The Situation in the Annexed Crimea and the De-Occupation Strategy

The Annual Report

Part 1

Kyiv, December, 2015

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In May-June 2014 the “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” Foundation was the first in Ukraine to formulate the basic principles of the Crimea Regain Strategy (1,2,3,4,5). Those principles have been publicized many times and commented on in Ukrainian

and foreign media and social networks. In November-December 2014 they were published and presented in the book A Strategy for Regaining Crimea (6).

Some conclusions concerning the initial period of the Crimea occupation, from February to December 2014, were published in a report presented in Washington on March 6, 2015 (7).

The first version of “The Strategy for Regaining the Crimea” (henceforth referred to as 'Strategy') was formulated on the assumption that it would be used by top-level agencies in the national government of Ukraine; however, these expectations were not fulfilled, or else they were only partially realized and to a very small degree.

The main concepts of the Strategy:

1. An economic blockade of the activities of the Russian Federation in the Crimea, in order to make the annexation of Crimea as expensive as possible, affecting:

sea, air and land transportation with the Crimea; cruises and in-coming tourism; delivery of goods from Ukraine and foreign countries to the Crimea; delivery of goods from the Crimea to destinations outside the peninsula; investments in the Crimea from the outside.

Ukrainian businesses working in the occupied Crimea.

2. A legal blockade of the Russian Federation in order to compensate for the losses suffered by Ukraine, by foreign countries and by their citizens after the annexation of the Crimea.

3. Opposition to any expansion of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region. The expansion of the international Organization for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) into GUAM "+" (+ Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria).

4. The reinforcement of the military presence of NATO in the Black Sea; the relocation of NATO naval forces to the Rumanian port Constanța on a rotation basis; the introduction of new international military exercises of the air forces, air defense forces, the ballistic missile defense forces, and forces for special operations in the Black Sea region.

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5. Personal sanctions against Crimean collaborators – citizens of Ukraine who violated their oaths as public servants. Revocation of all commitments of Ukraine to them in the form of pension support, or the issuing of foreign passports; the confiscation of their assets, etc.

6. Support for pro-Ukrainian citizens who leave the Crimea to continue their education, to work, or to conduct business; the protection of the civil rights and personal assistance for those who cannot leave the peninsula; the provision of links with the homeland.

7. The reconstitution of the Crimea AR Council of Ministers and the entire system of autonomous executive authority in unoccupied territory elsewhere in Ukraine. The creation of a Crimea Committee in the Parliament of Ukraine. The realization and implementation of economic programs with the participation of emigrants from the Crimea; creation of special economic zones (SEZ) and technological parks on the territory of five districts of Kherson oblast/province, adjacent to the Crimea.

8. The Enshrinement in the Constitution of Ukraine, of the status of the Crimea as the autonomous national territory of the Crimean Tatar people.

Some of the steps have been taken (see page 6)

An updated version of the Strategy presented in this report is not so much for the leaders of Ukraine as it is for members of society and for partners of Ukraine, international organizations and members of the Ukrainian diaspora.

The motives for changing the target groups are the following:

The highest-level political leaders of Ukraine have been neglecting not only the development and implementation of the “Crimean Strategy” on the national level, but have refused to even discuss it.

Moreover, high-level leaders of Ukraine, constantly declaring their devotion to and their belief in the reacquisition of the Crimea, after adopting a reasonably satisfactory Act “About the Occupied Territories of the Crimea and Sevastopol” (8) later passed a number of Acts that ran counter to the task of the reacquisition.

The so-called “Special Economic Zone Act” that regulates activity on the territory of the occupied Crimea became the most resonant one (9). It created a favorable environment for trade with the occupying forces and for the illegal trafficking of Ukrainian goods through the occupied Crimea to Russia. On the basis of it, other legal acts were adopted which discriminated against Ukrainian patriots who had left or were wishing to leave the occupied territory, having been turned into “nonresidents” in their native country. Simultaneously it put all the Ukrainians living

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in the occupied Crimea on the same footing as foreigners. It has not been repealed yet in spite of the multiple promises given by the President of Ukraine under pressure from the civilian activists of the Crimea and the leader of the Crimean Tartars.

However, some of the steps suggested in 2014 were carried out; this happened as a result of:

a) voluntary work by members of the civil society, with the involvement of the Ukrainian and foreign media:

the naval blockade of the Crimea, and the cessation of regular passenger transport between Sevastopol, Yalta and Istanbul;

the cancellation of the regular flight between Simferopol and Istanbul; the blockade by civilians of overland goods transport and electrical power

delivery to the Crimea; the adoption of the Act “About the Protection of Human Rights of Internally

Displaced People” (10).

b) the actions of partner countries and international organizations, and their recommendations to the leaders of Ukraine:

the sanctions of the USA, EU countries, Commonwealth countries and others opposed to the Russian Federation;

the sanctions of Ukraine against the Russian Federation;

c) the pressure from the civil society on the government agencies of Ukraine, and the activity of the leaders who support the Strategy.

the cutoff of water delivery to the Crimea via the Northern-Crimean canal; the closure of the rail connection with the Crimea; the prohibition of flights to Ukraine by companies from the Russian Federation

which fly to the Crimea; the creation of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the AR of the Crimea; indictments against the Crimean collaborators and the sequestration of their

property; the stopping of several ships.

Current high-level political leaders in Ukraine are afraid to deal with the reacquisition of the Crimea, leaving it for “future generations”. That is the reason why a civil society is obliged to intensify its activity on the international level, placing emphasis on cooperation with partner countries, but not ceasing to put pressure on Ukrainian government authorities.

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Taking into consideration the global consequences of the annexation of the Crimea and the subsequent developments in Ukraine and in the region of the Black and Mediterranean Seas, it is possible to work out solutions to the Crimean problem only in the broader international context.

During this period since the annexation of the Crimea a new understanding of its significance has taken shape. "The world became a different place after the events in the Crimea, and the changes are increasing very quickly.

President of the United States Barack Obama spoke about this in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly (11):

“We see some major powers assert themselves in ways that contravene international law.  We see an erosion of the democratic principles and human rights that are fundamental to this institution’s mission; information is strictly controlled, the space for civil society restricted.  We’re told that such retrenchment is required to beat back disorder; that it’s the only way to stamp out terrorism, or prevent foreign meddling…

… Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea and further aggression in eastern Ukraine.  America has few economic interests in Ukraine.  We recognize the deep and complex history between Russia and Ukraine.  But we cannot stand by when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation is flagrantly violated.  If that happens without consequence in Ukraine, it could happen to any nation gathered here today.  That’s the basis of the sanctions that the United States and our partners impose on Russia.”

The annexation of the Crimea led to dramatic and fatal consequences for Russian internal and external policies. The annexation of the Crimea became a decisive point and Russia, having passed it, changed from an authoritarian state into a neo-totalitarian one (12).

8. One of the peculiar features of this neototalitarism, in the the opinion of its few researchers, is the total control of the ruling regime over the life of society, yet under in which the population has unlimited access to media means and communication of the 21st century.

Life in the annexed Crimea today is a picture of what Russia will be in the very near future.

It has become obvious that the aggression against Georgia in 2008, the de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the creation of an enclave in Transdniester controlled by Russian military forces, the annexation of the Crimea, the

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attempt to detach Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk provinces from Ukraine (the “Novorossiya Project”) using the Crimean model, and the military intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria are interconnected constituent parts of a single process.

In the context of the facts mentioned above, the idea of some members of the EU to make a distinction between “sanctions for the Crimea” and “sanctions for Donbass” looks questionable. It is necessary to convince the partners of Ukraine of keeping the linkage of the preservation of sanctions and the pressure for tougher sanctions against Russia, until Ukraine has fully regained its territorial integrity, including the Crimean peninsula.

Russia’s entry into the war as an ally of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the ballistic missile attack on Syria from the Caspian Sea through the territories of the two states, may make this task easier, although it is likely that the inertia of the prosperous European development during the years after the collapse of the USSR, with the exception of the crisis in the Balkans, will have an impact for some time. This manifests itself in attempts to “pacify the aggressor”, which are very reminiscent of the years prior to the beginning of WWII. Moreover, in the remarks of some European leaders it is possible to trace not only the idea of “pacification”, but a tendency to sacrifice values and principles for the sake of the electoral or economic expediency.

The civilized world did not learn its lesson from the unexpected Russian attack on Georgia in August 2008. Nobody anticipated that Russia would dare to destroy the “peace of Yalta”, or that in February-March 2014 it would annex the Crimea; that ten active-duty battalions from the Russian Federation would invade Donbass in August 2014; that Russia would enter the war in Syria with aerial bombing, or that even more than that, it would fire long-range 'Caliber-NK' (13) cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea on October 7 and November 20, 2015.

This presented expert organizations in Ukraine and its partner countries with a serious challenge. It was necessary to shift from an analysis of events that had already happened to arrive at a prediction of the probable future moves of the Russian Federation.

An overall view of the events of 2014-15 which began with the occupation and annexation of the Crimea suggests that revanche on a global scale was the goal of Putin's regime, in response to the historic defeat of the Soviet empire. Putin is forming his own—anti-Western—world, which he calls (among   other   things ) EEU, or SCO. He has decided that a different set of basic values will prevail in his world.

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This being the case, modern Russia, along with entities like ISIS, has become a new global threat to the civilized world in the 21st century.

The annexation of the Crimea is also a symbolic challenge on Putin’s part to the leaders of the USA and Great Britain. He threw down this challenge to two countries out of the Big Three of the World War II era—the USA and the UK—a few months before the 70th anniversary of the Crimean Conference which laid the foundations of the postwar world. In annexing the Crimea, he in a very demonstrative manner destroyed what had been known for 70 years as the 'world of Yalta'.

Another aspect of the annexation's challenge, thrown down before the USA and the UK, was that it coincided with the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the date when they along with Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum which was to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine.The annexation of the Crimea, the attempts to create "Novorossia" on the territory of six to eight of Ukraine’s regions, and the direct aggression in Donbass revealed that Putin's Russia is a world leader in the scientific development and practical application of the principles of modern hybrid or diffuse war, which leaves even NATO somewhat at a loss in terms of responding adequately.

The new principles of modern warfare, successfully applied during the aggression in Ukraine, were presented by the chief of General Staff Colonel-General Gerasimov in the report "Main areas in the development of forms and methods of using the Armed Forces, and the crucial tasks of military science for improving them " at a general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation on January 26, 2013 (14). "In the 21st century a tendency to erase the differences between the state of war and peace can be traced. Wars are no longer declared, and when they begin, they do not follow a predictable pattern.

... Within a matter of months or even days, a prosperous country can turn into an arena of fierce armed struggle, may become a victim of foreign intervention, or it may be plunged into chaos, humanitarian disaster and civil war. In terms of the toll of victims and destruction, as well as the devastating social, economic and political consequences, conflicts of this new type have consequences that are comparable with those of a real war.

In addition, the "rules of war" have changed substantially. The role of non-military methods to achieve political and strategic objectives has increased, and in some cases they have exceeded the force of armaments in terms of their effectiveness.

... The focus of the methods of warfare is shifting towards the extensive use of 8

political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures, implemented with the involvement of population sectors with the potential to engage in protests. This is complemented by 'military' measures of a hidden nature, including the implementation of measures of information warfare and the special operations effect of forces. Often under the guise of peacekeeping activity and crisis management, those involved only turn to overt force at a later stage, basically to achieve ultimate success in the conflict.

... Asymmetrical actions which make it possible to neutralize an enemy's superiority in a military conflict have obtained a wide circulation. They include the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanent front throughout the adversary nation, as well as by means of the manipulation of disseminated information, the forms and methods of which are constantly being improved.

