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Raising an Effective Watchdog
Conditions of Effective Anti-Corruption Agencies
Gabriel KurisDeputy DirectorCAPI
Riga, LatviaJanuary 23, 2015
My background
• Deputy Director of the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity (CAPI)– New anti-corruption research center in New York
– Partnership between Columbia Law School and the New York City Department of Investigation
- In 2012-13, researched and wrote 8 ACA case studies for Princeton University
- Based on >160 interviews in Botswana, Croatia, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Slovenia, the UK, and the US.
- Online at: www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/
- Previous work: legal reforms in Cambodia, Philippines, and the Solomon Islands.
Defining an effective ACA
Don’t expect ACA to eliminate corruption• An ACA is just one critical part of an
anti-corruption system.• Uprooting a culture of corruption is a multi-
generational, society-wide project.
We can’t judge whether an ACA causes corruption to go up or down• We can’t yet reliably measure corruption.• Progress is slow and imperceptible.• It’s hard to pinpoint the causes of progress.
Even in the “cleanest” countries, there are always corruption cases to resolve and risks to address.
Hong Kong ICAC HQ.Not built overnight.
ACA Established
Strong Capacity
Independent >Pushback!<
Watchdog
Subverted
Defanged
Disbanded
Politicized
Poor Capacity
Weak
Dead
1. Nearly all ACAs fail. Internal scandals or mismanagement Government interference Politicization
Effective ACAs survive
2. Performance indicators: Strong case stats
Cases clearedArrests madeConvictions achievedGovernment processes improvedTrainings and public education
High-profile convictions and sanctions
2. Effective ACAs excel
3. Indicators of trust High intake of
complaints High levels of polled
public confidence Professional image Good relations with
media, civil society, international partners
Effective ACAs earn public trust
Studies agree on common factors of effective ACAs
Factors Meagher
(2004)
UNDP
(2005)
OECD
(2013)
De Speville
(2010)
Recanatini
(2011)
Chêne
(2012)
Political will/
independence
Mandate
Powers/
safeguards
Capacity
Partner
institutions
Other factors
mentioned
Compact
geography,
stable economy
Prevention
& education
efforts
Special-
ization
Public
support,
endurance
Clear legal
frameworkIntegrity,
Special-
ization
Patrick Meagher, "Anti-corruption agencies: A review of experience," The IRIS Discussion Papers in Institutions and Development (2004).UNDP, Democratic Governance Practice Team, “Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: a Comparative Study” (2005).OECD, Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of Models, Second Edition (2013).Bertrand de Speville, Overcoming Corruption: The Essentials. De Speville & Associates (2010).Francesca Recanatini, “Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?” International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Vol. 2, ed. by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.Marie Chêne, “Centralised versus decentralised anti-corruption institutions,:” U4 (2012).
Five conditions of effective ACAs
Political Will & Autonomy
• Continuous
• Clear
Mandate
• Investigation
• Prevention
• Education
• (Single or multiple agencies)
Powers & Safeguards
•Sufficient
•Lawful
•Flexible
Capacity
• Strong Leadership
• Internal processes
• Ample resources
Support network
• Help from other state bodies
• External partners
Good ACAs generate own political will
• Initial trigger usually external (international pressure or domestic scandal)– Support usually shallow and short-lived.
– Unrealistic early expectations lead to disappointment.
• To sustain political will: – ACA must earn public support by showing professionalism,
impartiality, and high-profile results.
– Government must make clear no impunity, no going back.
Strategic leadership matters more than set-up
• ACAs evolve, adapt to survive.
• Luck, events, and political winds create unanticipated challenges and opportunities.
• Good ACA leaders informally reshape their own mandates and powers to find niche.
• Better to have a weak ACA with a strong leader than a strong ACA with a weak leader.
Mandate: guard dog or watchdog?
• Guard dog– enforcement powers
• Watchdog– Only investigations
• Hybrid– Some sanctions
• Multiple complementary agencies
Watchdogs bark
Guard dogs bite
Guard dogs vs. watchdogsGuard Dog ACA Watchdog ACA
Role Investigate, advise, arrest(possibly prosecute)
Investigate, advise, draw attention
Public profile High Low
Evidentiary standard High Low
Disclosure rules Strict Weak
Investigative strengths Individual culpability Systemic problems
Need for safeguards High Low
Risks - Politicization or pushback
- Competition with law enforcement
- Irrelevance, impotence- Dependence on reliable
justice system
Resource needs High Low
Examples Latvia KNAB, Croatia USKOK, Indonesia KPK, Hong Kong ICAC, NYC DOI
Slovenia CPC, U.S. Office of Govt Ethics, Ghana CHRAJ
How much power?
• Powers must match mandate
• Investigative powers:
– Subpoena, witnesses testimony, audit, search and seizure, financial investigations, arrest, undercover operations, sting operations, telecom surveillance
• Preventive powers:
– Process audits, enforce recommendations, embedded investigators, coordinate policy, financial disclosures, political finance regulation
More power more safeguards
• Judicial, legislative, and/or executive supervision
• Codes & protocols for staff (Mauritius ICAC)
• Codes & protocols for leadership (Indonesia KPK)• Independent review boards (Hong Kong ICAC)• Transparency (Indonesia KPK)Safeguards shield those who follow the rules.
Importance of support network
• If justice-sector partners unreliable, may need complementary specialized bodies (police, courts).
• If ACA can’t juggle investigation, prevention, and education, other bodies can bridge gaps.
• Media, civil society, citizens, and international partners can also provide crucial support.
• Two-way partnerships create coalitions of support that sustain political will.
Applications to KNAB
• In international context, KNAB has historically been a rare success story.
• Because ACAs evolve over time, formal structural changes may not address internal issues.
• KNAB is a powerful guard dog. Could more safeguards both regulate and protect it?
• What are KNAB’s weak spots, and can other bodies step in to fill those gaps?
