep thischaracteristic in mind when formulating the warning, sothat the most probable and realistic dangers areinternalized by the target audience. 12. Once the warning penetrates the target audience, isaccepted from the source, and the intendedprobability is internalized, risk communicators mustbe prepared for the initial response of the audience,which is denial. The first principle in understanding disasterwarning responses is to recognize explicitly that theinitial response to any warning is denial (Drabek515). This denial is the beginning the social process. 13. People are rarely alone when they receive a warning.So it is groups, not individuals that actually processmost disaster warnings. And, as with everything elsethey confront, rarely is there an immediate consensus asto what should be done, if anything. So beyond denial,there is debate (Drabek 516). To limit, if not eliminate debate, warnings must beexplicit. When disaster warning messages are unclearor imprecise, people demonstrate incredible creativity atinterpreting the information so as to minimize theirperception of risk (Drabek 519). 14. While already combatting denial and unintendedinterpretations, risk communicators must also factor inthe variable nature of the target audience ,which mayexist on a wide spectrum, as well as the accompanyingsocial constraints associated with each end of thespectrum. When presented with a warning the target audience willbe presented with choices: how and when to act, if to actat all. There may be a range of choices, but the range ofchoices that are perceived as being available areconstrained by social experience and the emergentcircumstances of the moment. Responsesto disaster warnings, like other life conditions, arepatterned by invisible webs of constraint (Drabek 517). 15. While the above issues cannot be entirelyeliminated, their detrimental effects can be limitedby a strategically formulated warning. Begin by knowing your audience. The warningmust be consistent with the persons attitudes andbeliefs, or sufficiently persuasive to change themand to motivate the person to carry out the directedbehavior (i.e comply with the warning) (Wogalter,DeJoy, and Laughery 13). 16. Issues such as competence (intellectual ability,language and/or reading abilities) must also be takeninto consideration (Laughery and Hammond 10). Improved forecasting and widely availableinformation will be of little use if the targetaudience does not understand the warningsprovided, do not perceive themselves as vulnerableto the threat, or do not know how to best avoid thethreat (Sheridan 3). 17. Acknowledging that there is variability in the targetaudience is vital. When designing the warning,design with the low-end extreme in mind; if youdesign for the average you miss half your audience(Laughery and Hammond 10). The recipients must recognize themselves as theintended target audience and understand thenecessary behaviors required of them to adequatelyand appropriately respond to the warning. 18. To maximize such adaptive behaviors (the ability to respondquickly and appropriately) of the target audience it isnecessary to address more complex criteria. Drabek (519)states that addressing the following seven questions hasbeen shown to illicit the most adaptive behaviors: 1. Who is issuing the warning? 2. What is threatening? 3. What exact geographical area is threatened? 4. When is it coming? 5. How probable is the event? 6. Are there high risk locations, such as people inautomobiles, that require special actions? 7. What specific protective actions should be taken? 19. Formulating a warning that incorporates all of theseelements is a formidable task. Until there is a morecentralized government body to monitor and issuewarnings the design and implementation of aneffective community disaster warning systemremains only a dream in too many places (Drabek519). 20. The current problems affecting the effectiveness ofgovernment weather warnings will continue until issuessuch as successfully reaching the target audience,perceived credibility of the source, the conflict betweenexperts and the public, differences in risk perception,and the complexities of the social process are addressed. A centralized government approach to issuing warnings,one that takes into account the issues enumerated above,is vital to the effectiveness of weather warnings. Suchan approach will create a warning system thatsuccessfully reaches more people, and saves more lives:the ultimate purpose of the warning. 21. Barnes, Lindsey R., et al. "False alarms and close calls: A Conceptual Model of Warning Accuracy." Weather and Forecasting 22.5 (2007) : 1140-1147. Drabek, Thomas E. "Understanding Disaster Warning Responses." The Social Science Journal 36.3 (1999): 515-523. Laughery, Kenneth R. and Amy Hammond. Overview. Warnings and Risk Communication. Eds. Michael S. Wogalter, Dave DeJoy and Kenneth R. Laughery. Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, Inc, 1999. 2-12. Print. Lirtzman, Sidney I., and Avichai Shuv-Ami. "Credibility of Sources of Communication on Products Safety Hazards." Psychological Reports 58.3 (1986) : 707-718. McGinley, Maurice, Andrew Turk, and David Bennett. "Design Criteria for Public Emergency Warning Systems." Proceedings of the 3rd International ISCRAM Conference. Newark, NJ (USA), 2006. Print. 22. Renn, Ortwin and Debra Levine. Credibility and Trust in Risk Communication. Communicating Risks to the Public, International Perspectives. Eds. Roger E. Kasperson and Pieter Jan M. Stallen. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991. 175- 218. Print. Sheridan, Scott C. "A Survey of Public Perception and Response to Heat Warnings across Four North American Cities: An Evaluation of Municipal Effectiveness." International Journal of Biometeorology 52.1 (2007) : 3-15. Sorensen, John H. "Hazard Warning Systems: Review of 20 Years of Progress." Natural Hazards Review 1.2 (2000) : 119-125. Whitehead, John C., et al. "Heading for Higher Ground: Factors Affecting Real and Hypothetical Hurricane Evacuation Behavior." Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards 2.4 (2000): 133-142. Wogalter, Michael S., Dave DeJoy, and Kenneth R. Laughery. Organizing Theoretical Framework: A Consolidated Communication-Human Information Processing (C-Hip) Model. Warnings and Risk Communication. Eds. Michael S. Wogalter, Dave DeJoy, And Kenneth R. Laughery. Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1999. 13-21. Print. 23. http://matc.english.txstate.edu/research/usability-lab.html