Another challenge to the world posed by Putin's Russia in 2014-15 is that by intervening in the Syrian crisis, it joined two regional "arcs of conflict" – the Mediterranean and the Black Sea – into one "front line" from Tunisia to the Donbass.

The Russian Federation has created the largest military grouping in the Southern Military District. It includes not only the army and air force, but the intensively regenerated Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla. Military bases in the annexed Crimea, in non-recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the Rostov region, and in Krasnodar and the North Caucasus are used to carry out real military operations and to train not only the military but also the combatants who seized the Crimea and fought in Donbas.

In September and October 2015, realizing the complexity of supplying a base in Syria by sea, the Russian Federation acquired at least eight civilian bulk carriers, including them as military vessels under its flag in the 205th detachment of the 9th brigade of the Black Sea Fleet auxiliary vessels. A separate Black Sea Fleet brigade of marines was redeployed to guard the base.

In 2015, two of the six new missile frigates (with one more to come in 2016) will join the Black Sea Fleet; in November 2015, two missile corvettes (of a total of six which are projected), similar to those which carried out the rocket attack of Syria from the Caspian Sea on October 7, 2015 already arrived. By the end of 2015 the Black Sea Fleet will also have two new submarines (of which there will be a total of six). All these vessels are equipped with "Calibre" cruise missiles, which can carry a nuclear warhead with a range of at least 1,500 km (or even up to 2600 km, according to some sources).

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The air base in Gvardeiskiy (near Simferopol) will receive a naval missile-carrying aviation regiment (NMAR) in 2016, armed with long-range Tu-22M3 bombers.On November 16, 2015 a new submarine of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet "Rostov-on-Don" made a rocket attack on Syria from the Mediterranean Sea using "Caliber" cruise missiles (15). It should be noted that this submarine made its first passage from its construction and testing site (in the Baltic Sea) to its site of permanent deployment in the Black Sea.

Thus, Russia is using the Black Sea Fleet, based in the occupied Crimea, in the Syrian war. This means that the annexed Crimea has now been drawn directly into the Syrian crisis.

In this context, Russia's risk of reactivating the conflicts in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Nagorny-Karabakh) to block new energy-source transit projects to Europe from the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan via Turkey has substantially increased.

One of the most risky is the Moldovan direction. This is caused by the isolation of Trans-Dniester, and by the fact that pro-Russian forces play an important role in the civilian protests in Moldova.

The Occupation and Annexation of the Crimea: What was it?The occupation and the subsequent annexation of the Crimea is not the result of socio-political processes in the Crimea. It was the result of a combined special operation of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service, the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet, the Marines, the Air Force and the airborne forces of the Russian Federation. Assertions that the annexation of the Crimea was allegedly the result of the long-standing aspiration of the majority of the Crimean population toward Russia are untenable.

According to an analysis of information from various sources, we are able to conclude that Russian Defense Intelligence, with the support of the Federal Security Service, played a leading role in this special operation, and its direct head was a professional military intelligence officer, Vice Admiral Oleg Belaventsev.

Immediately after the annexation on March 21, 2014, he was appointed Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the so-called "Crimean Federal District." In April 2014 by a secret edict of the Russian Federation President he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for his success in the occupation of the Crimea.

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Chronology of the annexation

On February 20, as Vladislav Surkov, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, visited Crimea, social networks reported that a column of armored fighting vehicles was seen leaving the Kazachya Bay, where the Marine Brigade of Russia’s Black Sea fleet was based, and was headed toward Sevastopol. The following day Russian authorities said the move was intended to enhance protection of the fleet in light of the difficult political situation in Ukraine. Supposedly, the marines were to step up the protection of the Black Sea fleet military units in other parts of Crimea.

On February 23, the rally in Sevastopol illegally “elected” a so-called “People’s Mayor” and on February 24, Russian armored vehicles blocked all entrances to Sevastopol.

On the same day the decision was made to set up the so-called "self-defense" groups (see below, "the Crimean self-defense force").

Russian military personnel in uniforms without any rank insignia, together with "the Crimean self-defense force" were in operation during the first two weeks. They were called "the men in green". In early 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted in a number of interviews and films about the so-called "Crimean Spring" that the "men in green" were soldiers of the Russian Federation.

Sevastopol represented the beginning of the Crimean occupation, as according to an agreement with Ukraine, the headquarters of the Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, a member of the Russian Navy and the Armed Forces of Russia, were based there.

On February 25, a Russian Black Sea fleet squadron that had just returned from the Sochi Olympics transported eleven thousand soldiers with assault weapons from Novorossiysk. In Sevastopol, Russian Black Sea fleet servicemen submitted lists of their family members in the event of evacuation. The Marine Brigade was put on high alert. Two military vehicles with Russian license plates and carrying special forces entered Yalta and settled in the Black Sea fleet’s resort hotel.

On February 26, 2014, several hours after the occupation of Crimeaby Russian forces began, several thousand supporters of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis gathered in order to prevent legislators from passing separatist bills. They were opposed by several thousand supporters of the Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity) party. The clashes resulted in the deaths of two people. The Investigative Committee of Russia has opened an investigation.

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On February 26, 2014, Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defense in the Russian Federation, said that the Russian Ministry of Defense would take measures to ensure the safety of the Black Sea Fleet installations in the Crimea.

On the same day, at the order of the President of the Russian Federation, a surprise combat readiness check of the Western Military District, the 2nd Army of the Central Military District and Airborne Troops was announced. About 150,000 military personnel, 90 aircraft, more than 120 helicopters, 880 tanks, more than 1,200 pieces of military equipment, and up to 80 ships were involved in the exercise.

On the night of February 26, a reconnaissance and sabotage group of Russia’s airborne special forces arrived from Sevastopol in uniforms without insignia and seized the buildings of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of Crimea in Simferopol. They raised Russian flags and erected barricades in front of the buildings.

According to the group "Information Opposition", the seizure of the Supreme Council building of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on February, 27 2014 was carried out by military personnel of the 45th separate special operations regiment of the Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. And in April 2014, the military personnel of this Russian unit took an active part in extremist actions in the east of Ukraine, being the "explosively formed penetrator" and the main participants in seizing the local government, the buildings and the security forces. One example was the seizure of the administrative buildings in Slavyansk (Donetsk region), which was performed by servicemen of the 45th separate special operations regiment. (16)

On February, 27 2014, with military personnel present, a session of the Crimean parliament was held in which the government of the Crimea was dismissed. In violation of the law of Ukraine, Sergei Aksenov, leader of the "Russian Unity" party was appointed President of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea. On the same day a portion of the deputies of the Crimean parliament adopted a resolution on the organization and conducting of a republican referendum on the status of the Crimea to take place on May 25. This decision was also taken in violation of the laws of Ukraine, which make no provision for local referenda on the issues of the territorial integrity of the state.

On the morning of February 27, the Russian military set up checkpoints on the Isthmus of Perekop and the Chonhar peninsula, which connect Crimea and mainland

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Ukraine. The Cossacks, who had arrived in advance, guarded them together with the Russian military.

Besides them, members of “Berkut”, the Crimean special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, appeared at the checkpoints. They participated in the bloodshed on Maidan in Kyiv on February 18-20, 2014, then due to the civilian casualties the unit was disbanded and its members returned to the Crimea.

On February 27 2014 the official site of Ministry of Defense of Russia announced (17) that military units and bodies of Western and Central Commands of Russian Federation had initiated a large-scale relocation to designated areas, but the areas were not named in the announcement. On that occasion it was announced that “officers of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Russian Federation will inform the commanders of the military units about the regions and the task to fulfill after unsealing the corresponding packages”.

On February 28, special military forces of the Russian Federation without insignia captured the Simferopol and Belbek (Sevastopol) airports. Eleven Russian MI-24 combat helicopters entered Crimean air space from Russia, and eight Russian IL-76 military-transport aircrafts landed on the Gvardeyskoye airfield in Simferopol. It was announced that planes would land every fifteen minutes without the consent or participation of the State Border Service of Ukraine. Several dozen Russian-made armored vehicles, among which observers noticed Tigers (Tigr), and other types of equipment and weapons not previously seen at the units of the Russian fleet in Crimea, headed from Sevastopol and Gvardeyskoye in the direction of Simferopol. Unidentified armed men surrounded the State Border Service of Ukraine’s Balaklava unit.

On March 1, 2014 Sergei Aksionov arbitrarily subdued the Crimean security agencies and appealed to President of Russia for help. Aksionov declared that the referendum on the status of Crimea will be held not on March 25, but on March 30.

On the same day President of Russia asked Federation Council of the Russian Federation for permission to use Russian troops “until socio-political situation in Ukraine is stabilised”. Federation Council granted the request.

On the same day a group of armed men seized House of Trade Unions in Simferopol, and in Dzhankoy the former military airport was captured by Russian troops.

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On March 1, two large landing ships of the Baltic Fleet, Kaliningrad and Minsk, arrived in Sevastopol harbor from Novorossiysk (Russia) with paratroopers and equipment on board.

On March 2, two large landing ships, Russian Northern Fleet’s Olenegorsky Gornyak and Russian Baltic Fleet’s Georgiy Pobedonosets, arrived in Sevastopol harbor from Novorossiysk with more paratroopers and equipment.

On March 2014 armed men seized Permanent Mission of President of Ukraine in Crimea, and in Feodosia Russian troopers and kazaki ordered the Marine battalion of the Navy of Ukraine to lay down arms and blocked the military unit of the Ukrainian coastal defense in the village of Perevalnoye. Moreover, the so-called “men in green” blocked the Ukrainian Marine battalion in Kerch and seized the headquarters of Azov-Black Sea regional administration and Simferopol Border Detachment of Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

On March 3, the Russian military began a blockade of all Ukrainian military units and bases in Crimea that continued through March 25.

The commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Alexander Vitko, ordered the Ukrainian military to surrender by 5 a.m. on March 26 or face attacks on all units and bases in Crimea. This ultimatum was delivered to all Ukrainian military personnel by Russian soldiers.

A Russian Black Sea fleet missile boat blocked several exits from Sevastopol bays into the open sea for Ukrainian Boarder Service vessels, including the Balaklava Bay exit.

The Moskva missile cruiser, missile boat Squall, and two other Russian missile boats blocked the Donuzlav Ukrainian naval base north of Yevpatoriia.

On March 3 2014 the headquarters of the Navy of Ukraine and some Ukrainian military units in Sevastopol were attacked, as a result two officers of Sevastopol Tactical Air Force brigade of Armed Forces of Ukraine were injured at Belbek airport.

On the same day Russian soldiers blocked Ukrainian military unit № 2904 in Bakhchisaray, and the ships of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation blocked Ukrainian corvette “Ternopol” and command and control ship “Slavutych” in the Sevastopol Bay. The RF Black Sea Fleet representative demanded from the command of military unit in Belbek to come over to the side of the Crimean authorities, but the military men of Ukraine stayed faithful to the oath.

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On March 4, at a press conference, Putin claimed local self-defense forces and not Russian troops were blockading Ukrainian army facilities.

On March 5, Russian officials continued to deny the presence of Russian servicemen in Crimea, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

On March 5 2014 eight units of the State Border Service of Ukraine were blocked by Russian Federation soldiers. In addition some equipment belonging to the anti-aircraft missile regiment in Sevastopol were destroyed. On the same day OSCE military observers were not allowed to pass through the checkpoints at the Crimean border. This observer mission included representatives of 15 OSCE countries. In Simferopol the “Crimean Self-Defense Force (Samooborona)” blocked the free movement of Duniyu Miyativich, the OSCE representative for the issues of freedom of speech, who was holding a meeting with social activists and editors of the Crimean media.

