When do donors matter?The politics of promoting social

protection in sub-Saharan Africa

Bath, 8th September 2015

An adapted political settlements approach

Formal and informal

institutions

Paradigmatic ideas

Existing policy context

Problem frames,

policy ideas

Distributional regime:

- development strategy

- taxation

- social services

- social protection

Domestic and transnational

factions

Political prioritisation of SP Ruling coalition’s orientation to SP (long vs short-term)

Intended and unintended impacts: - regime legitimation, negotiated compromise - instability resulting from change in resource distribution and holding power

Political settlement

Domestic and global policy

advocates

Issue-specific policy coalition

Proposals rejected, revised or adopted based on compatibility with PS

Implementation, as intended or adapted to fit PS incentives

Resource distribution

Global factors

Bilateral and multilateral donors

Donors, IOs, INGOs

Global economic factors

Constraints related to implementation capacity

Research designCountry Political settlement Social assistance Health insurance

Ethiopia Potential developmental coalition

Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)

Pilot Community-Based Health Insurance

Kenya Competitive clientelism

Cash transfer schemes (OVC, elderly, disabled)

Proposed Social Health Insurance Scheme

Rwanda Potential developmental coalition

Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP)

Mutuelles de Santé

Uganda Weak dominant party

Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE)

Proposed National Health Insurance Scheme

Zambia Competitive clientelism

Social Cash Transfers Proposed Social Health Insurance

Our cases: different types of political settlements (Khan 2010)

HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: EXCLUDED ELITES

WEAK STRONG

VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: LOWER LEVEL FACTIONS

WEAK

STRONG

POTENTIALLY DEVELOPMENTAL DOMINANT COALITIONRWANDA, ETHIOPIALonger-term horizons Implementation capabilities high

VULNERABLE AUTHORITARIAN COALITION

WEAK DOMINANT PARTYUGANDAImplementation capabilities weakened by multiple demands and ‘blockers’

COMPETITIVE CLIENTELISTKENYA, ZAMBIAShorter-term horizons: threat of powerful excluded elitesImplementation capabilities weakened

Understanding elite commitment to social protection:

Rwanda’s VUP

Tom Lavers, ILOBath, 8th September 2015

Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP)

• Targeted programme to address poverty:– Public works (2008)– Direct support (2009)– Financial services (2010)

• Progress by 2014: 168 of 416 sectors (PW); 240 sectors (DS)

• DS expected to reach all sectors by 2015/16• 2/3 government financed, 1/3 donors

Rwanda’s dominant party political settlement

• RPF military victory in 1994. Political settlement consolidated around 2000. – No strong elite opposition– Relatively centralised power and cohesive coalition– Strong top-down control mechanisms– But vulnerability and questions over legitimacy

• Key ideas:– Moving beyond ethnicity, promoting national unity – Rapid, inclusive socioeconomic progress is the only means

of overcoming past divisions, giving everyone a stake in country

The VUP within the distributional regime• PRSP (2003-05)– Reasonable growth: 6.4% per annum 2001/02 – 2005/06– But rising inequality (0.51 Gini), low rate of poverty

reduction (3.5%), high regional inequalities• Identified as priority in 2007 leadership retreat• EDPRS 1 (2008-13)– Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) as one of three

flagship programmes– Aims to end extreme poverty by 2020

Policy ‘bricolage’

Donors funded study tour to Ethiopia to look at PSNP• Fit with GoR ideas (similar to GoE): anti-

dependency, productivityAlso integrated with existing government initiatives:• PDL-HIMO – labour-intensive infrastructure

development• Ubudehe – social mapping• Decentralisation – implemented by umurenge

Implementation challenges

• Is social protection really the priority? – Low labour intensity of public works ~50%– Infrastructure development dominates local

government incentives • Targeting problems in Ubudehe– No correlation between ubudehe and quantitative

surveys (Sabates-Wheeler et al, 2015)– New approach currently being rolled out

Conclusions

• Elite commitment in search of a policy• Top-down, elite driven response to threat

resulting from re/distribution• No evidence of bottom-up pressures• Policy translation, not diffusion• Competing priorities – poverty reduction

or infrastructure?

• Advocacy and finance alone is insufficient to generate elite commitment to social protection:– Ultimately domestic politics dominates– Dangers of ‘working with the grain’?

• Distributional regime matters:– Challenge to existing systems of rent distribution can make social

protection attractive, e.g. Rwanda, Zambia• Difference in process between PDCs and the rest:

– Elite perception of threats vs building local political / electoral support

– Centralised vs fragmented decision making– Implementation based on top-down targets vs vulnerable to

political capture– Also different types of policy? ‘Productive’ SN vs SCTs

Comparative analysis: Emerging themes