On March 6, 2014 Russian soldiers blocked access to the sea for the ships of the southern naval base of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by sinking the decommissioned frigate Ochakov and the tugboat Shakhtior at the access point to Lake Donuzlav. On the same day two other units of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine were blocked by Russian soldiers.

On March 6, 2014 an extraordinary meeting of the Crimean Parliament was held in the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was still guarded by the so-called “men in green”. At this meeting a resolution to hold a referendum on March 16 (i.e. in 9 days) was adopted. Moreover, a resolution on Crimea's membership in the Russian Federation as a constituent entity within the Russian Federation was adopted. The Sevastopol city council adopted the identical resolution on Sevastopol's membership in the Russian Federation as a constituent entity within the Russian Federation in an extraordinary meeting.

On March 7, before the Russian military in Sevastopol began its assault on the Ukrainian Air Force’s Crimea task group command, Cossacks rammed the gates of the base with heavy trucks.

On March 8, one hundred so-called “self-defense” troops equipped with automatic weapons, bulletproof vests, and portable radios arrived in three buses to the military registration and enlistment office in Simferopol and stationed machine-gunners on all the floors. This “self-defense” unit was led by a retired general who identified himself as an adviser to the Crimean government.

On March 8, 2014 Russian soldiers captured the Ukrainian border checkpoint of Shcholkine on the Cape of Kazantyp.

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On March 9, 2014 Russian military personnel captured the Ukrainian frontier point in the village of Chornomorske and a convoy of dozens of unmarked military vehicles transporting Russian military personnel came to Simferopol.

During the night of March 10, 2014 Russian soldiers captured the missile unit in Chornomorske and the military unit in Bakhchisaray.

On March 13, 2014 Russian troops and members of the “Crimean Self-Defense Force (Samooborona)” blocked the premises of the armory in Inkerman (Sevastopol).

During the night of March 14, 2014 the Unit of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine in Alushta was attacked. On the same day a convoy of Russian Federation military equipment, which was observed to include large-calibre artillery, set off from Kerch deep into the peninsula.

On March 15, 2014 the units of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the villages of Massandra and Gurzuf (Yalta) were captured. On the same day a four-unit antiaircraft missile battery was transported via the Kerch ferry.

Thus, the main military objectives and administrative buildings in the Crimea had been captured by the Russian soldiers and the local paramilitary organization “Crimean Self-defense (Samooborona)”, controlled by Aksionov, by March 16 (the day the referendum was announced) and the number of the Russian soldiers and the quantity of military equipment had increased considerably.

The Referendum

Before Crimea’s annexation by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the human rights situation in Crimea differed little from that in the rest of Ukraine. For the most part, residents of the peninsula enjoyed freedom of speech and assembly and had an active civil society. Numerous independent print, broadcast, and online media outlets operated. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots groups regularlyorganized assemblies, rallies, and pickets on political, social, and environmental issues. Protests against corruption or illegal construction were commonplace, and Crimean Tatar organizations were particularly active.

Throughout the EuroMaidan period of mass protests from November 2013 to February 2014, this situation did not materially change. (18)

To understand this crackdown it is important to recognize that, contrary to the Russian narrative, the annexation of the region was not the result of natural sociopolitical processes, nor did it grow from the aspirations of the Crimean population. In fact, residents of Crimea have actually grown more “Ukrainian” in their outlook in recent years.

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According to a 2011 survey by the Razumkov Center (19), an independent policy institute in Kyiv, 71.3 percent of respondents said they considered Ukraine their homeland—up from 39.3 percent in a 2008 poll. Among ethnic Russian residents, 66.8 percent viewed Ukraine as their homeland; among ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, that figure was above 80 percent. Only 18.6 percent of respondents said they did not think of Ukraine as their homeland, while 10 percent said they could not answer the question.

Compare: in 2008 only 39.3% of respondents in the Crimea considered Ukraine to be their motherland, 33.3% considered Ukraine not to be their motherland, and 27.4% were undecided.

Thus the social basis for separatism in the Crimea was steadily shrinking in the early 2000s and by 2012 it was at about 30% (compared to approximately 60% in 2009).

The sociological data given coincide with the information about the actual number of participants in the “referendum” on the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation (32.4%), as given by M. Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars.

In preparing to annex the peninsula, Russian state media launched a campaign to counter Ukrainian sentiments and inflame fears of impending repression by “Ukrainian fascists” among Crimea’s ethnic Russian population. This echoed similar rhetoric used by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions toward the EuroMaidan movement.

This referendum was held under occupation conditions marked by the presence of Russian military troops, including Cossacks, and “self-defense” units sealing off border crossings, airfields, and military bases, and guarding polling stations and election commission offices.

According to the results of the so-called referendum on March 16 2014, held at gunpoint and without observers, allegedly 96.77% of the participants (with an attendance rate at 83.1%) voted for the Crimea's annexation by Russia. In Sevastopol, traditionally famous for its pro-Russian views, 95.6% of the participants voted for the Crimea to be annexed by Russia (with an attendance of 83.1% attendance), which is lower than in the Crimea as a whole! This is just one more item of circumstantial evidence that the results of the referendum were falsified. Note: there are about 1.6 million voters in the Crimea, and 0.3 million in Sevastopol. The population of the Crimea is 2 million people; Sevastopol has 0.4 million residents.

The Changeover of Power and the Displacement of People

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The issue of human rights in Crimea, the region with the military base, is dealt with by Russia exclusively with a view to creating a loyal population, optimal in terms of the cost of maintenance, and which is not capable of social protest or any other uncontrolled forms of political activity.

It’s essential to understand that a population of 2.4 million in the Crimea is economically unprofitable for the military base. For that reason, we predicted in the middle of 2014 that the Russian Federation would encourage the migration of a considerable number of people from Crimea to different regions of Russia, at the same time populating the occupied Crimea with their citizens and replacing the Crimean state employees, in spite of their loyalty.

Since the first days of the annexation in March 2014, the Russian government has sent Russians to form its military, repressive, and managerial apparatus in Crimea. Sevastopol in particular has seen an influx of military forces, law enforcement officers, and regulatory agency officials and inspectors. (20)

In the year since the occupation began, Russia has removed Crimean professionals from strategically important posts throughout the peninsula. Major law enforcement officials, such as judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, and members of the security services, were steadily being replaced by personnel imported from different regions of Russia.

A partial sample shows the systematic nature of these replacements:

• March 25: After signing the treaty annexing Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin appoints Russian navy Vice Admiral Oleg Belaventsev as his official representative to the new Crimean Federal District.

• April 16: The port city of Feodosiia is assigned a new prosecutor from the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia.

• April 22: One hundred fifty employees from various Russian regions are detailed to the new investigative offices of Crimea and Sevastopol.

• April 25: A prosecutor from Orsk in the Orenburg region of Russia is appointed to a similar post in the Crimean city of Alushta.

• May 16: A new head of the Crimean gas-producing company Chernomorneftegaz, a subsidiary of Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz, is appointed from the Krasnodar region.

• May 18: Yevpatoriia in western Crimea gets a prosecutor from Russia’s Sverdlovsk.

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• May 31: The Crimea and Sevastopol traffic police forces receive new management from the Russian Federation.

• July 28: Three regions of Crimea are assigned new prosecutors from the Russian Federation.

• August 25: Seventy-three staff members of thirteen territorial bodies of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service arrive in Crimea for placements.

The numerous Russian bureaucrats, officers, mercenaries, and soldiers on short-term assignments, along with their families, made up the first large wave of the peninsula’s new population. This group constituted the first wave of people initially sent to, in Moscow’s historically revisionist lingo, “resettle” Crimea.

As a result, the population of Sevastopol has climbed steadily. (22) On January 1, 2014, the city was home to 384,000 people. (23) By August 1, 2015, the population had reached nearly 410,000, a 6.8 percent increase. (24) By August 2015, over twenty thousand residents of Russia had moved to Crimea in that year alone, the majority settling in Sevastopol, the location of the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Soldiers make up a large part of this new migration to Sevastopol, and along with major infrastructure projects to support this militarization—including a bridge over the Kerch Strait to connect Crimea to Russia, and the installation of electrical wires across Kerch Bay—officials in Crimea have been building homes for troops at a rapid pace.

In August 2015, fifty apartment buildings were completed, making 2,109 new housing units available for the families of those serving in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. To support the families of the arriving servicemen, the construction of a kindergarten and a school is scheduled to begin, for 260 and 600 children, respectively, by the end of 2015. (25) Even after these apartments are filled, two thousand more will be needed to house those serving in the fleet. (26)

By 2020, seventeen thousand apartments will be built for the military in Sevastopol in addition to five thousand apartments in other Crimean cities and towns. (26) Indeed, the expansion of the Black Sea Fleet, together with additional new military units on the peninsula, has produced a massive shortage of housing: the number of servicemen waiting for housing in Crimea exceeds three thousand.

In addition, construction of compounds for new coast guard units in the Simferopol area continues. Six bases for soldiers have already been built, and construction plans for family-style dorms, a kindergarten, and a new school for the soldiers’ children have already been approved. Completion is planned for 2016. (27)

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Territorial Agency of the Federal Statistics Service for the Republic of Crimea, “The Demographic Situation in the Republic of Crimea, JanuaryJune 2015” (28)

By October 2014, it had shrunk by nearly 4 percent to 1,891,500. (29)

But the population decline has swiftly reversed. By June 1, 2015, 1,901,300 people were living in Crimea. In the first half of 2015, 41 percent of migrants came from Russia, amounting to almost 8,500 people, compared with 922 during the same period in 2014. Also in the first half of 2015, 11,396 people left Crimea to live in Russia, compared with 386 people for the same time period in 2014. The Crimean population has continued to grow, despite the fact that there are three to four thousand more deaths than births there annually.

According to the official statistics of the Russian Federation regarding the annexation of the Crimea, including 2014 and first five months of 2015, 63,068 people came to the peninsula (21,991 of them to Sevastopol) and 25,691 people left the Crimea. (30) Thus the trends mentioned above are not only being maintained but are growing.

Information on real estate sales confirms the process of Crimea’s “new resettlement.” In August 2015, the State Committee on Registration of Crimea (Goskomregistr) reported that Russian citizens had purchased more than ten thousand apartments, seven thousand land parcels for individual development, and seven thousand homes.(31)

Goskomregistr itself serves as a good example of a broader, albeit difficult to track, pattern in which Russian bureaucrats are populating Crimea’s government agencies and ministries. Three of its four deputy directors are from Russia: one is from Novorossiysk, another from Moscow, and a third from Krasnodar. (32) Of Goskomregistr’s 433 employees, approximately 150 come from Russia, and there are plans to increase their numbers to 250.(33)

It makes it possible to evaluate the scope of the “new populating” of the Crimea with Russian officials: the Crimean government consists of 19 ministries, 8 state committees, 14 departments (not including the Territorial Departments of the Federal Security Service, the Border Guard Service, the police, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the Investigative Committee, and the customs and tax service, in which the number of officials from Russia is much bigger than in the Crimean government).

According to “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” experts, who rely on the analysis of public information as well as insider information, the percentage of the officials sent from the Russian Federation to staff the departments of Russian Federation federal agencies in the Crimea reaches 70%; in local agencies it is 50%.

Citizenship

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The main strategy for displacing and demoralizing so-called 'disloyal people' was the practice of mass and systematic “compulsion to adopt Russian citizenship”, which violated all fundamental human rights.

This was implemented from the very first day of annexation. Its aim is to create unbearable living conditions in the Crimea for those who don’t want to exchange their Ukrainian citizenship for that of Russia. They have to quit their job, leave their families, homes and property, and leave the territory of the Crimea.

On March 18, all citizens of Ukraine legally residing on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were automatically declared citizens of Russia. Those who wished to keep their Ukrainian citizenship had one month to inform the Russian occupation authorities.

This procedure violated all norms of international law related to citizenship. Moreover, it was purposely complicated. In all of Crimea, an area of 10,000 square miles, only four offices — in Sevastopol, Bakhchysarai, Simferopol, and Bilohirsk — were designated to receive the paperwork for those wishing to retain Ukrainian citizenship. Applications by mail or proxy were not accepted.

Some people had to travel as far as 150 miles to get to the nearest office. (Due to enormous lines, three additional offices, in Alushta, Yalta, and Kerch, were opened on April 12, five days before the deadline.)

Those who rejected Russian citizenship, or have not yet received their Russian passports, are required to obtain a residence permit. In a territory with a population of 2.4 million, the issuance of residence permits is limited to 5,000 per year. (34)

People not granted residence permits are considered foreign nationals with no right to be on the “territory of the Russian Federation” for more than 180 days per year. Natives of Crimea with family, jobs, and property in the region will have to regularly travel outside the peninsula for long periods of time, without guarantees that they will be allowed back in. (35)

In response, Ukraine’s parliament passed a law on April 15 suspending the country’s dual citizenship prohibition for Crimeans who had Russian citizenship forced upon them.

In a tit-for-tat measure, Russia’s Duma then passed legislation on May 28 setting criminal penalties for Russian citizens who hold dual nationality but have not disclosed that fact to the Russian authorities. Penalties include fines of up to 200,000 rubles (about $5,200) and up to 400 hours of community service. The law comes into force on January 2016. (36)

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Public servants in Crimea, such as judges, police officers, and government officials, are required by the Russian Federation to turn in their Ukrainian passports.10 According to numerous personal accounts from Crimean residents, all employees of state institutions, including hospitals and schools, are unofficially required to do the same. (37)

The authorities of occupied Crimea declared that Ukrainian passports would only be permitted until January 1, 2015, after which citizens with Ukrainian passports residing in Crimea would be considered aliens.

By effectively coercing Crimeans into getting Russian citizenship, the Kremlin indirectly restricts Crimeans’ freedom of movement to the territory of the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian law does not recognize documents issued by the occupation authorities; therefore, holders of Russian passports issued in Crimea will not be able to use them to enter other parts of Ukraine.

And because Ukraine has notified other states that it considers such passports illegal, Crimeans will likely encounter problems when traveling abroad, especially in countries that require visas.

This will also affect those who were under eighteen years of age on March 18, 2014, and had not yet been required to obtain a passport for foreign travel.(38)

RESTRICTING COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA: AN “INFORMATION GHETTO”

Russia is working to turn the Crimean peninsula into an information ghetto, where citizens are denied the opportunity to receive news and communication from the rest of Ukraine. On the heels of the annexation treaty, Russia took steps to replace Ukrainian Internet service providers on the peninsula. Access to Ukrainian television and independent media has been virtually eliminated, and major Ukrainian mobile phone services have been disconnected, with occupation authorities openly touting a new Russian provider.

Crimean media outlets were forced to re-register in accordance with Russian law, and, as a result, independent media essentially ceased to exist on the peninsula. Online publications were particularly affected; under Ukrainian law they were not required to register with state authorities, but under Russian law both online and print outlets must do so.

Today, challenging Crimea’s status as part of Russia or supporting its return to Ukraine—in the media, on social networks, or in a public place—is a prosecutable

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offense. The law also carries a potential three-year prison term and fines of up to three hundred thousand rubles or two years of the convicted person’s wages. Harsher penalties, including up to five years in prison, are reserved for making such calls “with the use of media, including information and telecommunications networks, including Internet.”

An amendment to Russia’s criminal code was passed in the Russian Federation on December 25, 2013, before the Crimean annexation. The law took effect in the territory of the Russian Federation on May 9, 2014, which at that point included the Crimean peninsula, and made it illegal to publicly call for “actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” Public calls to action are defined as oral or written suggestions or requests to act addressed to a particular person or persons, or to the general public. Neither the context in which those calls are made nor whether they generate actual action matters from the perspective of the law.

As with Russian laws on “instigating extremism,” determining what constitutes such a call and the intent of the speaker or writer is up to law-enforcement bodies. Lawyers, therefore, recommend that Crimeans choose words carefully and even watch their intonation when addressing topics related to Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia in public—be it online, in a store, or on public transport— to avoid their comments being interpreted as a “call” or “appeal.”

In ways that mirror Russian President Vladimir Putin’s moves early in his rule to bring domestic media to heel, the Kremlin has sought to consolidate its hold on Crimea by muzzling troublesome media outlets. Therefore, the 2015 witnessed a comprehensive “mopping up” operation against a few stalwart individuals and organizations.

Two leading Crimean Tatar media outlets, the Crimean news agency (QHA) and the ATR TV station, were ultimately forced to decamp to Kyiv after Russian authorities denied them registration. Prior to this denial, the authorities had searched the offices of ATR and seized materials, while QHA’s Editor in Chief had been repeatedly interrogated. (96)

Several other popular Crimean Tatar media outlets, the Lale children’s TV channel, and the Meydan and Lider radio stations, were also denied registration and consequently forced to shut down. (39)

Additionally, nearly all residents of Crimea whom the author of this report met, as well as other experts, expressed fear that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) continues to monitor Crimean citizens’ social media activities.

These fears were confirmed on April 20, 2015, when Emir-Usein Kuku, a representative of the nongovernmental Contact Group for Human Rights, was

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arrested on his way to work in Yalta. Authorities searched his home, seized electronic devices and books, and took Kuku to be interrogated by the FSB, presumably at a law enforcement location in Yalta. Kuku was accused of violating Article 282 of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation, “Incitement of Hatred or Enmity, as Well as Abasement of Human Dignity,” citing posts on Kuku’s Facebook page from 2013 as the pretext for this harassment. (40)

According to inside information from the administration of the Federal Security Service dealing with the Crimea and Sevastopol, a separate subdivision was created and approximately 30 officers use special software to constantly trace the “likes” and “reposts” of Crimea residents using social networks. Moreover, all the functioning media are under the tight control of the Federal Security Service, and are totally pro-Russian. The creation of a “digital information ghetto” in the Crimea is having significant consequences:

with every day that passes, elsewhere in Ukraine as well as in the outside world, it is becoming more and more difficult to have any idea about what is currently happening in the Crimea; information which may be somewhere near the truth must be obtained through painstaking analysis and comparison of discoverable facts;

even a solidly pro-Ukrainian inhabitant of the Crimea, confined within this “informational ghetto”, has no opportunity to access sources of information other than those planned by the media, created by Russian specialists in psychological warfare. Through this, the individual risks losing an objective grasp of reality and of key issues). Prolonged exposure to propaganda of that kind warps the psyche, and can lead to a “zombie” effect;

as a result, the longer the occupation of the Crimea lasts, the fewer solidly pro-Ukrainian citizens live in the Crimea. Young people, and especially schoolchildren, are particularly subject to various risks due to this.

Before annexation, mobile users in Crimea were mainly served by the three largest Ukrainian operators: MTS Ukraine (57 percent), Kyivstar (21 percent), and Astelit (16 percent). (41)

In early August, connection in Crimea to both MTS Ukraine and Kyivstar was stopped. Both companies said they were not responsible for the disruption of service.

On August 4, Russian operator K-Telekom announced the launch of service on the peninsula to replace MTS Ukraine. Kyivstar’s press office said that on August 11,

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unidentified armed men entered the company’s Simferopol office and began installing alternative equipment. Its service remains disabled in Crimea.

On August 8, the Ukrainian firm began roaming service in Crimea, using K-Telecom’s network, making it much more expensive to use MTS Ukraine in the region. (42)

The de facto authorities say these mobile operators have been kicked out because Ukrainian legislation supposedly prohibits them from paying for property leases, electricity, and equipment maintenance in Russian rubles. (43)

As of August 25, Ukrainian fixed-line operators had also been shut down in Sevastopol and their customers switched to Rostelecom.

On August 4, Russian operator K-Telekom announced the launch of service on the peninsula to replace MTS Ukraine.

Mobile telephone links

In 2015 the majority of Crimean mobile telephone subscribers, using numbers from the Russian operator “K-Telekom” (WIN mobile), have been unable to use roaming to make a connection to Ukrainian mobile networks. The only subscribers who are able to do so are those with sim-cards issued by Russian mobile operators in regions of the Russian Federation outside occupied Crimea. Sim-cards which are issued in Crimea make no provision for calling to mobile numbers belonging to Ukrainian service providers. The price of a one-minute roaming call from Ukraine to the Crimea or vice versa is approximately two U.S. dollars per minute. By comparison, the cost of roaming calls between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is approximately $1.30 per minute.

Persecution of those who criticize the annexation and are qualified as “disloyal” groups From the first days of the occupation, the Russian Federation organized a large-scale campaign of physical harassment and criminal prosecution of potentially disloyal groups and anyone who opposed the annexation of Crimea.

At first, these actions were carried out largely by the so-called “self-defense” forces, but they have since evolved into a systematic campaign conducted in concert with police and the FSB.

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The chief targets can be divided roughly into three groups (with some overlap):

• ethnic Ukrainians and other ethnic, religious, or national groups viewed as favoring Ukraine’s position in the conflict, including members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate; Catholics; Jews; and immigrants from Poland, Belarus, and the Baltic states

• the Crimean Tatar community, particularly officials of its self-governing body, the Mejlis, and other Muslim organizations, including the Spiritual Administration of Crimea Muslims and groups designated as extremist by Russia but not by Ukraine

• journalists, civil society activists, and members of NGOs existing prior to the occupation

UkrainiansIn the Crimea the term “Ukrainians” does not only designate an ethnic group—it is used to denote all Crimean residents of various nationalities who take a pro-Ukrainian position. This group thus has not only an ethnic component but a political one as well, and those who are part of it face discrimination in the exercise of their right of free assembly, their freedom to express their opinions, their freedom of religion (in the case of Orthodox Christians of the Kyiv Patriarch and Ukrainian Greek Catholics), their right of personal inviolability, and their right to use their native language.

In April and May 2014, Crimean departments of education announced that Ukrainian language and literature would be studied only as an elective. (44)

At the same time, the number of Russian language and literature lessons doubled; Russian history and geography lessons also increased. This, and the general anti-Ukrainian political climate, dissuaded most parents and students from electing to take Ukrainian classes.

On October 9, the de facto Crimean Minister of Education, Science, and Youth, Nataliya Goncharova, said that the demand for Ukrainian instruction in Crimea was rapidly declining. (45)

Consequently, there is no longer a single one of the six hundred schools in Crimea offering instruction fully in Ukrainian, and only twenty have separate Ukrainian classes.

This has led to massive job losses among teachers of Ukrainian, who now have to choose another source of income or retrain at their own expense. (46)

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In addition, high school students planning to take the External Independent Evaluation (the Ukrainian equivalent to the United States’ Scholastic Aptitude Test) in order to enter universities in Ukraine are thus deprived of an opportunity to study in accordance with the Ukrainian curriculum.

Crimean Tatars

The fact that the Crimean Tatars receive attention of a particularly repressive kind from the Russian authorities is not just by chance. In the opinion of the “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” experts, there are two reasons for this. First of all, the occupying power has not been able to persuade the Tatars to cooperate with them, although they have made very strenuous attempts to achieve this since the first days of the Crimean occupation.

Secondly, the Russian government considers the Crimean Tatar community the primary organized opposition group to the Kremlin’s occupation and annexation of Crimea.

Thirdly, Russia is concerned that Ukraine’s recognition of the Crimean Tatars as the native people of Crimea and, further, its acknowledgment that Crimea is this ethnic group’s national territory, may complicate Moscow’s assertion of Crimea’s historically Russian roots.

The Tatars of Crimea have endured especially harsh treatment since the annexation. Although there are no recent official statistics, it is estimated the Tatars number at approximately three hundred thousand.(54) For their refusal to recognize the authority of the de facto government, Tatar leaders have been exiled or banned from public life, their public commemorations prohibited, and their media muzzled.

One of the earliest signs that Tatars would receive brutal treatment came on March 15, when the body of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar activist, was found roughly two weeks after he attended a peaceful protest in front of the occupied Crimean parliament. (55) Witnesses reported seeing men in military uniforms leading Ametov away from the protest. His relatives later told Human Rights Watch that police had classified his death as violent.(56) Prosecutors have released no information on the progress of the investigation into his death.

On April 8, a monument to the renowned twentieth-century Crimean Tatar choreographer Akim Dzhemilev was demolished in the village of Malorechenske. In the same village, a red swastika was painted on the windows of a school whose headmaster is a Crimean Tatar. (57)

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On April 21, members of “self-defense” units arrived at the office of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis in Simferopol and removed a Ukrainian flag that had been raised on the building two days earlier. A similar event played out in mid-September, followed by a Russian security service search of a Mejlis member’s home and a raid on the Mejlis and a Tatar newspaper. (58) In the following days, the Tatars were evicted outright from the Mejlis building. (59)

In late April, the press secretary to Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar and Soviet-era dissident who formerly led the Mejlis, said he and another Tatar leader had been banned from broadcasts of the Crimea State TV and Radio network. (60) Two weeks later, Dzhemilev was barred from the territory of Russia and Crimea, although Russian authorities denied it at the time. He was returning to Crimea through the Turetskiy Val checkpoint in Armiansk, northern Crimea, and was blocked by Russian special forces and Crimean “self-defense” forces. In response, Tatars broke through the security line at the checkpoint to meet Dzhemilev. For that, the prosecutor of Crimea, Natalya Poklonskaya, ordered the Russian Investigative Committee and the FSB to investigate the protesters on charges of mass rioting, using force against officials, and illegally crossing the state border. (61) Poklonskaya also threatened to dissolve the Mejlis because of “extremist” actions by Tatars. (62) The prosecutor’s office refused to provide Tatar leaders with a copy of the warning, which would have allowed them to appeal it.

In June, Dzhemilev’s son, Khaiser, was taken into custody and charged with murder in connection with the May 2013 shooting of a security guard who worked for his family. Khaiser Dzhemilev’s case was being reviewed for a possible downgrade from murder to manslaughter when Crimea was annexed. The de facto authorities now say he is subject to Russian justice. At a July 16 press conference, Dzhemilev and his lawyer said that the European Court of Human Rights had ordered his son’s release, but in late September he reported that his son had been transferred to a prison in Russia’s Krasnodar region. (63)

On May 15, FSB officers raided the home of Ali Khamzin, head of the Mejlis’ Foreign Relations Department, on allegations that they had found Khamzin’s business card in the possession of members of Pravyi Sektor, a Ukrainian political group demonized by the Russian authorities. As Khamzin was in Kyiv at the time, his son, who also lived in the house, was summoned by the FSB the following day. (64)

In the days leading up to May 18, the annual day of remembrance for Tatars who were expelled from Crimea in 1944, the de facto authorities sought to preempt opportunities for public gatherings. On May 16, Sergey Aksyonov, Crimea’s de facto Prime Minister, issued a decree prohibiting mass events until June 6. In mid-June, the

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Simferopol City Council denied a request by Tatar officials to hold their annual Flag Day celebrations on June 26 in a city center park that had hosted the event in previous years. The council refused, saying that a “mass gathering in an area not intended to accommodate the expected number of the event participants can create conditions for violating the public order and the rights and lawful interests of other citizens.” (65)

On June 24, masked men unlawfully entered the house of Eider Osmanov, the Deputy Director of a madrassa in the Simferopol village of Kolchugino, while he was at home with his wife and two young children.(66) Later that day, a group of masked men invaded the school itself when students were present, according to Eider Adzhimambetov, Press Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis. The invaders searched the school and took the Deputy Director with them. He was released several hours later without any charges.

On July 5, Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov was banned from Crimea and Russia for five years on the grounds that he and the Mejlis had engaged in extremist activity. Chubarov had been traveling back to Crimea from a neighboring part of Ukraine when he was stopped at a checkpoint and barred from entering the peninsula. (67)

Therefore, in 2015 the Russian government effectively paralyzed the Tatar’s congress, the Qurultay, along with their executive agency, the Mejlis; liquidated independent Crimean Tatar media; created parallel collaborationist structures; sought to marginalize Islamic activity in Crimea; and intimidated the Crimean Tatar ethnic group by repressing its strongest leaders and activists.

On January 29, 2015, the deputy head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Akhtem Chiygoz, was arrested as part of the investigation into the so-called “incident of February 26, 2014.” On that date, thousands of Crimean Tatars gathered outside the then Crimean Parliament to show their support for Ukraine. The demonstrators clashed with pro-Russian forces. For his involvement in organizing the rally, Chiygoz remains in jail. (68) For the same incident, Ali Asonov, a father of four, has been locked up since April 15, 2015. (69) Additionally along with Dzhemilev, Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov, former Soviet dissident Sinaver Kadyrov, and the Coordinator General of the QHA information agency and Turkish citizen Ismet Yuksel have all been banned from entering Crimea for five years. (70)

The work of the Crimea Foundation charity, formerly led by Dzhemilev, has come to a standstill; its property was confiscated in April 2015, including the building in Simferopol where the Mejlis met. (71)

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In April 2015, an unofficial Turkish monitoring group formed at the behest of the Turkish government visited Crimea to study the human rights situation. Representatives of Crimean authorities strove to circumscribe the experts’ work, monitoring them continuously and preventing their speaking to Crimean residents. (72)

Among the many human rights violations of Crimean Tatars and others identified by the monitors were infringement of freedom of speech, due process, property rights, coercion to assume Russian citizenship, and restricted access to media and education in their native languages. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave the monitors’ report to Putin at a meeting in Baku on June 13, 2015. (73)

Still, Russian law enforcement did not allow six members of the Mejlis to leave Crimea and attend the World Conference of Crimean Tatars in Ankara, which took place from August 1 to August 3, 2015, summoning them on these days for interrogation about the “incident of February 26.”

Religious Groups

Members and leaders of Ukraine’s indigenous religious groups, who stood with EuroMaidan protesters against Yanukovych’s presidency and have spoken out against Russia’s annexation of Crimea, have been intimidated and harassed by the authorities or unknown attackers. (47)

Shortly after expressing support for besieged Ukrainian military units in February and March, members of Crimea’s five parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC) began receiving threats that they would be prosecuted and their parishes eliminated.

In March, three of its priests—from Sevastopol, Yalta, and Yevpatoriia—were kidnapped and later released. One of them, Mykolai Kwich, said he was questioned by members of the Crimean “self-defense” force and Russian intelligence officers and charged with extremism. (48)

The priests refused to talk about any further details of their detention or release. Later in the spring, the three priests left Crimea, but they returned to their parishes in late August. On September 2, the priest from Yevpatoriia, Bohdan Kostetsky, and twelve parishioners were detained on the way to Yalta, placed in a basement, interrogated, and released the following day without charge. These actions were likely acts of intimidation related to the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Maidan position of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine. The Greek Catholic priests remaining in the peninsula await clarification of the church’s legal status.

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Parishioners and the priest of St. Clement of Rome, a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Sevastopol that sits on the grounds of a Ukrainian Naval Academy facility, have been barred from using the building. (49)

On July 1, a group of armed men in Russian Cossack dress broke into a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Perevalnoye village, in the Simferopol district, and destroyed religious relics. During the attack, a pregnant parishioner and a priest’s daughter who suffers from cerebral palsy were hurt, and the priest’s car was broken into.

Archbishop Klyment of Simferopol and Crimea reported that the police took the invaders’ side and refused to register a complaint. (50)

The pastor of the Salvation Army’s Crimean branch, Ruslan Zuyev, who had reported on the pressure applied to representatives of Protestant religious groups in Crimea, was forced to leave Crimea with his family in June. He had been repeatedly summoned by the FSB for airing “pro-Ukrainian” views.(50)

In early March, Rabbi Mikhail Kapustin of the Communities of Reform Judaism of Simferopol and Ukraine fled Crimea with his family. Kapustin had denounced Russian aggression in Crimea. In late February, someone painted a swastika and anti-Semitic graffiti on his Ner Tamid synagogue. (51)

In April, vandals defaced Sevastopol’s monument to the 4,200 Jews, including Crymchaks (a small and separate indigenous group of Tatar-speaking Crimean Jews), who were murdered by the Nazi occupiers on July 12, 1942. (52)

On June 13, the façade of the Chukurcha Jami mosque in Simferopol was damaged when someone threw a Molotov cocktail at it. A surveillance camera recorded the attack, but a perpetrator has yet to be identified or arrested. In addition, the fence next to the mosque was painted with a black swastika and the arson date. (53)

Journalists and Political Activists

The list of abuses against journalists and activists since the Russian takeover of Crimea could comprise an entire report in itself. However, this abridged version highlights the severity of the current situation. The tone was set in early March, when armed men cut Ukrainian radio and television signals and Russian hannels took over the airwaves. (74) Since then, journalists have been subject to an ongoing campaign of harassment, violence, and threats.

On March 1, several members of the Crimean “selfdefense” forces entered the editorial office of the Center for Investigative Journalism in Simferopol. (75) According to center director Valentina Samar, the paramilitaries demanded to see the organization’s media registration documents and office lease agreement. Samar said

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that shortly afterward the Federation of Crimean Trade Unions, which owns the building, asked the center to vacate the premises by the end of the month. (76)

On May 17, FSB officers detained and interrogated Waclav Radziwinowicz, a Moscowbased reporter for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, for several hours. Various reports say he was accused of misrepresenting his identity or crossing the border illegally. (77) Nikolai Semena, a Crimea-based reporter for the Ukrainian newspaper Dien and photographer Lenyara Abibulayeva were also detained.

Those attempting to cover the cancellation of the commemoration of the Tatar deportation, and reporters in the Tatar community itself, have been especially visible targets. On the eve of the Tatar deportation anniversary, a photographer from the Crimean Telegraph newspaper was detained by “selfdefense” forces while recording a story about the maneuvers of police special units. (78)

On May 18, the deportation anniversary, “self-defense” forces detained Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev and Turkish cameraman Cengiz Kizgin for several hours at the paramilitary group’s headquarters in Simferopol. Pashayev stated on his Facebook page after their release that the two journalists were threatened with physical violence and subjected to psychological abuse. (79) They were also robbed of equipment and personal belongings valued at seventy thousand hryvnya (approximately six thousand dollars at the time). Afterward, they were transferred to police custody and interrogated with no attorney present.

On the same day, a journalist for Russia’s Dozhd TV was shooting a video in the central square of Simferopol when “self-defense” forces told him to delete the footage. He complied but still was brought to the “self-defense” office, where his equipment was damaged. (80)

On June 2, “self-defense” forces detained journalist Sergei Mokrushin and producer Vladlen Melnikov of the Center for Investigative Journalism for making “inappropriate remarks” about top Russian officials. (81) They were handcuffed and taken to the headquarters of the “self-defense” forces, where their telephones and social media accounts were inspected. Both men say they were beaten and Mokrushin appeared to have bruising around the ribcage and possibly broken ribs. (82)

On June 3, the Editor-in-Chief of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet, Shevket Kaybullaev, was summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office of Simferopol, where he received notice that the newspaper was being investigated for extremist activity because it referred to “Russia’s annexation of Crimea” and to Crimea as an “occupied territory.” (83)

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Two days later, a founder of the Events of Crimea website, Ruslan Yugosh, reported on attempts by Crimean police to put pressure on him by interrogating his seventy-three-year-old mother. According to Yugosh, representatives of the police came to his house and summoned his mother to testify in the district police station; no summons papers were served. (84)

On June 22, Sevastopol occupation police detained reporter Tatiana Kozyreva and cameraman Karen Arzumanyan of independent Ukrainian channel Hromadske TV, who were broadcasting from a rally at a city square. (85)

Andrey Schekun, a EuroMaidan activist and representative of the education and culture center Ukrainian House, (87) fled to Kyiv with his family after being abducted by “self-defense” forces on March 9, tortured, and eventually released on March 20. His apartment in Bakhchysarai, Crimea, was sealed by unidentified men on June 7. (88)

On May 10 (by some accounts, May 11) Crimea-born filmmaker Oleg Sentsov was detained by the FSB. Sentsov had participated in the AutoMaidan protests and helped bring food and supplies to Ukrainian soldiers trapped in Crimean bases during the early days of Russia’s occupation. He was charged with plotting to destroy key infrastructure in Simferopol, Yalta, and Sevastopol. (89)

Along with Sentsov, activists Gennady Afanasiev, Alexei Chirnii, and Alexander Kolchenko were also detained. The FSB claims they belong to Pravyi Sektor, but that organization and the detainees both denied their membership. On June 4, Sentsov’s lawyer, Dmitry Dinse, said his client had been tortured in an attempt to coerce him into confessing. Dinse has filed a complaint with Russia’s Investigative Committee. Sentsov and Kolchenko’s requests to see the Ukrainian Consul were denied. (90) A court has ordered Sentsov and his co-defendants to be held in pretrial detention until mid-January.

The fate of Vasyl Chernysh, a resident of Sevastopol and an AutoMaidan activist who was reported missing on March 15, the eve of the Crimean referendum, remains unknown. His family fears he is no longer alive. (92)

The Prosecutor’s Office and law enforcement agencies of Crimea have not provided information on the progress of investigations into the late-May disappearances of three other activists: Leonid Korzh, a member of Ukrainian House, reported missing on May 22; Timur Shaimardanov, reported missing on May 26; and Seiran Zinedinov, kidnapped on May 30. All were active in the movement for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and provided aid to Ukrainian military units trapped by the initial Russian takeover in February and March. (93)

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On June 29, houses in Simferopol were pasted with leaflets calling on residents to inform the Crimean Department of the FSB—anonymously, if necessary— of people who were “against the return of Crimea to the Russian Federation or participated in the regional Maidan.” (94)

In 2015, Russian law enforcement took over from the Crimean “self-defense” groups—the Russian-sponsored paramilitary groups constituting the guerrilla forces of the annexation—in pursuing opponents of the occupation. Their tactics include imposing harsh sentences for fabricated incidents in order to make an example of particular individuals.

This has opened the door to arbitrary arrest, search, and legal repercussions against thousands of people for “extremism and terrorism,” and “incitement against the territorial integrity of Russia.” In “the affair of May 3, 2014,” (95) and “the affair of February 26, 2014” (96) for example, Crimean Tatars attempted to break through a police cordon at a checkpoint in order to allow one of their leaders, Mustafa Dzhemilev, back on to the peninsula after Russian officials banned him from entering. Many who took part in this and related protests faced fines and criminal charges.

Especially noteworthy is the international attention received by the prosecution of film director Oleg Sentsov, or, as it is known in Russia, “the Crimean terrorist incident.” (97)

It is important to note that all the young people sentenced in the fabricated incident were born, raised, educated, and working in Simferopol, the capital of Crimean autonomy and a city that has traditionally been considered Crimea’s most pro-Russian. However, having come of age in a Crimea that was part of an independent Ukraine, they supported the Euromaidan movement in Kyiv and the Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea besieged by Russian forces during the annexation. (98)

Similarly, an FSB investigation concluded that the Karman art center—a unique amateur theater and a center of contemporary culture, art, and education included on official tourism lists of “Things to See in Simferopol”— functioned as a terrorist meeting place. The center’s founder and Director, Galina Dzhikaeva, managed to escape to mainland Ukraine after Russian authorities threatened her with arrest.

The Russian authorities have also prosecuted individuals for actions that took place before Russia annexed Crimea, such as when clashes broke out outside the regional parliament on February 26, 2014, between Crimean Tatars and supporters of Russia’s occupation.23 In another retroactive prosecution—for an alleged offense not committed in Crimea—Maidan activist Aleksandr Kostenko was detained in Simferopol on February 5, 2015 for allegedly throwing a rock at an employee of the Crimean Interior Ministry in Kyiv nearly a year earlier, during the EuroMaidan

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events. The matter was taken up by Crimea’s new Russian appointed prosecutor, Natalya Poklonskaya, and on May 15, 2015, a court found Kostenko guilty of harming a police officer and possessing parts of a firearm. He was sentenced to four years and two months in prison, reduced on appeal to three years, eleven months. (99)

The Russian FSB does not stop its pursuit of dissenters within the borders of Crimea, but also targets citizens of Ukraine who left Crimea as early as spring 2014. Thus, on March 10, 2015, five days after the publication of Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, the Russian FSB office for Crimea and Sevastopol charged its author, who now lives in Kyiv, with violation of Part 2, Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, accusing him of public incitement to destroy Russia’s territorial integrity. (100) In April 2015, Russian security agents began searching the home of and interrogating former employees of the www.blackseanews.net website, of which the author is a co-founder and Editor in Chief. At the time of writing this report, the investigation was still underway.

Likewise, Aleksandr Liev, a former Crimean Tourism Minister who fled to Kyiv after the annexation, said he was “repeatedly warned” by individuals from Russia “to talk less about the topic of returning Crimea, as I might face physical repercussions if anyone pulled any shady business. Everyone who brings up this topic is being monitored. For this reason the FSB will severely punish those who ‘bark.’ I was threatened explicitly and implicitly.” (101)

On August 19, 2015, Putin held a meeting in Sevastopol focused on instilling law, order, and state legitimacy in the Crimean Federal District. He warned publicly that “external forces” were trying to destabilize Crimea:

Some capitals speak openly on this subject, speaking about the need to conduct subversive activities. Structures are being created in parallel, cadres are being recruited and trained to carry out diversions and acts of sabotage, and to conduct radical propaganda. . . . Federal as well as the local authorities must take all these risks into account and respond accordingly. Nothing should be exaggerated here, nor should anything be fomented; but we must keep everything in mind and be prepared to respond accordingly and react quickly.” (102)

Several days later, on August 24, 2015, Ukrainian Independence Day, police in Crimea arrested several people who came individually to lay flowers at the Taras Shevchenko monument in Simferopol honoring the giant of the Ukrainian language and literature, and those who posted photos taken that day with a Ukrainian flag in Kerch. The monument to Shevchenko was erected shortly after Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union and, as one scholar put it in 2005, “remains the only clear symbol of Ukrainianization” in an otherwise Russified city. (103)

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Russian authorities have also expelled the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, the only human rights group working on the peninsula and publishing monthly reports. Its ouster came after it appeared on a list of potentially “undesirable” organizations that was unanimously approved by the Russian Federation Council on June 8, 2015. (104)

With these actions, the Russian government is seeking to scare supporters of Ukraine in Crimea and beyond its borders. The majority of Crimean residents accustomed to freedom of speech find themselves forced to flee to other regions of Ukraine.

On the basis of information provided by various Ukrainian government ministries, approximately 21,000 Crimean inhabitants have moved to the Ukrainian mainland (105). Experts on Crimea, including two who are among the authors of this report, indicate that Crimean Tatar leaders believe the number of Crimean emigrants to be at least twice that high.

This is confirmed indirectly by statistical data. As of January 1, 2014 the total population of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol) was 1,967,200. According to the census held in October 2014, the population had dropped to 75,700. (106) This includes the actual number of residents who left the Crimea because of its annexation, and this process is still continuing.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

Since the annexation, property rights in Crimea have been violated on a massive scale. All Ukrainian state property on the peninsula is now being expropriated under the rubric of “nationalization” by the Republic of Crimea. Private companies have also been effectively confiscated through hostile takeovers and forced management changes carried out by “selfdefense” forces.

Crimean authorities decreed on July 30 that all lease contracts on property dated before the annexation could be terminated prematurely and unilaterally. So far, four hundred public companies have been “nationalized” and the list is constantly growing. It includes all seaports, airports, railroads, wineries, grain elevators, agricultural enterprises, water and energy supply infrastructures, and some two hundred health resorts. The famous Nikitskyi Botanical Gardens, the Artek Children’s Center, the oil and gas company Chernomorneftegaz, and the More shipyard have also been seized. (107)

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The expropriation is not limited to Ukrainian state property. Many “nationalized” entities also include trade unions, higher education institutions, the Academy of Sciences, and civic organizations.

Private companies are not officially expropriated, but are instead subject to hostile takeovers and smear campaigns from the region’s de facto authorities. For instance, officials may spread false information that a private enterprise is bankrupt or faulty before seizing it. (108) This has been especially true of property belonging to Ukrainian businessmen who oppose the Russian takeover. In one August 24 incident, “selfdefense” henchmen blocked managers of the large Zaliv shipyard in Kerch from entering—supposedly at the request of the workers. The plant belongs to Ukrainian billionaire Konstiantyn Zhevago, a member of parliament who supports the democratic changes in the country. (109)

Russian authorities avoid taking part in these “nationalizations” directly, instead deeming property taken from the Ukrainian government to have been transferred to the Republic of Crimea. Similarly, Russia’s largest state-owned monopolies have not taken direct control of the expropriated enterprises in Crimea, fearing international sanctions. Instead, the occupation authorities created de facto government enterprises to assume control.

The concentration of a vast number of enterprises in the hands of the “Crimean authorities” has worrying economic implications. The authorities of autonomous Crimea have never run so many state businesses at once and have no pool of top state managers to draw from, because Russian personnel has been limited largely to military, law enforcement, and security agencies. This creates a serious management problem that will likely lead to a severe economic crisis in Crimea. The danger is compounded by the inability to attract private foreign investment to occupied Crimea. The expropriated businesses in Crimea have lost old markets and contracts and are in the process of switching to Russian legislation. They are kept afloat only by Russian bank loans that are allocated mostly for salaries.

Russia’s approach to economic development in the occupied territory has been opportunistic and chaotic. Plans for the funding and construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait change every few weeks. There is also a kaleidoscope of ideas on how to supply the peninsula with water, ranging from building desalinization plants to bringing it by tankers, to laying an underwater pipe network across the strait. Russia will likely have to continue heavily subsidizing Crimea just to keep pensions and public employees’ salaries at levels promised before the referendum. To do so, Moscow is already using national retirement savings funds, as well as the budget reserves of some regions of Russia, which increasingly fuels local irritation. (110)

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One need not be a dissenter or activist to fall afoul of the new authorities in Crimea. Simply owning a valuable piece of property has been enough to incur trouble from the Russian authorities.

In 2014, the Crimean occupying regime passed an act “nationalizing” at least four hundred properties in Crimea owned by the Ukrainian state, without due process or payment for the property. Exact government figures have not been published because the documents detailing Ukrainian state property in Crimea have been lost since the annexation. (111)

This year, the “nationalization” of Ukrainian commercial property was launched. Experts at the Maidan of Foreign Affairs generally accept prominent Ukrainian attorney Georgiy Logvinskiy’s estimate that about four thousand state, private enterprise, and social enterprise organizations have been seized for use by the Russian regime. (112)

The owners have received no compensation, rather authorities cited the corporations’ “strategic significance” or “unauthorized activities” as a pretext for expropriation in 2014. (113)

In 2015, missing the March 1 deadline to re-register corporations in accordance with Russian legislation, which was imposed after the annexation, was used as a reason to seize properties.

Initially expropriated properties became, for appearances’ sake, the property of the Republic of Crimea. However, toward the end of 2014 property stolen from the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian citizens was gradually handed over to the Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation. A partial list of such properties includes the Crimean nature reserve in Alushta, the “Swan Islands” nature reserves (Lebyazhi ostrova), the historic Yusupov and Golitsyn palaces, four state residences, the Massandra winery along with eight of its branches, several public and private retreat centers, and state children’s centers. (114)

All these properties are located in unique nature areas; encompass several tens, hundreds, or thousands of hectares; and would fetch tens or hundreds of millions of dollars on the market.

The Russian occupiers’ next phase of “appropriating Crimea” will likely be the sale of the expropriated Crimean property.

* * *

Conclusions. The Main Points of the Strategy for Regaining Crimea in 2016

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By the end of 2015 the 'transition period' was past in annexed Crimea, and the region's total subjugation by the occupying country began, as part of its move to achieve its geopolitical goals. (115) The neo-totalitarian regime in Crimea is a much more relentless model than that of the Russian Federation. In this sense, "the Crimean mode" is an experiment which will be applied in the near future throughout Russia in terms of human rights and domestic policy. The importance of this experiment for the Russian Federation lies in the fact that this neo-totalitarian pattern is being tested in a territory whose population lived for nearly a quarter century under democratic circumstances, with unlimited freedom of speech and opinion. The experiment produced an encouraging result for the Putin regime: whereas democratic institutions in the Russian Federation crumpled slowly and gradually over a twelve-to-fifteen-year period, in the Crimea it was done within a year, and in a much stronger form. It should be noted that in the Crimea, there once was a considerable amount of social activism in a number of spheres: the campaign for the preservation of forests and reserves and against construction development in parks; the struggle of small businesses to maintain their rights while contending with corrupt officials; and the battle of the Crimean Tatars to protect their rights. This activism often took the form of rallies, picketing, marches, or petitions. With the arrival of the occupying forces the attempts of the civil society to resort to their habitual “Ukrainian methods” were firmly suppressed by the Federal Security Service and are not seen any more. Harsh methods of suppressing civic activism, tested in occupied Crimea, are likely to be widely used in Russia as means of mobilizing a totalitarian society, building support for Russian militarism and expansionism, and using totalitarian power to achieve the appearance of unity in the populace. In 2015 there were many new developments in Russian-occupied Crimea. The patterns that had been established during the initial period were in a general sense maintained and reinforced, moving to a new level. The main economic processes in the Crimea are occurring in spheres connected with the principal objective of the annexation – the militarization of the Crimea. It primarily involved the accelerated development of the military infrastructure and of what could be termed the dual-function infrastructure:

the construction of a bridge across Kerch Bay;39

the laying of an electrical cable across Kerch Bay (“energy bridge”);

an increase in the capacity of the Kerch shuttle ferry;

the construction of garrisons and housing for military personnel;

the conversion of Crimean industrial enterprises on the basis of military orders, etc.

In 2015, expanding the military base at an accelerated pace, the Russian Federation is continuing to develop “technologies” in the Crimea which are beyond the limits set within international law in general and international understandings relating to human rights in particular. They are all aimed towards the formation of loyal population groups and a favourable environment in the region where the military base is situated. These processes were all at a stage of rapid development in 2014; now they have become a part of life in the Crimea. The Main Parts of the Strategy for 2016: The list presented below does not supersede the opening statements of the Strategy, but rather supplements them and develops them further.

1. The Strategy for the reacquisition of Crimea within a new conceptual framework must be part of an as-yet-unestablished strategy to restrain Russian expansion in the world. Crimea constitutes the first annexation in Europe since World War II—one which has demolished the whole structure of global security which was created after the war.

2. The international sanctions imposed on Russia by the civilized world in response to the annexation of Crimea must never be separated from the sanctions for “the aggression in eastern Ukraine”. Without the successful annexation of the Crimea, there would not have been an attempt to dismember Ukraine—the attempt which was halted in Donbas and other southeastern regions of Ukraine by Ukrainians.

3. The sanctions against the Russian Federation which are directly connected with the Crimea must be extended, making them more address-specific, sector-specific and project-specific—they must be explicitly linked with projects which are set to be implemented on the territory of the annexed Crimea:

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to include the seaports of Yevpatoria, Yalta and Feodosia on the EU sanction lists; and to forbid the sale of ferries for the Kerch shuttle ferry service by entrepreneurs from civilized countries;

to provide for sanctions against companies which are involved in the construction of the traffic bridge and the 'energy bridge' across Kerch Bay; or in the delivery of ships, floating cranes and equipment for the power plant which are being designed, or for those which are being constructed in Crimea; and in the development of offshore oil and gas extraction facilities;

to exclude the possibility of investing, purchasing and delivery or other forms of cooperation with Ukrainian enterprises which have been expropriated by the occupiers on the territory of Crimea.

to include on the sanction lists those enterprises and organizations in the Russian Federation which took over the management of enterprises in Crimea that were the state property of Ukraine, including the Management of Affairs Office of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Federal Security Service; the Ministry of Defense; the Central Bank; and other Ministries and State Corporations of the Russian Federation.

The effectiveness of the sanctions linked with the Crimea is confirmed by the following facts. Before the annexation, the amount of tax revenue collected within the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was sufficient to cover the budget expenses (about 40% of which were transferred to the budget of Ukraine and then returned in the form of subsidies). In 2014-2015 occupied Crimea on its own only provided revenues equivalent to 25% of budgetary expenditures, and 75% were transferred from the budget of the Russian Federation. In 2016 the subsidies from the Russian Federation will constitute approximately 80%.

4. In view of the sharp increase in the Russian Federation's naval capacity in the Black Sea, it will be necessary to solve the problem of reinforcing the navies of Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, by means of a transfer to those countries of warships from major naval powers such as those of NATO, based on the principle of the Lend-Lease.

5. In order to provide genuine support for supporters of Ukraine who wish to

leave occupied Crimea so that they may continue their studies, their work or their business activities, it will be necessary to create an international grant program, from which resources could be directed towards the studies/training of Crimean young people; towards support for possible evacuations of businesses; and towards the creation of new employment positions.

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Links

1 July 7, 2014. Andriy Klymenko (video): We must appeal to the International Court of Justice and demand compensation for the losses incurred due to the annexation of the Crimea. - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw22ChqjCrE

2 July 10, 2014. Andrey Klymenko. “A blacklist and a sea blockade are just a small portion of the strategy for recovering the Crimea. - http://www.blackseanews.net/read/83504

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3 July 11 2014. Alexey Kuropiatnik. A Strategy for Regaining Crimea. - http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/strategiya-vozvrascheniya-kryma-_.html

4 July 18, 2014. Andrey Klymenko. A Strategy for Regaining Crimea: an inevitable outcome. - http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/strategiya-vozvrascheniya-kryma-ishod-neotvratim-_.html

5 August 29, 2014. Alexey Kuropiatnik. A Strategy for Regaining Crimea: the Crimean Tartars under the occupation.

6 Maidan of Foreign Affairs. A Strategy for Regaining Crimea. - 2014. 208 с. ISBN 978-966-8495-50-2 http :// crimea . mfaua . org / strategy

7 A. Klymenko. Human Rights Abuses in Russia-Occupied Crimea.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/human-rights-abuses-in-russia-occumpied-crimea

8 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18

9 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1636-18

10 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1706-18

11 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly

12 http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2012/06/07/990257.html

13 The characteristics of the "Caliber-NK" guided missile system are classified information. However, in 2012, Sergei Alekminsky, commander-in-chief of the Caspian Flotilla, declared that "Calibre" guided missiles, when mounted on surface ships, were able to attack onshore targets at a distance of 2,600 km. http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2012/06/07/990257.html

14 http://www.avnrf.ru/index.php/zhurnal-qvoennyj-vestnikq/arkhiv-nomerov/534-vestnik-avn-1-2013

15 http://flot.com/2015/%D0%A1%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F182/

16 https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/484873874974606?stream_ref=10

17 http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11905614%40egNews

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18 On the day when President Victor Yanukovich refused to sign the EU Association Agreement, thousands of protesters came to the Maidan, the main square in Kyiv. After the authorities tried to have the protesters forcibly removed, demonstrations turned to even stronger protests against Yanukovich's authoritarian regime.

19 http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD122_ukr_3. pdf (in Ukrainian)

20 After annexing the Crimean peninsula, the “Republic of Crimea” and the “City of Federal Importance Sevastopol” were formed. They are considered separate subjects of the Russian Federation and make up the specially created “Crimean Federal District.” It is too early to judge the top priority for the settlement of Sevastopol. When soldiers receive housing from the state, they must register their residence there, while bureaucrats can obtain housing in Crimea or retain their housing and registration in the region of Russia where they lived previously.

23 - http://sevastopol.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/sevastopol/ru/statistics/population/

24 http://sevastopol.su/news.php?id=78925.

25 http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/report.asp?id=645671

26 http://regnum.ru/news/society/1955347.html

27 http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12050100@egNews

28 - http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/e0c900804982c4bfafe2ef2d12c3261e/%D0%94%D0%A1_0615.pdf

29 Territorial Agency of the Federal Statistics Service for the Republic of Crimea, “Population Counted During the Population Census of the Republic of Crimea,” August 14, 2015, http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/ connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/ru/census_and_researching/census/crimea_ census_2014/score_2010/ (in Russian).

30 Monthly report of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service on "Current social and economic conditions in Russia" http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_01/Main.htm31 http:// www.c-inform.info/news/id/27394 (in Russian).

32 https://www.facebook.com/goskomregistr?fref=nf

33 http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2015/7/22/goskomregistr-kryma-ishet-sotrudnikov-41127/)

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34 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/85896 (in Russian); http://www. blackseanews.net/read/87562 (in Russian); http://www.c-inform.info/ news/id/10994 (in Russian).

35 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/85239 (in Russian); http://www. blackseanews.net/read/81225 (in Russian)

36 - http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18 (in Ukrainian).

- http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80869 (in Russian); http://www. blackseanews.net/read/80309 (in Russian).

37 http://investigator.org.ua/news/124274/ (in Russian).

38 At the age of sixteen, every Ukrainian citizen must obtain a domestic passport, which becomes his or her primary official identification document. However, to travel internationally, adults must obtain a foreign travel passport. Those under eighteen can travel internationally by having their name included in their parents’ foreign travel passport or by obtaining a child travel passport.

39 Amnesty International, “Crimean Tatar Media Will Shut Down as Arbitrary Registration Deadline Expires,” March 31, 2015, https://www. amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/crimean-tatar-media-will-shutdown-as-arbitrary-registration-deadline-expires/.

40 - http://qha.com.ua/search?t=1&q=%D0%AD%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80-%D0%A3%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%83

- “Crimean Tatar Activist Detained in Crimea,” Genbank, April 20, 2015, http://en.krymedia.ru/society/3376723-Crimean-Tatar-ActivistDetained-in-Crimea.

- Emir Huseyn Kuku’s Facebook posts from 2013, https://www.facebook.com/emirhuseyn.k/timeline/2013 (in Russian).

41 http://ria.ru/economy/20140401/1002141618.html (in Russian).

42 James Barton, “MTS Ends Ukraine Services as Russia Reviews Crimea Telecom Options,” Developing Telecoms, August 6, 2014, http:// www.developingtelecoms.com/business/deals/121-operators/5392- mts-ends-ukraine-services-as-russia-reviews-crimea-telecom-options.html.

43 Ibid

44 http://crimea.vgorode.ua/news/sobytyia/224277-ukraynskyi-yazykv-krymskykh-shkolakh-budut-yzuchat-po-zhelanyui (in Russian).

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45 http://ria.ru/education/20141009/1027621414.html (in Russian).

46 http://ipc-bigyalta.org/new_big_yalta/14463.html (in Russian).

47 “Battle of Orthodox Christian Patriarchs as Ukraine’s Filaret Denounces Russia’s Kirill,” Kyiv Post, January 8, 2014, http://www. kyivpost.com/content/politics/battle-of-orthodox-christian-patriarchsas-ukraines-filaret-denounces-russias-kirill-334763.html.

48 Sonya Bilocerkowycz and Sofia Kochmar, “Ukrainian Catholics Experiencing ‘Total Persecution’ in Crimea,” Catholic News Agency, March 18, 2014, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ukrainiancatholics-experiencing-total-persecution-in-crimea/; http://investigator.org.ua/news/122162/ (in Russian); http://investigator.org.ua/ news/122277/ (in Russian).

49 http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/26565233.html (in Russian); http://www.unian.net/society/958567-v-kryimu-zaderjali-svyaschennika-ugkts-i-gruppu-prihojan-iz-evpatorii.html (in Russian).

50 - http://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/v-krymu-otbirayut-hramykievskogo-patriarhata-516020.html (in Russian). 30 http://ru.krymr.com/archive/news-ru/20140701/16898/16898. html?id=25408930 (in Russian). - “Crimea: Enforced Departure of Turkish Imams; FSB Surveillance,” Forum 18 News Service, September 3, 2014, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1992 (in English).

51 http://rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/21mar2014/kapustin.html (in Russian)

52 http://www.newsru.com/russia/22apr2014/ussr.html (in Russian).

53 http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mechet-v-simferopole-zabrosali-kokteylyami-molotova-146989_.html. (in Russian).

54 “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Upends Lives of Tatar Minority,” Associated Press, December 10, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes. com/news/article/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-upends-lives-of-tatarminority/513093.html. 36 http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/04/8/7021747/(in Russian).

55 Human Rights Watch, “Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed,” March 18, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed.

56 http://investigator.org.ua/news/124075/ (in Russian).

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57 “Crimean Tatar Mejlis Raided, Searched by Police,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 16, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ crimean-tatar-mejlis-raid-police-search-avdet-simferopol/26587038. html.

58 “Russian Officials Impound Crimean Tatars’ Assembly,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 18, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/crimean-tatar-mejlis-russia-impounded/26592606.html.

59 “Crimean Tatar Leaders Banned on Crimean State TV,” Crimean News Agency, April 22, 2014, http://qha.com.ua/crimean-tatar-leadersbanned-on-crimean-state-tv-131226en.html.

60 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/79292 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews.net/read/79825 (in Russian).

61 “Protestors Warn Crimean Tatars Over ‘Extremism’ Amid Protests,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 4, 2014, http://www.rferl. org/content/ukraine-crimea-tatars-warned-extremism/25372706.html

62 http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/videogallery/ gallery?galleryId=247461056& (in Russian); “Dzhemilev’s Son Transferred in Custody from Crimea to Krasnodar,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, September 29, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ khaiser-dzhemilev-son-custody-crimea-arrest-transfer-krasnodartatar/26611103.html.

63 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80412 (in Russian)

64 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/82155 (in Russian).

65 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/82533 (in Russian);

66 http://www. blackseanews.net/read/82539 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews. net/read/82564 (in Russian).

67 Amnesty International, “Document–Ukraine: Crimean Tatar Leader Banned from Homeland,” July 9, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/ library/asset/EUR50/035/2014/en/82d8d901-6885-4bd3-81a0-e9752dbcff03/eur500352014en.html.

68 “Akhtem Chiygoz detained till Feb 19, may face 10 years in prison,” QHA, January 30, 2015, http://qha.com.ua/en/events-incidents/ akhtem-chiygoz-datained-till-feb-19-may-face-10-years-in-prison/133037/.

69 Halya Coynash, “The Law and Crimean Tatars held hostage in Russian-Occupied Crimea,” June 24, 2015, http://khpg.org/index. php?id=1434810307.

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70 Refat Chubarov, open letter to the Chancellor of Germany and Presidents of France and Ukraine, Facebook, August 22, 2015, https://www. facebook.com/dogrujol/posts/833379746757181?notif_t=like&_ft_=qid .6185919291900500971%3Amf_story_key.4173191491116904188%3 AeligibleForSeeFirstBumping. ‘

71  “Crimean court decrees seizure of Mejlis building in Simferopol for state use,” Krym Inform Information Agency, April 30, 2015, http:// www.c-inform.info/news/id/22495 (in Russian).

72  “What is in the human rights report that Erdogan handed to Putin?” QHA, June 30, 2015, http://qha.com.ua/chto-napisanov-otchete-po-pravam-cheloveka-peredannom-erdoganom-putinu-145970.html (in Russian).

73 “Report by the Turkish Monitoring Group on the situation in Crimea,” QHA, June 5, 2015, http://qha.com.ua/photo.php?id=26805 (in Russian).

74 Reporters Without Borders, “Freedom of Information in Dire Straits in Crimea,” March 7, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-freedom-ofinformation-in-dire-07-03-2014,45960.html.

75 David E. Caplan, “Masked Gunmen Seize Crimean Investigative Journalism Center,” Global Investigative Journalism Network, March 2, 2014, http://gijn.org/2014/03/02/masked-gunmen-seize-crimean-investigative-journalism-center/.

76 http://investigator.org.ua/news/120460/ (in Russian).

77 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Conflicting Sides Should Stop Targeting Media Professionals Covering Ukraine Crisis, Says OSCE Representative,” May 19, 2014, http://www.osce.org/ fom/118686; Reporters Without Borders, “Ukrainian and Russian Authorities Step Up Arrests of Journalists,” May 21, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/ ukraine-ukrainian-and-russian-authorities-21-05-2014,46320.html.

78 http://investigator.org.ua/news/127662/ (in Russian).

79 http://investigator.org.ua/news/127425/ (in Russian).

80 Reporters Without Borders, “Ukrainian and Russian Authorities Step Up Arrests of Journalists,” May 21, 2014.

81 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 5.

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82 Reporters Without Borders, “More Journalists Abducted in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea,” June 4, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-morejournalists-abducted-in-04-06-2014,46399.html.

83 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 6.

84 Ibid., p. 6.

85 Ibid., p. 6

87 The Ukrainian House Crimean Center for Business and Cultural Cooperation is an NGO engaged in educational and cultural activity. It supported the EuroMaidan, and during the 2013-2014 “Revolution of Dignity” organized pro-EuroMaidan meetings in Crimea.

88 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 17

89 Ibid., p. 17. Amnesty International, “Ukrainian Detainee Threatened with Rape,” June 24, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/ EUR50/027/2014/fr/740a7dff-12c4-4685-8e57-159c923fa4ac/eur- 500272014en.html.

90 “Moscow Court Prolongs Detention for Ukrainian Director,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 29, 2014, http://www.rferl. org/content/sentsov-crimea-terror-pretrial-detention-prolongationlefortovo/26611965.html.

92 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 4.

93 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 4.

94 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, p. 6

95 “Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea,” Human Rights Watch, November 17, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/11/17/rights-retreat/ abuses-crimea; “Crimean Authorities Move Against Tatars and Their Leader,” Euronews, April 22, 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2014/04/22/ crimean-authorities-move-against-tatars-and-their-leader/.

96 On February 26, 2014, several hours after the occupation of Crimea by Russian forces began, several thousand supporters of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis gathered in order to prevent legislators from passing separatist bills. They were opposed by

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several thousand supporters of the Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity) party. The clashes resulted in the deaths of two people. The Investigative Committee of Russia has opened an investigation. 97 On May 11, 2014, Russian law enforcement detained Oleg Sentsov, Gennadiy Afanasyev, Aleksei Chirniy, and Aleksandr Kolchenko in Simferopol and charged them with conspiring to commit terrorism. Special services said they were preparing, “as part of a terrorist organization, to detonate explosive devices at the Eternal Flame memorial on May 9, 2014, and at the Lenin monument in Simferopol on April 14 and 18, 2014.” The judge sentenced Sentsov to twenty years’ imprisonment, Kolchenko to ten years, Afanasyev to seven years, and Chirniy to seven years imprisonment, all at a maximum security prison. Shaun Walker, “Russian court jails Ukrainian film-maker for twenty years over terror offences,” Guardian, August 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/25/russiancourt-jails-ukrainian-filmmaker-oleg-sentsov-for-20-years-over-terroroffences; Ovcharuk, Bogdan, “‘The system does not forgive,’—Crimean activists hauled before a Russian military court,” August 10, 2015, https:// www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/crimean-activists-hauledbefore-a-russian-military-court/

98 Oleg Sentsov was born in 1976, Aleksandr Kolchenko in 1989, Gennadiy Afanasyev in 1990, and Aleksei Chirniy in 1981.

99 http://investigator.org.ua/news/162365/

100 On May 9, 2014, Article, 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code took effect. It forbids “Public provocation to commit acts intended to destroy the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” Part Two of the article specifically forbids the use of media including information/telecommunications to commit such offenses

101 “Former head of Crimea Ministry of Resorts: The United States and European Union have done much more than Ukraine to make Crimea a burden for Russia,” Gordon, August 25, 2015, http://gordonua.com/ news/crimea/Eks-glava-Minkurortov-Kryma-SSHA-i-ES-sdelaligorazdo-bolshe-chem-Ukraina-dlya-togo-chtoby-Krym-stal-neposilnoynoshey-dlya-Rossii—95516.html (in Russian).

102 http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50156

103 http://crimeahr.org/v-kerchi-politsiya-zaderzhala-treh-chelovek-za-foto-s-flagom-ukrainyi/

104 http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/27116105.html

105 http://www.ppu.gov.ua/operatyvna-informatsiya-3/

106 (http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/ru/census_and_researching/census/crimea_census_2014/score_2010/)

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107 Monitored by the Black Sea News and Maidan of Foreign Affairs.

108 http://www.sobytiya.info/public/14/44006 (in Russian).

109 “Zaliv Goes to Court,” Tradewinds News, September 18, 2014, http://www.tradewindsnews.com/shipsales/344853/Zaliv-goes-to-court.

110 http://www.ng.ru/economics/2014-06-26/1_pensii.html (in Russian); http://www.newsru.com/finance/25jun2014/siluanovdenegnet. html (in Russian); http://inosmi.info/cctv-moskva-vkladyvaet-v-krymmilliardy-no-ne-vidit-blagodarnosti.html. (in Russian).

111 As a result, the July 20, 2015, decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine “On the state of measures realized to protect property rights and Ukrainian state interests in connection with the temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine,” was not enacted by the President until August 26, 2015. http://www.president.gov. ua/documents/5142015-19371 (in Ukrainian).

112 http://investigator.org.ua/news/140008/

113 According to Article 235 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, nationalization (as a basis for curtailing ownership rights) legally requires making exchanges for property value and other losses as established in Article 306 of the Codex, which, in turn, stipulates that losses suffered by the owner of the nationalized property shall be compensated by the state.

114 http://www.udprf.ru/press-center/soobsch-smi/2015-03-12

115 «Transition period» is a term which is widely used by the occupying authorities in the Crimea as well as by the Russian Federation in 2014-15. It implies the shift in all spheres of life in the occupied territory to the laws and rules of the occupying country.

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